Stefan Molyneux's 'Universally Preferable Behaviour': A Critique

[PillPuppetPoet]

Stefan Molyneux's 'Universally Preferable Behaviour': A Critique

 

'Universally preferable behaviour', or UPB, is the moral theory of the prominent contemporary philosopher Stefan Molyneux. It sets out to provide an objective, rational foundation for many of our common moral valuations, as well as clarifying them and providing guidance regarding more controversial moral and political issues. In this essay, I attempt to evaluate some of its chief arguments. I shall pass over the introduction, which is mainly about explaining the need for such a foundational moral theory based upon objective reality, which is all quite sound and I do not disagree with, and head straight for the core of the 'proof' for the new theory herein revealed.

 

Stefan's first argument for UPB is that 'if there is no such thing as UPB, then one should oppose anyone who claims that there is such a thing as UPB, However, if one “should” do something, then one has just created universally preferable behaviour.'. He also says 'if I argue against the proposition that UPB is valid, I have already shown my preference for truth over falsehood- as well as a preference for correcting those who speak falsely'. I find this argument highly flawed. Though the latter excerpt is in fact correct, the idea that these preferences are 'universal' is wholly undemonstrated and in fact highly unlikely. Actually, there are many circumstances where one should not argue with one who believes in UPB, or many other doctrines that one believes to be false. If someone has no innate moral compunction and a spiteful, malicious disposition, yet believes that they will go to Hell if they do harm to others, then only a naïve fool would seek to relieve them of this belief. In other words, what Stefan has demonstrated is only that his imagined interlocutor has a preference to point out the truth in this one circumstance, not that everyone 'should' do so 'universally', or that the interlocutor necessarily believes that everyone should do so universally.

Stefan's second argument for UPB is that 'everything that lives is subject to certain requirements, and thus, if it is alive, must have followed universally preferred behaviours.' , such as 'breathing, eating and drinking'. This assertion ostensibly has some truth to it, but unfortunately it runs counter to some of Mr. Molyneux's other statements and the intentions of his argument. Firstly, Mr. Molyneux says UPB is not what people 'do' universally prefer, but what they 'should' universally prefer. (pp. 20). Thus the fact that all life forms do prefer certain conditions seems of no obvious relevance to his argument. Secondly, as Mr. Molyneux also says elsewhere in the book, rightly in my opinion, the conditions of life are not always preferred, as the act of suicide demonstrates. The fact that the imaginary interlocutor would have to be alive in order to counter Mr. Molyneux's argument, once again, would not seem to make his preferences 'universal'.

Stefan's third argument is since most people believe in UPB, tacitly at least (e.g. by the commonality of their preferences), it is true. This is a false argument, and once again, runs directly counter to what Mr. Molyneux says elsewhere about opinion not altering reality, (in relation to democracy). Secondly, it could be denied that preferences are universal, and not merely very common – especially moral preferences. His forth argument is along the same lines, pointing to the fact that while 'choices are infinite', 'human beings make very similar choices'; therefore 'not all choices can be equal'; 'to say that there are no principles of universally preferable behaviour would be to say that all choices are equal'. This is also quite false: it could simply be that preferences and their justifications are usually quite general but still relative to individual factors rather than being 'universal' to all humankind. It also repeats the same fallacy as the previous argument, in attempting to derive an 'ought' simply from the 'is' of people's actual preferences, assuming them to be based on 'universal' moral values, rather than merely prejudice or some other form of arbitrariness.

Stefan's fifth and final argument is similar to his second – he basically says that all life forms, and man in particular as the most successful one, must have evolved by acting on UPB. Forgive me if my critique is beginning to sound a little monotonous, but I can only say that this again repeats the fallacy of trying to derive an 'ought' when his argument only indicates the 'is' of shared human preferences, i.e. not as that there is a universal standard of what human beings should prefer, but simply that man has (purportedly universal) preferences. In addition, it begs the question whether all human beings 'succeeded' through the same morally relevant preferences: for instance, maybe some succeeded by hard work, and others succeeded by exploiting the hard work of others via fraud, such as religion?

Summing up this section, I would have to say that Mr. Molyneux has been far from convincing in his demonstration of the existence of UPB. However, one of the real Achilles' heels of his theory, at least in the view of this reader, is introduced in a subsequent section. This is in his bold and uncompromising insistence on its 'universal' aspect, whereby, according to Mr. Molyneux, the moral rules governing the relations of human beings are as uniform as gravity upon falling rocks. But, equally, wouldn't a geologist be laughed at for insisting that all 'rocks', from chalk to diamond, had exactly the same propensity and pace of erosion? While I would agree that the theory should be stated in such terms that moral guidelines exist for all human beings, the notion that there are no distinctions among human beings that might have a bearing upon the morality or rationality of their actions seems to me an evident absurdity, which is confirmed elsewhere by Mr. Molyneux's own statements that someone with an IQ of 65, or a small child, cannot be held responsible for their actions to the same degree as a cultivated and intelligent adult. As we shall see, Mr. Molyneux's insistence on this point, together with what he calls 'logical consistency' are the errors which turn out, unfortunately, to be the faulty notions with which he builds much of his structure.

 

To get an understanding of how Stefan intends his theory, it is necessary to turn to the way he applies it to: rape, murder, theft, etc. His first strategy is a reductio ad absurdum, whereby he assumes that rape is morally good. He claims that this is illogical, since a rape can only occur if the victim resists, and that thus 'attacking virtue by definition enables virtue', and this is an 'insurmountable paradox'. But is it? By the same logic, one could say that fighting evil in general cannot be virtuous since it is only enabled by the evil which one is fighting. So far from being an 'insurmountable paradox', I would say this is par for the course when it comes to moral behaviour, which is always 'enabled' by its opposite or the threat thereof. Mr. Molyneux's next argument is almost equally puzzling. He says 'if only one of (the two men in a room) can be good... we have a logical contradiction that cannot be solved', referring us to the aforementioned example that 'a valid theory cannot predict that one rock will fall up, while another rock will fall down'. But, why should both men even have the capacity to be good at the same time, let alone actually be good at the same time? What is there in the notion of morality, or universal preference, that means it necessarily cannot be mutually exclusive, competitive or relative? We wouldn't say they could both excel equally at winning a chess match with each other at the same time, so why should they both be able to necessarily excel at morality? Again, by the same logic, it cannot be virtuous for one of two men in a room to give CPR to a dying child, because then the other one couldn't do it. It would thus be equally or more moral to simply let the child suffocate to death. Mr. Molyneux's third argument is perhaps the most eye-brow raising of the lot, wherein he says that 'because he will be physically unable to get an erection.... his ability to perform the “good action” becomes impossible'. Surely this could just be obviated by describing the principle as 'he who has raped is good', rather than 'he who is raping is good'. This 'logical problem' would also obviously apply to any moral code that defined actions themselves as solely constitutive of virtue, rather then also having done them. So: a fat man giving food to a starving person could also not be defined as remotely virtuous, because at some point he will not be starving, (or, there will be an absence of starving people to feed), and he won't be able to feed them, and hence he is 'unable to be good'. A much better and much simpler argument would seem to be that it is not universally preferable because not everyone wants to do it - and even fewer victims 'prefer' it to happen to them, nor 'should' they as it will not be conducive to their happiness (the true 'universal preference', in my opinion) or anyone else's. Why Stefan doesn't mention this, and instead sticks to his strictly 'logical' approach all but defies explanation.

