How is morality different from language?

[Nick900]

In what ways is morality different from language?

 

• It is universally preferable IF one wants to communicate effectively to use the same language.
• It is universally preferable IF one wants to make any sense that you abide by the rules of the language.
• You do not need to use the language, there are many you may choose from.
• If you use a different language, nobody will use violence against you.

 

Is morality any more binding than language, or is it just a useful convention people may or may not adopt to aid in our mutual survival?

 

Why am I asking? - Well, if it's just a convention like language, an intellectual challenge or cultural norm, I would use it if it benefitted me (e.g., to get along with others), but I wouldn't act morally if it was to my disadvantage ... making morality loses any power it once had.

 

I've read many of the "why be moral?" posts but I'm still unconvinced, perhaps a more focused comparative approach may work?

[Will Torbald]

I always try to remember that UPB says that morality is the subset that deals with enforceable behavior. Language is another subset of UPB, but it is not fair to enforce it, so it is an aesthetic behavior. What is fair to enforce is the NAP and it's derivatives of not stealing, assaulting, etc.

[Nick900]

I always try to remember that UPB says that morality is the subset that deals with enforceable behavior. Language is another subset of UPB, but it is not fair to enforce it, so it is an aesthetic behavior. What is fair to enforce is the NAP and it's derivatives of not stealing, assaulting, etc.

 

But it's only enforceable because you decide it's enforceable, likewise we decide choice of language isn't enforceable ... but it could be, if we wanted it.

 

You've made up a rule called NAP which states that if aggresses against you physically, you are allowed to use force back. But why not say, if someone speaks to you in another language, you get to enforce your language on them? - To me, the only difference is that we have culturally decided one is fair and the other is not. By your standard of UPB/NAP you can rule it immoral but it's still relative to UPB/NAP right?

[shirgall]

But it's only enforceable because you decide it's enforceable, likewise we decide choice of language isn't enforceable ... but it could be, if we wanted it.

 

You've made up a rule called NAP which states that if aggresses against you physically, you are allowed to use force back. But why not say, if someone speaks to you in another language, you get to enforce your language on them? - To me, the only difference is that we have culturally decided one is fair and the other is not. By your standard of UPB/NAP you can rule it immoral but it's still relative to UPB/NAP right?

 

The enforceability of language is direct: the responsibility for confirming that a transmitted message is understood is with the sender, therefore the sender needs to negotiate language rules, transmit the message, and verify it... all using the same medium: language.

 

The enforceability of morality is not direct: the sender teaches a moral lesson and can verify that the lesson has been understood, but following the moral lesson is the responsibility of the receiver, since they are the ones performing actions which could be judged moral or immoral and must evaluate potential actions before deciding on one.

[Will Torbald]

But it's only enforceable because you decide it's enforceable, likewise we decide choice of language isn't enforceable ... but it could be, if we wanted it.

 

You've made up a rule called NAP which states that if aggresses against you physically, you are allowed to use force back. But why not say, if someone speaks to you in another language, you get to enforce your language on them? - To me, the only difference is that we have culturally decided one is fair and the other is not. By your standard of UPB/NAP you can rule it immoral but it's still relative to UPB/NAP right?

You could enforce anything if you want. The argument, philosophical argument - not a cultural decision - is what moral principles are worth enforcing that make rational and empirical sense. What is fair isn't decided through whim, but through reason.

[EclecticIdealist]

You could enforce anything if you want. The argument, philosophical argument - not a cultural decision - is what moral principles are worth enforcing that make rational and empirical sense. What is fair isn't decided through whim, but through reason.

What is fair can only be decided through reason against a standard or ideal which is chosen on the basis of sentiment (what some might term "whim").

[Will Torbald]

What is fair can only be decided through reason against a standard or ideal which is chosen on the basis of sentiment (what some might term "whim").

 

The whim you're talking about is in another layer. I was talking about the whim of enforcers. If someone wants to decree that French is the official language of their country, they would have to enforce it. It's their whim. But if you want to say that all standars and all principles are whims, that's on another level, and I think that's the level of nihilism.

[EclecticIdealist]

The whim you're talking about is in another layer. I was talking about the whim of enforcers. If someone wants to decree that French is the official language of their country, they would have to enforce it. It's their whim. But if you want to say that all standards and all principles are whims, that's on another level, and I think that's the level of nihilism.

Nihilism isn't a level, it's a perspective or philosophical outlook.

