The problem of evolutionarily irrelevant strong emergence

[richardbaxter]

1. We can't measure sensation (mental properties themselves). We can only measure a) the neural correlates of what we presume to be sensation or b) self-report of sensation. Our inference of sensation/sentience is based on the logical extension of our personal belief/experience of sensation to like organisms, machines, etc. but there is nothing in the known laws of the universe which define their nature/qualia (eg the redness of red) or when they emerge. I think we need to clarify this concept of "empiricism" to the audience (which is really the combination of the epistemological primacy of sense data and non-reductive physicalism). There is nothing faulty/incoherent with non-reductive physicalism, however it is critical to distinguish such from the concept of empirical observation (measurement).

2. This distinction prevents us falling prey to the kind of positivism which purports that everything accessible to us is accessible also to the empirical method. Physical is by definition (in physics) what is empirically measurable, and there is therefore a significant proportion of known (inferred) reality which is formally non-physical. Under the philosophy of "physicalism" however (which is somewhat of a misnomer according to the definition of physical), we assert that all of our experiential reality (mental properties) are mapped to physical reality (observables). There cannot be any phenomenological experience which is not grounded in nature.

3. Furthermore, this distinction prevents us from automatically assuming that materialism (non-reductive physicalism) is a satisfactory ateleological philosophy of mind. Under naturalism, a physical system evolves perfectly according to the laws of nature. Therefore, ostensibly emergent mental properties are redundant (see Jaegwon Kim on non-reductive physicalism; in particular his thesis on overdetermination). The organism (including its central nervous system) functions perfectly according to the laws of physics (be they deterministic or indeterministic) without any unnecessary strong emergent phenomenon. Strong emergent properties are qualitatively distinct from physical emergent properties (like crystals) in that they cannot be empirically observed.

Joseph Tagger: Can you prove you're self-aware?
Will Caster: That's a difficult question, Dr. Tagger. Can you prove that you are?
(Transcendence, 2014).
 
The apparently arbitrary assignment and nature of mental properties (evolutionarily irrelevant existence; our brain functions and evolves perfectly fine without them) leads most contemporary/secular philosophers of mind to argue either a) eliminativism, b) 'informationism', c) panpsychism, or d) simulation.

a) Eliminativism: that mental properties (or their perception of physical non-reducibility) are an illusion. Yet assuming that we take both our internal sentience (existence/experience) and our extrapolation of this sentience to like organisms as true (although such cannot be empirically verified), what is its basis: why does it exist? Informationism, panpsychism and simulation attempt to explain why some systems (peculiar subsets of the universe in space-time; eg human CNS, Pentium III, etc) have this apparently emergent phenomenon.

b) 'Informationism': That mental properties are the natural product of complex arrangements of matter/energy above a given threshold of complexity (sentience is just as if not more fundamental than observables; in that the universal system "knows they are coming"). Informationism assumes that mind is the inevitable outcome of the arrangement of matter/energy in sufficiently complex states. Such however requires nature to be geared towards the creation of sentience, and is as such not indistinguishable from pantheism.

c) Panpsychism: That all physical entities have (the capacity for) associated mental properties. There is no distinction between physical and mental substances, though unlike physicalism the material does not take precedence over the mental. Panpsychism asserts that consciousness is an inherent property of all particles (energy/matter) in the universe. Panpsychist models are however not without their own limitations. Apart from their animistic inelegance (hypothesising sentient rocks for instance), nothing in the laws of nature define which systems (collections of particles in space-time) should combine to form complex indivisible centres of consciousness like you or me (the Combination Problem).

d) Simulation: That the material world as experienced by us is not the underlying construct of mental existence but merely the designated method for generating its experience. Simulation (like substance/Cartesian dualism) pushes back the problem of the underlying construct/laws of mind to another universe. This philosophy of mind has elements of theism (alien gods).

3. There is also another critical although somewhat unrelated limitation in the positivist analysis. Although one can observe a consistency between nature (regulated behaviour or causality) and logic, one cannot use nature to formally derive logic. This is a circular reasoning fallacy. One must assume reason as an axiom in order to make/process our empirical observations (follow the empirical method). For this reason logic (like mathematics) is declared to comprise non-physical abstract objects.

[Goldenages]

 

The apparently arbitrary assignment and nature of mental properties (evolutionarily irrelevant existence; our brain functions and evolves perfectly fine without them) leads most contemporary/secular philosophers of mind to argue either a) eliminativism, b) 'informationism', c) panpsychism, or d) simulation.

 

 

I doubt that evolution generates anything that is evolutionarily irrelevant.

If evolution generated something evolutionarily irrelevant, that would proof evolution wrong.

And there is nothing observed, neither on plants nor animals, that is evolutionary irrelevant, even strange things such as monstrous tail feathers or birds with inability of flying etc.etc.

 

So if mental properties had no function, we would not have any.

 

The basic advantage of mental functions is, that a theory can be killed instead of the being itself.

We do not have to jump over the cliff to find out whats happening.

We can simulate the jump in our mind, and, if we simulate correctly, we keep our genes in the pool.

 

 

regards

Andi

[ofd]

I doubt that evolution generates anything that is evolutionarily irrelevant.

 

 

This is not how evolution works. You don't have to be the best, fittest, fastest to spread your genes. You only have to be faster than your competitor, more adapted and so on. If a tiger hunts three people you don't have to be an Olympic athlete to survive but you have to outrun the slowest guy.

 

In addition, being smart doesn't equal self awareness. Orang Utans score higher than chimpanzees when it comes to the mirror test though they are less smart. It makes no difference from an evolutionary standpoint if an animal is an automaton and spread its genes or if it's a self aware automaton and spread its genes. It may well be that consciousness is a fluke that serves no real purpose for spreading your genes.

[Goldenages]

 

You don't have to be the best, fittest, fastest to spread your genes. You only have to be faster than your competitor, more adapted and so on. If a tiger hunts three people you don't have to be an Olympic athlete to survive but you have to outrun the slowest guy.

