Does Free Will require choice?

[Archimedes]

I read the short story „Story of Your Life“ by Ted Chiang last week after watching Arrival and the story stayed with me for a while. The thread talks about small spoilers regarding the theme of the short story.

 

In the short story the protagonist ends up remembering the future and thus is not free to alter it. However, the story concludes that she has free will in that she follows through with a choice she already knows she's will make in the future. By choosing not to alter the future, she is creating it and actively affirming it. While she makes the choice to not alter the future, she also doesn't really have any choice but to go through with what she knows will happen. The author assumes that knowledge of the future would change you in a way, so you wouldn't want to change it. So basically the author says that free will exists in an deterministic universe in the form of not affecting the outcome of future events. But if you are not free to affect the future, how free can your choice to not alter that future really be? Or am I wrong in assuming choice is required for free will to exists?

[Will Torbald]

 So basically the author says that free will exists in an deterministic universe in the form of not affecting the outcome of future events. But if you are not free to affect the future, how free can your choice to not alter that future really be? Or am I wrong in assuming choice is required for free will to exists?

 

In a deterministic universe, it's the other way around. You are always affecting the outcome of future events. That's why it's deterministic in the first place. What you are doing now is affecting the future. What she can't do is to stop affecting the future, which sounds weird, but that's why she follows through with her memories of the future. In a way, deterministically, her knowledge of the future is what created the future since she was affected by the knowledge in the past which follows into the future. A bit of a loop there, but it's common in time travel stories to have recursive time.

[RichardY]

I read the short story „Story of Your Life“ by Ted Chiang last week after watching Arrival and the story stayed with me for a while. The thread talks about small spoilers regarding the theme of the short story.

 

In the short story the protagonist ends up remembering the future and thus is not free to alter it.

However, the story concludes that she has free will in that she follows through with a choice she already knows she's will make in the future.

By choosing not to alter the future, she is creating it and actively affirming it. While she makes the choice to not alter the future, she also doesn't really have any choice but to go through with what she knows will happen.

The author assumes that knowledge of the future would change you in a way, so you wouldn't want to change it.

So basically the author says that free will exists in an deterministic universe in the form of not affecting the outcome of future events.

But if you are not free to affect the future, how free can your choice to not alter that future really be? Or am I wrong in assuming choice is required for free will to exists?

 

To what point does the protagonist remember the future?

If she remembers the future she must have in some way experienced it, if so was it really the future?

I wonder to what degree the brain has to be forward thinking. I mean like receiving light from a former distance star, now extinguished or just in everyday situations. 

 

What was the choice she made?

 

So she accepts the future, progression of reality while choosing not to exert influence? Perhaps similar to atheist refuting God or maybe religion and in so doing affirming its existence.

 

If something really is the future can someone change it? Given sufficient technology is it possible to stop a star fading or reverse its death? I guess that may involve going faster than the speed of light. I wonder if the emergence of "free will" or perhaps "something different" properties of the brain allow for neurons in a way to converge to a singular point in which their collective action as an emergent property could exceed/transcend the speed of light.

 

What could be the reasoning that the future would change someone in a way that they wouldn't want to change the future? Wouldn't they  be effectively be split in two? Two identical individuals being an impossibility of inhabiting the same universe perhaps? Perhaps like a clone of a plant, but with an animal instead.

 

As long as you know the totality of existence(Future/Past?) you are not effecting it.

 

Choice would seem to be a prerequisite of freewill. Choice has limits. Within each choice, though millions+ of neurons I guess may have acted to be able to conceive of that choice. Free perhaps is a state of mind in-accordance with ethics. If you are acting out of rage, spite etc how much of that is you or the mirroring of others, however distorted.

 

When I initially looked at your post a rollercoaster loop came to mind. Then an Ankh. There would seem quite a bit to explore here. If I say freewill requires choice, which would seem that it does, what exactly does that explain?

 

 

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

I thought a similar thing upon watching the movie. It was a good narrative device but doesn't make logical sense. If one is free to change the future then the future is not determined. That's how you know determinism isn't true. Because under determinism the future is set as a matter of natural law. So it theoretically can be predicted. If it can be predicted then it can be changed. But if it can be changed then it can't have been determined. If you say the change was itself determined then it can't be predicted. 

