Physicalism (Materialism) Verifies Free Will

[Mole]

Physicalism (Materialism) Verifies Free Will

Defining free will and physicalism

The 'will' is the conscious experience of deciding and initiating human actions.

Stefan Molyneux defines free will as the ability to compare an action to an ideal standard, but I will take a broader definition of free will which I would assume Stefan would agree with (without allowing for compatibilism):

Free will is the ability to choose between possible actions independently of events that are external to a persons 'will'. That is, a person who decided to pursue action A at time X could have chosen action B under exactly the same external circumstances if he or she had 'willed' to do so.

The opposite of free will is determinism which is: the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the 'will'. Another definition of determinism is that events including the 'will' are determined by previously existing causes, however, this definition will not be used because I believe it does not necessarily touch the core of the issue which is whether our 'will' can act undetermined by external causes. If we were to assume this second definition, then determinism would be compatible with free will.

Physicalism (also known as materialism) is the doctrine that the real world consists only of the physical world.

The contradiction between free will and physicalism

In this section, I will play devil's advocate and suggest a contradiction between free will and physicalism.

Stefan argues that it is self-evident that free will exists, i.e., that our will causes human actions, as anyone arguing against this is causing their human action of 'arguing'. Not only that, but they are assuming that the other person is in a sense causing their 'listening' or 'acceptance' or 'non-acceptance' of their argument, which are also human actions.

An issue with free will that probably troubles the minds of others in this community is that if free will is self-evident, it is true. If it is true, then determinism is false. If determinism is false then physicalism is false. It seems if we accept free will, we must abandon physicalism and adopt mind-body dualism, that is, that the 'will' is real but is independent of the physical world. It seems that the physical world is synonymous with objective reality because all that is objective is in some way measurable and that which is measurable is physical. However, mind-body dualism would mean that reality consists of more than objective reality, which means truth is subjective. However, the statement that 'truth is subjective' demonstrates that truth is objective, which is a contradiction. We are left in a bind. Either determinism or free will is true. Determinism must be false because free will is self-evident, and free will must be false because mind-body dualism is self-contradictory. This is a contradiction.

Defending free will and physicalism

I believe there is an error in the above reasoning. It does not follow that "if determinism is false then physicalism is false". In fact, I will now argue that if physicalism is true, then free will is true, and hence determinism is false.

The 'will', self, or consciousness exists and this is self-evident (cogito ergo sum; I think therefore I am). Therefore, physicalism would imply that the 'will' is physical. This conclusion is in line with physicalist theories of consciousness including Integrated Information Theory (IIT) which states that a system's consciousness is determined by its causal properties and is therefore an intrinsic, fundamental property of any physical system. If physicalism is true, then consciousness is a property of the causal links between neurons in a person's neural network. Then, consciousness is identical to the neural network. They are one of the same.

If consciousness is the neural network, then our 'will' is also the neural network. Determinism would suggest that human actions are caused by this neural network but that human actions are caused by events external to our 'will':

Determinism would suggest that the neural network itself is determined by external events such as non-conscious 'zombie' networks or neural networks connected to but external to the brain such as the peripheral nervous system. Therefore, if our brain determines actions and our brain is determined by external events, then our actions are determined by external events.

However, it is not necessarily the case that external events determine our conscious neural network. According to IIT, the neural network is causally linked in such a way that the system is more akin to a positive feedback loop than a feed-forward system. That is, rather than external events causing consciousness causing action, external events play a role in consciousness (for example, I might say the reason I drank a glass of water is that I am thirsty) but that consciousness is caused by prior consciousness. Therefore, actions would be caused by consciousness, but consciousness would not be caused by external events. And because the 'will' is synonymous with our experience of consciousness, our 'will' has self-caused the action. It is not even that non-conscious processes cause our 'will'. It is that our 'will' and indeed our 'self' is composed in that integrated neural network that plays out causes and effects with itself. This is exactly what free will is, it is the freedom of the 'will' to act without being determined by external events, and because the ‘will’ is equal to the neural networks, the neural networks don’t count as external events. The best way to describe free will would be to say that it is an endogenous system. So we must conclude that physicalism actually demonstrates that free will is true and determinism is false. Looking at it from this perspective, it is completely, both ontologically and metaphysically accurate to say that 'I' convinced myself do to action A or action B.

Conclusion

The conception of free will I have suggested seems to dissolve much of the worries that people have about determinism. Some may worry that if determinism is true, then how can we ever be satisfied that we act rationally or are responsible for our actions? If external events determined that I would do something irrational or evil, how are we to expect any kind of integrity from ourselves. If we cannot expect integrity from ourselves, how can we say that we are really rational animals and how can we assign responsibility to ourselves and others? It seems that if determinism is true, then we are in a way doomed to a quasi-pathological life and we are fundamentally not in control of our own happiness. I believe this is the fundamental worry among free willers. The conception of free will I suggest solves this issue by suggesting that our self-integrity lies within the physical integrity (literally the integrated information) in our neural networks that retain a self-generating, endogenous system. If we look at free will with a physicalist lense, I believe we can preserve free will without compromising physicalism.