Moving onto Stefan's discussion of rape as a possible APA (aesthetically positive actions),

according to his definition of being universally preferable but not enforceable through violence, it might seem he is correct in saying that rape cannot be an APA, as it is enforced through violence. However, even here, there is a conflation regarding who the enforcement is enacted on. In the case of rape, the enforcement is on the victim, whereas in the case of UPB, presumably the enforcement is upon the potential perpetrator – therefore, one cannot necessarily say the rape is not an APA. Again, the argument that it is simply not in any way preferable for many people would have seemed more sensible. Here Mr. Molyneux also gives 'being on time' as an example of a genuine APA, which is a 'universally preferable' rule that can be 'totally avoided'. However, if I have a business meeting, and my boss turns up an hour late with no prior warning that he is a tardy individual, could that really have been avoided ? If one knows someone has a habit of turning up late, then one can avoid them – although if they were your boss if would probably mean getting a new job - but the first time it happens ? If 'avoid-ability' was such a strong determinate of whether something is morally imperative or merely aesthetically preferable, as Mr. Molyneux says it is, then in fact it would seem that 'being late without warning' was no better than rape. Mr. Molyneux then asks whether 'liking jazz' or 'liking classical music' can be a APA, saying that if so its maxim would be 'subjective preferences are universally preferable.' However, surely there could be other, better justifications than the fact that it is merely a' subjective preference', which is really assuming what one sets out to prove. For instance, could one not make the Nietzschean-esque argument that 'liking classical music' is inherently better for one, and a sign of a more developed sensibility, than liking jazz or pop? In other words, the correct formulation is not “subjective preferences are universally preferable', but 'healthy or refined preferences are universally preferable'. If that is not 'universal' enough for Mr. Molyneux, I can only stress again that the concern for 'universality' is a basically arbitrary bugbear that distorts the whole theory and is far from 'logical', just as it is not 'logical' to say that all rocks have the same erosive properties. 'Universality', it seems to me, is a relative and imprecise definition – if one was being strict about it, one wouldn't be able to say anything at all, except perhaps something like 'Existence exists'. The aim of philosophy, and science in general, is chiefly not to make fewer distinctions, but more relevant distinctions.

Thus again, in the discussion as to whether rape is a 'personally positive' preference, Stefan opines that that maxim would be 'personal preferences must be violently inflicted upon other people', and that one could not propose 'personal preferences may be violently inflicted upon other people' since that is not universal enough. But why? As far as I can see, all Mr. Molyneux has given us in support of his preference for 'universality' is the analogy with all rocks falling down due to gravity, which is hardly a water-tight argument, as I have explained. And who is to say that 'may be violently inflicted' is not universal enough? Mr. Molyneux says that if they are not completely absolute and universal, they 'fall into APA territory, and so cannot be inflicted on others.' However, are not APAs also supposed to be a type of 'universal (italics added) preferences' ? Again, by Stefan's logic, what would be the place for physical combat sports like wrestling and boxing? If 'personal preferences may be violently inflicted upon others' is not valid, doesn't that mean such sports are not in the personal preferences category, but either in the morally good or evil? That would seem rather bizarre. (perhaps this issue results partly from the aforesaid conflation of the actions being enforceable on the actor/perpetrator as a result of their behaviour, which admittedly, is one mark of a 'moral' imperative, and on the acted-upon/victim, as part of the initial behaviour itself, which admittedly is generally immoral and violates the NAP, but is an entirely different issue.) In his 'Seven Categories', has not Mr. Molyneux simply built 'non-violence' into his definition of aesthetically positive and personally positive, assuming the violence can only ever be justified in response to immoral behaviour, without justifying this rationally? In other words, has he not tied violence, under the guise and excuse of scientific universality, to enforcement of the 'good' and UPB? He then eliminates rape from 'the good' (illogically, I have argued), and then from APA and personal preference on the basis of his fundamentally arbitrary definitions, which assume what he should be attempting to prove. Going back to his discussion of the NAP where perhaps he supposes to have proved this, we see here his only argument is that a theory must be universal, or, to quote, 'rocks fall down'. This seems to be a very weak argument. It is exactly like ignoring penguins and ostriches and insisting 'All birds can fly' is more correct and 'scientific' than 'Some birds can fly' because of its greater universality. One cannot simply assume there are no morally relevant distinctions to be made between different instances of initiating force. And afterall, if the more universal a theory is the better, how is one even justified in bringing in the word 'initiation'? Wouldn't it be more universal, and thus, according Mr. Molyneux, more 'rationally consistent', simply to say 'it is universally preferable not to use force at all'? As I said, this insistence on universality is fundamentally arbitrary and results in assuming what needs to be proved.

Stefan argues that rape cannot be a personally negative action (PNA) since in that case the victim couldn't justify using force to resist, whereas the rapist would supposedly be justified in using force to carry out the assault. It would seem that this argument is not water-tight either, firstly because resisting attack and initiating are not strictly identical, especially in all circumstances, so there is no reason in theory to subsume them under the same maxim, regardless of what Mr. Molyneux claims about 'universality', and, secondly, the notion that PNAs can never be enforced by violence is, as has already been argued, simply assumed rather than proven.

Stefan argues that rape cannot be an aesthetically negative action (ANA) because they cannot be enforced by violence. Again there is a conflation between 'enforced' on the victim and perpetrator. He also says that 'being late' would be an ANA because it is avoidable, but, as I have argued, it isn't always. It would seem more a question of the intimacy and invasiveness of the crime, together with the traumatic emotions it tends to provoke, rather than its 'avoidability', that is at issue.