[Archimedes]

In a deterministic universe, it's the other way around. You are always affecting the outcome of future events. That's why it's deterministic in the first place. What you are doing now is affecting the future. What she can't do is to stop affecting the future, which sounds weird, but that's why she follows through with her memories of the future. In a way, deterministically, her knowledge of the future is what created the future since she was affected by the knowledge in the past which follows into the future. A bit of a loop there, but it's common in time travel stories to have recursive time.

 

I don't understand. Does her ability to affect the future mean she has free will?

 

 

To what point does the protagonist remember the future?

If she remembers the future she must have in some way experienced it, if so was it really the future?

I wonder to what degree the brain has to be forward thinking. I mean like receiving light from a former distance star, now extinguished or just in everyday situations. 

 

In the story there are aliens who have a teleological worldview. They perceive time non-linear way. Since they perceive past present and future simultaneously, they don't really have a will but instead act in order to realize a purpose. The protagonists learns the language of aliens and the story assumes that the Sapir-Whorf-hypothesis is true, which results in the protagonist gaining awareness of future events. She never really learns to perceive the world like the aliens do, she just remembers events of the future. 

 

She then remembers that her unborn baby will die in the future. Knowing this, she goes through with having that baby. She can't change the fact that she will have a baby, nor that that child will die. However, she's still glad that she has that baby, because through her memories she started to love her and wants to experience the joyful moments she know will happen in the future.

[RichardY]

In the story there are aliens who have a teleological worldview. They perceive time non-linear way. Since they perceive past present and future simultaneously, they don't really have a will but instead act in order to realize a purpose. The protagonists learns the language of aliens and the story assumes that the Sapir-Whorf-hypothesis is true, which results in the protagonist gaining awareness of future events. She never really learns to perceive the world like the aliens do, she just remembers events of the future. 

 

She then remembers that her unborn baby will die in the future. Knowing this, she goes through with having that baby. She can't change the fact that she will have a baby, nor that that child will die. However, she's still glad that she has that baby, because through her memories she started to love her and wants to experience the joyful moments she know will happen in the future.

 

What about more mundane events like whether she should have a burger or the steak in a restaurant, I think just to mess with "destiny" people would choose to have the other if they already had one item or perhaps most people would be content to order the same stuff? I guess the language does not convey the emotive experience.

 

Makes me think of a STTNG episode "Time squared" where the Enterprise gets sucked into a wormhole and there is a duplicate Picard intent on repeating his initial actions in linear time, which ends up with The Enterprise destroyed and Picard sent back into the past.. Basically the newer Picard ends up phasering the older one. While Baby is alive do X. Solution phaser the baby, time loop ended. I mean if she doesn't have cumulative memory of previous experiences, she is in effect caught in an infinite loop. Perhaps she might wait for baby number 5 or later.

[Gloria]

I thought Predestination rather than Free Will was the Corner stone of the Protestant Reformation. I find it an impossible argument to completely resolve for either position. 

[Will Torbald]

I don't understand. Does her ability to affect the future mean she has free will?

 

Affect and change are not the same thing. Deterministically, you are affecting the world that will lead to a future series of events motivated by your actions. That is always going to occur. For free will to happen, you would have to somehow do stuff in the present that will not affect the future in any way as you choose. Suspend the laws of nature at will, become a god basically. You can't say that you are in a deterministic universe and that you chose future A over B because the past A "made you choose" future A over B. In a free will universe, things don't happen over cause and effect, but everything would have to be motivated by itself. Do you see rocks moving on their own will here?

[A4E]

 If it can be predicted then it can be changed.

Wrong, because if something or someone succeed in 'changing' the future, then whatever or whoever was trying to predict the future in the first place failed to predict that it would be 'changed' preemptively.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

Wrong, because if something or someone succeed in 'changing' the future, then whatever or whoever was trying to predict the future in the first place failed to predict that it would be 'changed' preemptively.

 

As I said, in this instance it can't then be predicted. That's because if they succeeded in predicting it would be changed then that outcome itself could be changed and so on and so on. You create a theoretically endless loop.