 

[barn]

30 minutes ago, Mole said:

without allowing for compatibilism 

30 minutes ago, Mole said:

Free will is the ability to make choices independently of events that are external to a persons 'will'. Therefore, a person who decided to pursue action A at time X could have chosen action B under exactly the same external events if he or she had 'willed' to do so.

(no influence?)

 Independent of my will is how many people choose to buy baguettes on a specific day, nevertheless when I am about to grab a pair and they're all gone, I can't disregard the choices of others and pick up two of them if people before me, they'd bought them all up.

E:dit - say you added 'from the pool of perceivable & available options.

Edited June 21, 2018 by barn
E:dit

[Mole]

4 minutes ago, barn said:

(no influence?)

 Independent of my will is how many people choose to buy baguettes on a specific day, nevertheless when I am about to grab a pair and they're all gone, I can't disregard the choices of others and pick up two of them if people before me, they'd bought them all up.

I think you know what I mean. To be more specific, the possible choices are dependent on external events, but that making the choice among the possible choice is independent of external events. I would prefer if people respond to the actual argument rather than particular things I have written unless they can show that it's relevant to my actual argument/whole idea. The purpose of writing this post is to convey an idea and that's it, I don't have time to discuss particular details of what I wrote unless is it pertinent to the idea.

[barn]

7 minutes ago, Mole said:

I think you know what I mean.

What do you think I know?

(not trying to be difficult but that looks presumptuous)

7 minutes ago, Mole said:

. I would prefer if people respond to the actual argument rather than particular things I have written unless they can show that it's relevant to my actual argument/whole idea.

Well, yeah I understand you would like to see your vision being taken further, interacted with.

It's just I can't mind-read and that part seemed conflicting. Sorry if that's bothersome, I hoped you would welcome questions... maybe not.

Do you mind me asking clarifications if it's unclear what you're putting forward?

7 minutes ago, Mole said:

The purpose of writing this post is to convey an idea and that's it, I don't have time to discuss particular details of what I wrote unless is it pertinent to the idea. 

What do you mean by "I don't have time to discuss particular details"?

Is it that you preferred just went along with what you suggested as a whole, like a thought experiment? (like 'riddle me this' type approach?)

Edited June 21, 2018 by barn
E:dit - I mean, if you asked for that... I could see that as an honest ask for doing someone a favour.

[barn]

9 minutes ago, Mole said:

To be more specific, the possible choices are dependent on external events, but that making the choice among the possible choice is independent of external events.

Thanks by the way, sort of what I asked. (as in: responding to my analogy would have been more preferable)

[Mole]

17 minutes ago, barn said:

What do you think I know?

(not trying to be difficult but that looks presumptuous)

Well, yeah I understand you would like to see your vision being taken further, interacted with.

It's just I can't mind-read and that part seemed conflicting. Sorry if that's bothersome, I hoped you would welcome questions... maybe not.

Do you mind me asking clarifications if it's unclear what you're putting forward?

What do you mean by "I don't have time to discuss particular details"?

Is it that you preferred just went along with what you suggested as a whole, like a thought experiment? (like 'riddle me this' type approach?)

I shouldn't have assumed that you know what I mean, I apologise for that. By specific details, I just mean the actual things I have written down outside of the context of the idea I'm trying to convey. I was not accusing you of doing this, but just cautioning you if you are. Someone can say something factually incorrect but they say it for a purpose and sometimes people when responding ignore the purpose. But it doesn't really matter if what is said is factually incorrect if the purpose is still meaningful in the larger context. But now I know you weren't doing this, you just didn't understand the purpose of why I said that.

[barn]

3 minutes ago, Mole said:

I shouldn't have assumed that you know what I mean, I apologise for that. 

Hey, that's fair and square, accepted. I'm moving past it.

4 minutes ago, Mole said:

By specific details, I just mean the actual things I have written down outside of the context of the idea I'm trying to convey.

Yeah, I know it looks as if I cherry picked for the sake of being argumentative, while I can tell you my aim was to best absorb the meaning of your 'foundations' for the idea proposed, without the need for having to ignore 'annoying splinters' from the get-go.

7 minutes ago, Mole said:

I was not accusing you of doing this, but just cautioning you if you are. 

That's a bit 'paranoid' in my estimation, meaning I think it's 'overkill' but perhaps you disagree. Anyways...

8 minutes ago, Mole said:

Someone can say something factually incorrect but they say it for a purpose and sometimes people when responding ignore the purpose.

I think I know that from having seen it before. (amongst other 'garden variety of approaches')

9 minutes ago, Mole said:

But it doesn't really matter if what is said is factually incorrect if the purpose is still meaningful and justifiable.

... and that's why I suggest (and remind myself) to be open when constructivity is present.

10 minutes ago, Mole said:

But now I know you weren't doing this, you just didn't understand the purpose of why I said that. 

Splendid.

All good, thanks for updating your proposed base.

[ofd]

Quote

The 'will', self, or consciousness exists and this is self-evident (I think, therefore I am).

I fail to see how this is self evident. Experiments with split brain patients make it clear that unconscious action are justified after the fact with made up rationalisations. No matter how hard you press those patients, they will always have an explanation for what they did.

[barn]

1 hour ago, Mole said:

It seems if we accept free will, we must abandon physicalism and adopt cartesian dualism, that is, that the 'will' is real but is independent of the physical world.

