The existence of souls

[Donnadogsoth]

First, everything I say presumes the action of the principle of sufficient reason (psr), which states that everything is the way it is for a reason.

 

Second, we must separate mind from brain. It is clear from the action of the unconscious, the brain, in creating the vivid, detailed, highly structured domain of dreams, that the brain is perfectly capable of highly functioning outside of the conscious mind. We also see this in the careful actions of somnambulists, and the autonomic processes of the body. In other words the brain can function reflexively in all capacities without any need for a conscious mind. In terms of metaphysical naturalism, there is insufficient reason for the conscious mind to exist.

 

Third, the fact that, as everyone knows from empirical experience, the mind does exist, demonstrates that the mind is distinct from the brain. This mind I call “soul”.

[Eudaimonic]

38 minutes ago, Donnadogsoth said:

First, everything I say presumes the action of the principle of sufficient reason (psr), which states that everything is the way it is for a reason.

 

Second, we must separate mind from brain. It is clear from the action of the unconscious, the brain, in creating the vivid, detailed, highly structured domain of dreams, that the brain is perfectly capable of highly functioning outside of the conscious mind. We also see this in the careful actions of somnambulists, and the autonomic processes of the body. In other words the brain can function reflexively in all capacities without any need for a conscious mind. In terms of metaphysical naturalism, there is insufficient reason for the conscious mind to exist.

 

Third, the fact that, as everyone knows from empirical experience, the mind does exist, demonstrates that the mind is distinct from the brain. This mind I call “soul”.

Wow, that's a pretty unique argument, I mean this sincerely, and maybe it's just because I'm sometimes ignorant, but I've not heard that argument for souls before, so definitely thank you for that, really interesting to mentally munch on. Do I smell Schopenhauer...? Maybe not...

Anyway, not sure if this is nesseccarily an argument, but could it be that we simply haven't found the reason for it's existence (though I think something like the idea that freewill may have an evolutionary benefit of some sort and needed a conceptually aware brain to be able to obtain that could stand as an example of a possible reason, though I have no proof for the validity of that idea) but the fact that it does exist implies that it has a reason for existing?

Perhaps we don't know how mind arises from the brain, but perhaps "mind" is an effect of the unique human brain rather than something separate and that this "mind" serves an evolutionary purpose.

In short, I guess I don't see how just because we haven't found a reason for it's existence or just because we don't know the connection between mind and "body" so to speak, that this necessarily means that the two are different. Is there emperically evidence for that? I definitely be curious to find out.

Thought provoking though, let me know what you think!

[Donnadogsoth]

46 minutes ago, Eudaimonic said:

Wow, that's a pretty unique argument, I mean this sincerely, and maybe it's just because I'm sometimes ignorant, but I've not heard that argument for souls before, so definitely thank you for that, really interesting to mentally munch on. Do I smell Schopenhauer...? Maybe not...

Anyway, not sure if this is nesseccarily an argument, but could it be that we simply haven't found the reason for it's existence (though I think something like the idea that freewill may have an evolutionary benefit of some sort and needed a conceptually aware brain to be able to obtain that could stand as an example of a possible reason, though I have no proof for the validity of that idea) but the fact that it does exist implies that it has a reason for existing?

Perhaps we don't know how mind arises from the brain, but perhaps "mind" is an effect of the unique human brain rather than something separate and that this "mind" serves an evolutionary purpose.

In short, I guess I don't see how just because we haven't found a reason for it's existence or just because we don't know the connection between mind and "body" so to speak, that this necessarily means that the two are different. Is there emperically evidence for that? I definitely be curious to find out.

Thought provoking though, let me know what you think!

Relate any possible reason for the mind's association with the body, to what we were discussing in the “Why am I me and not you?” thread.  All minds being equal, as mere nodes of experience, there is insufficient reason for any one mind to associate with any one body.  Either all minds are the same mind (pantheism) or there are no minds (complete eliminativist materialism).

To break free of these two alternatives we must consider that every mind is unique, akin to the content of a single, unreproduced original LP recording.  My unique mind gives God, who created it, sufficient reason to associate my mind with my body and not another body.  Without this consideration, again, pantheism or complete eliminativist materialism, both of which destroy the soul as a distinct entity.

On free will: If we believe the mind to be distinct from other minds, we must believe that those minds (souls) are unique; and if we believe souls are unique and possess free will, they must be separate from the material of the brain (metaphysical naturalism) because under that metaphysic there is no “alternate world” for free will to come from. Free will means choice unbound from physics. If all there is is physics, there is no room for free will. Thus if we believe we have free will we must also have souls.

[Eudaimonic]

1 hour ago, Donnadogsoth said:

Relate any possible reason for the mind's association with the body, to what we were discussing in the “Why am I me and not you?” thread.  All minds being equal, as mere nodes of experience, there is insufficient reason for any one mind to associate with any one body.  Either all minds are the same mind (pantheism) or there are no minds (complete eliminativist materialism).

