Arius

This forum can be used to project insecurities. Should it be removed?

[View:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IiZeOgxpCmI]

If there are enough donations of a small size, perhaps it's time to reevaluate who the audience is and what it wants. I'm still unclear if this FDR thing is a business or not, but if it is, it should try to cater to the paying audience (Admittedly, that's not me). By that I mean, if a large percentage of the audience is poor but generous, perhaps it's time to investigate a payment gateway which doesn't charge on a per transaction basis. Amazon offers an extremely low per-transaction fee (2 cents on the dollar for transactions under $10). Just the other day someone advanced a goal to get donations up to 2% of listeners. Seems to me this is kismet. The show needs a higher donor percentage and lots people want to donate really small amounts of money. Why not invest in a low-fee payment gateway and introduce a new class of subscriber.. I'm just spit-balling, but what about "Mini-philosopher"? The donor class could be for ridiculously small amounts of money, say between $.05 (the smallest amount which can be sent through Amazon) and $4.99 per month (or as individual donations), just below Bronze in the hierarchy. I'm almost positive the total quantity of donations would rise if smaller-amount, single and multiple payments were accepted (which is a technical issue, rather than anyone's personal failing). Plus, almost everyone uses amazon for something, so no one needs to sign-up for anything to donate. If this FDR thing is a business, then it only makes sense to offer services which paying customers want. If there really is a great frequency of small donations, I'd take that as a sign that people really want to donate money, but times are tough all over. If anything, Bob's $2 is an indication that, no matter the quantity, Bob sees value in FDR. So cheer up!

If there is some philosophical validity to determinism, the proponents have yet to advance it. It's "The largest and most popular philosophical conversation in the world" not "Let's all argue about the invalidity of argumentation". At the end of the day, no one has, to this point, advanced an argument for determinism which does not negate the possibility of rational argumentation (either by excluding choice or by making idealized alternatives impossible). Until that happens, there's no ground left to cover on the subject. Stef closed the topic because the discussion lacks any possible resolution. If you're genuinely interested, you might consider exploring the extensive history of the subject on the forum (via the search function). It has been discussed to death.

Insomuch as theft requires violence, it is a violation of the NAP. For example, a robber might use a gun or knife to coerce someone into surrendering some piece of property. Alternatively, one person might clutch a piece of property so tightly that no other person could arrest control without the exercise of force. The labor theory of value is a holdover from a time when workers were surfs and could not legally acquire ownership of the means of production. There are three non-state arguments about property which I am familiar with. First, ownership of external items extends from self-ownership, and creating a thing is the strongest claim to value. That's your right-leaning view. Second, ownership is a type of relationship between people and the exact terms must be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. That's your centrist view. Lastly, ownership is economically convenient, but it has no moral context as property doesn't exist beyond some kind of state. That's your left-leaning view. Under the first model, if I add value to something which exists in nature, I become the decider of its use. There are several reasons which are generally offered to justify this claim. It might be that, as I have used my time to create the value, I become its owner (whomever pays the cost owns the item). Alternatively, it might be that I have the most to lose by the misuse of the value (whomever has the most invested owns the item). Regardless, by committing an act of theft (usurping control without investing or paying the cost), the creator of the value loses the original investment in creating the value. The argument goes, if you steal the byproduct of the use of a person's life, it is no different than depriving the person of life for that period of time. Thus, the right-leaning model equates theft with either assault or kidnapping. The second model requires that people hold abiding by agreements as a virtue. Because those people involved have agreed upon the distribution of items, the person who commits an act of theft is violating the terms of an agreement they previously reached. While not necessarily an NAP violation under strict a physical-force-only interpretation, the centrist-voluntarist considers a breach of agreement a type of moral transgression. That is, violating agreements is something people ought not do. The third model is anti-individualist. It presumes that ownership exists as a tool of rule and control. I can't offer a compelling argument for a collectivist form of property ownership, as I don't believe it's either morally or ethically viable. So, I can't comment on NAP violations with respect to a left-anarchist property model. Both right and centrist small government models reject theft as incorrect. However, theft is only an NAP violation under the right-leaning model.

Yea. We've had a good run, but I'm not sure there's any way to go as far into this as might be necessary. If you write that text on lying, let me know. Thanks for the great convo.