 

Shure. But this was not my argument

My argument was, that evolution does not prefer qualities that have no evolutionary benefit. Having a conscious brain costs a lot of energy. If the same benefits a conscious brain provides could be achieved by an unconscious brain, there would be no consciousness on earth. Because every unconscious zombie, driven by instinct, would be more successful than us. (Politicians are not a counter-argument )

So there is a reason why evolution invested the energy in consciousness.

 

Together with consciousness comes the "I".

There is no special region in the brain where "I" is located.

"I" is a concept. Its the logical follow up of raising consciousness, that becomes aware that there must be an originator of actions.

A conscious mind without an ego is not possible.

 

regards

Andi

[richardbaxter]

Hi Goldenages,

It is important to note that mental properties are not the same as physical (empirical) consciousness. Imagine a computer with a model of self (physical consciousness). It acts like an intelligent conscious being and its CPU (brain) and speaker (mouth) inform us that it is self-aware. We can measure this model of self and how it has been encoded in the computer ("I", "HAL", etc). Yet we have a choice (or must come to some philosophical conclusion as to) whether to believe that this model of self corresponds (maps) to an internal reality, or, conversely, whether it is merely a software program telling us what it has been programmed to tell us.

 

In the case of mammalian/human evolution, I think it is very likely that physical consciousness evolved for the purpose of enhancing the species' survival (ie it is adaptive, as opposed to being a byproduct, as referenced by ofd); but this says nothing of the reality of internal existence. Mental properties are functionally and therefore evolutionarily irrelevant from a physicalist perspective. The central nervous system of homo sapiens is declared to operate according to the laws of physics, and such laws only reference physical (eg neuronal) properties. A substance dualist could argue that mental substances (and their properties) serve some biological function, but Cartesian dualism has many problems not worth examining here (eg interactionism).

Cheers,

Richard

[Kikker]

It is important to note that mental properties are not the same as physical (empirical) consciousness.

At this point i'm quite curious, what exactly are mental properties and why can't they per definition be observed?

[Goldenages]

 

Yet we have a choice (or must come to some philosophical conclusion as to) whether to believe that this model of self corresponds (maps) to an internal reality, or, conversely, whether it is merely a software program telling us what it has been programmed to tell us.

 

Til today there is no way to distinguish between both. All we can do is to watch behavior, ask questions and so on, and then conclude wether there is a conscious mind behind or not.

See Turing Test https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test

 

The only person I can be shure to have a conscious mind is - myself.

For the rest I have to assume there is, and there are good reasons to assume this, because they behave and react similar.

 

 

 

Mental properties are functionally and therefore evolutionarily irrelevant from a physicalist perspective. The central nervous system of homo sapiens is declared to operate according to the laws of physics, and such laws only reference physical (eg neuronal) properties.

 

We do not know how the data that are processed in the brain sum up to, or result in, or create, consciousness.

To use a (bad) analogy: If I have no clue about programming, and I watch the flow of 0´s and 1´s  through the cable that connect my PC with the display, I will never find out that this is, e.g., a word document, or a picture, or whatever.

 

So what scientists do is to look for certain active areas in the brain, measure signals, and they measure brain waves. What they found is that most likely consciousness is achieved when there is a consonance of brain waves.

 

That is the view onto consciousness we have - its the same view somebody has of Word or a pic who watches 0´s and 1´s flowing through a cable.

 

Just because we do not know better, there is no need for dualism or ghosts.

 

regards

Andi

[richardbaxter]

Hi Kikker;
    
Mental properties are a sentient being's internal experience of objective/physical reality (this 'stream of consciousness' will include things like the smell of a particular flower or the colour of a particular region of one's field of view). Our own mental properties by definition can be observed (sensed/felt) by us, but;
1. We have no direct access to another being/machine's mental properties (and we only have indirect access if we make some philosophical assumption about their correspondence to observables; eg physicalism).
2. Mental properties cannot be measured (empirical observation). One cannot measure or confirm the existence of one's own or another's internal experience using the empirical method. In regard to Andi's analogy, (under physicalism) our brain will encode some representation (through its neural networks) for this colour or smell, and this can be measured.

[Kikker]

Hi Kikker;

    

Mental properties are a sentient being's internal experience of objective/physical reality (this 'stream of consciousness' will include things like the smell of a particular flower or the colour of a particular region of one's field of view). Our own mental properties by definition can be observed (sensed/felt) by us, but;

1. We have no direct access to another being/machine's mental properties (and we only have indirect access if we make some philosophical assumption about their correspondence to observables; eg physicalism).

2. Mental properties cannot be measured (empirical observation). One cannot measure or confirm the existence of one's own or another's internal experience using the empirical method. In regard to Andi's analogy, (under physicalism) our brain will encode some representation (through its neural networks) for this colour or smell, and this can be measured.

If all mental properties are all internal experiences i'm confused on how empirical observations could possibly exist. To elaborate, our internal experience includes far more than sense or smell. Our sight for example is not only the light that enters our eyes, it includes perceptional knowledge on how to estimate distance and includes a memory capable of storing all relevant objects (lamp, table, tree) and recalling them in real-time. A chair doesn't actually exist in the physical world, we sense something and categorize that thing as a chair if it has certain attributes. How can you possibly measure the hight of a house when the difference between house and air is a mental property, the meter/feet you measure it in is a mental property and your sense of the instrument you're measuring with is a mental property?

[ofd]

 Because every unconscious zombie, driven by instinct, would be more successful than us.

 

That depends on how you define success. If you define in terms of biology, biomass is a good indicator. 

 

The reason for consciousness being ubiquitous in humans could be a bottleneck scenario, where a small group of self aware hominids survived a catastrophe. 

 

There is no special region in the brain where "I" is located.

 

Well, you can look for neurological damage with persons who lost the sense of 'I' or self and then compare if there are damages to specific parts of their brain. It seems that when the parietal lobe is damaged, you can lose that feeling. 