To break free of these two alternatives we must consider that every mind is unique, akin to the content of a single, unreproduced original LP recording.  My unique mind gives God, who created it, sufficient reason to associate my mind with my body and not another body.  Without this consideration, again, pantheism or complete eliminativist materialism, both of which destroy the soul as a distinct entity.

On free will: If we believe the mind to be distinct from other minds, we must believe that those minds (souls) are unique; and if we believe souls are unique and possess free will, they must be separate from the material of the brain (metaphysical naturalism) because under that metaphysic there is no “alternate world” for free will to come from. Free will means choice unbound from physics. If all there is is physics, there is no room for free will. Thus if we believe we have free will we must also have souls.

Well I've never heard of eliminativist naturalism before so don't mind me if I'm mixing up something and I applaud you for the vocab, but if I get the concept right (no mind i.e. no conceptual awareness) I can't see why there is nesseccarily a dichotomy between one mind and no minds. Mind arises from conceptual awareness which arises from prefrontal brain development (as far as we know) and this seems universal across the human species (compare pre-conceptual babies or mentally disabled/brain dead) which at the very least implies a strong cooralation between the physical brain and awareness. In fact, I believe surgeons can disconnect specific areas of the brain which disable conceptual awareness (brain dead,) but I could be wrong on that.

Each person's genetic code seems unique, so it seems quite possible to me that ones awareness at least in qulia could be individually distinct from another's. If not, how do we differentiate between two human bodies? The same principle may just as well apply to ones awareness, I think. As well, the uniqueness of each mind could arises from physical causes (evolution) rather than a God (which, to my knowledge, has less if not none at all, emperically basis than evolution.) The mind could've arisen to give an individual the greatest level of control of it's environment.

I don't see why free will implies freedom from physics, if this is the case and we do have free will, wouldn't we be able to defy the laws if physics? Free Will, it seems to me, would simply mean the ability to originate cause, which could come through something like Rand's 'think or not think' choice. Could are through value-conflict, where two things are values equally but you must act which forces choice (seeing as though value arises from conceptual awareness.) What I'm saying is that there seems to be other ways to look at free will which have more of a sense basis than souls or God.

Free will and the physical nature of reality must be connected because they share the same metaphysical base. Without such a universal metaphysical base we can't form a universal methodology (epistemology) to truth which would devolve into subjectivism which would invalidate any theory proposed. Either free will arises from reality or there isn't free will because a free will derived from anything but what is real would be something non-real.

Let me know if this makes sense, love the discussion so far.

[neeeel]

8 hours ago, Donnadogsoth said:

First, everything I say presumes the action of the principle of sufficient reason (psr), which states that everything is the way it is for a reason.

 

Second, we must separate mind from brain. It is clear from the action of the unconscious, the brain, in creating the vivid, detailed, highly structured domain of dreams, that the brain is perfectly capable of highly functioning outside of the conscious mind. We also see this in the careful actions of somnambulists, and the autonomic processes of the body. In other words the brain can function reflexively in all capacities without any need for a conscious mind. In terms of metaphysical naturalism, there is insufficient reason for the conscious mind to exist.

 

Third, the fact that, as everyone knows from empirical experience, the mind does exist, demonstrates that the mind is distinct from the brain. This mind I call “soul”.

Nope, everyone does not know from empirical experience that the mind does exist.  And even if they did, that does not demonstrate that its distinct from the brain.

 

Mind is a concept. You cant point to it or identify it in any way. You cant even identify your own mind. We experience , and then ascribe that to a mind. 

[Meister]

There is no discussion about the existence of soul. Soul cannot be perceived through mind or emotions.

Use meditation to silence mind and emotions and you will perceive soul.

[Donnadogsoth]

10 hours ago, Eudaimonic said:

Well I've never heard of eliminativist naturalism before so don't mind me if I'm mixing up something and I applaud you for the vocab, but if I get the concept right (no mind i.e. no conceptual awareness) I can't see why there is nesseccarily a dichotomy between one mind and no minds. Mind arises from conceptual awareness which arises from prefrontal brain development (as far as we know) and this seems universal across the human species (compare pre-conceptual babies or mentally disabled/brain dead) which at the very least implies a strong cooralation between the physical brain and awareness. In fact, I believe surgeons can disconnect specific areas of the brain which disable conceptual awareness (brain dead,) but I could be wrong on that.

Each person's genetic code seems unique, so it seems quite possible to me that ones awareness at least in qulia could be individually distinct from another's. If not, how do we differentiate between two human bodies? The same principle may just as well apply to ones awareness, I think. As well, the uniqueness of each mind could arises from physical causes (evolution) rather than a God (which, to my knowledge, has less if not none at all, emperically basis than evolution.) The mind could've arisen to give an individual the greatest level of control of it's environment.