Bumped (1) into the above, can't get past it.

Feel free to skip. (based on previous comment, no probs)

I prefer to think in terms of (substance dualism, Descartes) , as in: no body, -> no mind

Similarly,

'Will' can't be independent of the physical realm it 'lives' in, furthermore not every physically appropriate surrogate manifests (a) free-willed entity, hence it's more than just physicality as a pre-requisite that's needed. (Sorry, can only theorise regarding the requirements there)

Is it perhaps that there are levels to free-will, though could be difficult to agree on specifics... maybe a similar approach could be used, akin to how awareness is being 'spliced up'?

(the later, like this levels - look for-> Psychology / Developmental stages, ' levels 0-5 ' , levels   ')

E:dit

Edited June 21, 2018 by barn
E:dit - Although my strong inkling is that awareness holds the key here to answers that'll provide much better questions for examining free-will afterwards.

[Mole]

3 hours ago, barn said:

I prefer to think in terms of (substance dualism, Descartes) , as in: no body, -> no mind 

I have now replaced Cartesian dualism with mind-body dualism.

 

3 hours ago, barn said:

'Will' can't be independent of the physical realm it 'lives' in, furthermore not every physically appropriate surrogate manifests (a) free-willed entity, hence it's more than just physicality as a pre-requisite that's needed. (Sorry, can only theorise regarding the requirements there)

Maybe I should say not contingent instead of independent? As with the definition of free will, I mean not determined by. Also, what do you mean by a physically appropriate surrogate?

3 hours ago, barn said:

Is it perhaps that there are levels to free-will, though could be difficult to agree on specifics... maybe a similar approach could be used, akin to how awareness is being 'spliced up'?

There are two different meaning to levels. I am aware researchers are splicing up awareness and even free will to say that there are different degrees of free will working at the same time. Another meaning is reflected in the paper you cited, which is suggesting different stages of awareness, just like developmental stages that a child goes through. I will evaluate both meanings with the original idea I had posted.

First meaning (degrees of free will):

It seems to me that if my argument is sound then our awareness is fundamentally in control of external causes affecting it. For example, I may be thirsty, but my thirst doesn't over-ride my free will. Because awareness is unified (awareness is a whole package) it seems that if any external cause were to create an effect in my neural network, the neural network would act as a whole to integrate this effect with the rest of the neural network through causal links that go through the entire network. Indeed, this is exactly what we experience when we realise we are thirsty. The neurobiological changes reflect the phenomenological changes. Because of this reason, I have doubt that there are levels of free will.

Second meaning (stages of free will):

Of course, responsibility depends on knowledge. It would seem that as more information is integrated the person reaches higher stages of free will.

[barn]

24 minutes ago, Mole said:

I have now replaced Cartesian dualism with mind-body dualism

Yes, you did.

22 minutes ago, Mole said:

3 hours ago, barn said:

Is it perhaps that there are levels to free-will, though could be difficult to agree on specifics... maybe a similar approach could be used, akin to how awareness is being 'spliced up'?

There are two different meaning to levels. I am aware researchers are splicing up awareness and even free will to say that there are different degrees of free will working at the same time. Another meaning is reflected in the paper you cited, which is suggesting different stages of awareness, just like developmental stages that a child goes through. I will evaluate both meanings with the original idea I had posted.

First meaning (degrees of free will):

It seems to me that if my argument is sound then our awareness is fundamentally in control of external causes affecting it. For example, I may be thirsty, but my thirst doesn't over-ride my free will. Because awareness is unified (awareness is a whole package) it seems that if any external cause were to create an effect in my neural network, the neural network would act as a whole to integrate this effect with the rest of the neural network through causal links that go through the entire network. Indeed, this is exactly what we experience when we realise we are thirsty. The neurobiological changes reflect the phenomenological changes. Because of this reason, I have doubt that there are levels of free will.

Second meaning (stages of free will):

Of course, responsibility depends on knowledge. It would seem that as more information is integrated the person reaches higher stages of free will. 

This looks beautiful to me, what you just did. Thank you for the clarity too. I'm gonna have to reread it carefully later.

A hat-raise! Thanks.

p.s. {I'm starting to like your 'style' .}

[Mole]

3 hours ago, ofd said:

I fail to see how this is self evident. Experiments with split brain patients make it clear that unconscious action are justified after the fact with made up rationalisations. No matter how hard you press those patients, they will always have an explanation for what they did. 

Your example seems to be a case against free will rather than the will itself. I would think the will is self-evident just as consciousness is self-evident.

[Mole]

3 minutes ago, barn said:

p.s. {I'm starting to like your 'style' .}

Haha, thanks. I'm just experimenting with my style. Thanks for contributing to my experiment

[RichardY]

So a person has "freewill" under physicalism in so far as their will, is out of sync with reality. Would be like if you were playing a First person shooter online, someone goes out of sync and you miss shooting them. The Lag theory of frewill? Or possibly the "moist robot hypothesis"

Physicalism still does not explain consciousness. A person may act conscious as in after a major accident or sleepwalking, but not have consciousness. I guess it might be possible that only yourself has consciousness (solipsism). Trust me when I say I have consciousness, and am not a philosophical zombie....

