richardbaxter Posted July 23, 2017 Share Posted July 23, 2017 An argument for ontological materialism as pertaining to philosophy of mind (i.e. naturalistic physicalism); 1. Assume that there must be some substrate which defines a) when mind emerges (mental instantiation) and b) how mind operates (mental laws). i) This needn't be the same substrate in both cases, and ii) we needn't have access to it (the substrate would operate perfectly according to its laws of nature regardless). What philosophical evidence do we have that i) it is the same one, and ii) we have access to it? Note the only substrate we have access to is the physical substrate. ii) Why should a sentient being have access to the stuff (substrate) from which their mind arises (a) and which defines how mind operates (b)? 2. Mind (by definition?) requires access to an objective reality (operates on some sense data). 3. We infer that the substrate controlling how mind operates (b) is the physical substrate (brain), which we by definition have access to. - Therefore we may well have access to the substrate which defines when mind emerges (a) also. - And it may well be the same one (i). i) Why should the substrate from which mind arises (a) and which defines how mind operates (b) be the same one? (evidence #2) 4. We infer that the substrate for the operation of mind (b) evolved according to the laws of nature. - Therefore the substrate from which mind arises (a) may also have evolved according to laws of nature. - And it may well be the same one (i). [assumptions are enumerated] 1 Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Goldenages Posted July 24, 2017 Share Posted July 24, 2017 I agree regards Andi Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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