Stefan argues that 'rape' fit the criteria of evil, because it involves the initiation of the use of force, it isn't logically contradictory, its avoidable, and it doesn't fit into any of the other categories. He argues here that if the maxim was 'it is moral to take one's pleasure, regardless of the displeasure of others', that would be logically inconsistent because, in that case, it would be moral to enforce two contradictory behaviours, such as rape and the resistance to rape. I grant that this would indeed be contradictory based on Mr. Molyneux's definition of 'moral' behaviour. However, I have argued that Mr. Molyneux has failed to prove rape could not fall into one of the previous categories. Furthermore, he has still nowhere proven that there is such a thing as moral behaviour or UPB that ought to be enforced. Nor has he proven that the initiation of force is always evil to any mildly sceptical enquirer, - he has basically just assumed it - as I have already explained. Actually, it seems that 'universally preferable behaviour' is a highly misleading term, because Mr. Molyneux means by it not what is really universally preferable, but what people 'ought' to prefer, (despite his arguments for it only supporting the former, as I have already shown). This 'ought' is totally abstracted from any context that might give it meaning, and is not rationally binding except in Mr. Molyneux's own twisted logical realms. In truth, universal humanity is not an organic whole - it has no reason of its own - only the reason of its individual members. Thus, if one is going to find universal values, real 'universally preferable behaviour', a universal 'ought' or Good that holds true for all mankind, one will have to do it by examining each individual's own Good, and finding what they all have in common. That universal goal common to all mankind, as Aristotle argued, is happiness or eudaimonia. However, what constitutes happiness for one human being may mean dire misery for another. Unfortunately, there are never going to be any logical manoeuvrers one can do, no matter how acrobatic, that can prove there are rationally binding rules for human interaction whereby each subjugate one's own happiness, in whatever degree, to the happiness of others. Thus, while the proposition 'it is moral (rational) to take one's own pleasure, regardless of the displeasure of others', is impossible to enforce multi-laterally, as Mr. Molyneux pointed out, the problem is, Mr. Molyneux has not proven that it is rational to enforce (or how it would be done) or follow any moral rule, any rule that abstracts from the primacy of one's own personal experience in view of a consideration of how it impacts upon all human beings, particularly if one can enforce one's own personal pleasure.  Despite all his pretensions to scientific rationality, Mr. Molyneux's adoption of a 'God's-eye' perspective in an attempt to define rationally binding preferences which exclude the initiation of violence abstracts from the most central feature and presupposition of reality itself, the Ego or individual consciousness.   In my opinion, without facing this central thorn head on, one is condemned to mere sophistic trickery and willful delusion, with little or no hope for alleviating its repugnant consequences in our own lives or those of our species as a whole. It is not when we trick ourselves and each other into believing in illusory moral/legal absolutes, but when we learn to see both the whole in ourselves, and ourselves in the whole, that true charity begins. Anybody who is so desperate to prove human decency that they would fall for this type of reasoning is almost certainly an already fundamentally decent person, but it takes a different kind of moral discipline, based not in abstract logical procedures but the kind of empathetic expansiveness of spirit that Mr. Molyneux at times can be so adept at, to really bring such a potentially noble personality type to ripeness. I personally wish there was less of the 'logician' and more of that latter side of his character - the empath -  in this particular book.  To be continued...

 

[PillPuppetPoet]

(Apologies for the re-posting, I only just discovered there was a section of the forum dedicated specifically to UPB, and obviously it fits here better.)

[PillPuppetPoet]

4 hours ago, MMD said:

The scientific method isn't a 'god's-eye' perspective - it is a methodology.

Email me at [email protected] and I'd be happy to schedule you for the show to debate your criticism on-air.

 

Really? Thank you. I'd be highly honored and obliged to do that! I am still completing my response to it by going through the whole book in this manner, I'll drop you an email  then, once I have finished it in writing. And I don't mean to already be making excuses, but in all honestly I make no claims to be a great at thinking on my feet like Stefan and it would actually make me very nervous! Still, I'm pleased if you think that my objections may yet provide the impetus for some didactic value, and I would be thrilled to try hard to bring something worthwhile to the show, within the year or so if that's convenient. Thanks very much again for your consideration. 

[PillPuppetPoet]

As I see it, there remains an even more central flaw in Mr. Molyneux's theory. That is, his very definition of 'the good' is circular. He defines the morally good, the 'ought; by 'universally preferable and enforceable through violence'; but he also defines 'universally preferable' by 'that which universally ought to be preferred', as well as defining 'enforceable' by 'what ought to be enforced'. Thus, all he is doing here is making the questionable and undemonstrated assertion that moral rules must be universal to all human beings, but nowhere does he define what he means by 'ought', nor does he demonstrate it to be rationally binding, or even rationally significant. In fact, it seems the way he is using it is not in terms of the rational 'ought', as in, 'If I want X, I ought to do such and such in order to obtain it', but merely as a form of sanctimonious moral exhortation. Unless Mr. Molyneux can clearly express what he means by this 'ought' in a way that identifies some objective facts, it must be assumed that he is simply making the category error of conflating facts and injunctions abstracted from the individual souls which either make those injunctions or give them some validity. In other words, it might sound good to be able to 'prove' that one 'ought not to rape, murder, steal, etc' in the abstract, and be a little chastening to some who are easily impressed by such things, but since the 'ought' here is not defined in terms of anything actually existing in reality, or anything else that seems to warrant any rational consideration whatever, it appears to be nothing more than Mr. Molyneux's own somewhat imposing personal injunction passed off as existing 'in reality' itself, when the only 'injunctions' that reality gives, at least that I'm aware of, are our own impulses, which Mr. Molyneux should take as his premise in the demonstration, but instead ignores in favour of proving 'logical contradictions' (which turn out not to be contradictions at all) in the acts under question. In the section on rape, Mr. Molyneux argued that rape couldn't be morally neutral because it was enforced by violence; however, Mr. Molyneux merely assumed that force was objectively immoral if not used to enforce 'the good'. Admittedly, if we grant him this one assumption, he may be able to hoodwink us into quite a lot, but in reality my wager is that he will never be able to prove that anything is objectively immoral or moral, in a rationally binding and non-trivial sense (as well as its rationally binding sense, 'immoral' and other value-laden words also have a factual sense of 'that which is generally considered immoral' – but that does not give rational legitimacy to the general view, it merely multiples and complicates the definitions of the words), except that which is detrimental or conducive to our own happiness – since that is the true rational basis or refutation of our preferences. If Mr. Molyneux believes that reality gives other kinds of injunctions of its own, surely he should explain how it does so and what their nature is before he attempts to define what they order us to do and not do, in the same way that if we were wise we would want to know what a legal code is and how or whether it is enforced before we moved onto learning specific laws that we were expected to obey and how they came into operation. To be continued...

