ProfessionalTeabagger

I guess it's possible. Although animals sometimes chew their limbs off to escape traps. He could have chosen to suicide by cutting his wrists rather than face the agony. So saying he HAD to cut his arm off is not correct. The animal would not have had the capacity to project such futures. This suggests the animal is acting purely on instinct but the human has some free will. But such extremities tend to remove our free will and we fall back on our animal instincts.

Do you mean philosophy is doing it or FreedomainRadio?

We measure free will when we evaluate whether someone is morally responsible for something. For example, the insanity defense is a measure of whether the person was insane when committing the crime. If they were insane then they can't logically be said to be acting of their own free will. This is particularly clear in type of insanity defense called volitional insanity or irresistible impulse.

I think you can measure free will. That's why we can hold people morally responsible.

I'm not sure very object has a mental picture associated with it but that's irrelevant. A "mental picture" is not the same as a concept. you can't just change "concept" to "mental picture". A concept might also have an emotion or aesthetic quality associated with it but we don't say "By concept I mean emotion". A concept is an abstract idea that refers to something. Sure and if a giant alien came and squeezed all society or justice together we could break of bits of society and justice. Make a nice society burger or justice table. Just like my pencil is made out of high quality forest pre-squeezed by a radioactive canoe beast from idiotron 2.

A concept is an abstract idea. Mental pictures are incidental. The aggregate of tree cells have a distinct configuration. The forest doesn't. A forest is not a distinct object in reality. A tree is. That's why you can break a piece of the tree but not the forest. It's a misuse of language to refer to the parts you remove from a forest like trees or undergrowth or the space and call that breaking of a piece of forest. I already pointed out how silly it would be to claim your shed was made from forest. It might be colorful to say that but it's not accurate.

That's an equivocation. To say "A forest is associated with a concept called "Forest"" is to assume your first usage of forest is the same as your second usage. But in order for your first usage to be associated with the second there would have to be some essential difference. Otherwise it would just be a tautology. But there is no essential difference between forest and the concept called forest. However there is an essential difference between tree and the concept called tree. A tree is a singular configuration of matter and energy that is distinct form from other trees. The concept of "tree" is is a concept we apply to that singular configuration. "Forest" is a concept we apply to an aggregate of of singular configurations. If we add more trees it's still just forest (because the concept only exists in our minds). But if we add more trees to a tree it's not still one tree. It's several trees.

A forest is concept. Yeah, I have a nice shed made out of forest. It's really good forest.

You can't break of a piece of a forest but you can break of a piece of a tree.

I don't think coercive government is Newtonian. It's a choice.

If you don't use meaningful language then you'll just be incomprehensible. You're not necessarily wrong. But if you violate rational ethics you will be wrong. It's better to ask "How is morality different from science?". Sure you don't need to use science in that particular realm but if you don't you'll be wrong. That's the essential difference.

It's the initiation of force we're concerned with, not force in general. Your post doesn't make that clear distinction.

Skeptics of the senses become much less so when their paycheck is at stake.

I didn't argue that believing and knowing were the same thing. You can't have beliefs in an infinite regression. Such a thing is called knowledge. Knowledge terminates that. You keep saying you explained X in the OP as if explaining things in OP's has some higher authority. I rebutted your claim about recursive beliefs and justification. You have knowledge that you believe something. You know you believe. You do not get to change "know" to the phrase "know, for certain". In your argument there is no difference between "know" and "know, for certain". You did not posit two categories of "know" or "knowledge". You don't know if you don't believe any of those things so stop making such factual statements. Calling it belief doesn't save things. Believe whatever you want in your head but when you start making statements about reality and correcting people you're using objective standards. You can't necessarily know if your place of employment still exists but still get ready to go to it I agree. But that's a different point. We're talking about not being able to know anything. When I go to my place of employment I have a reasonable expectation it still exists. I'm not saying to myself it cannot NOT exist. If I go and it HAS burned down then that's just called being wrong. I understand you believe that your belief you don't know anything at all doesn't inhibit you. The annoying thing is that you don't understand that it should somewhat inhibit you. It does matter that you claim to not know anything because you're not just sharing arguments with us. You are correcting us. You don't know if I'm right. You don't know what right is. You don't know anything. That's not remotely what I argued, I argued Your theory of knowledge requires omniscience. A standard of knowledge be must logically possible in order to be a rational standard. Omniscience is not logically possible. Therefore your theory of knowledge is not rational. I'm arguing your theory of knowledge is not rational because it's not logically possible. See? My definition of knowledge is those beliefs that consistently conform to reason and evidence. But my theory is not the point. I don't have to come up with a theory in order to disprove yours. It's got nothing do do with not liking your definition. What does it matter whether I like it or not? My problem with your definition is that it's wrong. FFS I'm not talking about your identity existing. You can put your self into any nonsense scenario or configuration of selves that you want You need to exist in order to say you don't know if you exist. That's the only logically possibility. WTF does that mean? Geometry? Do you expect me to deduce your argument for you from a wikipedia page? Is this "but in math there's this blah, blah... and that proves square circles exist" horseshit. The infinity was just an analogy. Just respond to the argument.