So, you're saying that knowledge is irrelevant to ethics? Absolutely everything a person knows could be wrong, yet they're just as morally culpable as you or I. That there's no ethical difference between killing a falsely consenting person and a person who actually consents? That there is no method of discerning if rape has actually occurred. That all mutual transactions are morally indistinguishable from involuntary interactions. It's just too much for me. The idea that there's no such thing as consent.... I don't have a reason, but I just don't buy it. I'll need to think on that. Why wouldn't breaching contracts suffer from that problem? If lying is the moral equivalent of eating, then there's nothing wrong with falsely entering a contract, or leaving one at any time. If truth is not the binding agent, what is? I'm not even sure that it's possible to claim an agreement has a different moral standing than a non-agreement if the basis of agreement is morally neutral. insomuch as that's true, rape and consensual sex are the same thing. Would you define "responsibility" for me? I'm pretty sure we use the word differently. Generally, when I use the word, there's some associated idea of knowing what you're doing. I wouldn't claim my dog was responsible for anything. At most, he performs actions. I don't believe he's capable of contextualizing those actions or developing moral theories. As I see it, the mental handicap of being a dog excludes him from culpability (a word I use interchangeable with "responsibility"). That's an interesting question. You'd first try to establish the use of 'a' and 'o', against preference, as a behavior. Involuntary vowel exposure (IVE), yea? So, for a person to IVE they must either write or say either of the vowels 'a' and 'o' against the preference of a nearby person. Interestingly, you cannot both prefer to not be exposed to the vowels and to expose others to the vowels (as you expose yourself by exposing others). A neutral obligation to IVE (people may IVE) would fail the two guys in a room test. Now, the idea that there is a positive moral obligation to IVE is obviously wrong. You can't argue "people should IVE". However, the opposite claim of "people shouldn't IVE" can be a universal. Of course, there's a broader formula to the claim. Something like "you shouldn't perform acts which require one participant's preferring the act not be performed ". Insomuch as that's true, there is a prohibition If the broader claim is incorrect (if performing acts which require one participant's preferring the act not be performed is permissible), then why are rape, theft, and murder always wrong? I'd like to leave the discussion of force out of this for the time being. I'm of a different mind than you on the use of force, but I don't believe that discussion will add to this one (I am easily derailed). Sufficed to say, I think the imposed consequences of all wrongdoings are similar. You'd be obligated to not make a statement for the same reason a person who prefers to rape is obligated not to. My guess is that the person who prefers to do wrong is just SOL in an ethical system. Otherwise, we'll go right off the cliff of "there's no right or wrong"..I try to avoid that cliff.