[PillPuppetPoet]

If one turns to Mr. Molyneux's discussion of murder, we see that his arguments are mostly analogous to the case of rape and so dubious for the same reasons. One point that I could still make, is that in his discussion of whether an opposite moral rule could apply to a man who was asleep, i.e. 'I can shoot a man in his sleep anytime I want.' During this discussion, he says this is absurd because 'a man's nature does not fundamentally alter when he naps'. I would just like to say here that there are, however, cases when certain states of being may indeed call for opposite moral rules (although 'sleeping' hardly seems to be one of them). For instance, if I have murdered someone else, then arguably 'murdering' or executing me could be justified, even though my 'nature', at least biologically speaking, is still largely the same. In this case, my status is not really 'naturally' different, but artificially so – i.e. as a result of human (my own) actions. Another example would be if my tribe is at war with another tribe, I may be able to justify putting to death my enemies although the difference is not based on nature but on society. In other words, reversing moral rules, at least in some circumstances, is not really the obvious 'logical impossibility' that Mr. Molyneux maintains, but a procedure that is probably necessary to most, if not all, moral theories.

Let us now discuss Mr. Molyneux's approach to the topic of theft, which is important to understand as from his arguments here he goes on to make very bold assertions regarding the immoral nature of government taxation, that make up a large part of his practical philosophy. He begins by trying to demonstrate that we own our own bodies and, in general, are responsible for their effects. He says that 'the very act of controlling my body to produce speech demands the acceptance of my ability to control my speech – an implicit affirmation of my ownership over my own body'. But as he points out himself in the next paragraph, this control may be by a 'demon' or some other agent. In other words, one might say the agent which controls the body, may not be the same one who experiences pleasure and pain within it and so bears the brunt of the 'justice' inflicted upon it. Logically, one has need to enforce justice on the demon, not on the person the demon is possessing; how that can be achieved seems highly uncertain, though. He goes on to say that 'rejecting ownership of the body is to reject all morality, which as we have seen above, is utterly impossible', then using the same argument as his very first one for UPB, i.e. that 'to reject morality is to say that it is universally preferable to believe that there is no such thing as universal preferences'. Firstly, one should point out here that Mr. Molyneux has already seemed to admit in the previous paragraph that a person can be insane, or theoretically demonically possessed, in which case they cannot be held morally responsible. Rather than saying that this leads to the absurdity, if generalized, that there is no morality, to be consistent he should simply accept the fact that if one allows of it in specific cases there is no ostensible reason why it cannot be generalized, and thus ownership of the body and morality remain moot. If he still wanted to affirm ownership of the body and morality, he would have to do it on an empirical rather than a logical basis, inferring their responsibility not from their speech acts, which may or may not be controlled by demons, but from his own inner experience of control of his own body and extrapolation to others. Going back to the second stage of his argument here, as I have already argued, one is not necessarily asserting 'that it is universally preferable to believe that there is no such thing as universal preferences', but merely that oneself has this preference. 

Mr. Molyneux argues that unless there is a right to exclusive self-ownership of one's body and ownership of the effects one's body, in effect other people have a right to our organs. Although this idea is repugnant to most of us, it is neither the only way to interpret the negation of such a right (it could be that other people have a lesser right to our organs, for instance in harvesting them after we die) , nor in itself necessarily absurd. The next section is where Mr. Molyneux brings in his view that mentally deficient people cannot be considered equally responsible to the more able, which, as I have already argued, seems to conflict with his seemingly dubious insistence on universality. Next he argues that saying men have less than 100% property rights involves an infinite regress, 'wherein everybody ends up with infinitely small ownership rights over pretty much everything'. Clearly, saying 'one owns 50% of what they own', does involve such a regress. But, that just seems like sophistry to me, since one can logically maintain that 'one only owns 50% the body one has direct use of', or 'one only owns 50% of the speech utterances that come out of “one”s mouth', or 'one only owns 50% of “one”'s monetary takings in the last fiscal year'. In fact, given the fact that all these things, particularly the latter two, are partly caused by social factors, i.e. the actions of 'others' - not merely our own volition - there is prima face a rather good reason for saying such things. Which is not to say that Mr. Molyneux doesn't have some strong practical arguments against such policies, but as far as I can see, you won't find them in this book. Another point I would like to make is, that if we are 100% responsible for and possess total ownership of the effects of our bodies, that would seem to imply that children are the property of their parents, which needless to say, seems a rather repugnant and practically indefensible view. In the next sections, Mr. Molyneux repeats some similar arguments as for rape, saying in this case that theft 'both affirms and denies the existence of property rights', since the thief necessarily wants to hold onto what he has stolen. This argument seems sound enough, although it appears the 'thief' may have different notions of what constitutes property than Mr. Molyneux, which may in his own mind, and even according to UPB, legitimate his own 'reallocation' (for instance, I cannot see a logical contradiction in the Marxism dictum 'to each according to his need, from each according to his capacity').

To be continued... 

[PillPuppetPoet]

 

We will briefly look at Mr. Molyneux's argument against the initiation of violence, and in favour of self-defence. Once again he says that if the initiation of violence is moral, it requires 'that he resist virtue to enable virtue, which is self-contradictory'. As we have already seen, this is far from a water tight argument. When Mr. Molyneux does try to prove the right of self-defence, his first and second arguments are by analogies, saying it would be 'akin to a medical theory that said that illness is bad, but that it is evil to attempt to prevent or cure it' – since this is merely an analogy, it lacks any rigorous binding force, but, if one does try to take it seriously, one may well opine that often the best way to 'treat' an illness is not to engage in any dramatic procedures, any dramatic 'self-defence' that might make the ailment worse, but merely to carry on in a good-natured and stoical way. Next Mr. Molyneux argues that if one tries to place self-defence in any category other than moral or immoral, it 'is to say that violence cannot be inflicted on others – but the very nature of violence is that it is inflicted on others'. This seems like a confusion between the violence of justice enforcement and the violence of the act itself, which for clear understanding are important to differentiate. Just because the act itself is violent, that doesn't automatically mean that violence is justified in resisting it, which seems to be what Mr. Molyneux is saying by lumping it in his 'immoral' category: as moral philosophers, that is something that we have to try to demonstrate, not assume. Anyhow, as far as I can see, Mr. Molyneux has nowhere given any good reasons to think that all violence is either moral or immoral, he has merely built it into his definitions. I think this all relates to the above where it was insufficiently demonstrated that rape, or other forms of violence, could not fall into 'personally positive' or 'personally negative' categories of behaviour. Mr. Molyneux's assertion that 'self-defence cannot be required behaviour, since required behaviour can be enforced through violence, which would mean that anyone failing to violently defend himself could be legitimately aggressed against. However, someone failing to defend himself is already being aggressed against, and so we end up in a circular situation where everyone can legitimately act violently against a person who is not defending himself, which is not only illogical, but morally abhorrent.' doesn't seem strictly correct, because it is quite possible for the powers that be to enforce such required behaviour, for instance, a child who is bullied at school may be punished further by his parents for not standing up for himself (although obviously I am not recommending this, but it is not strictly 'illogical').