Rationality of some degree would be a prerequisite of evil. Evil is when someone knows the action is wrong but they do it anyway. In order to know the action is wrong you have to be somewhat rational. That's why animals can't be evil.

You can't logically claim that you can't know anything and you are close to certain. It's like saying you're close to the top of a mountain but reaching the top is impossible. Degrees of certainty entail the existence of actual certainty. Climbing towards the top of a mountain entails the existence of the top of the mountain. But the mountain you posit is an infinitely high mountain and as such has no top.

You don't have to claim you know. Justification is not an issue. Justify your belief or don't. It's all the same and you wouldn't know anyway. Belief is something you think is true. You don't know if you believe you believe. You don't know if you believe that you believe that you believe . . . and so on. As soon as you claim to believe X you're claiming knowledge of something. You also don't know if belief requires justification. You can't know ANYTHING. So stop telling me X doesn't need this or that and how reality works. You don't know anything. You don't know what you wrote in your OP. You don't know what you addressed. Your theory of knowledge requires omniscience. A standard of knowledge be must logically possible in order to be a rational standard. Omniscience is not logically possible. Therefore your theory of knowledge is not rational. If you don't exist then you can't be believing you don't know you exist. So you can't logically say you don't know. The only logical option is that you do know you exist.

You can't know if you believe that's your stance. To claim to believe something is to claim you know you believe it and to know what belief means and to know what stances are and to know you exist to believe. But you can't know anything. You can't believe you don't know anything. That's because you can''t know anything and that includes your belief that you don't know anything. You can't say you never claimed to know any of those things because that absolute is a claim to know that you never claimed to know any of those things. But as you cannot know anything then you cannot know that.

Then you can't know that that's your stance. You can't know you're confident and you can't know anything. You don't know if you believe it because you can't know anything. You don't know that don't know anything.

You also cannot choose to have have large muscles when just a moment ago you had no muscles. By your standard no one ever chooses to gain big muscles. The notion that you cannot choose to desire something a moment ago you abhorred has already been refuted. It does not follow that because I cannot choose such things in that moment that I therefore have no choice over any desire I may have in the future. I'm not sure desire is same thing as value. I value the NAP. That doesn't mean I desire it. If I desire a cookie does that mean I value it? Saying I "I desire the cookie" and "I value the cookie" can denote two separate things (even though there may be an overlap). Desires are emotional. Values not necessarily. You said past ACTIONS. I said choices. I know choices involve actions but an action can often not involve choice. At no point have I ever argued that because desires are part contingent on past actions that therefore they are chosen. That would obviously be a fallacious argument. What do you mean when you ask how humans can say no to their desires? If you have a desire for a cookie you have a choice to eat it or not. You claim then is that's just a stronger desire which forces you to avoid the cookie. But you still have the choice to eat the cookie. The desire isn't necessarily in total control of you. That would be a compulsion. I didn't say we could IGNORE our desires. It's best to use the terms I use and not completely different ones. Compulsion and desire are not just different in magnitude. They are different in kind. http://the-difference-between.com/desire/compulsion When a person has a compulsion to do X that means they generally have no choice and have to do it. If a person has a desire then they generally have a choice and don't have to do it. There's an overlap with these but the distinction in kind is valid. In your position the strongest underlying desire is a compulsion which the person has no choice over. You need to start saying "compulsion" and not "desire" for the sake of accuracy. There's a difference between the dog's desire changing and the dog changing its desire. The dog is imply fulfilling its desire, not changing it. It's not like it weened itself of water through will power or something. When I choose to eat the cookie and then no longer desire a cookie my desire for cookies hasn't changed. The comparison to what I'm saying is not valid. I made an argument demonstrating the actual relevant distinction between humans and animals. I didn't just say "We're more complex, therefore...X". Complexity tells me nothing. As for choosing the NAP, yes I know there are lot's of drivers behind it but there's also me who navigated that sea of desires and preferences. I have some degree of volition that shapes my desires, etc.