I don't see why free will implies freedom from physics, if this is the case and we do have free will, wouldn't we be able to defy the laws if physics? Free Will, it seems to me, would simply mean the ability to originate cause, which could come through something like Rand's 'think or not think' choice. Could are through value-conflict, where two things are values equally but you must act which forces choice (seeing as though value arises from conceptual awareness.) What I'm saying is that there seems to be other ways to look at free will which have more of a sense basis than souls or God.

Free will and the physical nature of reality must be connected because they share the same metaphysical base. Without such a universal metaphysical base we can't form a universal methodology (epistemology) to truth which would devolve into subjectivism which would invalidate any theory proposed. Either free will arises from reality or there isn't free will because a free will derived from anything but what is real would be something non-real.

Let me know if this makes sense, love the discussion so far.

What does free will mean in naturalistic terms? If everything is material, including the brain, and the mind is a function of the brain, then whence cometh choice? What appears to be choice would just be the action of matter, as the electrochemistry, atomic interaction, quantum effects, etc., of the brain. Where does freedom come into it?

[Donnadogsoth]

4 hours ago, neeeel said:

Nope, everyone does not know from empirical experience that the mind does exist.  And even if they did, that does not demonstrate that its distinct from the brain.

 

Mind is a concept. You cant point to it or identify it in any way. You cant even identify your own mind. We experience , and then ascribe that to a mind. 

Who are the "we" who "experience"?

[neeeel]

Just now, Donnadogsoth said:

Who are the "we" who "experience"?

There isnt a "we" who experience. I put that in to keep the language simple and understandable

[Donnadogsoth]

Just now, neeeel said:

There isnt a "we" who experience. I put that in to keep the language simple and understandable

Who is the "I" you refer to?

[neeeel]

Just now, Donnadogsoth said:

Who is the "I" you refer to?

again, there isnt an "I", "I" put that in to keep the language simple and understandable

[Donnadogsoth]

57 minutes ago, neeeel said:

again, there isnt an "I", "I" put that in to keep the language simple and understandable

Simple and understandable to whom?

[Eudaimonic]

58 minutes ago, Donnadogsoth said:

What does free will mean in naturalistic terms? If everything is material, including the brain, and the mind is a function of the brain, then whence cometh choice? What appears to be choice would just be the action of matter, as the electrochemistry, atomic interaction, quantum effects, etc., of the brain. Where does freedom come into it?

I'm not sure that free will is the opposite of a mechanistic universal.

Free will, in my conception, is the ability to originate cause. This only requires potentialities and one's ability to manifest a specific potential via volitional action.

Universals don't nesseccarily exclude potentialities so long as they can exists withing the context of the universals. (A simplified metaphor: If you go to a seafood restaurant for dinner, you're going to eat seafood, but you can choose between the cod, haddock, salmon, some combination, etc.)

How free will arises in humans is still something with is up for debate (though we can assume it; I think determinism probably holds the burden of proof) though my own theory, which I haven't though much on it, posits that it arises through internal value-conflict, Rand made a convincing argument that 'to think or not to think' was the primary source of choice.

However it does arises, it doesn't seem to me that it could be a soul, as this either split reality dulistic, eliminating the source of the universal methodology you've used to posit a soul or put the reality we perceive as something non-real with also invalidate the methodology you've used to posit a soul.

 

[neeeel]

5 minutes ago, Donnadogsoth said:

Simple and understandable to whom?

lol, you can keep going on like that, Ive already explained. You are presuming the existence of a "whom" and then using that to ask "whom"

[Donnadogsoth]

49 minutes ago, Eudaimonic said:

I'm not sure that free will is the opposite of a mechanistic universal.

Free will, in my conception, is the ability to originate cause. This only requires potentialities and one's ability to manifest a specific potential via volitional action.

Universals don't nesseccarily exclude potentialities so long as they can exists withing the context of the universals. (A simplified metaphor: If you go to a seafood restaurant for dinner, you're going to eat seafood, but you can choose between the cod, haddock, salmon, some combination, etc.)

How free will arises in humans is still something with is up for debate (though we can assume it; I think determinism probably holds the burden of proof) though my own theory, which I haven't though much on it, posits that it arises through internal value-conflict, Rand made a convincing argument that 'to think or not to think' was the primary source of choice.

However it does arises, it doesn't seem to me that it could be a soul, as this either split reality dulistic, eliminating the source of the universal methodology you've used to posit a soul or put the reality we perceive as something non-real with also invalidate the methodology you've used to posit a soul.

 

I don't quite understand your objection.  Are you a metaphysical naturalist?  If so, how does determinism not hold?

[Donnadogsoth]

43 minutes ago, neeeel said:

lol, you can keep going on like that, Ive already explained. You are presuming the existence of a "whom" and then using that to ask "whom"

Why are you using the word "you" in reference to me if I am not a whom?