[A4E]

As I said, in this instance it can't then be predicted. That's because if they succeeded in predicting it would be changed then that outcome itself could be changed and so on and so on. You create a theoretically endless loop.

Ok, I understand what you are trying to say here, but I don't understand how you automatically come to a conclusion that if something is predicted, it can be changed. We predict the orbits of planets and our moon for example. That does not mean that we can just go ahead and change the orbits.

 

Now lets say that we know the orbit of a planet, but we have a mega pulse laser to change its orbit with one jolt. Then it becomes a vaaastly more complicated thing to predict the orbit. (pretty much impossible). Because we would have to factor in all things that could set off the laser. Not just any human, but perhaps some other animal would accidentally set it off as well. But it is still based on the same principles as when we predict planet orbits, (laws of the universe). And we are not really 100% predicting the orbits either though, just guessing on the most probable, and usually ending up right.

 

If the laser was locked inside a high security facility, with earthquake protection and whatnot, and there was a tedious strict routine to use the laser, then we are once again back to a high percentage chance of predicting the planets orbit.

 

This is part of the reason I can not agree with your statement.

 

 

That's how you know determinism isn't true

This is the sentence that triggered me, which is basically why I am talking to you now, since I am a free will denier.

[RichardY]

I think the issue is not to change the future, because it hasn't occurred, but to affect it. 

 

Does the glacier act on you or do you act on the glacier, which entity has the initiative.

 

Now just need "1.21 Jigawatts" of electrical power, to more aptly affect the future..... Maybe it might be possible to loop time for an individual in someway if certain factors remain unknown.

 

Whatever you deny, is generally affirmed in someway. Politicians, avoid denying things all the time, when they do, laser-sight on their forehead.  

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

Ok, I understand what you are trying to say here, but I don't understand how you automatically come to a conclusion that if something is predicted, it can be changed. We predict the orbits of planets and our moon for example. That does not mean that we can just go ahead and change the orbits.

 

Now lets say that we know the orbit of a planet, but we have a mega pulse laser to change its orbit with one jolt. Then it becomes a vaaastly more complicated thing to predict the orbit. (pretty much impossible). Because we would have to factor in all things that could set off the laser. Not just any human, but perhaps some other animal would accidentally set it off as well. But it is still based on the same principles as when we predict planet orbits, (laws of the universe). And we are not really 100% predicting the orbits either though, just guessing on the most probable, and usually ending up right.

 

If the laser was locked inside a high security facility, with earthquake protection and whatnot, and there was a tedious strict routine to use the laser, then we are once again back to a high percentage chance of predicting the planets orbit.

 

This is part of the reason I can not agree with your statement.

 

This is the sentence that triggered me, which is basically why I am talking to you now, since I am a free will denier.

 

There might be practical reasons one can't change a predicted thing but theoretically you can. We can predict lots of determined things in reality but you only need to think about it theoretically for what I'm saying to be true. 

In determinism (causal determinism - which is what most people seem to be referring to when they use the term)  the future point X is set as matter of natural law. There can be no possibility of point X being any different. Under determinism you cannot have a future point X and point Y. This would mean the future is in flux and not set.

So any such set future point can be theoretically predicted (whether it be a few atoms,  the movement of a planet or something conceptual). Let's say you have a small isolated space filled with air molecules and a super-computer to calculate where each molecule will be in 1 minute (future point X). You can predict future point X. But as soon you you calculate future point X you can now change future point X. If determinism was true then this could not logically happen. 

The only explanation is that the original prediction was wrong and failed to take into account the change made to point X. So if you then take into account that change and make a new prediction you can them change this new prediction. And so on and so on into infinity. The future point X exists in a state of flux and is not determined. So all it takes to disprove determinism is to show one non-determined event. This thought experiment shows such an event is possible. Thus determinism is disproven.

You can apply determinism to non-conscious configurations of matter/energy but not to conscious, intelligent configurations that have become aware of the determined reality itself. 

Once determinism becomes aware of determinism it's no longer determinism. 

