Physicalism (Materialism) Verifies Free Will

[MahtiSonni]

If the physical level is everything, then everything is just a dance of atoms, electrons and their parts as a direct result of the laws of physics, and that's it.

Here's a syllogism for you:

If physicalism is true,

and the laws of physics are known,

and the objects those laws are applied to are known,

then everything could be explained, and accurately predicted before it happens.

Therefore the very concept of free will becomes absurd, and, being the direct result of inescapable laws of physics both predictable and immutable.  In that case the experience of having a will, or for anything to make sense at all, would be a freak accident.

Edited September 19, 2018 by MahtiSonni
Refined the syllogism to be more clear.

[ofd]

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then everything could be explained, and accurately predicted before it happens.

That doesn't follow. There is a difference between predictions and determination.

[MahtiSonni]

28 minutes ago, ofd said:

That doesn't follow. There is a difference between predictions and determination.

Let's ask our friend Merriam-Webster:

Definition of Predict 

transitive verb

: to declare or indicate in advance

As that falls in line with what I said I don't see your point.

[ofd]

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As that falls in line with what I said I don't see your point.

You have determined systems and yet you can't predict their future state. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_pendulum

[MahtiSonni]

23 minutes ago, ofd said:

You have determined systems and yet you can't predict their future state. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_pendulum

Due to not knowing well enough the physics involved (imperfect knowledge of the mass, shape and forces affecting them), correct?  After all, the link you provided gives even visual examples where the movement is calculated.

The premise was supposed to assume knowledge of the relevant physics.  Sorry if I was unclear.

[ofd]

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The premise was supposed to assume knowledge of the relevant physics.  Sorry if I was unclear.

The laws of nature are well known (more or less), you can't measure the initial state of the pendulum system well enough so that you can predict it's behaviour well into the future. The same is true for the universe where even more so you can't know the initial states to a precise degree. Hence you have the curious fact that you can't make accurate predictions into the future though the laws of nature along with the initial states determine the outcomes.

[MahtiSonni]

10 minutes ago, ofd said:

The laws of nature are well known (more or less), you can't measure the initial state of the pendulum system well enough so that you can predict it's behaviour well into the future. The same is true for the universe where even more so you can't know the initial states to a precise degree. Hence you have the curious fact that you can't make accurate predictions into the future though the laws of nature along with the initial states determine the outcomes.

Yep, our tools are inadequate for the task my syllogism presents.  The philosophical point it presents, however, isn't dependent on what hardware we can have available.

If we are purely physical, we cannot have free will, for in that case literally everything is a direct result of the laws of physics following their path and nothing can change that.  There's no room left for any will to interfere, being itself a (by)product of those laws.

Obviously I do not accept the premises, as I am not a materialist, but the syllogism itself is valid, as far as I can tell.

[Mole]

17 hours ago, MahtiSonni said:

Yep, our tools are inadequate for the task my syllogism presents.  The philosophical point it presents, however, isn't dependent on what hardware we can have available.

If we are purely physical, we cannot have free will, for in that case literally everything is a direct result of the laws of physics following their path and nothing can change that.  There's no room left for any will to interfere, being itself a (by)product of those laws.

 Obviously I do not accept the premises, as I am not a materialist, but the syllogism itself is valid, as far as I can tell.

I indeed did accept your syllogism as part of my original formulation. However, I could make an argument that the syllogism is false. Stefan actually made this argument and it seems to be compatible with physicalism. It is that the whole is something else than the sum of its parts. So while atoms are determined, free will is something else that is not determined. This is not contradictory with physical laws because 1. physics doesn't necessitate determinism. 2. physics doesn't necessitate that everything is reduced to particles, in fact it necessitates the opposite. Physics also has laws that apply at one level of analysis but don't apply at others. For example, you can't formulate laws of electrical circuits by looking at individual electrons. Another perhaps stronger example is that you can't formulate theories of consciousness without considering the a whole neural network. Electrical circuits and consciousness exist, so we know that studying particles using Newtonian/Einsteinian/Quantum/String theory physics is inadequate to understanding the world. We have to use different levels of analysis. Hence, we could understand single neurons as being determined in a closed system but we could understand the brain as having free will. Now, this raises a question. It seems the elements of consciousness does depend on reduced parts. For example, emotions light up in one part of the brain. Senses can be reduced to photons entering my retina. Movements are firings of neurons. It seems then that even if the brain has free will, any particular function of the brain must correlate with the functions of its parts or neurons. It would not make sense that I could have a dream but there would be no trace of it in an MRI. Hence, it must be that free will actually determines the position of neurons. That is, there is a bidirectional relationship between the whole brain and its parts. We are accustomed to believing that everything is reducible. That all phenomena are determined by its parts, and those parts are determined by its parts and so on. I needn't see why this is the case. It makes more metaphysical sense to say that the world consists of entities that act according to their nature and that they have relations to other entities including the very parts of the entity itself but that the entity is the originator of its effects. This is indeed how a child would first understand the world. We may try to prove that everything is reducible but we should at least understand that any such conception must be compatible with what I just said and also that it is possible that we can have metaphysics without reduction. The only issue I have with what I have described in this reply this: As I said, the brain must correlate with its parts even if it isn't determined by those parts. A brain cannot do anything unless something has changed in its parts. However, it also seems to follow that it cannot compel free will without it being correlated with its parts. If I decide to shoot a gun, those thoughts will be reflected in my neural structure. How then could I compel free will such that it has an effect in the parts of my neural structure unless free will itself was correlated with my parts? It seems then that free will cannot effect parts of the brain because any deviation from the determinism of particular neurons would itself need to be reflected in those determined neurons meaning that the deviation is not possible. This is a strong argument, I believe, against what I have proposed in this reply, so I am not entirely convinced of what I have said. The only possible solution is that perhaps free will is not physical and that it doesn't have any correlate with particular neurons at all. This isn't as crazy as it sounds. After all, if we are going to even conceive of free will, it seems to be something that is separate from my thoughts because it seems pure free will doesn't have any content or mechanisms whatsoever. It really does seem to be something that precedes my thoughts and hence it could be non-physical. Furthermore, it may not exist in some kind of other realm but rather be some kind of property of the whole brain. In this way it still belongs to the whole and so the idea that the whole is something else than the sum of its parts still stands. This possibility is the most likely if free will does exist. Maybe in such a way it is actually physical but just doesn't correlate with its parts. Whether this is at all possible, I am not sure and it's something I have to think more about.