[neeeel]

12 minutes ago, Donnadogsoth said:

Why are you using the word "you" in reference to me if I am not a whom?

already explained. The existence of the word you does not mean that theres an actual you. If you want me to use some other convoluted set of words to refer to the concept, let me know

 

[Donnadogsoth]

Just now, neeeel said:

already explained. The existence of the word you does not mean that theres an actual you. If you want me to use some other convoluted set of words to refer to the concept, let me know

 

You keep referring to me.  Why?  If I don't exist, why are you talking?  Are you a solipsist?

[Eudaimonic]

1 hour ago, Donnadogsoth said:

I don't quite understand your objection.  Are you a metaphysical naturalist?  If so, how does determinism not hold?

Sorry if I'm not being clear enough, I thank you for responding kindly

I take my metaphysics from Objectivism, which I suppose is a form of metaphysical naturalism, if I understand the term correctly. At the very least it supposes a metaphysical monism with a universal and objective identity and laws (universals.)

The objection consists, essentially, in the dichotomy I believe you're setting up between free will and "determinism" (unchanging universals.) I object to the dichotomy. Free will can be compatible with determinism in the sense that potentialities (choice; originating of cause) can exist within a set if universals (review again the seafood metaphor.) I reject that there is a dichotomy here.

I also reject the idea that in any case a soul could be the cause of free will, as setting up a soul sets up dulistic metaphysics which sets up subjective epistemology which invalidates any theory or sets up the "reality" that we're perceiving as non-real and therefore invalidates any theory you can posit, including a soul.

 

[Donnadogsoth]

2 hours ago, Eudaimonic said:

Sorry if I'm not being clear enough, I thank you for responding kindly

I take my metaphysics from Objectivism, which I suppose is a form of metaphysical naturalism, if I understand the term correctly. At the very least it supposes a metaphysical monism with a universal and objective identity and laws (universals.)

The objection consists, essentially, in the dichotomy I believe you're setting up between free will and "determinism" (unchanging universals.) I object to the dichotomy. Free will can be compatible with determinism in the sense that potentialities (choice; originating of cause) can exist within a set if universals (review again the seafood metaphor.) I reject that there is a dichotomy here.

I also reject the idea that in any case a soul could be the cause of free will, as setting up a soul sets up dulistic metaphysics which sets up subjective epistemology which invalidates any theory or sets up the "reality" that we're perceiving as non-real and therefore invalidates any theory you can posit, including a soul.

 

I reject your rejection of souls on the following grounds:

Free will is compatible with monism, but, only if the mental dimension is said to constitute and create the material dimension. Take any material object, you will find it is composed in your experience of a bundle of predicates. The cherry is red, contains a pit, sports a stem, etc.. Remove your experience and under the principle of sufficient reason (psr) nothing is left—there is no reason for anything to be left--unless the cherry itself has a perspective. Mind is therefore primary to all existence. "Material" is merely the experiences the mind has of its own nature, or, if we admit the existence of other minds, its own nature as that nature harmoniously reflects the interaction between these minds. This view is compatible with free will, while the existence of a soul (mind independent of any physical substrate) is shown. Metaphysical naturalism is replaced by metaphysical idealism.

I anticipate your objection:  What force harmonises the different minds making their reflections accurate?  That must be answered, "God".

 

[Eudaimonic]

31 minutes ago, Donnadogsoth said:

I reject your rejection of souls on the following grounds:

Free will is compatible with monism, but, only if the mental dimension is said to constitute and create the material dimension. Take any material object, you will find it is composed in your experience of a bundle of predicates. The cherry is red, contains a pit, sports a stem, etc.. Remove your experience and under the principle of sufficient reason (psr) nothing is left—there is no reason for anything to be left--unless the cherry itself has a perspective. Mind is therefore primary to all existence. "Material" is merely the experiences the mind has of its own nature, or, if we admit the existence of other minds, its own nature as that nature harmoniously reflects the interaction between these minds. This view is compatible with free will, while the existence of a soul (mind independent of any physical substrate) is shown. Metaphysical naturalism is replaced by metaphysical idealism.

I anticipate your objection:  What force harmonises the different minds making their reflections accurate?  That must be answered, "God".

 

The primacy of mind, it seems to me, is impossible as to be aware is to be aware of something. Awareness requires something to be aware of first, which would indicate the primacy of Existence. (One of the disproofs of God actually relies on this axiom; God is awareness without Existence and therefore violates the primacy of Existence.)

I would say that a material object is not composed of predicates (I'm not really sure what you mean here completely though, like words?) but of existents. The concepts red, stem and pit all relate to existents with their measurements omitted (see Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology) and all these are either more specific or broader measurements of existents.

If you remove your experience of existents from the equation, the sufficient reason could simply be the axiom Existence Exists. Perception is not required for Existence, Existence is required for Perception as to perceive is to perceive something.