Physicalism would hold matter to be primary and "consciousness" to be an after effect, materialism. I'm more in line with "Substance"(Aristotlian) rather than "Materialism"(Locke), which means my current metaphysics is Neutral Monism, which means that mental affects take equal precedent to the material, and consciousness as a whole is a construction of the interacting elements. However I would entertain the idea as "consciousness" as primary, being the mind of God idea, or Subjective Idealism.

[barn]

Hey Mole,

These are really complicated things , if I accidentally forget to mention something or skip something... I welcome your reminding me of it, if it happened.

(1) I'm suggesting revisiting this part again, please

9 hours ago, Mole said:

ORIGINAL - [...] It seems if we accept free will, we must abandon physicalism and adopt mind-body dualism, that is, that the 'will' is real but is independent of the physical world. [...]

(no body  ->  no mind)

A suggestion, the following (curious what you thought of it)

9 hours ago, Mole said:

PROPOSED - [...] It seems if we accept free will, we must abandon physicalism and adopt mind-body dualism, that is, that the 'will' is real but it is tied to the preexistence of a physical world unidirectionally. [...]

(Although, I must admit I can't disprove adequately the inverse, that non-matter can't, in no circumstances can it create matter.)

I know my suggestion might be perturbing some things down the chain of conclusions but I think it's important to make that distinction, to highlight that one-way relationship.

Or maybe I'm completely wrong, in which case I should be helped to see my error.

4 hours ago, Mole said:

7 hours ago, barn said:

'Will' can't be independent of the physical realm it 'lives' in, furthermore not every physically appropriate surrogate manifests (a) free-willed entity, hence it's more than just physicality as a pre-requisite that's needed. (Sorry, can only theorise regarding the requirements there)

Maybe I should say not contingent instead of independent? (1)

As with the definition of free will, I mean not determined by. (2)

Also, what do you mean by a physically appropriate surrogate? (3)

(1) - See my first comment in this reply above.

(2) - Ok.

(3) - Sure. Back then (IQ-G), now, additionally (living vs. dying)

I was thinking back then about how IQ-G (biologically determined) isn't sufficient for free-will, from personal observation, empirically too. Place two smart enough individuals side by side and if one of them isn't capable to manifest free-will in a scenario where the other was capable to utilise it, it's fair to conclude, free-will required more than just sufficient bodies/brains...or 'whatnot' (Chemistry is 'reallyverytoomuch' complicated here, for me)

But now, when I have re-visited it, it's also likely that since free-will can be partially blocked/erased (ie - in abuse, coercion, threat), it must have been either intrinsically present before as a capability and later developed further into a more complex sytem.

Or in the case if it wasn't intrinsically there, maybe it was taught/learnt.

Which made me ask: Would an individual be able to survive on a deserted island (provided enough food, no predators, endless supply of fdr podcasts... was available) by having to rely on the self only, to invent and then manifest free-will? I think yes.

It's because life's core part is an endless chain and continous manifestations of choices. Failing at making decisions on a continuous basis, equals to being very good at atrophy, dying.

Does what I have written make sense to you?

4 hours ago, Mole said:

First meaning (degrees of free will):

It seems to me that if my argument is sound then our awareness is fundamentally in control of external causes affecting it. For example, I may be thirsty, but my thirst doesn't over-ride my free will. Because awareness is unified (awareness is a whole package) it seems that if any external cause were to create an effect in my neural network, the neural network would act as a whole to integrate this effect with the rest of the neural network through causal links that go through the entire network. Indeed, this is exactly what we experience when we realise we are thirsty. The neurobiological changes reflect the phenomenological changes. Because of this reason, I have doubt that there are levels of free will.

· Do you think a human has the ability to put its head in a bucket of water and ... until ... ?

· Well, tell me what you see here. All good?

(If yes, then I'll have to ask you some more because then it's probably me, who's not in picture.):

"our awareness is fundamentally in control of external causes affecting it."

with

"The neurobiological changes reflect the phenomenological changes."

 

· Probably you know how a torrent file is being shared (download from multiple sources the same file in pieces simultaneously, pieces come not in order, ie - download part 1 and 4 and 2 and 3... but in the progression bar you see a 'common' strip, representing the overall progress in percentage written over it (usual progression bar with a percentage, nothing fancy). And in another part of the program (utorrent - it's at the bottom third of the UI)... the already acquired parts/availability (imagine a very sparse barcode becoming denser and denser to the point that it appears as a continous colour, each thinly pixel strip represents a piece of the file you're downloading)...  )

I'm thinking that free-will, self-awareness are things that similar to the analogy with the torrent file being downloaded in pieces, only becomes accessible/available to be opened after a certain quantity of pieces have been gathered. For example you can open the movie file at 89% completion, albeit experiencing some artifacts in the video, unplayable parts while playing the movie until the download is fully terminated. Similarly, I'm wondering if free-will and awareness could be accessed less or more depending on consciousness, which is greatly influenced by age...

4 hours ago, Mole said:

Second meaning (stages of free will):

Of course, responsibility depends on knowledge. It would seem that as more information is integrated the person reaches higher stages of free will.