[richardbaxter]

@Kikker as you point out all human sensual experience (under naturalism) corresponds to a heavily processed reconstruction of reality (including object recognition, motion detection, categorisation etc). When the creature is in a "conscious" (aroused) state this experience is generally derivative from some external reality, but it all nonetheless corresponds to physical reality (the neuronal processing of objects, concepts, etc). Note even in our dreams/hallucinations/thoughts (internal verbalisations) one is still experiencing physical reality. It just so happens that the part of physical reality being experienced doesn't correspond to any reality outside of the organism itself.

The empirical method (measurement) doesn't need to be conducted by a sentient being (one could imagine an intelligent non-sentient machine deriving many truths about the world using the method and then stating its conclusions in a text box). This is the advantage of the method; it is entirely objective (based on its assumptions). One could argue that the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM suggests that measurement might require a sentient being however (many have). Taking its proposition of denying local realism, and then making the additional assumption that the wave function collapse occurring during measurement is caused by sentient observation. (Note this has got nothing to do with 'the observer effect'; the physical consequences of measurement on a system). Many however suggest that the wavefunction collapse during measurement is not a product of sentient observation, and suggest various alternate conditions for its collapse (for example decoherence and a spontaneous "minicollapse"). Likewise, even if sentient observation were required for measurement (and the outcome of reality itself/the collapse of the probabilistic wavefunction into a definite solution), it would be difficult to argue physicalism (given the primacy of mental reality; something akin to simulation theory). It does however solve the redundancy problem.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_locality#Copenhagen_interpretation

[Kikker]

Well, you can look for neurological damage with persons who lost the sense of 'I' or self and then compare if there are damages to specific parts of their brain. It seems that when the parietal lobe is damaged, you can lose that feeling. 

Can you point to a study on that part? Because the parietal lobe is mainly about spacial awareness, object manipulation, object recognition and language manipulation. The self doesn't really fit into those categories as far as I'm aware.

 

@Kikker as you point out all human sensual experience (under naturalism) corresponds to a heavily processed reconstruction of reality (including object recognition, motion detection, categorisation etc). When the creature is in a "conscious" (aroused) state this experience is generally derivative from some external reality, but it all nonetheless corresponds to physical reality (the neuronal processing of objects, concepts, etc). Note even in our dreams/hallucinations/thoughts (internal verbalisations) one is still experiencing physical reality. It just so happens that the part of physical reality being experienced doesn't correspond to any reality outside of the organism itself.

 

The empirical method (measurement) doesn't need to be conducted by a sentient being (one could imagine an intelligent non-sentient machine deriving many truths about the world using the method and then stating its conclusions in a text box). This is the advantage of the method; it is entirely objective (based on its assumptions). One could argue that the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM suggests that measurement might require a sentient being however (many have). Taking its proposition of denying local realism, and then making the additional assumption that the wave function collapse occurring during measurement is caused by sentient observation. (Note this has got nothing to do with 'the observer effect'; the physical consequences of measurement on a system). Many however suggest that the wavefunction collapse during measurement is not a product of sentient observation, and suggest various alternate conditions for its collapse (for example decoherence and a spontaneous "minicollapse"). Likewise, even if sentient observation were required for measurement (and the outcome of reality itself/the collapse of the probabilistic wavefunction into a definite solution), it would be difficult to argue physicalism (given the primacy of mental reality; something akin to simulation theory). It does however solve the redundancy problem.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_locality#Copenhagen_interpretation

If a non-sentient machine is able to use the scientific method then it uses mental properties which are categorically immeasurable so we don't know whether it's conclusions are scientific or not, or it uses a measurable method which has the same results as mental properties which heavily suggests that mental properties aren't immeasurable.

 

The point I'm trying to make is that if mental properties are immeasurable and all things are understood through mental properties we would always need to assume that mental properties definitely contain information about the real world without ever knowing for sure. This leads to a situation where every observation someone makes can be both empirical as well as not-empirical and can't ever be certain. Empirical evidence is thus redefined as a probability (instead of an absolute truth) with the assumption that the world we observe is real. If mental properties can be observed it is accessible for empirical method since the empirical method only needs to estimate it's working based on observations. If mental properties are categorically inaccessible to the empirical method even though the empirical method is based in estimates then any observation we make has an equal chance of being true as well as false meaning it's impossible to measure for example a house.

[ofd]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_basis_of_selfis where I got the info from. There are some case studies where a person changes the personality after specific parts of the brain are damaged.

 

The point I'm trying to make is that if mental properties are immeasurable and all things are understood through mental properties we would always need to assume that mental properties definitely contain information about the real world without ever knowing for sure.

 

That's a fascinating idea, but I would put it differently. Mental properties aren't meant to be a true information of the world, they are meant to be a good enough representation that makes it possible that the genes can be passed. 

The function of an eye and the visual cortex is to make future eyes possible by passing on genes, not to give an exact representation of the world. Natural selection hence came up with different represenations of the reality for different kinds of animals. A bird of prey sees the world differently than a mouse. Both are adapted to their enviroment.

There are simple tests to check if your eyes give you a real picture of the world or not. 

 

See more at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saccade

[RichardY]

The apparently arbitrary assignment and nature of mental properties (evolutionarily irrelevant existence; our brain functions and evolves perfectly fine without them) leads most contemporary/secular philosophers of mind to argue either a) eliminativism, b) 'informationism', c) panpsychism, or d) simulation.

 

Strong Emergence or Weak Emergence? If Weak Emergence is accepted then reality can be defined? If Strong Emergence is accepted, existence is affirmed? Reality takes precedence over the totality of existence?

 

a) Eliminativism: Mental Phenomenon not mirroring existence, colour cells in eyes, limits to resolution, Facial Recognition. Kant's Special Faculty?

 

b) 'Informationism': Like the Movie Solaris?

c) Panpsychism: Like Golems?

d) Simulation: Another universe or other dimensions? So basically like the Movie The Matrix or series Deep Space Nine (Wormhole Aliens)   Wouldn't this theory support Strong Emergence in distinction to the other two? Could this also be compatible with the many worlds hypothesis?