Free Will is compatible with monism because the existence of a universal doesn't exclude potentialities within that universal. Existence is universal, the choice to post this or not is a potential within Existence.

Souls still require a dulistic or Platonic view of metaphysics, which both invalidate any knowledge one could posit, because Souls wouldn't be held down to the monistic universal laws they operated in. Either free will is compatible with monism or there is no such thing as free will (which I don't believe) but a soul could never be a solution, if it's apart of the monistic universal then it operates within it. 

[Donnadogsoth]

1 hour ago, Eudaimonic said:

The primacy of mind, it seems to me, is impossible as to be aware is to be aware of something. Awareness requires something to be aware of first, which would indicate the primacy of Existence. (One of the disproofs of God actually relies on this axiom; God is awareness without Existence and therefore violates the primacy of Existence.)

I would say that a material object is not composed of predicates (I'm not really sure what you mean here completely though, like words?) but of existents. The concepts red, stem and pit all relate to existents with their measurements omitted (see Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology) and all these are either more specific or broader measurements of existents.

If you remove your experience of existents from the equation, the sufficient reason could simply be the axiom Existence Exists. Perception is not required for Existence, Existence is required for Perception as to perceive is to perceive something.

Free Will is compatible with monism because the existence of a universal doesn't exclude potentialities within that universal. Existence is universal, the choice to post this or not is a potential within Existence.

Souls still require a dulistic or Platonic view of metaphysics, which both invalidate any knowledge one could posit, because Souls wouldn't be held down to the monistic universal laws they operated in. Either free will is compatible with monism or there is no such thing as free will (which I don't believe) but a soul could never be a solution, if it's apart of the monistic universal then it operates within it. 

Why can't a mind be aware of itself? The same goes for God.

 

We only know “existents” in the form of sense impressions, which are present only in the mind. Colour, estimation of length, estimation of hardness, are all categories the mind uses to present to itself the appearance of an object. Since these qualities are what the observer imagines (a different observer might see the cherry is green, etc.), the cherry, in of itself, has no redness, stemmedness, or pit, except as we imagine the cherry itself has a mind, a perspective, a soul of some kind that provides the substance that is reflected into the mind of the observer(s). No zombies are allowed in the Universe!

 

For, consider you are an individual, and I am an individual, and the cat over there is an individual, but is the cherry an individual? An individual cannot be divided. My mind, myself, cannot be split in two. Yet we can split the cherry in two, perhaps with a laser, and none are the wiser. Hence my talk of zombies. Are we really surrounded by zombie matter?

 

To say “existence exists” might mean no more than “I exist” (solipsism). There needs to be a self or substance behind a thing's phenomenal existence before we can say that it “exists” outside of our idiosyncratic perception of its apparent existence.

 

I agree that free will is compatible with idealist monism, but not materialist monism, because if the Universe is matter and nothing but, it must obey the laws of matter. Minds that happen for no reason (violating the psr) to be associated with material brains must therefore obey material laws. In idealist monism there is no matter as such and so the minds are free to choose by virtue of their own non-material natures. Materialist monism renders mind material, remember, and we do not find free choice in the material world that all brains reduce to—atoms, quarks, leptons, and the like. You seem to envisage some sort of “wiggle room” that makes human brains not subject to the causality that applies to the very ingredients that they are made of (and made of nothing but).

[Eudaimonic]

23 minutes ago, Donnadogsoth said:

Why can't a mind be aware of itself? The same goes for God.

 

We only know “existents” in the form of sense impressions, which are present only in the mind. Colour, estimation of length, estimation of hardness, are all categories the mind uses to present to itself the appearance of an object. Since these qualities are what the observer imagines (a different observer might see the cherry is green, etc.), the cherry, in of itself, has no redness, stemmedness, or pit, except as we imagine the cherry itself has a mind, a perspective, a soul of some kind that provides the substance that is reflected into the mind of the observer(s). No zombies are allowed in the Universe!

 

For, consider you are an individual, and I am an individual, and the cat over there is an individual, but is the cherry an individual? An individual cannot be divided. My mind, myself, cannot be split in two. Yet we can split the cherry in two, perhaps with a laser, and none are the wiser. Hence my talk of zombies. Are we really surrounded by zombie matter?

 

To say “existence exists” might mean no more than “I exist” (solipsism). There needs to be a self or substance behind a thing's phenomenal existence before we can say that it “exists” outside of our idiosyncratic perception of its apparent existence.

 

I agree that free will is compatible with idealist monism, but not materialist monism, because if the Universe is matter and nothing but, it must obey the laws of matter. Minds that happen for no reason (violating the psr) to be associated with material brains must therefore obey material laws. In idealist monism there is no matter as such and so the minds are free to choose by virtue of their own non-material natures. Materialist monism renders mind material, remember, and we do not find free choice in the material world that all brains reduce to—atoms, quarks, leptons, and the like. You seem to envisage some sort of “wiggle room” that makes human brains not subject to the causality that applies to the very ingredients that they are made of (and made of nothing but).