I'm curious of your opinion... Would you say that my 'torrent' analogy could be applied to stages of free will too? (a file can be accessed from 89% but not before)

4 hours ago, Mole said:

Thanks for contributing to my experiment

Narration: Mouse 1 - He said it's 'His' experiment... If he knew. Should we tell him? Mouse 2 - I don't know. O-ooo, I mean he's family 'n all ...

 

 

[neeeel]

9 hours ago, Mole said:

The 'will' is the conscious experience of deciding and initiating human actions.

So what does this mean exactly? I am assuming "conscious experience" is the important thing here? 

there is conscious experience of lots of things, eg eating a banana. What is different about the conscious experience of deciding and initiating actions, that allows you give it some extra function, that allows you to give it status as an "actor" outside of the material world?

 

[ofd]

Quote

Your example seems to be a case against free will rather than the will itself. I would think the will is self-evident just as consciousness is self-evident.

Sure, but since split brain patients can't experience the will as described by you, it works against both.

[Mole]

13 hours ago, neeeel said:

So what does this mean exactly? I am assuming "conscious experience" is the important thing here? 

there is conscious experience of lots of things, eg eating a banana. What is different about the conscious experience of deciding and initiating actions, that allows you give it some extra function, that allows you to give it status as an "actor" outside of the material world? 

 

2

My argument doesn't necessarily need the 'will' to be an extra function, though it may be. The 'will' is a part of conscious experience, and I think my argument would apply to our entire conscious experience, so the 'will' would be covered by that, whatever the 'will' is exactly. My argument is basically trying to defend the idea of self-causation. Consciousness is a unified experience that perfectly correlates with a multi-directional, unified causal chain. The chain causes human actions. Since the chain is unified and consciousness is unified, external causes cannot change the chain without the entire chain changing. Because the entire chain is changed, consciousness is changed so that it is aware of this external cause. However, if it is aware of this external cause, then the external cause does not determine the conscious experience, so it does not determine human action. Yes, every action is 'determined' by prior causes but we are fully experiencing all these causes, so there are no unknown factors if that makes sense. Rather than actions being determined by external causes, they are self-caused. We often think that if consciousness is contingent on some causal chain, that means it is determined by things outside of our control. But if consciousness is the causal chain, then we only have to worry about causes external to that chain.

 

 

 

[Mole]

3 hours ago, ofd said:

Sure, but since split brain patients can't experience the will as described by you, it works against both. 

Then it seems they are like animals? I would think animals don't have free will.

[Mole]

14 hours ago, barn said:

19 hours ago, Mole said:

22 hours ago, barn said:

'Will' can't be independent of the physical realm it 'lives' in, furthermore not every physically appropriate surrogate manifests (a) free-willed entity, hence it's more than just physicality as a pre-requisite that's needed. (Sorry, can only theorise regarding the requirements there)

Maybe I should say not contingent instead of independent? (1)

As with the definition of free will, I mean not determined by. (2)

Also, what do you mean by a physically appropriate surrogate? (3)

(1) - See my first comment in this reply above.

(2) - Ok.

(3) - Sure. Back then (IQ-G), now, additionally (living vs. dying)

I was thinking back then about how IQ-G (biologically determined) isn't sufficient for free-will, from personal observation, empirically too. Place two smart enough individuals side by side and if one of them isn't capable to manifest free-will in a scenario where the other was capable to utilise it, it's fair to conclude, free-will required more than just sufficient bodies/brains...or 'whatnot' (Chemistry is 'reallyverytoomuch' complicated here, for me)

But now, when I have re-visited it, it's also likely that since free-will can be partially blocked/erased (ie - in abuse, coercion, threat), it must have been either intrinsically present before as a capability and later developed further into a more complex sytem.

Or in the case if it wasn't intrinsically there, maybe it was taught/learnt.

Which made me ask: Would an individual be able to survive on a deserted island (provided enough food, no predators, endless supply of fdr podcasts... was available) by having to rely on the self only, to invent and then manifest free-will? I think yes.

It's because life's core part is an endless chain and continous manifestations of choices. Failing at making decisions on a continuous basis, equals to being very good at atrophy, dying.

Does what I have written make sense to you? 

 

Oh, I see what you mean by physically appropriate surrogate now. You were just trying to explain how 'will' is dependent on the physical world, particularly dependent on the kind of thing it manifests (particular brains). Yes, that may be a problem for dualism.

What I understand from the rest of what you said is that you are questioning the pre-requisites of the 'will'. I would agree with Stefan here that free will is the ability to compare an ideal standard. That entails particular relationships in the brain. It is essentially a pattern of consciousness.

[Mole]

15 hours ago, RichardY said:

So a person has "freewill" under physicalism in so far as their will, is out of sync with reality. Would be like if you were playing a First person shooter online, someone goes out of sync and you miss shooting them. The Lag theory of frewill? Or possibly the "moist robot hypothesis"

I am not sure what you mean out of sync with reality. I am not sure where I said or implied that.

 

15 hours ago, RichardY said:

Physicalism still does not explain consciousness. A person may act conscious as in after a major accident or sleepwalking, but not have consciousness. I guess it might be possible that only yourself has consciousness (solipsism). Trust me when I say I have consciousness, and am not a philosophical zombie....

I believe these people are conscious, but they cannot retain memories so they cannot remember what they did.