One of the weirdest sections in the book is entitled 'Don't eat fish'. Here Mr. Molyneux argues that 'fish' is too specific a word to be part of a moral rule, rather 'eating is either moral, immoral, or morally neutral.' Suffice to say, when your moral theory entails that devouring whole living human beings is morally indifferentiable from munching on a carrot, it may be a good time to pause and reflect if you might have gone awry somewhere...

In the next section, on 'Animal Rights', Mr. Molyneux makes some interesting assertions but doesn't really come to any conclusions. When he says that 'No human being can exist without killing other organisms such as viruses, plants or perhaps animals. Thus “Human life” is defined as “evil.” But if human life is defined as evil, then it cannot be evil, since avoidance becomes impossible.', this is a fallacious argument, because human life itself is avoidable - for instance by not eating. Again, when he says the proposition 'it is evil to kill people' doesn't make sharks evil, because they can't avoid it, this is faulty logic. Presumably, what he means to say here is that it is NOT always evil to kill people, just as he has just argued that it is not always evil to kill fish, for the reason that some non-human organisms simply can't avoid it. He goes on to opine that rational consciousness is a necessary distinction to a moral theory, which I would agree with, but I would argue that there are probably quite a lot of other relevant distinctions which Mr. Molyneux overlooks for the misguided pursuit of 'universality', which, as we have just seen in his 'Don't eat fish' section, leads to him coming sadly acropper in some areas.

To be continued...

[jpahmad]

7 minutes ago, PillPuppetPoet said:

 

 

One of the weirdest sections in the book is entitled 'Don't eat fish'. Here Mr. Molyneux argues that 'fish' is too specific a word to be part of a moral rule, rather 'eating is either moral, immoral, or morally neutral.' Suffice to say, when your moral theory entails that devouring whole living human beings is morally indifferentiable from munching on a carrot, it may be a good time to pause and reflect if you might have gone awry somewhere...

 

 

You can't eat a living human because in order to do so, you would have to violate the NAP (which is immoral) before doing so.

[PillPuppetPoet]

1 hour ago, jpahmad said:

 

You can't eat a living human because in order to do so, you would have to violate the NAP (which is immoral) before doing so.

That's true, but it would seem to be a good reason for not disregarding the object of a moral proposition when determining whether or not the proposition is valid, no? Also, who says the NAP doesn't apply to fish? Also, Stefan didn't prove the NAP, at least not satisfactorily; his only argument that I could make out was 'rocks fall down', i.e. the universal quality of his theory, which as I have argued is as weak as arguing that 'all birds can fly' is superior to and more scientifically accurate than 'many birds can fly' simply because it is more general. 

 

Thank you for your reply. 

[PillPuppetPoet]

The next section of the book concerns the practical implications of the theory, where we can clearly see the nature of Mr. Molyneux's own reformist agenda, as present in his other books such as 'Practical Anarchy' and 'Everyday Anarchy'. Here he argues, in effect, that soldiers cannot legitimately kill, because all that differentiates them from civilians in a costume. This is, in my opinion, a rather rhetorical and facetious, a 'straw-man' argument, since few people have seriously argued such a thing. While perhaps Mr. Molyneux has some cause to be contemptuous of such official stamps of approval, (in view of the way many armies have historically conducted themselves) it would be sophistical to deny that the 'costume' is merely part of the paraphernalia that tends to come with job, which gains any legitimacy it may have from the selection process and military policy, ultimately derivable from the consent and approval of some high ranking sectors, if not most or even all sectors, of the nation - often in view of that nation's self-defence, which Mr. Molyneux has already argued is a legitimate concern. Furthermore, even soldiers – whatever costume they are wearing - are rarely allowed to kill indiscriminately, away from the field of combat. But, the point here I would like to make is that there are other factors which legitimate or incriminate particular actions than mere biological factors - in this case, it would be something like 'the consent of the governed', just as consent of a woman is relevant to whether or not sexual activity is classed as love-making or rape.

Next Mr. Molyneux presents his view that the government uses violence to exact obedience, in the form of taxation, etc. This is an important insight, but he stretches it a bit far by arguing there is no distinction to be made between this kind of violence and more vigilante attacks, and by saying that there is 'no social contract' at all. As Socrates argued in Plato's Crito, there does exist some kind of tacit contract between the individual and society if he has in some sense chosen to live there - just as Mr. Molyneux believes there is a tacit contract of parents to care for their children, since they have chosen to have them. While the contract may not be as strong as in this latter case, (given the relative difficulty in today's society of living anywhere else but the society one happens to be born a citizen of), and I think Mr. Molyneux is hitting at a very important point in view of his total philosophy, which in my opinion presents a possibly far better way of doing things ( I urge everyone to read 'Practical Anarchy' and 'Everyday Anarchy' before beginning to form an opinion of this matter), I might argue that it is still a bit wrong to over-look the aspects of consent which are involved in such things as armies and taxation, relative to brute vigilante activity, and reduce it to purely a kind of 'alternate universe' thinking where up becomes down, and down becomes up – although I must admit there is an element of that in it which people would do well to take on board (and of course, the fact that citizens have a duty to obey the laws of society doesn't relieve the law-givers of the duty to make just laws which don't stifle the economy or overly restrict human freedom). The other point that I would like to make, is that since Mr. Molyneux has failed, (or so it seems to me), in arguing for the strictly immoral nature of all murder and theft, even if armies and taxation are examples of these his argument is not totally conclusive that these are necessarily immoral or negative. The reason why a policeman can only do his job with a 'uniform' on is clearly so that other people are aware the source of his (however alleged, in Mr. Molyneux's view) authority, and do not feel that they can call on the defence of the (however alleged) authorities in resisting it, which, (even if you don't think this authority is ultimately valid), would most likely breed all kinds of mayhem and unnecessary devastation.