Why can't awareness be aware of itself? To be aware means to be aware of something, therefore there must be something which exists before something is aware. For awareness to come about in the first place some sort of existent would have to be present for that awareness to be aware of. Sure, awareness can be aware of itself (we are aware of our awareness) but the awareness that we are aware of first must need something to be aware of to arise.

Sense perception and logic (which arises from sense perception) are our only means to knowledge, to invalidate these is to invalid any posit at knowledge, including the one that claims the senses are invalid. Qualities are not something which are imagined but which are objective to existents. This is essentially identity, everything has a nature which differentiates it from everything else but at the same time can be qualified universally as existing. If a cherry is green then you're eyesight is failing you, simply measure the light waves which bounce off a cherry to measure its color more objectively. The senses have the capacity for accuracy, but they're not infallible, luckily they can be confirmed by the other senses.

Individuals can be defined mechanistically as universal matter and energy with differentiated qulia. Time and space are also packaged in this qulia, as in that person is here and another is there at this time or that time is a part of it's nature (as well as it's interactions with other existents.)

You have to say that Existence Exists for you to be able to say that you exist.To exist implies that there is an objective physical existence outside of yourself, because awareness can't give rise to existence. There is no phenomenal existence, you are experiencing what is objective and real, to say otherwise is to invalidate knowledge (as you would be seeing it through, perhaps, kantian categories, which would mean you're not perceiving anything which is real i.e. true.)

I don't see why matter can't both obay universal principles while simultaneously choosing between potentialities within those universals. If it's physically possible for one to both run and walk, within the universal laws of physics, why can't I chose one or the other, if I have that capacity?

[Donnadogsoth]

I didn't say, “awareness is aware of itself”; the mind is not identical to awareness. I said, why can't a mind, which is something, be aware of itself? Obviously minds can be aware of themselves or else how could we be said to be “self-conscious,” “self-aware,” or have “self-knowledge”?

 

The highest knowledge we can gain comes to us only secondarily from sense-perception and logic, primarily from the use of hypothesis and proof-of principle experiment. The difference is that the hypothesis is a creative act and the results of a successful experiment are not logically deducible from the original knowledge base.

 

Reducing a cherry's redness or greenness to a measurable wavelength begs the question of what a wavelength means. A wavelength is a sense-impression displayed on a measuring machine. What if most people saw the cherry of said wavelength of colour was green? Would the popular vote win the day? The wavelength by itself means nothing.

 

Saying “existence exists” can be collapsed solipsistically into “I exist”, for the reason already given that mind (mind which has awareness, but is not itself equivalent to awareness) can be aware of itself, and does not require a substrate in order to exist.

 

One's “choice” to either walk or run is still guided by the material of the brain which operates according to physical laws governing the behaviour of fundamental particles. If there is no soul, no mind independent of matter, then all is literally reductionist matter, and all behaviour will be purely and solely a result of the working-out of that matter according to said physical laws.

[neeeel]

16 hours ago, Donnadogsoth said:

You keep referring to me.  Why?  If I don't exist, why are you talking?  Are you a solipsist?

Language implies the existence of a "you", that doesnt mean that such a thing actually exists.

No, I am not a solipsist, entirely the opposite, in fact.

[Donnadogsoth]

6 hours ago, neeeel said:

Language implies the existence of a "you", that doesnt mean that such a thing actually exists.

No, I am not a solipsist, entirely the opposite, in fact.

If you don't exist, there's no reason to talk to you.  Goodbye!

[neeeel]

42 minutes ago, Donnadogsoth said:

If you don't exist, there's no reason to talk to you.  Goodbye!

lol, you dont exist, and youre still talking!

[Eudaimonic]

17 hours ago, Donnadogsoth said:

I didn't say, “awareness is aware of itself”; the mind is not identical to awareness. I said, why can't a mind, which is something, be aware of itself? Obviously minds can be aware of themselves or else how could we be said to be “self-conscious,” “self-aware,” or have “self-knowledge”?

 

The highest knowledge we can gain comes to us only secondarily from sense-perception and logic, primarily from the use of hypothesis and proof-of principle experiment. The difference is that the hypothesis is a creative act and the results of a successful experiment are not logically deducible from the original knowledge base.

 

Reducing a cherry's redness or greenness to a measurable wavelength begs the question of what a wavelength means. A wavelength is a sense-impression displayed on a measuring machine. What if most people saw the cherry of said wavelength of colour was green? Would the popular vote win the day? The wavelength by itself means nothing.

 

Saying “existence exists” can be collapsed solipsistically into “I exist”, for the reason already given that mind (mind which has awareness, but is not itself equivalent to awareness) can be aware of itself, and does not require a substrate in order to exist.