If I was begging the question by saying desire is something we have choice that would still not mean you are not begging the question by saying it's something we do not have any choice over. Now you're conflating desires with values. Desires often conflict with values. We can act on a desire in violation of our values. So that doesn't justify this hierarchy of desires you posit. I'm not arguing that because our desires are part contingent on past action that they are therefore chosen. Yeah we're animals technically but there's a valid distinction between a human animals and a non-humans one in terms of conceptual ability and rationality. That's the vital difference. Animals are compelled by their desires and lack the capacity to say no. Humans have such desires but can say no (or yes I guess). Hence the choice. If you're going to say every action is compelled by desire then concede that you are talking about compulsion. Say "compulsion", not "desire". There is a distinction there. For example if we say a person desired to stab someone and then did it, there contains in that a logical element of choice. If we say a person was compelled to stab someone we don't even need to add the "and then did it" bit. Because "compulsion" generally precludes choice. The dog in your example has not changed its desire. There's a difference between fulfilling a desire for a while and changing that desire. If you said the dog had changed it's desire to not drinking water (assume there's an alternative) based on some reason then that would be a valid comparison. Saying we have more complex minds, etc doesn't explain anything. I choose the non-aggression principle. I have a strong desire to follow it. That desire gets stronger the more choices I make. You might then posit some underlying desire that compels me to the nap and so on. But I logically I could choose to reject all those too. I could even choose to reject rejecting all those. I don't think there's any desire I couldn't choose to say no to.

You are conflating desire with compulsion. A desire is something you have some choice over. You can say no. You put desires in some hierarchy which you fail to justify. You assert that my desire to eat the cookie was less powerful than the desire to eat the broccoli and so I was really just involuntarily compelled to follow my health desire. But the strength of the desire (which I assume YOU mean the degree to which they compel to a particular course of action) is partly determined by choices I generate. My health desire perhaps dominates because I made certain choices that allowed it to. If you're going to assert that all properties of desire are determined then you're begging the question. You would be assuming all desire is this way in your premises in order to conclude that all desire is this way. Desire is not compulsion. Animals are generally compelled by their desires/compulsions and so never really change them. But humans have a conceptual and rational ability that partly frees them from mindlessly following the strongest desire. That's why our desires can change radically.

Not really because the free willer doesn't claim all is chosen. The determinist does claim all is not chosen.

Choosing to believe something you didn't believe before is a common determinist straw-man. It does not follow that having some control over ones action/ choices, etc means you have total control or can do contradictory things. You can't just choose to believe something to know to be false. The choosing desires argument is even sillier. I can't necessarily instantly choose to like broccoli more then cookies but I can choose to eat the broccoli despite desiring the cookie. As it happens I actually often DO like broccoli more than cookies these days because I made choices over time. So I did to some extent choose my desires there. You can say it's just because of a desire to be healthy and posit a seemingly never ending regress of desires. But that doesn't work either because part of my desire to be healthy is chosen as well. The fact we can curb our desires or indulge them proves we have some choice about them and about which desires we cultivate. I don't know what a lower order desire is. I assume you mean a less powerful desire. But that often fluctuates. Simply by thinking we can change the strength of our desires or even get rid of them. We often have multiple strong desires at once but have to choose based on standards other than the feeling of desire.