 

Which do you think is the truth? Maybe they all are. Or perhaps there is another theory?

 

 

Regards

RichardY

 

------------------------------------------------

 

 

The "I", affirming the EGO? Is it possible to have multiple consciousnesses? In which case which one is you? You have only one mouth..... but I wonder, if someone could reliably hold a conversation in sign language with 2 people simultaneously or perhaps another activity? Be simultaneously proceeding along 2 trains of thought, would this in fact cause someone to become unconscious? Perhaps a similar process occurs in dreaming?

 

If the singular conscious is to be affirmed what about it is affirmed?

 

Conversely some seek to negate the EGO, in search of "Enlightenment".

 

Perhaps some practical mental faculty benefit could be deduced somehow from the discussion? Perhaps some on going process?

[Goldenages]

 

It seems that when the parietal lobe is damaged, you can lose that feeling.

 

Yes, because the unity of the brain is destroyed.

 

 

 

 The point I'm trying to make is that if mental properties are immeasurable and all things are understood through mental properties we would always need to assume that mental properties definitely contain information about the real world without ever knowing for sure.

 

We do not need to measure mental properties in order to assume they contain information about the real world.

We just had to measure mental properties in order to understand how the brain works.

 

 

I do not need to understand the 0´s and 1´s in the cable just to view a pic on the monitor.

Nevertheless I can know wether this pic shows an aspect of reality or not.

 

In the second case, someone else knows how to build a monitor that translates the 0´s and 1´s into a pic.

In the first case, evolution provided some fancy equipment that produces consciousness.

And if this equipment fosters survival, it is a valid theory about the world.

 

regards

Andi

[Kikker]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_basis_of_selfis where I got the info from. There are some case studies where a person changes the personality after specific parts of the brain are damaged.

 

That's a fascinating idea, but I would put it differently. Mental properties aren't meant to be a true information of the world, they are meant to be a good enough representation that makes it possible that the genes can be passed. 

 

The function of an eye and the visual cortex is to make future eyes possible by passing on genes, not to give an exact representation of the world. Natural selection hence came up with different represenations of the reality for different kinds of animals. A bird of prey sees the world differently than a mouse. Both are adapted to their enviroment.

 

There are simple tests to check if your eyes give you a real picture of the world or not. 

 

See more at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saccade

Yes, I read through the study and the role of the parietal cortex doesn't seem to be very well understood except for the literal self-image we have, since we already know that both seeing and imagining something requires the parietal cortex.

 

I worked under the assumption of mental properties to show how his proposed view contradicts itself, without the need for counter-evidence from the real world on how evolution works or how we can to some extend measure brain functions, even simulate them (blue brain project can simulate parts of a rat brain). I find there is little reason to believe that it is impossible to understand our brains inner workings. Our inability to simulate a human brain for example is more of a computational challenge than a inability to unravel the workings of our neurons.

And if this equipment fosters survival, it is a valid theory about the world.

The point wasn't that you can't know whether any of the mental properties contain information about the real world. It was that you never know what is and what isn't from the real world except by probability estimates.

[richardbaxter]

If a non-sentient machine is able to use the scientific method then it uses mental properties..

 

Can you please explain your basis for this? The scientific method requires empirical measurement and such measurement has no access to mental properties (it therefore cannot use them per say). Measurement only has access to physical properties (eg the state of a particle, neuron, etc). Under physicalism such physical properties are assumed to correspond to mental properties - however one would struggle to find a neuroscientist (speculating about philosophy) who adopts reductive physicalism (a 1 to 1 correspondence between mental and physical properties) based on how information is distributed across neural networks. Most physicalists uphold non-reductive physicalism; specifically the thesis of supervenience (that there cannot be a change in a substance's mental properties without a corresponding change in its physical properties), or attempt some form of eliminativism. Under the peculiar form of the Copenhagen Interpretation discussed, measurement requires mental properties but it does not use them per say (it still has no access to them).

[richardbaxter]

The point I'm trying to make is that if mental properties are immeasurable and all things are understood through mental properties we would always need to assume that mental properties definitely contain information about the real world without ever knowing for sure..

This is correct. Not only is the empirical method inherently probabilistic (one can only conduct an experiment so many times to rule out anomalies; hence its determination of p values against a null hypothesis), but it is based on philosophical assumptions which are inherently unprovable (ie axioms). More generally, these include the validity of logic, the existence of self, the validity of mental properties to capture/experience a "real" (objective/physical) world etc.

 

The empirical method is based on an assumption of causality in the measured system; it was not designed to vindicate philosophers of the existence of a causal relationship between their personal experience of reality and reality itself. In fact, this relationship will vary heavily due to subjective biases (psychophysics). One does therefore not conduct experiments using subjective measurements (unless the underlying construct is difficult to measure otherwise; eg in psychology, in which case any differences between experimenter ratings must be considered systematics to be partialled out).

 

To quote the Lady Jessica from the Children of Dune; "All proofs inevitably lead to propositions which have no proof! All things are known because we want to believe in them!"

 

[ofd]

Under the peculiar form of the Copenhagen Interpretation discussed, measurement requires mental properties but it does not use them per say (it still has no access to them). 

 

How is that relevant to mental states and neurology?

 

Also, you don't need to understand the exact nature of mental properties to make statements about them. If you imagine a brain as a Turing machine, you can make statements about mental properties, other behaviour, limitations and so on. 

 

hence its determination of p values against a null hypothesis

 

This is a popular misunderstanding. You don't test the p values of a hypothesis, but that of the null hypothesis. If the p value of the null hypothesis is below 0,02 either the null hypothesis is false and the hypothesis is correct or a an extreme rare event happened. 

[Goldenages]

 

The point wasn't that you can't know whether any of the mental properties contain information about the real world. It was that you never know what is and what isn't from the real world except by probability estimates.

 

Hm,I still do not understand this

Mental properties do contain information about the real world. The brain ist designed to constantly make theories about the world, some are correct, some are wrong, some are helpful, some misleading, some are conscious, some subconscious.