15 hours ago, RichardY said:

Physicalism would hold matter to be primary and "consciousness" to be an after effect, materialism. I'm more in line with "Substance"(Aristotlian) rather than "Materialism"(Locke), which means my current metaphysics is Neutral Monism, which means that mental affects take equal precedent to the material, and consciousness as a whole is a construction of the interacting elements. However I would entertain the idea as "consciousness" as primary, being the mind of God idea, or Subjective Idealism. 

 

I don't necessarily think physicalism would hold matter to be primary. I think it can hold matter to be identical to consciousness. In fact, I think it is crucial that it is identical because if consciousness was an after effect of matter, then consciousness would be determined by external elements which is the brain, but that would be determinism. But if consciousness is the elements in the brain, then it is not determined by those elements, it simply is those elements. This means no external elements are necessarily determining it or it's outputs, so it can be self-caused.

[barn]

2 hours ago, Mole said:

Oh, I see what you mean by physically appropriate surrogate now. You were just trying to explain how 'will' is dependent on the physical world, particularly dependent on the kind of thing it manifests (particular brains). Yes, that may be a problem for dualism.

What I understand from the rest of what you said is that you are questioning the pre-requisites of the 'will'. I would agree with Stefan here that free will is the ability to compare an ideal standard. That entails particular relationships in the brain. It is essentially a pattern of consciousness...->only->

 overall

... ->which is 'moving the goalpost' here unintentionally, as consciousness has to be connected with the/an intermediate, and then through it, to matter. (though same unidirectional relationship again)

[RichardY]

6 hours ago, Mole said:

I am not sure what you mean out of sync with reality. I am not sure where I said or implied that.

 

On 6/21/2018 at 10:34 AM, Mole said:

 

The thesis of this article is that physicalism verifies free will by explaining free will as being a phenomenological experience, but also an intrinsic property of some causally multidirectional neural networks. That is, human actions are self-caused rather than determined by causes external to the 'will' because the causally multidirectional neural network is self-contained from external causes and this is reflected phenomenologically.

It's not like people are sealed in a bubble, and even if they were, there could be no context to their communication or action. What I mean by "the lag theory of freewill" (out of sync) or moist robot hypothesis is freewill occurs as some kind of error or due to a gap in space. "Nature abhors a vaccum" - Aristotle (didn't know the quote initially was Aristotle). Wikipedia - "He also argued against the void in a more abstract sense (as "separable"), for example, that by definition a void, itself, is nothing, and following Plato, nothing cannot rightly be said to exist."
 

6 hours ago, Mole said:

I believe these people are conscious, but they cannot retain memories so they cannot remember what they did.

Conscious memories perhaps. Though there are instance that show the retainment of unconscious ones, language is a clear example. Though perhaps in theory if would be possible for an organism to function to a certain extent if it were to copy or use instinct to function. Whole  undividied consciousness is not necessarily a necessity, as far as human experience understands it. What is perceived as whole by consciousness is really a construction of consciousness.

 

6 hours ago, Mole said:

I don't necessarily think physicalism would hold matter to be primary. I think it can hold matter to be identical to consciousness.

It's still acknowledges matter to be first, whether it could or not.... It's not Physicalism then, but Neutral Monism or Property dualism.

6 hours ago, Mole said:

In fact, I think it is crucial that it is identical because if consciousness was an after effect of matter, then consciousness would be determined by external elements which is the brain, but that would be determinism. But if consciousness is the elements in the brain, then it is not determined by those elements, it simply is those elements. This means no external elements are necessarily determining it or it's outputs, so it can be self-caused.

What makes the brain special? Why wouldn't smaller organisms have a very limited sense of consciousness, from their nervous systems. Planarian flatworms can regenerate from thin slithers and grow into a worm with a head, initally thought maybe earthworms. Makes me think of the movie "Men in Black", the regrowing head scene.

[smarterthanone]

On 6/21/2018 at 5:34 AM, Mole said:

Free will is the ability to choose between possible actions independently of events that are external to a persons 'will'. That is, a person who decided to pursue action A at time X could have chosen action B under exactly the same external circumstances if he or she had 'willed' to do so.

The opposite of free will is determinism which is: the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the 'will'. Another definition of determinism is that events including the 'will' are determined by previously existing causes, however, this definition will not be used because I believe it does not necessarily touch the core of the issue which is whether our 'will' can act undetermined by external causes. If we were to assume this second definition, then determinism would be compatible with free will.

My biggest problem with your whole thing are your definitions. If we simply tweak definitions we can prove anything. This is a strawman definition for determinism. I think it is also a purposely vague way of focusing on free will. But lets continue.

Regarding your definition of free will... A person could have chosen Action B instead of Action A but they wanted Action A. If the situation was repeated in the exact same scenario, they will still want Action A and thus they will not pick Action B... ever. How often do you get offered a promotion that you want, that is only good, no downsides... and then turn it down? Never. You can repeat the circumstance 10 million times and you will always take it.

Regarding neural networks being independent of external influence... Your neural network cannot be free from external influence simply because you were born and your neural network was determined by genetics. So that is where we are starting off before you even have to make a 'choice'.