 

Standards and Ideals are chosen based on sentiment or "whim". Principles are rationally chosen based upon the outcomes they will or are likely to create. The NAP for example, is the principle that universal non-aggression will result in a peaceful society and provide the greatest opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation in society. It is chosen due to the sentiment, "whim", or desire for such an outcome combined with the rational belief that adherence to the NAP is likely to bring about such a desire. I don't believe this is the definition or hallmark of nihilism, although it is not incompatible with nihilism.

 

The desire to enforce a particular language as the only language that may be used (in a society) will be based upon the desire for a particular result and the belief that enforcing the exclusive use of such a language will bring about such a result and that the benefits of such a result exceeds any deleterious potential consequences.

[Will Torbald]

Nihilism isn't a level, it's a perspective or philosophical outlook.

 

Standards and Ideals are chosen based on sentiment or "whim". Principles are rationally chosen based upon the outcomes they will or are likely to create. The NAP for example, is the principle that universal non-aggression will result in a peaceful society and provide the greatest opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation in society. It is chosen due to the sentiment, "whim", or desire for such an outcome combined with the rational belief that adherence to the NAP is likely to bring about such a desire. I don't believe this is the definition or hallmark of nihilism, although it is not incompatible with nihilism.

 

The desire to enforce a particular language as the only language that may be used (in a society) will be based upon the desire for a particular result and the belief that enforcing the exclusive use of such a language will bring about such a result and that the benefits of such a result exceeds any deleterious potential consequences.

UPB is the method of choosing standards without whim. It is systematic, not consequentialist. It doesn't go about enabling the whims of society, but challenges them.

[EclecticIdealist]

UPB is the method of choosing standards without whim. It is systematic, not consequentialist. It doesn't go about enabling the whims of society, but challenges them.

UPB is not a method of choosing a standards, it is a method of comparing ethical or aesthetic propositions against the standard of the UPB or democratically selected aesthetics and esthetics that are only superseded by universal private property ownership and the NAP. It is a method of determining whether the proposition conforms with this standard or not. It enables an objective and rational evaluation of the proposition, but the standard of UPB/NAP has already been chosen as a consequence of subjective "whim" or sentiment. It challenges the whims of society by virtue of the supremacy of the NAP and its corollary in the protection of private property ownership.

[Will Torbald]

UPB is not a method of choosing a standards, it is a method of comparing ethical or aesthetic propositions against the standard of the UPB or democratically selected aesthetics and esthetics that are only superseded by universal private property ownership and the NAP. It is a method of determining whether the proposition conforms with this standard or not. It enables an objective and rational evaluation of the proposition, but the standard of UPB/NAP has already been chosen as a consequence of subjective "whim" or sentiment. It challenges the whims of society by virtue of the supremacy of the NAP and its corollary in the protection of private property ownership.

It's like we read completely different books. I don't want to keep discussing this because you are unable to adhere to my previously made corrections. In the other thread you went back to calling upb preferred behavior rather than preferable, so I don't care what you think about upb anymore. Anything else is game.

[EclecticIdealist]

It's like we read completely different books. I don't want to keep discussing this because you are unable to adhere to my previously made corrections. In the other thread you went back to calling upb preferred behavior rather than preferable, so I don't care what you think about upb anymore. Anything else is game.

Indeed, it is as if we read completely different books; or rather, it is like one of us read the book, perhaps a couple of times, and the other read it many times, analyzed it, explored the logical fallacies it presented, determined what value there was in it, and then set about to share those insights with others. I find it unfortunate that you consider my analysis and difference of opinion with you (and quite probably Stefan) such heresy that you refuse to discuss it further or back up your position with logic and reason.

 

Nevertheless, I will defend my usage of the term "preferred" by citing references from Stefan's book as well as appealing to reason.

 

On pages 9 & 10 of UPB (pdf version), Stefan lays out some ground rules he will adhere to in his quest to "define a methodology for validating moral theories that is objective, consistent, clear, rational, empirical – and true." In rule 7 he refers to "the ethical instincts of mankind" and "near-universal social prohibitions". He uses the propositions that assault, rape, murder, and theft are immoral to test his framework for validity -- an empirical test of external consistency if you will. This suggests that Stefan holds the near-universal judgment of mankind or society on what is moral fairly highly.