[MahtiSonni]

1 hour ago, Mole said:

I indeed did accept your syllogism as part of my original formulation. However, I could make an argument that the syllogism is false.

To state that there is something exempt from the laws of physics and not a direct result of them means that you step outside physicalism.

If physics determine everything (as physicism states),

and physics are known,

then everything is known.  Past, present and future.

In any other case the initial premise has to be false.  There's no way around it.

Stefan actually made this argument and it seems to be compatible with physicalism. It is that the whole is something else than the sum of its parts.

If the whole doesn't follow the laws of physics but has "a will" that is not determined by said laws, you're outside physicalism.

It really does seem to be something that precedes my thoughts and hence it could be non-physical.

If true, it would prove physicalism false.

I'd prefer if you used some paragraph spacing.  A massive wall of text is a real pain to read.

[ofd]

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The philosophical point it presents, however, isn't dependent on what hardware we can have available. 

The problem is that you make statements about the physical world from that don't conform with what we can observe. Predictions are based on models that are simpler and more abstract than the process they model and that you can't make perfect measurements. Which is why you include a margin of error in your calculations. If you wanted to model a system you need a simulation that is as complex as the model you try to simulate. If you want to model the universe you need another universe and you have to know the initial state of the original universe.

[MahtiSonni]

1 hour ago, ofd said:

The problem is that you make statements about the physical world from that don't conform with what we can observe.

Logic isn't dependent on empiricism.  Whether we can actually test the syllogism in practice is completely irrelevant.

[ofd]

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Logic isn't dependent on empiricism. 

The validity of the syllogism itself doesn't depend on reality, that's true.

The moon consists of green cheese.
This rock is from the moon.
∴ This rock is green cheese
The above is a correct syllogism, because it's form (Barbara) is valid. However, it does not relate to empirical reality so it is wrong on a physical level. For syllogisms to be true both in form and in reality, the syllogism needs to follow the forms that generate truth values and the statements of the premises have to be true on an empirical level.
 

[MahtiSonni]

11 minutes ago, ofd said:

The validity of the syllogism itself doesn't depend on reality, that's true.

The moon consists of green cheese.
This rock is from the moon.
∴ This rock is green cheese
The above is a correct syllogism, because it's form (Barbara) is valid.[/quote]

I do not particularly enjoy this game you're trying to play.

The syllogism I presented correctly shows that either free will or physicalism must be false.  That is a logical necessity and not dependent upon stuff we have.  Either you can grok that or you're not tall enough for this ride.  

[ofd]

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I do not particularly enjoy this game you're trying to play.

It's not a game I play, I summarize the most basic information to syllogisms in any textbook on the subject.

 

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The syllogism I presented correctly shows that either free will or physicalism must be false. 

What you wrote wasn't a syllogism. Look up how they are formed if you don't believe me.
Even if you had been able to form your arguments in terms of syllogisms it would have been wrong in reality, because one of your premises (no difference between computability and determinism) is wrong.
 

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That is a logical necessity and not dependent upon stuff we have.

Statements about reality must conform to reality. If they don't they can be discarded. Statemens about the validity of logic don't depend on the reality, they are concerned about the form and structure of statements. If those don't conform to the rules of the logic you use, they are wrong.

 

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Either you can grok that or you're not tall enough for this ride.   

Read some basic intro to physics and logic. Then reflect and bow in shame.

[MahtiSonni]

9 minutes ago, ofd said:

It's not a game I play, I summarize the most basic information to syllogisms in any textbook on the subject.

You presented a false syllogism (if moon is green cheese, no rocks can come out of it).  I don't know why you're raping logic to talk back at me and am not particularly interested in finding out.

What you wrote wasn't a syllogism. Look up how they are formed if you don't believe me.

I did and it still is.

I'm done with you.

[ofd]

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I'm done with you.

Enjoy your ignorance as long as you can.

[MahtiSonni]

The physicalist/materialist question is about as basic as logic gets.  A can't be -A.

If physicalism is true, then everything follows the laws of physics (A) and are thus determined by them.  That includes our brain and the stuff happening there.

If we have a free will that isn't determined by the laws of physics and not everything follows the laws of physics (-A), then physicalism has to be false.

The possible error I might have here could be a misunderstanding of what physicalism means to some, but I'm willing to throw Epicuros on that one: if it doesn't mean ontological monism, why use a name that implies it?

Edited September 24, 2018 by MahtiSonni
More precise clarification of A -A dichotomy.