There is no way for any mind to watch the world without making theories, without interpretation.

What should be the meaning of watching reality without interpreting it?

That´s what a mirror does.

I mean thats what it is all about: Watch reality, make theories (assumptions), and act.

 

 

The fact that our eyes interpret a certain wavelength of the electromagnetic spectrum as "red" is a theory about the world. It is helpful to distinguish between a ripe fruit with much sugar and an unripe fruit with less sugar. Despite the fact that there is no "red" outside our brains (our mental properties) this theory is helpful and dramatically pushed evolution of primates. It definitely contains information about the real world.

Evolution selects our brains since millions of years, erasing those with wrong and not helpful theories, supporting those with correct and helpful ones.

Why should we assume that our mental properties do not contain information about the real world?

 

Or maybe I miss your point completely

 

regards

Andi

[Goldenages]

 

The empirical method is based on an assumption of causality in the measured system; it was not designed to vindicate philosophers of the existence of a causal relationship between their personal experience of reality and reality itself. In fact, this relationship will vary heavily due to subjective biases (psychophysics). One does therefore not conduct experiments using subjective measurements

 

Well, same argument in different words: Evolution is an empirical process. And there is a causality between reality and the experience of reality in form of mental properties - the latter formed by evolution.

The causality is, the better reality is represented, the more success.

 

regards

Andi

[richardbaxter]

How is that relevant to mental states and neurology?

I don't understand this, the validity of local realism and the preconditions of measurement are directly relevant to content which has previously been discussed, and the focus of the discussion is not mental states or neurology.

 

Also, you don't need to understand the exact nature of mental properties to make statements about them.

One can make objective statements about mental properties based on the assumption of their correspondence to physical properties (but this has little to do with empirical measurement). Obviously, one does not need to understand the brain as a Turing machine to make statements about mental properties. A Turing machine is just a model of AI; it needn't have any associated mental properties.

 

This is a popular misunderstanding. You don't test the p values of a hypothesis, but that of the null hypothesis.

I think you may have misinterpreted the word "against"; granted it is ambiguous - the p values refer to the null hypothesis. In fact one would have to be pretty confused upon encountering a series of significant low p values and non-significant high p values to think otherwise.

 

Well, same argument in different words: Evolution is an empirical process. And there is a causality between reality and the experience of reality in form of mental properties - the latter formed by evolution.

The causality is, the better reality is represented, the more success.

Andi, I completely agree this; under the assumption of the existence of mental properties and their correspondence to physical properties. If an internal mental reality exists and has a relationship to the actions of the organism, then we would expect this internal reality to accurately represent external reality in a successful species.

[richardbaxter]

@Kikker; note in the case of psychophysics (eg rate how hot your foot feels on a scale of 1 to 10, is the horizontal rod longer than the vertical rod, rate how green the apple is, etc) one is not empirically measuring mental properties, one is measuring self-report (beliefs/conceptions) of mental properties. Under physicalism, the creature has evolved to believe in and value mental properties (the existence of "itself" as an observer/sentient being), but the reality of this encoded belief is irrelevant to its evolution - it only need be adaptive or otherwise a byproduct of related physical processes. a) One could say that the individual participants of the experiment are "measuring" (or classifying) their mental properties under the assumption of a correspondence between mental and physical reality. b) Likewise, one could say that the experiment is "measuring" mental properties under the assumption of a correspondence between the mental and physical reality of the participants. c) Furthermore, one could say that the experiment is "measuring" the participants' internal experience of this (non-empirical) "measurement" process (a) under the assumption of a correspondence between the mental and physical reality of the participants. But in none of these cases has empirical measurement of mental properties occurred. The only thing which has been empirically measured is self-reported beliefs of an organism.

 

An example of empirical measurement is a system that detects and counts the number of specific objects moving across a specific region in space-time. One could employ either machines or humans to do this task (both will be imperfect at the task, and must be calibrated/taught accordingly). But at no time is one empirically measuring mental properties. Likewise, one could obtain/measure self-reported experiences and propose a direct correspondence between what is seen (eg specific colour of a specific region in their field of view) and what can be independently verified (eg specific neurons being fired), but this is not an empirical hypothesis. It cannot be denied by observation and the prerequisite of empirical science is that one can at least in theory devise an experiment which would demonstrate the hypothesis to be false. Even if one conducted the analysis on themselves (took as true their own self-reported experience) no one else could independently verify it. Yet just because a proposition cannot be empirically verified, it doesn't make it a bad assumption. Such assumptions are necessary for things as simple as respectful communication (and others like logic are necessary for any form of communication).

[richardbaxter]

Regarding "physical consciousness" ("a computer with a model of self"), as applied to a human being. A model of self may well have a survival advantage. One could imagine a skynet with a model of self versus a skynet without a model of self. The skynet with a model of self is going to have a higher probability of wanting to protect its circuits because it believes in more than just its circuits; it believes in the existence of "itself" as a non-physical being. Whether or not that self actually exists is irrelevant; it is another question entirely.

[Goldenages]

 

Whether or not that self actually exists is irrelevant; it is another question entirely.

 

Assuming that physical properties correspond to or create mental properties, our self exists as real as the 0´s and 1´s exists that encode a pic.

(Our mind exists anyway. If our mind did not exist, we would not be able to talk about it. First, we would not have any means to talk. And second, there would be no topic to talk about).

 

Just by the way: Many people find it offending or insulting that our mind, i.e. the essence of man, should "only" be some kind of fancy electricity. Many would prefer that there should be more to it, some divine spark or similar, in any case something mysterious and out of this world.

 

I do hold the contrary conviction.

 

Its the same - wrong - idea that prefers mystic, religion and superstition to reason and evidence. People fall on their knees when somebody talks about gods who send their sons so that we can crucify them, or are ecstatic when Buddha teaches complicated ways on how to escape the world (any jump from a skyscraper will do that).