[themortalgod]

This reminds me a lot of the Oracle's position in The Matrix. She explains to Neo that he isn't there to make the choice, he has already made it. Rather, he experiences the events of his life to understand why the choice was made. Its a strange position that sort of projects free will as being determinist while still being free. I always felt it was sort of a paradoxical house of cards from a logical point of view. 

 

Back on the more specific topic, I believe that if we were able to "see" the future in any way, shape, or form that we would inevitably change it and thus our vision of the future could never actually be accurate. Its similar to the Observer-expectancy effect, which creates cognitive bias that will alter our reaction to future events even if we already know what is going to happen and are making an active choice to do our best not to change the course of events.

 

To see the future is to change the future, which means we never actually saw the future but, rather, only a possibility that became impossible the moment we observed it.

[RichardY]

[A4E]

  the future point X is set as matter of natural law. There can be no possibility of point X being any different. Under determinism you cannot have a future point X and point Y.

 

Correct.

 

 

So any such set future point can be theoretically predicted (whether it be a few atoms,  the movement of a planet or something conceptual).

Yes, but realistically only outside of a closed system. ie if our universe is a closed system, then someone outside of our universe who is getting data about everything in it, and is unable to change anything in it, would be able to 100% predict everything that was going to happen in it. (with something more powerful than the processing 'engine' used in this universe)

 

I'm not going to say that it will be impossible for anything inside of the universe to predict things in the universe, but its going to be a spectacularly hard thing to do that's for sure.

 

 

Let's say you have a small isolated space filled with air molecules and a super-computer to calculate where each molecule will be in 1 minute (future point X). You can predict future point X. But as soon you you calculate future point X you can now change future point X.

This is exactly like saying if we figure out that 2 + 2 = 4  then we can change 2 + 2 to become 5.

 

Especially if you had added "nothing else can interact with them", which is what usually is implied when you use the word 'isolated'

 

 

If determinism was true then this could not logically happen. 

The only explanation is that the original prediction was wrong and failed to take into account the change made to point X.

Exactly. That is what I was trying to point out in my first reply. I could probably have formed my reply better to make it more clear.

 

Whoever or whatever trying to make a prediction, failed to do so.

 

 

So if you then take into account that change and make a new prediction you can them change this new prediction. And so on and so on into infinity. The future point X exists in a state of flux and is not determined. So all it takes to disprove determinism is to show one non-determined event. This thought experiment shows such an event is possible. Thus determinism is disproven.

You can apply determinism to non-conscious configurations of matter/energy but not to conscious, intelligent configurations that have become aware of the determined reality itself. 

Once determinism becomes aware of determinism it's no longer determinism.

You have not convinced me that your assessment has any leg to stand on.

[Kikker]

There might be practical reasons one can't change a predicted thing but theoretically you can. We can predict lots of determined things in reality but you only need to think about it theoretically for what I'm saying to be true. 

In determinism (causal determinism - which is what most people seem to be referring to when they use the term)  the future point X is set as matter of natural law. There can be no possibility of point X being any different. Under determinism you cannot have a future point X and point Y. This would mean the future is in flux and not set.

Determinism doesn't make it impossible for beings to observe causal relations and act accordingly. If determinism had such an attribute then an frog intercepting a fly would already disprove such an attribute, without the need to include free will or choice.

 

 

So any such set future point can be theoretically predicted (whether it be a few atoms,  the movement of a planet or something conceptual). Let's say you have a small isolated space filled with air molecules and a super-computer to calculate where each molecule will be in 1 minute (future point X). You can predict future point X. But as soon you you calculate future point X you can now change future point X. If determinism was true then this could not logically happen.

In your "thought experiment" it is irrelevant whether you predicted X or not. You cannot influence X if it is isolated from you, if it isn't isolated from you then to accurately predict the future you also need to predict yourself.

 

 

The only explanation is that the original prediction was wrong and failed to take into account the change made to point X. So if you then take into account that change and make a new prediction you can them change this new prediction. And so on and so on into infinity. The future point X exists in a state of flux and is not determined. So all it takes to disprove determinism is to show one non-determined event. This thought experiment shows such an event is possible. Thus determinism is disproven.