[neeeel]

12 hours ago, Mole said:

Consciousness is a unified experience that perfectly correlates with a multi-directional, unified causal chain.

Sorry, I dont think I know what this means

 

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The chain causes human actions. Since the chain is unified and consciousness is unified, external causes cannot change the chain without the entire chain changing. Because the entire chain is changed, consciousness is changed so that it is aware of this external cause. However, if it is aware of this external cause, then the external cause does not determine the conscious experience, so it does not determine human action. Yes, every action is 'determined' by prior causes but we are fully experiencing all these causes, so there are no unknown factors if that makes sense. Rather than actions being determined by external causes, they are self-caused. We often think that if consciousness is contingent on some causal chain, that means it is determined by things outside of our control. But if consciousness is the causal chain, then we only have to worry about causes external to that chain.

 

No, consciousness is part of the causal chain. There are no external causes ( what would they be external to?). Its not that consciousness is changed as a result of external causes, its that the changes in consciousness were an integral part of the chain already. Every part of the system working with, and on,  every other part of the system, at every moment, unguided and seamless.

 

Consciousness is not aware of every external cause. You could argue that , for example, our brain structure is a reflection of the chain up to the present moment, but there is no awareness of most of that. We are not aware why we do things, or why we feel things, a lot of the time. 

 

[Mole]

On 6/23/2018 at 8:53 AM, neeeel said:

On 6/22/2018 at 7:05 PM, Mole said:

Consciousness is a unified experience that perfectly correlates with a multi-directional, unified causal chain.

Sorry, I dont think I know what this means

It means that consciousness is one experience. It is not like seperate body limbs. Our experience is one thing. And that correlates with an endogenous system. The system is the neural network, and it is the entire neural network working endogenously that makes consciousness one thing.

[Mole]

On 6/23/2018 at 8:53 AM, neeeel said:

No, consciousness is part of the causal chain. There are no external causes ( what would they be external to?). Its not that consciousness is changed as a result of external causes, its that the changes in consciousness were an integral part of the chain already. Every part of the system working with, and on,  every other part of the system, at every moment, unguided and seamless. 

 

When I percieve a cloud, the cloud is part of the causal chain that makes up my consciousness in the sense that it led to my perception. But as you seem to agree, consciousness is another part in the entire chain. Well, then what I mean by external is external to the part that is conscious.

[ofd]

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and it is the entire neural network working endogenously that makes consciousness one thing. 

This is disproven by anaesthetics. Some make you unconsciousness, others leave your consciousness intact while removing only the pain perception and making you follow commands without being able to do otherwise. Like the rest of the brain, consciousness is a modular unit, with parts doing specific parts and those specific parts alone. Take one of those parts out and you will get a different result from your normal experience.

[RichardY]

3 hours ago, ofd said:

This is disproven by anaesthetics. Some make you unconsciousness, others leave your consciousness intact while removing only the pain perception and making you follow commands without being able to do otherwise. Like the rest of the brain, consciousness is a modular unit, with parts doing specific parts and those specific parts alone. Take one of those parts out and you will get a different result from your normal experience.

When you say consciousness is a modular unit. Do you mean?

1)a) Something akin to seperate video/sensory feeds. With a Freudian unconscious, as a repository or dead city as described in "Civilization and it's Discontents". At best "compatibilism"(still determinism though), as actions can be empirically observed. b) Having listened to Spinoza's "The Ethics", that would be a unitary, although not modular consciousness. He concludes Hard Determinism, "as we know not what, from where our actions come". Found Spinoza's The Ethics much better, than Freud's "Civilization and it's Discontents". Although both their views seem very similar. 

2) Actual living complexes and subpersonalities within consciousness. Jungian unconscious. I think Jung's conception of consciousness might be similar to Leibniz's Monadology. "The Best of all possible Worlds", seems a bit off however. It's personally the metaphysic that makes the most sense to me so far. 

3.) Something else.

[ofd]

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3.) Something else.

This. What I meant by that is that our brain functions (including consciousness) consist of very specific processes that only do one job. There is a process for recognizing shapes, a function for the feeling of self, one to motivate you and so on.

[neeeel]

13 minutes ago, ofd said:

This. What I meant by that is that our brain functions (including consciousness) consist of very specific processes that only do one job. There is a process for recognizing shapes, a function for the feeling of self, one to motivate you and so on.

consciousness does no motivation whatsoever

 

[RichardY]

6 hours ago, ofd said:

This. What I meant by that is that our brain functions (including consciousness) consist of very specific processes that only do one job. There is a process for recognizing shapes, a function for the feeling of self, one to motivate you and so on.

How isn't that equivalent of the freudian conception of the unconscious then? A motivating factor being the pleasure pincinple? I haven't read into it, but is the moist robot hypothesis a good analogy of what you mean. I think I heard Scott Adams mention that he was involved with hypnosis, wouldn't that be more in accordant with the unconsious mind?

I find the notion of the unconscious mind really hard to let go of basically certain of it, when I would have dismissed the notion a decade a go(especially Rands criticism), a kind of photocopier and organiser of history. The only other theory being a kind of subconscious, in which case, affirmations, NLP self help techniques should in theory propel mankind to unprecendented and accelerating individual acheivement, an every emerging number of "Randian" or randy..... heroes.