 

One's “choice” to either walk or run is still guided by the material of the brain which operates according to physical laws governing the behaviour of fundamental particles. If there is no soul, no mind independent of matter, then all is literally reductionist matter, and all behaviour will be purely and solely a result of the working-out of that matter according to said physical laws.

I suppose then that I am confused at to what your definition of mind is, for that, again, I apologize. According to your definition, is the mind a physical entity or something else? Perhaps just give me a full definition. Mechanistically speaking, a mind can become aware of itself by awareness first arising from an existent and then this existent becoming aware that it is aware of other existents.

I believe hypothesis can only be validated through submitting that hypothesis back to one's sensual data/logical validity. Incomplete sensual data -> Attempt at derivation of principle -> Hypothesis based on principle -> Logical Validation/Disproof via Internal Consistency -> Empirical Validation/Disproof via Universalization of Principle to know Sense Data -> Truth/Falsehood of Hypothesis. I'm not sure what you mean by "highest knowledge" here or how such knowledge is separated from sense data (a valid mechanistic reality) which is valid (indicating an external reality.) Also this doesn't seem to resolve the dulistic/platonic necessity of splitting knowledge, either knowledge is based in reality or it's derived from two realities (invalidating knowledge) or it's derived from another 'more real' reality (invalidating any knowledge we  could posit.) If there is higher knowledge, we don't have access to it.

That objects absorb all colors except one and that the one color which bounces off the object and reflects into our eyes (which color it bounces is determined by it's nature) is an objective fact measurable through the senses and validated by the scientific method i.e. universal principles (which is derived from the senses.) A wavelength is something objective which can be detected through multiple methodologies which confirm each other and which have all be developed relative to sense data and empirical testing. To say wavelengths don't exist because they can only be represented on a machine and not directly with the human eye is akin to saying, in my view, that length doesn't exist because it can only be represented as numerics on a ruler. A wavelength means something because it is a measurement of something objective. The concept 'wavelength' represents the unit with the measurement omitted; this is how we save brain energy because otherwise we would have to spend all out time remembering every instance of 'wavelength' individually instead of grouping it together under one term. This is why math has always been important to philosophy because math represents this concept formation of objective reality in it's most basic form: 1+1+1+1+1 = 5 = 3+1 = 4+1 = 6-1 ...... we remember 5 better than we remeber 1+1+1+1+1. See Unit-Economy.

I'm not sure of your definition of mind anymore, but if the Mind is something the it must be composed of something and must exist in an objective existence. If it is made of something than that something must exist objectively.

Well, I'm not sure how free will arises in a materialistic reality (again I have a theory of value-conflict I've half worked out) but we can say that within universals one thing could've been another if it were able to choose between two alternatives. There's nothing which can do that, I would argue, beyond humans. How they do that I'm not sure, but I'm saying that if they could this wouldn't contradict a materialist reality based on universal. But, again, it could never be a soul due to the epistemological problems a soul sets up against it's own proposition. You can't posit a truth without claiming that reality is monistic, objective and that we can know it through our senses without invalidating objective, universal truth. A soul requires either a dulistic or platonic reality (or non-reality).

I kinda feel like we're running around in circles here though and I'm not sure where exactly your objection is. It looks like there is a significant disconnection, it seems to me, in the connection between your epistemology (which seems sense-based) and your metaphysics (which seems idealistic.) Could be me though...

 

[Donnadogsoth]

We have four bones of contention:

1.What is mind.
2.What is matter.
3.What is knowledge.
4.What sort of universe must exist to allow free will.

My positions are four.  Hopefully this will clarify matters and free the discussion from entanglements.

1.A mind is a monad, an indivisible unity possessing perception and desire. Everything a monad perceives is a part of its own substance, including its experience of the entire material world. It does not require anything else to exist, save its Creator, in order for it to (a) exist, (b) perceive, (c) desire, and (d) act on its perceptions and desires. Aside from the Creator, no other monad need exist for this to happen. Nothing exists except for monads and their qualities.
2.Matter does not exist except as the internal qualities of a monad. There is no “outside world” for matter to exist in, only an invisible sea of non-local, non-extended monads.
3.Knowledge, at the highest level, is the working out of an ontological paradox through the discovery of a principle or “thought object” existing in the mind from that mind's creation.
4.Free will is a quality of mind (monad) and requires no other monads (save the Creator) in order to function.

[Goldenages]

On 1.5.2017 at 3:50 PM, Donnadogsoth said:

What does free will mean in naturalistic terms?

It means that there is a choice between two or more alternatives.

A few thoughts to the opponents "free will" and "determinism":  It is said that physics is deterministic, however this is not the whole truth.

First, it is a very good thing that physics is generally deterministic. If it were not, and matter would change its properties randomly, we obviously could not exist. Second, we do like a predictable environment, and make efforts to make our lives as predictable as possible. We build houses, roads, heatings, supermarkets and so on to exclude chance as much as possible, we prefer partners who behave in a predictable way, we dislike persons who act erratic.