It isn't the only explanation. You tried to predict a closed system with 2 important elements: you and those molecules. But you only predicted the molecules. You're leaving out an element thus your prediction isn't necessarily true (or false) in a deterministic world.

 

 

You can apply determinism to non-conscious configurations of matter/energy but not to conscious, intelligent configurations that have become aware of the determined reality itself. 

Once determinism becomes aware of determinism it's no longer determinism.

In your argumentation style a missile intercepting system has become "aware of the determined reality itself" since it can predict the course of a missile and prevent that course from happening, but it could also fail leading to an "infinite loop" which switches between an intercepted missile and the original course for future point X.

[HasMat]

You might benefit from looking at entertainment modalities: watching linear stream movie vs playing a computer game.

 

In one you are a passenger on a ride, in the other you are a participant.

 

Moral culpability requires the ability to change events.

 

The degree to which a being is responsible for their own internal state (enjoying evil), is the degree to which they can be morally responsible as a passenger-hostage on a ride.

 

This same scenario happens when someone drinks alcohol. They knowingly consume something that diminishes their control over their behavior. The initial act to enter that state is its own choice. Then once their competency is diminished they have another, differing, level of responsibility.

 

These 2 thinks must be disambiguated.

 

Back to the movie passenger, the choice to enter the theater makes an unwilling hostage-passenger somewhat at fault if they enjoy it. But a movie passenger who never had the choice would not be guilty of this. Just like if someone spiked your drink with alcohol. Getting into the game wasn't voluntary, regardless of what happens next.

 

For an agent to start as a non-actor (can't cause), and then become a moral agent (connected to physical body), it must make some small volitional decision to get on that ride. It must walk into the movie theater, it must take that sip of alcohol, it must log in to that computer game.

 

If freewill has no control over its own creation/integration, as biological machine, then where it finds itself, in whatever circumstance, can be blamed elsewhere/elsewho. This doesn't mean the freewill must be the sole cause, it just must assent to the conditions/contract of its mortal birth.

 

It's like Stephen Hawking getting wheeled into the movie theater by his parents, and consenting to being taken in. That consent is enough to imbue their life with personal responsibility (assuming they have freewill once living). If they don't have choice once living and just a passenger, their consent to enter only covers their own internal response (enjoying evil/enjoying good).

 

But other than that, passengers on rides aren't at fault. Look for the operator of the Ferris Wheel if you want to blame someone.

 

Ultimately we can only be faulted for what we control, or co-sign for.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

Determinism doesn't make it impossible for beings to observe causal relations and act accordingly. If determinism had such an attribute then an frog intercepting a fly would already disprove such an attribute, without the need to include free will or choice.

 

In your "thought experiment" it is irrelevant whether you predicted X or not. You cannot influence X if it is isolated from you, if it isn't isolated from you then to accurately predict the future you also need to predict yourself.

 

It isn't the only explanation. You tried to predict a closed system with 2 important elements: you and those molecules. But you only predicted the molecules. You're leaving out an element thus your prediction isn't necessarily true (or false) in a deterministic world.

 

In your argumentation style a missile intercepting system has become "aware of the determined reality itself" since it can predict the course of a missile and prevent that course from happening, but it could also fail leading to an "infinite loop" which switches between an intercepted missile and the original course for future point X.

 

I didn't argue that determinism makes it impossible for beings to observe causal relations and act accordingly. 

 

​You're not isolated from the thought experiment. It's theoretical. I didn't try to predict two elements. Only the molecules. 

 

The missile system isn't aware. It might be better to use a non-human-programmed example as one could say the missile system is an extension of human choice. The "awareness" really goes back to the programmer and the system is just a tool. 

 

​I don't know what argumentation style means. What does that matter? It's either correct or incorrect. 

[Maorio]

I read the short story „Story of Your Life“ by Ted Chiang last week after watching Arrival and the story stayed with me for a while. The thread talks about small spoilers regarding the theme of the short story.