Would you say that consciousness is the result of some form of error then? What unites all the varying processes into a percevied single unity?

[ofd]

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consciousness does no motivation whatsoever

Oh yes, I am aware of that. There is no conscious act, rather a process within a system.
 

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How isn't that equivalent of the freudian conception of the unconscious then? A motivating factor being the pleasure pincinple?

I am not familiar with Freud, but our cravings make sense when you put yourself in the enviroment of the stone age. Survival (eating fatty and sweet food) and procreation are the words of the day. The enviroment has since changed, but our cravings haven't adapted yet. There are fast food joints everywhere and porn is available online.

 

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I haven't read into it, but is the moist robot hypothesis a good analogy of what you mean. I think I heard Scott Adams mention that he was involved with hypnosis, wouldn't that be more in accordant with the unconsious mind?

I haven't read it either, but yes, it seems familiar to what Evolutionary Psychologists like Buss wrote. Desires that have been shaped by evolution work in skip logic casuistic way. Lets say you are in the stone age and you see a nice girl, Grokette. Unconsciously, and shaped by evolution, a process goes on in your mind.

Does Grokette have a good body ratio? If yes, increase her attractiveness. If not, decrease it.

Does flirting with Grokette pose any risk? If yes, stop it. If not, pursue.

(In our case Grokette is with seven foot tall Mortar so you stop any advances right away).
 

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Would you say that consciousness is the result of some form of error then? What unites all the varying processes into a percevied single unity? 

Yes, a lucky error for us. You don't need a single unity to unite the processes, it's only necessary when you are conscious. Consciousness may be a way to rationalize the decisions that have already been made, it may be a spokesperson that explain to yourself why you do the things that have been decided to make.

My perspective has largely been shaped by Blindsight, a fantastic novel by Peter Watts, that is available for free. It deals with those questions (nature of consciousness and what not) in great detail.

Robert Wright has a less grim view of the world (or more grim, depending on your perspective). In 'Why Buddhism is True', he shows that Buddhism is some sort of Evolutionary Psychology in itself, the craving it describes are the same that made us survive the stone age. Also, he shows how to circumnavigate them.
 

[RichardY]

@ofd

I tend to think of the movies and how many character names have a wider meaning, so that's it not just basic biological urges, but more linguistic and reality structuring. It's not like characters have generic names like Jack & Gill, usually. Even if they do, usually has some meaning within the context of the story.

Either the phenomena of consciousness must have some form of utillity. Or has the ability to structure reality itself. If it has some form of utility or disutility, then the question "should" be, how best to reason with that information. Perhaps I'll look at the books you recommended. If not the Psychoanayltic unconsious mind, then some other theory of mental processing might be interesting. Only so many ways to crack an egg.

[Elizbaeth]

Pretty cool thread. 

 

On 8/25/2018 at 1:31 AM, ofd said:

My perspective has largely been shaped by Blindsight, a fantastic novel by Peter Watts, that is available for free. It deals with those questions (nature of consciousness and what not) in great detail.

Robert Wright has a less grim view of the world (or more grim, depending on your perspective). In 'Why Buddhism is True', he shows that Buddhism is some sort of Evolutionary Psychology in itself, the craving it describes are the same that made us survive the stone age. Also, he shows how to circumnavigate them.
 

Thanks for the reading tips. I am very interested in the Robert Wright book and will buy it. I don't always think it's bad to begin with a grim perspective of things, btw. If you can look at things at their very worst, and try to understand and prepare accordingly, then it seems like you have a better chance of doing well in reality. And plus, any good outcomes are just that much more surprisingly hopeful. 

One of the best books I read as a kid was August, by Bernard Beckett. It was an investigation of free will and, if I remember correctly, the "moist robot" theory (which I kinda tend to lean towards). 

 

On 8/28/2018 at 2:49 PM, RichardY said:

Either the phenomena of consciousness must have some form of utillity. Or has the ability to structure reality itself. If it has some form of utility or disutility, then the question "should" be, how best to reason with that information.

I think this is an endlessly fascinating idea. I think that everything we are/do at least originates from something useful, or else it wouldn't be a part of us. But I sometimes wonder how purposeful it is to try to get too meta about our own consciousness - not that that really prevents me from speculating. Can we really understand things outside of our own filter, our own structure of being? How can we even have the imagination to know that there is something else to reason within/without, since we are only able to know, define, test, and enact within the confines of what we are by experience and consciousness? I feel like this is almost close to the "existence as a stimulation" theory. Interesting, but ultimately not relevant. If we are nothing but a stimulation, than we are a simulation. Being a simulation or pre-destined or being in total control of my own will does not change the fact that I experience my existence and being, and I still believe I choose my course, and I still feel my feelings and believe that I am me. I do not know how I could avoid any of these things, and I do not know how it could be possible for me to understand free will, reality, myself and the universe through any other modes than the consciousness that I experience and believe that I have. It's really a startling idea - that our atoms are somehow aware, and somehow our atoms have an integrity which maintains borders and boundaries of self. It is fascinating to examine, but I think the most mysterious and worthwhile aspect is that we are granted the ability to witness it unfolding. My thoughts tend to stick there, and on that I can sit and contemplate with lots of satisfaction.