Sorry, I wrote a long post. Please feel free to disregard any parts which you do not see as important. [] I wanna go back to the very beginning and explain why I have a gut-feeling that lying is unethical. Perhaps if I explain the problems I see with accepting lying as morally permissible, you'll migrate my way a little (or vise versa). Consent is an extremely important concept when discussing preferability. If it's a legit move to fake consent (say "I agree" when you don't), then there is no empirical method of determining the difference between theft and trade, euthanasia and murder, or rape and consensual sex. Right now, to determine the difference, I would examine if the two involved people had reached an agreement... That is, in my mind, the only real method of observing consent occurring. If, for example, a merchant can fake consent to a customer and it's not unethical to do so, then the customer has no method of determining if the purchase is theft or trade. I simply cannot believe that consent, the foundation of voluntarism and primary means of determining preference, is unknowable. That's just too wild for my mind. So, I imagine that the "binding" property of UPB rests on some requirement that statements be true (or consent be valid once given). If not, then how do we know that "yes" means "yes" or "no" means "no". You see my dilemma? Because of this, I'm willing to go to great lengths to argue against any intellectual vehicles for faking consent. Imagine, one person consents to sex, but claims rape the day after. If lying is morally permissible, the apparently consenting person actually was raped. You can be a rapist in spite of the empirical evidence. I guess I'm not clear on why you'd even talk to the murderer. We agree that full disclosure is not required, so I neither see the necessity nor the reason in lying to the murderer. Well, you correcting me (and my caring what you do) is dependent on our shared preference for making true statements. An action which necessarily includes going against the preference of another is either impossible on the individual level or a non-universal. Your example "you shouldn't correct people who prefer not to be corrected" is interesting. Of course, we'll need to agree on some definition of "correct", but I believe that the should statement is actually accurate. That is, I believe you can't correct someone who prefers not to be corrected, as correction requires the correctee to accept the correction. You can tell me a right answer all day, but I can simply refuse to accept your answer. That is, I don't think correction is simply a matter of one person making a statement, it requires a second person to accept that statement as true. I'd regard any impossible statement as outside the bounds of ethics. People can't ought do what cannot be done. Though, I'd be willing to further explore this question. My guess is that preference only matters in the case that both people need to take some action according to the definition. For example, in the case of rape, both people must perform some sex-act. In the case of theft, both people must be interested in advancing an ownership claim. Contrast that with eating. An ought statement like "you shouldn't eat around people who prefer you not eat around them" isn't a valid moral prohibition because it is possible for everyone to both prefer people not eat around them and prefer to eat. Perhaps it is necessary to include, in the definition, an act which the individual being lied to must perform... In the case of theft, the victim is in the owning something. In the case of rape, the victim is having sex. In the case of murder, the victim is dying. How about "people shouldn't present false statements as true to people who prefer to believe true statements, determine the truth of a statement based on presentation, and take action based on statements they regard as true"... Which would mean "lying" would need an equally verbose definition. Something like "Presenting false statements as true to people who prefer to believe true statements, determine the truth of a statement based on presentation, and take action based on statements they regard as true". We've come a long way from "making false statements". Doing nothing is not making a false statement. You can't make either of the types of claims you suggest without problems, that's true. However, you can refrain from making a claim at all. If all you can do is lie, it's better not to talk, yea? Help me out here...Why can't you make no statement in this case and the case with the murderer? Rather, excepting both of the statements you have suggested as contradictory and impossible, why can't you simply perform another action which is consistent with the universal?

"Always tell the truth"..at least in my mind, implies an involuntary positive moral obligation for full disclosure. Equally, it suggests that truth-telling is always better than saying nothing or eating broccoli. So, I reject the claim "people must make true statements" as a non-universal. I'm not trying to argue for an obligation to always reveal everything (keeping secrets is, at least, morally permissible). Keeping secrets (not revealing true information, and not presenting false information as true) can be universalized. I just really want to make that clear, cause I keep getting the feeling that you believe "always tell the truth" and "don't lie" are opposites. I don't regard them in that fashion. One is a prohibition, the other is an imperative. There is the middle-ground of "every behavior which is not making false statements" which should be considered. I'll try explaining it like this. Suppose someone offered-up the idea that "people shouldn't rape". If someone offered a counter-argument of "people should consent to sex", the problem would become immediately apparent. The claim "people should consent to sex" creates a positive moral obligation. It also isn't the opposite of "people shouldn't rape". I think "people shouldn't make false statements" and "people should make true statements" are being compared in a similar way. That is, one creates a positive moral obligation, and is not the opposite of the other. I will not hesitate to do whatever I can to make this discussion as productive as possible. In any case where a non-preference is a required condition of an action (rape, theft, etc), that action cannot be ethical. I agree, that idea is foundational. If a behavior is sometimes preferable by definition, you're right. If a behavior is sometimes preferable in practice, I don't think that has any bearing on how it fits into an ethical structure. Rape is, by definition, non-preferred by at least one participant. That doesn't mean people in the world don't prefer to rape, only that they prefer not to be raped (the victim is always the non-preferring party). I have an idea! Permit me to redefine "lying". I made a mistake, I see that now. I defined it "making false statements". That's incorrect. I wanted to define it as "making false statements to people who prefer true statements". That better fits with rape ("sex with people who do not prefer sex") and theft ("taking property from people who prefer to not have their property taken"). Then there' s no positive moral obligation and you can still lie to liars. How does that sit with you? If we go with that definition, then all the "who prefers the truth" discussion is more about identifying who may be lied to, rather than the fundamental morality of lying. I think that's the way to go. Because you're right, a behavior needs to be impossible to universally prefer to be excluded from ethics. What do you think about lying as "making false statements to people who prefer true statements"?