 

But the very same people take all the man-made wonders that surround us for granted. From the full fridge to cars and airplanes that bring us to any point on earth, from modern medicine to central heating and computers who make it possible to chat from continent to continent.

They call it "materialism" and mean it in derogatory way.

 

Everbody knows, and many worship the pope, whose ideas hinder and endanger civilisation for centuries.

Nobody even knows the name of those geniuses who designed the first silicon chip.

 

What this means, is, that people worship those who want to keep their minds in a cage, and despise those who use their minds in order to build a civilisation.

 

So if the up to date science is correct, there is nothing divine, nothing supernatural in our minds.

They are completely "materialistic".

Therefore we should consider ourselves lucky, because our minds are not created by the whims of a god, but are a product of empiricism.

 

regards

Andi

[richardbaxter]

Cheers Andi - I meant that the question is irrelevant with respect to the evolution (survival) of the system. As you point out, if there is such a correspondence between mental and physical properties (as most contemporaries would agree on), it is extremely philosophically relevant.

 

This is why philosophers debate the preconditions for strong emergence; when does it occur. Do mental properties just magically get assigned to complex carbon organisms in some primordial garden (as David Chalmers asks pointedly in his paper "panpsychism and protopanpsychism"), or is there a fundamental but presently unknown relationship between their apparent emergence and the underlying physical system (b, c, d). Perhaps we should start to question the existence of mental properties given their empirical irrelevance (a), etc.

[Kikker]

On 14-4-2017 at 3:05 PM, richardbaxter said:

On 11-4-2017 at 9:29 PM, Kikker said:

If a non-sentient machine is able to use the scientific method then it uses mental properties..

 

Can you please explain your basis for this? The scientific method requires empirical measurement and such measurement has no access to mental properties (it therefore cannot use them per say). Measurement only has access to physical properties (eg the state of a particle, neuron, etc). Under physicalism such physical properties are assumed to correspond to mental properties - however one would struggle to find a neuroscientist (speculating about philosophy) who adopts reductive physicalism (a 1 to 1 correspondence between mental and physical properties) based on how information is distributed across neural networks. Most physicalists uphold non-reductive physicalism; specifically the thesis of supervenience (that there cannot be a change in a substance's mental properties without a corresponding change in its physical properties), or attempt some form of eliminativism. Under the peculiar form of the Copenhagen Interpretation discussed, measurement requires mental properties but it does not use them per say (it still has no access to them).

You quote just half a sentence, which was a or statement. I'm not sure what I need to explain since you don't address the second part of the sentence.

On 14-4-2017 at 3:49 PM, richardbaxter said:

 

This is correct. Not only is the empirical method inherently probabilistic (one can only conduct an experiment so many times to rule out anomalies; hence its determination of p values against a null hypothesis), but it is based on philosophical assumptions which are inherently unprovable (ie axioms). More generally, these include the validity of logic, the existence of self, the validity of mental properties to capture/experience a "real" (objective/physical) world etc.

 

The empirical method is based on an assumption of causality in the measured system; it was not designed to vindicate philosophers of the existence of a causal relationship between their personal experience of reality and reality itself. In fact, this relationship will vary heavily due to subjective biases (psychophysics). One does therefore not conduct experiments using subjective measurements (unless the underlying construct is difficult to measure otherwise; eg in psychology, in which case any differences between experimenter ratings must be considered systematics to be partialled out).

 

To quote the Lady Jessica from the Children of Dune; "All proofs inevitably lead to propositions which have no proof! All things are known because we want to believe in them!"

 

 

On 15-4-2017 at 6:43 AM, richardbaxter said:

@Kikker; note in the case of psychophysics (eg rate how hot your foot feels on a scale of 1 to 10, is the horizontal rod longer than the vertical rod, rate how green the apple is, etc) one is not empirically measuring mental properties, one is measuring self-report (beliefs/conceptions) of mental properties. Under physicalism, the creature has evolved to believe in and value mental properties (the existence of "itself" as an observer/sentient being), but the reality of this encoded belief is irrelevant to its evolution - it only need be adaptive or otherwise a byproduct of related physical processes. a) One could say that the individual participants of the experiment are "measuring" (or classifying) their mental properties under the assumption of a correspondence between mental and physical reality. b) Likewise, one could say that the experiment is "measuring" mental properties under the assumption of a correspondence between the mental and physical reality of the participants. c) Furthermore, one could say that the experiment is "measuring" the participants' internal experience of this (non-empirical) "measurement" process (a) under the assumption of a correspondence between the mental and physical reality of the participants. But in none of these cases has empirical measurement of mental properties occurred. The only thing which has been empirically measured is self-reported beliefs of an organism.

 

An example of empirical measurement is a system that detects and counts the number of specific objects moving across a specific region in space-time. One could employ either machines or humans to do this task (both will be imperfect at the task, and must be calibrated/taught accordingly). But at no time is one empirically measuring mental properties.

It seems that in these two posts a argument of mine got refuted by you without me knowing or you misunderstood it, it was about a house being unmeasurable. I was under the assumption that mental properties correspond to brain functionality or (if you refuse that connection) at least mental ability. Meaning everything is measured in mental properties. To take your example of counting the number of specific objects moving across a specific region in space-time; counting is a mental property. The specific object has a definition to differentiate between the specific object and any other thing, object recognition is a mental property. Movement is also only recognized through mental properties. All empirical measurements depend on mental properties to measure it in. Even an action like writing your observations down on paper needs mental properties to first store those observations when observing and then mental properties to retrieve that information to write it down. Mental properties aren't limited to subjective observations, objective observations are also depended on mental properties.

If mental properties aren't brain functionalities what are they? and how do you differentiate between a mental property and brain functionality?

 

Quote

Likewise, one could obtain/measure self-reported experiences and propose a direct correspondence between what is seen (eg specific colour of a specific region in their field of view) and what can be independently verified (eg specific neurons being fired), but this is not an empirical hypothesis. It cannot be denied by observation and the prerequisite of empirical science is that one can at least in theory devise an experiment which would demonstrate the hypothesis to be false. Even if one conducted the analysis on themselves (took as true their own self-reported experience) no one else could independently verify it. Yet just because a proposition cannot be empirically verified, it doesn't make it a bad assumption. Such assumptions are necessary for things as simple as respectful communication (and others like logic are necessary for any form of communication).