Mr. Molyneux makes a good argument about the irrationality of signing over one's rights to others, i.e., that if one is not competent to make decisions oneself, one is doubtless even less competent to sign over one's entire fate to supposed 'experts'. However this may be, that doesn't seem to address whether or not it is rational to arrogate the right to make decisions about other people's lives to oneself. If one really is able to make better decisions for others than they are, that may well be a good reason, based upon benevolence, to arrogate such decisions. However, suffice to say, there are good arguments against this as a general social policy, at least in practice, one of which is the one Mr. Molyneux makes here, and others which are dealt with rather well in Mr. Molyneux's other books. The next section makes a number of good arguments about the problematic nature of centralized monopoly of violence (i.e. 'government'), although for more detail I recommend the aforementioned two books on anarchy. I must admit, I'm not sure that Mr. Molyneux has totally dispatched the notion that a break-down in such a centralized 'authority' may result in civil war, at least if the transition wasn't very wisely handled, but he has certainly made an encouraging and powerful contribution to clarifying this topic. Next Mr. Molyneux makes some interesting points about religion, and more points about government. But we will move onto his assertions regarding the 'majority', which he basically asserts, on my interpretation, is an artificial category that cannot have attributes lacking in its individual members. While I think what he says has some validity, and I would by no means rush to enshrine the holy sanction of any majority decision in society or among other groups, I would still tend to take issue with it on the basis that, just as a group of atoms can make up something larger than its parts (for instance, a biological cell), so a majority is not just significant in terms of the qualities of its individual members but has a significance and power of its own, by virtue of its collective force, i.e. the sum and amalgamation of these qualities when taken together. In social terms, I am imaging this means, for instance, that the majority has a basic power to inflict its will on the rest of society, which if they fail to submit to the society will tend to disintegrate into civil war. Admittedly, this is partly only a convention, and a more advanced society may be based more in the voluntarism that Mr. Molyneux envisages, but at a certain stage it may seem useful to enshrine majority rule as a value to prevent anarchy (in a more negative sense). Another example would be the hand, which is commonly composed of five fingers. For this hand to be effective, it is necessary for all 5 fingers to work together, even if I am only 51% certain of the goal which I am operating towards. Thus a kind of 'majority rule' ideally  operates in that realm, too. Having said this, I think there are other, often much more important values than majority rule which also need to be very much taken into consideration. To be continued...

[PillPuppetPoet]

Mr. Molyneux closes the book with some more sections of a society run according to UPB, which would be free of the harmful myths of religion and the State. These are rousing and still valid in their way, but unfortunately the UPB framework that was supposed to buttress them here seems faulty. To my mind, there is also somewhat of a lack of connections drawn between the UPB framework, even if it was valid, and the better society they are intended to create. I just cannot see how the supposed 'logical' contradictions in a Statist regime necessarily lead to its failure, which seems to be far more a result the other considerations – for instance the inherent problem with public property, for which no-one has any direct incentive to keep in good condition, as explained in 'Practical Anarchy' – than the 'violations' of UPB argued for here. While he does make some excellent general points, (for instance the way in which a society founded on a false, Statist morality will draw morality itself into discredit), I think Mr. Molyneux could conceivably have done a better job of joining the dots for us, although, given the problems with the alleged proofs in the book there is probably not that much point until a wholesale re-think of the theory has been achieved. My own view is that most of the proposals for society, such as a reduced State, are far better argued for on a practical basis as Stefan has done in his other books. As far as morality goes, I would sooner base it on a combination of natural selfishness, agnosticism or tentative faith as regards religion, and the good conscience i.e. on the desire and the nihilism-vanquishing reflection that all individuals rationally and objectively prefer to attain happiness, and how for all we know there may yet be some kind of mysterious, unseen Oneness to humanity or the Universe, some karmic law and divine plan which hasn't yet been discovered, the mere possibility of which makes in advisable, on a Pascalian like wager, to behave beneficently towards others for the sake of one's own soul in this life and the next. Along with that, one should of course add and expatiate upon that fact that one of the best ways to attain happiness, even in this life, in any functioning society is to contribute positively towards the lives of others with as much empathy, kindness and law-abidingness as possible - to contribute magnanimously to society, which is the very 'ship of fools', the precious life-raft that we are all sailing on - which is one of the most inspiring and motivating aims in life, that, for socio biological reasons if nothing else, fills one with a momentous pathos, impetus, serenity and energy, of which Stefan Molyneux's heroic project to save the dying Western world through the battle of ideas is undoubtedly a remarkable example and model for our times.

 

END. 

[GeorgeW]

So hey, did the on air debate ever happen? I had some of the same objections to the book as PPP and I am interested to know how Stefan answers them.

[PillPuppetPoet]

On 9/4/2018 at 2:34 AM, GeorgeW said:

So hey, did the on air debate ever happen? I had some of the same objections to the book as PPP and I am interested to know how Stefan answers them.

No not yet. My fault. Problem is that I wouldn't necessarily be able to convey many of my points orally. I am not good at remembering all my arguments like Stefan. I just concentrate on a problem for a moment, write something, then all but forget it. I am impaired from psych. treatment. Still, I might give it a go eventually.

[MrNlul77]

On 9/9/2018 at 10:57 AM, PillPuppetPoet said:

I am not good at remembering all my arguments like Stefan. I just concentrate on a problem for a moment, write something, then all but forget it. I am impaired from psych. treatment.

Has the “psych treatment” (which after the amount of comments you’ve posted is no excuse) impaired your cognitive abilities to the point where your unable to read your own comments or remember that printers have been invented. 

I didn’t bother reading past your first couple of objections, which IMO are false and I felt it pointless to continue. The point of philosophical debate is to get to the truth. If you’re debating with someone, whether that person would act immorally should they know the truth is irrelevant to whether something is true or not. 

As I see it, I may be wrong, Universally Preferable Behaviours are situation and desired outcome dependent. UPB’s are IF - AND IF - THEN statements.