It's only about the chemical elements insomuch as you actually own the thing. I maintain, the physical configuration of matter is unimportant to an ownership claim. It doesn't matter which glass the water is in, if my ownership claim was valid in one glass, it's valid in another. 1: Boundaries are defined by the claimant who has made the most primary claim of ownership and made use of the object. Whoever transforms an unowned object in a manner that creates value sets the bounds. Remember a physical object is an ascertainable bounded pattern of matter, temporally stable and cohesive such that it can be reliably identified and distinguished from surrounding matter. Anything which can be "reliably identified" is sufficient for the creation of an ownership claim. Now, value ("a subjective individual human assessment that the possession or use of an object is preferable to non-possession and non-use") is entirely subjective. The claimant merely need claim that they have put the property to valuable use. I, for example, showed how I had used the symbols 'r' and 'R' to create a statement, and the word "Alexander" to illustrate a point. Both are quite valuable activities IMHO. 2: No, it isn't clear. Which unowned place a claimant chooses to claim is arbitrary, but once the claim is made, the exact boundaries of the property must be well-defined within the claim. Your exclusion of "fuzzy" objects makes that clear. I abandoned my ownership of argumentation because it was too poorly defined for me to sustain the claim. However, a claim of "these ten square feet", "the symbols 'r' and 'R'", or "the word 'Alexander'" are all well-defined.

You do agree that clouds are made of water, right? You also believe people can own water, right? I don't see why owning water in cloud form is such a big deal for you. If there an equal prohibition against owning ice or plasma? Why is the liquid form of water the only permitted state for owning? Are all gasses off-limits, or is it just water vapor? To whom do you say it? That's a pretty big part of the question. If you're all by yourself, you can validly claim ownership of the whole of the universe. Who would ever know? In fact, as there are no other people, you cannot violate the NAP or self-ownership. Under your definition, if there is exactly one person in existence, they cannot make an invalid ownership claim. Well, you've explained to me that ownership (a property right) is "a legitimate exclusive moral claim of authority to exclude others from use of property". "Legitimate" means "that which does not violate the principles of self-ownership and the Non-Aggression Principle". So, if the claim to exclude others from the 25,000 square mile plot doesn't violate the NAP or self-ownership, then it must be valid. Alternatively, if it violates the NAP or self-ownership, it must be invalid. You've already established rules for answering this question. Well, if they both have claims which, when exercised, do not violate self-ownership or the NAP, then both of their claims are valid. Alternately, if their claims are mutually exclusive, then the first claim which is made has priority. That is, the entire purpose of homesteading is get there first. Thus, by the homesteading rule, the first one to make a claim which does not violate NAP or self-ownership has the valid claim. See, you describe homesteading as "the process of transforming an un-owned object in a manner that creates value, thereby establishing a legitimate property right". By that definition, the first claim transforms a property from unowned to owned. An ownership claim cannot be advanced against an owned property. Thus, the first guy to transform the unowned property into an owned property wins the territorial dispute. It's pretty easy to see who got there first and made the claim of ownership. If you arrive somewhere and there's already someone there, you weren't first. If you arrive somewhere and no one's there, you might be first. That's pretty objective. Which is exactly the reason I feel confident in my claim of ownership over the symbols 'r' and 'R' and the word "Alexander". Nobody else had claimed them and my claim doesn't violate self-ownership or NAP. I've discussed the qualities of the properties which make them ownable. I'm really quite certain that I've gotten-in on the ground floor of this new land rush for intellectual properties.

"goods are valuable because they serve various uses whose importance differs"? You need the water I own. I let you use the water. You pay me money. Seems very straightforward. You need to use the symbols 'r' and 'R'. I own those symbols. For a price, I'll permit you to use them. Clearly there's value to you in using my symbols and word. Look how frivolous you are when you can steal them from me. I'm certain you'd pay a fair price to use my property. The fence is a nicety, like a handshake during a greeting. It isn't required, but it smooths-out the interaction. The boundaries of the property are well-defined to the owner. As ownership is a moral claim, as long as the owner knows (and accurately represents) what is owned, no indicators are necessary. A passer-by wouldn't know that my car belongs to me. There are no markings on my car that indicate it is mine. It could be an abandoned vehicle as easily as it is my car (it's getting kinda old). None of these conditions modify the ownership status of the vehicle. I don't have a fence around my car. I don't have a big sign which says "This is my car, leave it alone". But it's still my car. Enclosure and ownership are two different things. Drawing and owning are two different things... Though, under the proposed model of IP there is a lot of overlap. The homesteader might not own land on the basis of the drawing, but I believe he does gain ownership of all similar renditions of the drawing he has created. Unless someone else already drew a picture like that, then he's trespassing. Drawing a picture of a thing, even under the proposed model of IP, is not a claim to the ownership of the thing. At best, it is a claim of ownership to the drawing. Clouds are made of water. If the property claim on the water is valid, then the form of that water is irreverent. How absurd is it to claim that, because a thing is a few degrees hotter or cooler, heavier or lighter, larger or smaller that somehow modifies its ownership? It modifies value, no doubt. But not the actual ownership of the thing. My car does not stop being mine simply because it overheats. If I remove the engine from my car, it remains mine. If I have the car crushed into a cube, it is still my cube until I relinquish the title.