 

In the short story the protagonist ends up remembering the future and thus is not free to alter it. However, the story concludes that she has free will in that she follows through with a choice she already knows she's will make in the future. By choosing not to alter the future, she is creating it and actively affirming it. While she makes the choice to not alter the future, she also doesn't really have any choice but to go through with what she knows will happen. The author assumes that knowledge of the future would change you in a way, so you wouldn't want to change it. So basically the author says that free will exists in an deterministic universe in the form of not affecting the outcome of future events. But if you are not free to affect the future, how free can your choice to not alter that future really be? Or am I wrong in assuming choice is required for free will to exists?

 

one could argue that your ability to "see" the future does in fact change it (shrödingers cat) and then you go into an endless loop until the moment you move past the future you saw and turning into the past. How would this seeing the future changes it affect someone and thier ability to make decisions?

 

I remember reading somewhere that if you know all the input variables then you should be able to perfectly predict the outcome. 

 

The discussion in this  thread is the reason why most time travel movies are so wierd and contradictory. The more movies try and explain this part the stranger they become. The story writers try to come up with a very varied and interesting solution to the problem of time travel and try to make them seem plausable.

 

As to the question on if you are responsible for your actions, the way I see it and as many have written in this thread, there are two parts to an action being wrong or evil. First the act itself, second the guilty mind. Doing wrong or evil things under coercion doesn't make you responsible.

[Kikker]

I didn't argue that determinism makes it impossible for beings to observe causal relations and act accordingly. 

 

​You're not isolated from the thought experiment. It's theoretical. I didn't try to predict two elements. Only the molecules. 

 

The missile system isn't aware. It might be better to use a non-human-programmed example as one could say the missile system is an extension of human choice. The "awareness" really goes back to the programmer and the system is just a tool. 

 

​I don't know what argumentation style means. What does that matter? It's either correct or incorrect.

 

....

Your argumentation style is incorrect. Even now you're arguing that something can't be "aware" because it is an extension of human choice. Do really you need an explanation? Having children is an extension of human choice, and even if god made humans, then everything is made by god including humans. You can't have humans be aware and not aware at the same time. Also if you argue that it only applies to objects why not say that all objects can't be aware? The fact that a human made it is irrelevant.

 

And your previous argument was the same, under determinism a closed system ---> a system without any outside interference <--- would be entirely predictable if all elements are accounted for. You thought of a closed system, predicted it and then interfered with it which means it isn't a closed system. You can't have a closed and a not closed system at the same time. So I said either extend the closed system or really make the molecules a closed system by excluding your own interference.

 

 

"​You're not isolated from the thought experiment. It's theoretical."

What? This is your experiment:

 

Let's say you have a small isolated space filled with air molecules and a super-computer to calculate where each molecule will be in 1 minute (future point X). You can predict future point X. But as soon you you calculate future point X you can now change future point X. If determinism was true then this could not logically happen.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

....

Your argumentation style is incorrect. Even now you're arguing that something can't be "aware" because it is an extension of human choice. 

 

Nope. Not remotely what I said or argued. Not wasting my time debating someone who just makes up their opponent's arguments in their head. 

[Kikker]

Even now you're arguing that something can't be "aware" because it is an extension of human choice.

Nope. Not remotely what I said or argued. Not wasting my time debating someone who just makes up their opponent's arguments in their head. 

 

The missile system isn't aware. It might be better to use a non-human-programmed example as one could say the missile system is an extension of human choice. The "awareness" really goes back to the programmer

Double think right there.  

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

Even now you're arguing that something can't be "aware" because it is an extension of human choice.

Double think right there.

 

After viewing your profile I can see that you are earning a negative rating and I would assume it's this kind of obtuseness you're displaying that's causing it. I did not argue that something can't be "aware" because it is an extension of human choice. That's retarded. Simplly quoting me and repeating your claim is not an argument. That shit isn't going to fly around here. 

I argued that it might be better for you to use non-human programmed example because the missile system is just a tool of the human. Get it? How you got to "something can't be "aware" because it is an extension of human choice", I don't know. Why would I argue such a ridiculous thing given my position on free will? If you continue to insist this is my argument after I have clearly stated twice that it is not then there'll be no further discussion. 

[ofd]

So any such set future point can be theoretically predicted (whether it be a few atoms,  the movement of a planet or something conceptual). Let's say you have a small isolated space filled with air molecules and a super-computer to calculate where each molecule will be in 1 minute (future point X). You can predict future point X. But as soon you you calculate future point X you can now change future point X. If determinism was true then this could not logically happen. 