IF (whatever the situation is) - AND IF (whatever the desired outcome is) - THEN (whatever the action is)

eg.  IF (the situation is that someone would murder/ harm others if the truth was told) - AND IF ( the desired outcome is to not have the murder/ harm take place) - THEN (the action is to lie) 

eg. IF (people need to eat food to live) - AND IF ( people want to live) - THEN (eat food)

Edit: I read a little bits of your other comments and IMO you’re scared to call in the show because it serves your ego to hide rather than risk exposing the level to which you’re displaying the dunning-Kruger effect. It serves a psychological need you have to feel intelligent/ perhaps superior. You’ve set up a paradigm that helps you feel comfortable/ safe/ it gives you a sense of relief from responsibility and to have that shattered would be to much for you to handle. 

Seriously, I think it would help you psychologically, if Stefan chooses to put in his time, to call in the show. Your “critique” of UPB is the least of your issues.

Good luck and be well

Edit#2 it’s all just my subjective opinion it maybe complete nonsense.

[PillPuppetPoet]

On 9/19/2018 at 3:18 AM, MrNlul77 said:

Has the “psych treatment” (which after the amount of comments you’ve posted is no excuse) impaired your cognitive abilities to the point where your unable to read your own comments or remember that printers have been invented. 

I didn’t bother reading past your first couple of objections, which IMO are false and I felt it pointless to continue. The point of philosophical debate is to get to the truth. If you’re debating with someone, whether that person would act immorally should they know the truth is irrelevant to whether something is true or not. 

As I see it, I may be wrong, Universally Preferable Behaviours are situation and desired outcome dependent. UPB’s are IF - AND IF - THEN statements.

IF (whatever the situation is) - AND IF (whatever the desired outcome is) - THEN (whatever the action is)

eg.  IF (the situation is that someone would murder/ harm others if the truth was told) - AND IF ( the desired outcome is to not have the murder/ harm take place) - THEN (the action is to lie) 

eg. IF (people need to eat food to live) - AND IF ( people want to live) - THEN (eat food)

Edit: I read a little bits of your other comments and IMO you’re scared to call in the show because it serves your ego to hide rather than risk exposing the level to which you’re displaying the dunning-Kruger effect. It serves a psychological need you have to feel intelligent/ perhaps superior. You’ve set up a paradigm that helps you feel comfortable/ safe/ it gives you a sense of relief from responsibility and to have that shattered would be to much for you to handle. 

Seriously, I think it would help you psychologically, if Stefan chooses to put in his time, to call in the show. Your “critique” of UPB is the least of your issues.

Good luck and be well

Edit#2 it’s all just my subjective opinion it maybe complete nonsense.

Wow. Where do I start with this ?

Real character assassination at someone who has simply been frank enough to admit he isn't anywhere near as verbally competent as he'd like to be.  Obviously your 'depth psychology' sessions have set up a 'paradigm' where you feel it necessary to be extremely and unjustly harsh on your interlocutors for any admission of weakness. (That is one of the flaws of modern psychology with its excessive interest in 'debunking' and emphasis on exposing 'hidden motives'. )

Sure, I could just read sections of it out, but its rather long and I can't read all of it out can I ? Either way, it would come across very awkwardly. Still, I may very well do that at some point if its agreeable to all parties. For someone who thinks so little of my writing as you apparently do, I can't understand why you think I have such an urgent 'responsibility' to get myself on the show. Maybe I shouldn't say this, and I say it with the proviso that I do really admire Stefan's work in many other respects, but I feel it would also be rather disingenuous to go out of my way to appear on the show as I honestly do not think enough of UPB to even have a serious philosophical interest in it. Hence why I've already forgotten most of it (indeed it didn't make any definite memory pathways even while I was writing it, because I feel the whole theory is baseless, illogical and amounts to spinning sophistical words together in thin air! I generally remember only TRUE things, not false, nonsense things I disagree with and all my countless objections to them).

The only thing you say that is true is that I don't exactly relish the idea of the debate, or it makes me feel 'uncomfortable'. Not because I would find it unbearably 'shattering' or a 'relief from responsibility' (what 'responsibility' exactly?), but because like everyone who is rational I want to appear at my best... or at least in a way that adequately represents my ideas. There is nothing defensive or psychologically deficient or illogical about sticking to what you're good at, you know. Although I can say it has genuinely inspired and encouraged me a great deal to find that there are people like Mr. Molyneux out there, my life doesn't revolve around FreedomainRadio either. I am not exactly a joiner. The world is too big for that, and I'm not stubborn enough to stick to one small part of it. (All power to people who are though.) Even if I did get the chance to appear, it would be mostly as an attempt to provide a service to Stefan and his viewers, try to attract an audience for my own writings, and just for the sheer enjoyment of the great privilege to chat to good man like Stefan Molyneux. But given that I'm not confident it would achieve those goals, and due to my own reclusive, introverted nature I find unusual 'social occasions' more stressful than exactly enjoyable (and the fact that I may have just caused some minor offense now by my lack of interest in his favorite theory): why do it ?

I would also suggest your view that my failure to perform that role invalidates what else I have to bring to table is a reflection of your own prejudice in favor of vain public sparring and falling under the influence of a cult of personality, as opposed to the appreciation of ideas for their own sake. Such things are not without legitimate attraction, but the written word is not without its own value. Again, why do you seem to be so offended that I don't jump at the chance to come on the show, when you don't even seem to value the more substantial contribution I've already made? I'd say that is more like a projection of your own insecurities about your devotion to the theory in question and/or the thinker behind it. Why do you think I have some 'responsibility' - that I owe it to you or someone - to go on the show? Is this some kind of Royal Court where 'he who is invited before the King must not dare refuse'? There's no disrespect to Stefan Molyneux here. Its precisely because I put such stock in his opinion that I feel somewhat unworthy or uneasy about gracing the presence of him and his listeners. As you say, the reason I haven't booked an appointment as of yet is partly own issues. I really didn't think it was such a big deal or reason to try to humiliate someone by questioning their self-awareness though.

According to my own philosophy, people must do what they feel comfortable with, not try to force themselves into things which they don't. In my opinion, the problem is not that the former serves my 'ego', but that the latter is a form of cowardice - an inability to stay true to and assert one's own emotional needs due to fear of appearing ridiculous, weird, or stand-off-ish. While I don't mind criticism per se, nor do I feel the further intimidation tactics you've used here are either justified or the right way to make someone feel like doing anything. What next? Are you gonna call me a 'pussy'? I dare say this might be some 'toxic masculinity' you have going there. I'm sorry, but I don't respond to that kind of motivation. I think you should learn to appreciate and respect people's concerns rather than trying to undermine their own value systems by purported references to psychological instability. I think you will find it is much more effective.