 

But that is not all. On page 30, he states "Ethics as a discipline can be defined as any theory regarding preferable human behaviour that is universal, objective, consistent – and binding." He also states, if I tell him that it is moral for sons to obey their fathers, and immoral for them to disobey their fathers, then I am proposing a preference that is universal, rather than merely personal – I am trying to turn a 'little truth' (I want you to become a baseball player) into a 'great truth'." Thus we see that Stefan in talking about ethics is talking about preferences for behavior; not just behavior that is possible to be preferred. Stefan goes on to say, "When I speak of a universal preference, I am really defining what is objectively required, or necessary, assuming a particular goal." Again, it is quite clear that the meaning of the term "Preferable" in UPB is that of "desired or selected above or before other alternatives."

 

And yet, on page 31, Stefan begins redefining the term "universally preferable" to mean "objectively required (given a specific, desired outcome)". We must never forget that second part. If we forget that second part, we don't have the whole truth, we have a partial truth which is better than an outright lie, but is nevertheless still a falsehood. If we were to play the substitution game as Stefan has done (which I highly recommend anytime the meaning of a word seems ambiguous or in question), the title of his book goes from "Universally Preferable Behavior" to "Objectively Required (given a specific, desired outcome) Behavior". Of course, it doesn't have the same ring to it as the present title, but at least it is clearly stated. Of course, it leaves open the part about a specific, desired outcome.  Who desires the outcome? What specifically is the desired outcome? THAT is what Stefan establishes with the rest of his framework. That is where the libertarian principles get injected into his framework in such a way that for most, they become inseparable until they carefully examine it and evaluate it and seek to understand it so as to utilize it.

 

Still, on pages 35 and 36, in the discussion of those premises you cited in the other thread, Stefan goes back to using the term "universally preferable" to refer to a (near) universal preference or as I might term it that which is (nearly) universally preferred. That you take such issue with my use of the term "preferred" rather than "preferable" suggests to me that you have a different understanding or hold to a different meaning than either of the meanings that Stefan put forth in his book in the passages I have cited (one of which I consider to be problematic and completely fallacious without the implicit qualifier at the end).

 

On page 41 of his book, Stefan actually uses the term "universally preferred behavior" multiple times in his 2nd syllogistic proof of UPB. But perhaps you're really taking issue with my usage of the term "universally" in reference to the near absolute commonality of a preference? I then refer you to his 3rd syllogistic proof and more importantly, the (nearly) universally held moral prohibitions against assault, rape, murder and theft as well as the very concept of morality itself -- the rules of behavior decided by or agreed upon by the members of society which are obligatory upon all members of society (whatever the size or composition of that society happens to be).

 

Again, I'm not disputing the fact that Stefan attempted to discover or identify an universal, objectively true standard of morality. I'm simply saying he failed to do so because it is impossible to discover something that cannot exist. Objectively True Preferences don't exist, therefore, Objectively True Morality cannot exist. Arguing that it does is like arguing for the existence of dehydrated water. 

[NotDarkYet]

How is math different than language?

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

In what ways is morality different from language?

 

• It is universally preferable IF one wants to communicate effectively to use the same language.
• It is universally preferable IF one wants to make any sense that you abide by the rules of the language.
• You do not need to use the language, there are many you may choose from.
• If you use a different language, nobody will use violence against you.

 

Is morality any more binding than language, or is it just a useful convention people may or may not adopt to aid in our mutual survival?

 

Why am I asking? - Well, if it's just a convention like language, an intellectual challenge or cultural norm, I would use it if it benefitted me (e.g., to get along with others), but I wouldn't act morally if it was to my disadvantage ... making morality loses any power it once had.

 

I've read many of the "why be moral?" posts but I'm still unconvinced, perhaps a more focused comparative approach may work?

 

If you don't use meaningful language then you'll just be incomprehensible. You're not necessarily wrong. But if you violate rational ethics you will be wrong. It's better to ask "How is morality different from science?". Sure you don't need to use science in that particular realm but if you don't you'll be wrong. That's the essential difference. 

[HasMat]

Math starts with discrete observations about the granularity(divisibility, quantity) of reality and moves towards abstraction.

Language begins at abstraction, joint-attention of 2 individuals designating representations of reality (this is the creation of a fantasy), and moves towards the real. Mapping these designations more specifically to actual instances of reality.

 

I would argue that math and language are just opposing strategies to gap the divide between abstraction and reality. One is moving towards abstraction and the other towards reality, with opposite beginning points.