You seem to misunderstand hypotheses, they are assumptions with reasonable probability (because of previous observation) which need to be tested in an experiment. So if your hypothesis is that self-reported experiences about the color someone is seeing correspond with a distinct neurological patterns you can test that. Maybe take multiple test subjects let them self-report the colors they're seeing and measure the neurological effect then make an estimate if any correspondence you see is improbable enough with a no-correspondence (null case) assumption to make your hypothesis more probable.

[Goldenages]

On 15.4.2017 at 3:20 PM, richardbaxter said:

I meant that the question (rmk: wether the self or qualia exists) is irrelevant with respect to the evolution (survival) of the system.

I do not think so.  Instinct driven animals behave like automats that react in a very predictable way to inputs. The concept of "ego" not only allows for an endless variety of behaviour, but also for the ultimate motivation: The fear of an individual being extinguished. So the qualia, the inner landscape, the self, the ego, the soul, whatever name we may use, is definitely an evolutionary advantage. To skip this and wonder why there is a strong emergence of mental properties is like doing research on the art of flying and exclude the wings.

 

The instinctive (subconscious) knowledge of our (and an animals) brain is overwhelming. Every dog who jumps and catches a ball in midair has perfect - subconcious - knowledge of Newton´s laws of motion. We could not even walk if our brain did not have the - subconcious - knowledge of uncounted ancestors back to the first fish who crawled out of  water.

But it took several thousand years of human history til the conscious mind of Isaac Newton brought the laws of motion into consciousness and to paper. And since this ~350 years the world has accelerated and changed far more rapidly than it did for the last 20.000 years.

A conscious ego is the mightiest tool on earth.

 

regards

Andi

[Erwin]

It seems to me that the arguments proposed here assume that the concept of self does not already exist.

Perhaps we should defined what we mean by the concept of self?

A programming analogy has already been provided. To follow through this analogy, the majority of large-scale applications are developed with an object-oriented paradigm (OOP).

What OOP means is simply that the software relies on concepts being represented as objects of some kind. For example, assume that "Application" is an object:

app = Application()

app.name = 'My Application'

app.description = 'Performs magic'

app.price = '$50'

Isn't "app" the concept of self in this case?

[ofd]

 

Quote

I don't understand this, the validity of local realism and the preconditions of measurement are directly relevant to content which has previously been discussed, and the focus of the discussion is not mental states or neurology.

Are neurons in a state of coherence or decoherence?

 

Quote

One could argue that the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM suggests that measurement might require a sentient being however (many have).

This is the Deepak Chokra interpretation of Copenhagen.

[richardbaxter]

Goldenages - what we are debating here is the fundamental point of the argument. From a scientific perspective, the only thing that is relevant to the evolution of living systems are entities which can be measured using the empirical method. If the physical (natural) laws are deduced(/inferred by induction) based on these empirically observable properties, then there is no reason to assume the existence of any other phenomenon (non-observable properties; ie mental properties) as necessary for these processes to occur. Thus the amazing physical process (neural network processing/program) known as "physical consciousness" which enables the organism to survive in increasingly complex and threatening environments bears no weight on the existence of empirically non-observable properties (mental properties), and therefore their relevance to its evolution.

Under the assumption of physicalism (a common type of substance monism) some substances pertaining to living systems (which for the purposes of the argument I will add are arbitrarily delineated subsets of space-time) have both physical and mental properties, and so one could declare the mental properties relevant to the degree that they are associated with particular parts of these natural systems that are known to evolve (which for the purposes of the argument I will add are also arbitrarily delineated subsets of space-time; neural architectures). This apparent arbitrary delineation of these apparent (under the assumption of physicalism) emergent properties makes philosophers ask what defines such delineation and the preconditions for mental existence. Is it perhaps information (b) - the fact that certain parts of the physical universe are highly complex and process a lot of information? Etc. To put it another way, there is no functional difference between AI that are programmed to have a self but don't and AI that are programmed to have a self but do (where their programs are identical).

The "conscious ego" may be described in a specific scientific literature, corresponding to a precisely defined empirical construct (such as a tendency for the humanoid organism to exhibit the behavioural symptoms of self-awareness, volition etc). It may even refer to an internal philosophical consciousness, under the assumption of a correspondence between physical and mental properties as is commonly the case in post-behaviourist eg cognitive psychology (assumes that internal consciousness/experience is an emergent property of information processing in the brain). The existence of philosophical consciousness (mental properties) is however outside the scope of science to defend. We might use the empirical method to discover very similar living systems to ourselves (singular) which exhibit very similar patterns of information processing, and philosophically deduce that these probably also exhibit mental properties, but the question is ultimately irresolvable (at this stage of our understanding of the universe; within the current paradigm).

[richardbaxter]

Ofd -  Decoherence depends on the environmental exposure of the quantum system (reduction of the probability of encountering inadvertently measured phenomenon or particles interacting with such inadvertently measured phenomenon). The level of decoherence experienced by a particle upon measurement will depend on the degree of information gained with respect to its momentum/position and the degree to which they constrain its possible pathways. For example, relative to the position and width of two slits through which the wavefunction must pass; if the measured position/momentum of the "particle" enables the experiment (or experimental measuring device <- undefined) to eliminate the possibility of the particle travelling through one of those slits, then it will be considered to have decohered. But if there still exists uncertainty in this question, the level of decoherence experienced by the "particle" during the measurement will be a function of this uncertainty. With no decoherence due to measurement (ie a complete failure of measurement) or external/environmental interference, the "particle" will behave according to its wave properties and proceed to pass through both slits simultaneously before interfering constructively/destructively with itself and collapsing to a definite state (at some other experimental measuring device such as a photodetector). The position at which it will be measured can be estimated statistically based on the probability wave function. For classical (large) phenomena like neurons, although they do interfere with each other, the level of decoherence observable by existent measuring devices is negligible. But this does not avert the problem of what causes the minicollapse (to a definite rather than a probabilistic state; even if that state were almost so certain to be definite).