 

Causal determinism makes the claim that previous states together with the laws of nature determine the future. Computability is a special case, but not necessary for something to be determined. 

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

Causal determinism makes the claim that previous states together with the laws of nature determine the future. Computability is a special case, but not necessary for something to be determined. 

 

It has to be at least theoretically predictable. 

[ofd]

It has to be at least theoretically predictable. 

 

 

That depends. If you are an external observer, there is theoretical predicability. There are discussions if that is also the case if you are a part of the system that you try to predict.

[neeeel]

one could argue that your ability to "see" the future does in fact change it (shrödingers cat) and then you go into an endless loop until the moment you move past the future you saw and turning into the past. How would this seeing the future changes it affect someone and thier ability to make decisions?

 

I remember reading somewhere that if you know all the input variables then you should be able to perfectly predict the outcome. 

 

The discussion in this  thread is the reason why most time travel movies are so wierd and contradictory. The more movies try and explain this part the stranger they become. The story writers try to come up with a very varied and interesting solution to the problem of time travel and try to make them seem plausable.

 

As to the question on if you are responsible for your actions, the way I see it and as many have written in this thread, there are two parts to an action being wrong or evil. First the act itself, second the guilty mind. Doing wrong or evil things under coercion doesn't make you responsible.

 

Determinism would also say that "seeing the future" was also determined.

 

You might benefit from looking at entertainment modalities: watching linear stream movie vs playing a computer game.

 

In one you are a passenger on a ride, in the other you are a participant.

 

Moral culpability requires the ability to change events.

 

The degree to which a being is responsible for their own internal state (enjoying evil), is the degree to which they can be morally responsible as a passenger-hostage on a ride.

 

This same scenario happens when someone drinks alcohol. They knowingly consume something that diminishes their control over their behavior. The initial act to enter that state is its own choice. Then once their competency is diminished they have another, differing, level of responsibility.

 

These 2 thinks must be disambiguated.

 

Back to the movie passenger, the choice to enter the theater makes an unwilling hostage-passenger somewhat at fault if they enjoy it. But a movie passenger who never had the choice would not be guilty of this. Just like if someone spiked your drink with alcohol. Getting into the game wasn't voluntary, regardless of what happens next.

 

For an agent to start as a non-actor (can't cause), and then become a moral agent (connected to physical body), it must make some small volitional decision to get on that ride. It must walk into the movie theater, it must take that sip of alcohol, it must log in to that computer game.

 

If freewill has no control over its own creation/integration, as biological machine, then where it finds itself, in whatever circumstance, can be blamed elsewhere/elsewho. This doesn't mean the freewill must be the sole cause, it just must assent to the conditions/contract of its mortal birth.

 

It's like Stephen Hawking getting wheeled into the movie theater by his parents, and consenting to being taken in. That consent is enough to imbue their life with personal responsibility (assuming they have freewill once living). If they don't have choice once living and just a passenger, their consent to enter only covers their own internal response (enjoying evil/enjoying good).

 

But other than that, passengers on rides aren't at fault. Look for the operator of the Ferris Wheel if you want to blame someone.

 

Ultimately we can only be faulted for what we control, or co-sign for.

 

Its not clear what you are arguing here, but just wanted to point out that nothing in your post is an argument against determinism

[RichardY]

Willard:"Everyone gets everything he wants. I wanted a mission, and for my sins, they gave me one. Brought it up to me like room service. It was a real choice mission, and when it was over, I never wanted another."

 

 

Roxanne: Do you know why you can never step into the same river twice?

Willard: Yeah, 'cause it's always moving.

 

 

Willard:"Never get out of the boat." Absolutely goddamn right! Unless you were goin' all the way... Kurtz got off the boat. He split from the whole fuckin' program.

 

 

Kurtz:"You have to have men who are moral... and at the same time who are able to utilize their primordial instincts to kill without feeling... without passion... without judgment... without judgment! Because it's judgment that defeats us."

 

 

 

Mistah Kurtz—he dead. An Epigraph of "The Hollow Men".