If I want to go on the show, and they are happy to have me on, I will. Its not for you to tell me when. If FreedomainRadio want to issue me some kind of 'ultimatum', that is entirely up to them (but I highly doubt they will.) I really didn't think it was such an issue, and in fact, although I strongly refute the charge that it would be 'better for ME' to appear on the show, and that NOT doing so represents some kind of 'psychological abnormality', the fact that there is such intense feeling over my post will only act as a greater impetus for me to finally get around to it and make the effort to swat up a bit as necessary. If I've offended anyone involved with the show, I sincerely regret it. I think Stefan Molyneux seems like an extremely fair-minded guy though, who wouldn't take offence too easily even if he did find someone's behavior rather evasive, (as long as they weren't doing it to get the better of him in an argument, anyway - which I am actually not, btw). I think Stefan Molyneux is easily man enough to tolerate someone posting a critique of his work without them being FORCED to come on his show. If I am wrong, well... so much for 'free' domain. :-/ Bear in mind, I have bought all his books available on Amazon and donated to him personally (and I have receipts to prove it), and I urge everyone else who is able to do so. IMHO, his ethics needs re-working though. But its just my opinion. And you think nothing of it, anyway - right? Come on, if you're not prepared to read my essay, which I've already gone to a lot of trouble to write and conveys all my ideas much better than even I can myself, why should I be bothered to put myself through what I've already said would be a bit of a stressful and unnatural experience for me? 

By the way, I felt no real need to defend myself like I just have above, but I had some spare time on my hands so I found it entertaining to do so. Hopefully you'll find my response somewhat worthwhile - if you've bothered to actually read it this far.

As regards your response to my critique: 'whether someone would act immorally is irrelevant to whether something is true or not'. But Stefan isn't arguing that: he's not arguing whether something it 'true or not', he's arguing for UPB. And on that account, the argument is a failure. 

As regards the 'IF/THEN' interpretation, I really don't even remember how that fits in with Stefan's theory (see why I am not too keen to get into a verbal debate). But, as I've outlined above, that interpretation won't save his hole-ridden arguments for the various absolutes he tries to prove. 

Have a nice day. 

[neeeel]

On 9/20/2018 at 2:29 AM, PillPuppetPoet said:

I honestly do not think enough of UPB to even have a serious philosophical interest in it

you have spent I dont know how long typing out very long posts critiquing UPB ( a philosophical work), but you have no serious philosophical interest in it?

 

Quote

I feel the whole theory is baseless, illogical and amounts to spinning sophistical words together in thin air

 

This isnt an argument. I suppose you might claim that you have already supported this statement in previous posts, but I havent been able to determine exactly what your problems with UPB are from reading your posts. 

[PillPuppetPoet]

On 9/21/2018 at 8:22 PM, neeeel said:

you have spent I dont know how long typing out very long posts critiquing UPB ( a philosophical work), but you have no serious philosophical interest in it?

 

 

This isnt an argument. I suppose you might claim that you have already supported this statement in previous posts, but I havent been able to determine exactly what your problems with UPB are from reading your posts. 

My philosophical interest in the TRUTH, not in what I perceive to be other people's mistakes and logical muddles about it. Logical muddles are not interesting to me, I don't remember them. My limited memory is more dedicated to the nature of the soul, the nature of society, the nature of the Cosmos, search for the good life, weighing up different values and outlooks, actual logical relations, and intellectual and world-history dynamics, etc. I wrote the critique because Stefan Molyneux was one of the very few things that inspired me and kept me going through very low periods. Not only do I like listening to what he has to say, but being something of a cult figure he offers a ready made platform here to engage with real philosophy among people who share a similar outlook to myself. So, I wasn't engaging in UPB because I liked UPB, but because UPB was considered by a philosopher who I find very engaging and relevant to be relevant to his overall system. It may not seem like much of a service - seen as I basically came at it from the point of view of demolishing the theory (rightly or not) - but it was basically just meant as my own contribution to this thriving community and my own personal homage to Stefan's work. The very reason I felt I had something to contribute was because I so strongly DISAGREED with it, and I thought I could see a lot of its holes; on the other hand, I haven't bothered commenting on the parts of his work that have influenced me most because, in that case, I am the student sitting at the Master's feet trying to absorb his every word - rather than feeling that I have some kind of better view of things which I can offer to others. So, really NO, my interest in UPB was, just being brutally honest, not philosophical and truth-orientated, it was merely an intellectual exercise and a kind of challenge I set myself. Sorry to make this unflattering analogy, but I might as well have been deconstructing a film I thought was poor, going into minute detail about why I didn't like it. The film itself didn't teach me anything profound; more like I was hoping to teach others a few things through it. I'm sure that sounds rather arrogant and ridiculous to those who  don't see anything wrong with the theory, but I am confident in my own perceptions and I reserve the right to my own opinion. There is no use deferring to others out of far greater market share when the truth seems a certain way to you.

Of course that wasn't intended as my argument; of course that's what I would claim. There is no use going into it again either, if you can't see what my objections are in that critique above then nothing I can say here could possible make you, either. I would humbly suggest though (because I myself think my objections are good) that if you can't see my objections, you're not approaching it logically, but are perhaps too emotionally committed to putting stock in what the Great One has to say despite all evidence to the contrary. Sorry for being so rude, but as I've made clear already, from where I'm sitting this theory in an Emperor With No Clothes and Stefan's undoubted charisma is the most likely thing I can think of to be holding it together. Its natural that one would automatically place a lot of worth in his productions, because so much of what he says is amazingly enlightening, extremely relevant to our lives today and rationally persuasive. As I say though, one has to have the courage to call bullshit where that's what one's eyes are telling one. It would be a disservice to Stefan Molyneux to do anything else, who has so dedicated himself to tireless rational confrontations in pursuit of truth, unmasking and urging us to be wary of so-called 'authority' figures, and embracing criticism.

Maybe I have missed something important though. As I said, my recollection of even my own essay isn't good. But, if you do come up with any questions, I'll try to answer them by reading back through it a bit. Let me know. 

[barn]

@PillPuppetPoet

From what I've seen, I'm convinced that your intentions are coming from a constructive place rather than anything else.

It's ok to be less than perfect. (perfection is an impossible standard, designed to paralyse... Just discard it being the only option.)

I'll be tuning in, listening curiously to the both of you, when it happens. All things in their due time... I just hope it won't take years... preferably and it's completely up to you guys!

Have a good day, today as well!