We all know that if some random guy aligns to a perspective it doesn't make it their perspective. If one looks at the founders of quantum theory; they were all discussing this possibility (the role of the conscious observer in measurement) back to the days of Schrodinger's cat. The problem is that nothing within the Copenhagen interpretation defines what collapses the wavefunction in its totality (irrespective of decoherence; such final collapse being coined "minicollapse" in the context of decoherence). It is also the reason why many physicists (speculating about philosophy) take seriously apparently less intuitive QM interpretations (like Everett's many worlds). Furthermore, it is a reason why some were keen to bring back a deterministic interpretation (De Broglie-Bohm). It is an example of a philosophical anomaly.

[Goldenages]

8 hours ago, richardbaxter said:

From a scientific perspective, the only thing that is relevant to the evolution of living systems are entities which can be measured using the empirical method. If the physical (natural) laws are deduced(/inferred by induction) based on these empirically observable properties, then there is no reason to assume the existence of any other phenomenon (non-observable properties; ie mental properties) as necessary for these processes to occur.

 

Well, its easily possible that I did not dig deep enough into this topic and therefore can not see the problem.

Yes for shure we can not measure our internal self - because it already is the measurement, formatted by our brains. What we indeed can measure are the basic informations who somehow merge for consciousness. We can measure brain waves. We can stimulate certain regions of the brain to create specific sensations. We can create the wavelength that everyboy will sense (or measure) as "red". We can make specific sounds that everbody will sense or measure correctly and therefore understands.  Science works on artificial eyes to help people who are blind. Apple works on a system to "write" just with thoughts.

So what we do not know is how the brain does that, and we can not proof that another brain is capable of doing that.  But lets go back to the analogy with the 0´s and 1´s: Lets assume you sit in front of the screen and are the only one who can see it. (i.e. you are the only person who knows for shure that you are conscious). If I can write the program for a circle I do not have to watch the screen to be shure that a circle appears. Likewise, if I measure all information of a brain that I can get I have good reason to assume that this brain is conscious.

The fact that we do not know how it works only tells us that we do not know how it works, and nothing more. Another analogy: There are billions of people on earth, compared to that only a few know how to produce a cell phone. Now lets assume some weird virus killed all those people. So nobody knows any more how a cell phone works. Now would we assume that cell phones and all the phenomenons they create are not relevant any longer? Would we assume, now that we do not know any longer how it works, that it is a kind of magic if I dial a number and can speak to somebody miles away? Of course not. We know this phenomena are there, and we would like to find out (again) how to reproduce them. So it does not make much sense to me to say, well, we can not measure consciousness, and we do not understand it, so lets say it is not relevant.

 

The question wether consciousness is inevitable or just casually is vital for all evolutionary questions. Are legs inevitable? Eyes? Wings? Is an information center who stores information and steers actions inevitable? Is consciousness inevitable? All this (and who knows what else?) is possible, and if the environment demands for it, and there is enough time, I would say this all is inevitable. If we could only find out what is all possible

 

regards

Andi

 

 

 

 

[richardbaxter]

Hi Andi - I agree with a lot of what you are saying here. The problem of not knowing 'how it works' is equivalent to raising explanations for why it appears to work the way it does under the assumption of naturalistic mind (at least a-c).

The issue however with equating strong emergent phenomena (mental properties) with weak emergent phenomena (like wings, crystals, neurons) is that weak emergent phenomena are reducible to the physical construct. Only with a platonic outlook does one even believe that wings exist, as something more than ("over and above") the underlying physical system. With enough computational resources one could simulate the emergence of wings from the laws of physics and some initial conditions.

Yet regardless of their platonic/nominalistic outlook, there is a qualitative difference between a network of neurons firing and one's sensation of lavender. Even with enough computational resources, one will not necessarily be able to simulate the emergence of the sensation of lavender from the laws of physics and some initial conditions (it depends on the preconditions of such emergence). This is why philosophers don't take for granted that the 'how it works' explanation will belong to the same category of explanations (weak emergence) that derive atoms from subatomic particles, molecules from atoms, life from molecules, complex life from living cells, computers from complex life, and self-referential computers from their less intelligent or adaptive predecessors. Weak emergent systems may be supervenient on their substrate but this does not imply that every supervenient system (like naturalistic mind) is weakly emergent.

The question of whether the emergent property of wings exist, or the emergent property of a self-referential computer exists is relevant to evolution, but the question of whether the machine (organism) is self-aware is not.

I agree that if we could find out what were possible within the constraints of nature we could know what were inevitable - but the problem is that we do not know what is possible. We don't know the preconditions; as you point out we can only guess at them at this stage. Furthermore, discovering (guessing) that a phenomenon is inevitable given its environment is not an explanation (pertaining to internal consciousness, this is an example of the misapplication of the anthropic principle). One must still explain (eg provide some naturalistic explanation for) for why the neuronal-mental correspondence/mappings exist (hence a-d). What are the prerequisites for sentient beings - perhaps there are 5 identical sentient beings for every CNS, perhaps there are zero sentient beings for every CNS, perhaps there is one? What in nature specifies the rules, because the current laws of nature (physics) make no reference to such phenomena.

Cheers - Richard

[ofd]

Quote

But this does not avert the problem of what causes the minicollapse (to a definite rather than a probabilistic state; even if that state were almost so certain to be definite).

My understanding is that the collapse of the wave function is due to the enviroment and that information gets transferred to a universal wavefunction.

 

Quote

The question wether consciousness is inevitable or just casually is vital for all evolutionary questions. 

Indeed. Lately I learned about the Portia spiders. Those sneaky critters show intelligent behaviour that is quite astonishing while having very few neurons compared to mammals. You can have very intelligent behaviour in solving problems, so what is the plus that consciousness provides?