Now this determinism has limits. In physics we know chaotic systems, where infinitely small changes of the initial point lead to unpredictable behaviour (e.g. double pendulum, weather). Then there is quantum theory, while its effects on our world are not fully understood, it is safe to say that if I want to calculate wether the 28. billard ball will hit the 29. at the intended angle, my calculation will be very doubtful because of accumulating errors. So if things get complicated and complex - and both the universe and our brains are - determinism comes to an end.

So the universe is not deterministic in the way that Laplace assumed - given a demon knows position and movement of every atom in the universe at a certain time, this demon is still not able to forecast future. It is not possible.

And here we have the base for free will. It is no proof that man has free will, but it is the proof that free will is possible according to the laws of physics. Neither the universe nor our minds operate like clockworks. In the universe many things happen by chance, we act (sometimes ) after the process of thinking.

Thats the free will in naturalistic terms.

 

regards

Andi

[Donnadogsoth]

31 minutes ago, Goldenages said:

It means that there is a choice between two or more alternatives.

A few thoughts to the opponents "free will" and "determinism":  It is said that physics is deterministic, however this is not the whole truth.

First, it is a very good thing that physics is generally deterministic. If it were not, and matter would change its properties randomly, we obviously could not exist. Second, we do like a predictable environment, and make efforts to make our lives as predictable as possible. We build houses, roads, heatings, supermarkets and so on to exclude chance as much as possible, we prefer partners who behave in a predictable way, we dislike persons who act erratic.

Now this determinism has limits. In physics we know chaotic systems, where infinitely small changes of the initial point lead to unpredictable behaviour (e.g. double pendulum, weather). Then there is quantum theory, while its effects on our world are not fully understood, it is safe to say that if I want to calculate wether the 28. billard ball will hit the 29. at the intended angle, my calculation will be very doubtful because of accumulating errors. So if things get complicated and complex - and both the universe and our brains are - determinism comes to an end.

So the universe is not deterministic in the way that Laplace assumed - given a demon knows position and movement of every atom in the universe at a certain time, this demon is still not able to forecast future. It is not possible.

And here we have the base for free will. It is no proof that man has free will, but it is the proof that free will is possible according to the laws of physics. Neither the universe nor our minds operate like clockworks. In the universe many things happen by chance, we act (sometimes ) after the process of thinking.

Thats the free will in naturalistic terms.

 

regards

Andi

First, a system may be staggeringly, even infinitely complex but still deterministic, so the butterfly effect, etc., does not overturn determinism.  Second, quantum theory rests, in popular interpretation, on statistical probabilities, which essentially say that things happen according to chance, according to luck, as if little green men were underneath the floorboards of reality rolling dice to determine what happens in the real world.  Either way, saying that our decisions arise from determined clockwork effects, or that our decisions are the result of dice throws, nowhere does the mind depart, in metaphysical naturalism, from being purely and exclusively determined by the results of said clockwork and dice.

[adamNJ]

You damage the brain, you damages the mind.  The mind is what the brain does.

[Goldenages]

9 hours ago, Donnadogsoth said:

Either way, saying that our decisions arise from determined clockwork effects, or that our decisions are the result of dice throws,...

This is not correct.

Chaotic systems are not deterministic (thats why they are called chaotic).

While chance is important in quantum mechanics, this is not what I ment. What I ment is that quantum mechanics is a barrier for the precision of any measurement, also for objects as big as billard balls. This unavoidable error in any measurement is irrelevant for normal billard, but becomes important if you just play enough balls.

 

regards

Andi

[Donnadogsoth]

6 hours ago, Goldenages said:

This is not correct.

Chaotic systems are not deterministic (thats why they are called chaotic).

While chance is important in quantum mechanics, this is not what I ment. What I ment is that quantum mechanics is a barrier for the precision of any measurement, also for objects as big as billard balls. This unavoidable error in any measurement is irrelevant for normal billard, but becomes important if you just play enough balls.

 

regards

Andi

We're not talking about measurement, we're talking about choice.  If the mind is purely natural then the mind is a slave to natural causation, which is either deterministic, or purely random, or a mixture of both, and in threither case is a mere slave to those processes.

[Goldenages]

40 minutes ago, Donnadogsoth said:

 If the mind is purely natural then the mind is a slave to natural causation, which is either deterministic, or purely random, or a mixture of both, and in threither case is a mere slave to those processes.

 

Exactly    

We do not need a mind to make random decisions. For random decisions it´s easier to roll the dice, or do literally just anything,  and evolution would never select a conscious mind to produce such behaviour.

We do not need a mind to act deterministic. Our reflexes do this already.  Evolution would never select minds if deterministic behaviour is at least equal to mindful behaviour.

 

Our minds are right in between, weaving between randomness and clockwork.

 

regards

Andi