Not part of your definitions. If you'd like to revise them... People own all sorts of things which they don't control. I own my car, but it's out in the parking lot right now. If someone picked the lock and hot wired my Echo, it doesn't suddenly stop being my car. If I take a vacation and a bunch of hobos move in to my house, does it suddenly become their house because I was gone? Come on now. Ownership is a moral claim, it has next to nothing to do with control. My goodness, by that logic, if I hand someone my wallet, it suddenly stops being mine. At a minimum, A theory of property needs to account for what happens in the real world. The farm owner builds a fence as a tool to indicate to other people what he perceives the boundary of the property to be. If he's especially community-minded, he might post a bill in the town square with a diagram of his property. At a minimum, he'll post a sign which indicates his boundary. Me? I'm a nice guy and explain exactly what part of the intellectual space belongs to me. Better than a fence, I gave you a personal explanation of what I own. Not only that, I'm nice enough to personally explain when you're on my property. I've actually used the computer to produce reproductions of my property. What more can I do to clearly indicate where my property is? Somehow, I don't think you have trouble telling 'r' and 'R' from other symbols (you write too well to claim you have that problem). I didn't claim a family of symbols. I'm claiming exactly two symbols. There is nothing fuzzy about what I'm claiming ownership of. Good lord, I picked the word "Alexander" because I know you're familiar with where it is in intellectual space. I'm not trying to pick obscure property for fun. I'm trying to get-in on the rush for commonly used symbols. There's big money in licensing the rights to 'r' and 'R'. I'm not sure "Alexander" has commercial value, but my owning it invalidates the "fuzzy" argument. You are actively using the word, so you can't claim ignorance of it's exact location and dimension in intellectual space. In fact, of all the names you could have picked for the forum, you selected that one. You must know exactly where it is in intellectual space, since it was so easy for you to find it. You are still trespassing. There are exactly two solutions to the problem. Either my claim of ownership is invalid (and we need to work on your definitions, so there can be some exceptions), or you are in the wrong morally (and need to change your forum name). It's a strange scenario, but we need to put your theory to the test. If every usage of your theory results in a new exception, then I don't think there's very much value in it.

I'm not sure if you are aware, but there are air rights, water rights, and mineral rights. In fact, the concept of property can be extended to any object which physically exists. True, one person doesn't own all the world. However, all the available land is constantly being converted to property and subdivided. There is no physical object which cannot be owned. To include: clouds, air, and water. Water rights. If I own the water, it doesn't matter if it becomes displaced. My car is not, somehow, less my car because it moves over a parking space. By the same token, my water is not any less my water because it changes containers. If my ownership claim is valid, you're in the wrong for stealing my water. Farmland. Do you know how large Disneyland is? Have you ever seen a private animal reserve? There are a ton of extremely-large, privately owned plots of land. If my ownership claim is valid, I can own the whole world. Diamonds are sold in extremely small sizes. So are microchips. There are a number of micro and nano objects which are privately owned. Steal a diamond, see what happens. You are still trespassing on my property without an explanation.

My symbols and my word are both owned by me. You are trespassing on my property again. It is immoral for you to do so, as trespassing is immoral. Let's just compare it to land. I claimed ownership of argumentation, which I will now refer to as a piece of land. I claimed this piece of land and you walked all over it against my express permission. You then claimed that the land could not be owned because there was some type of mineral (it was actually a process, which is unownable) on it. I excepted your definition that land with that mineral was unownable (process are conceptually fuzzy and cannot be sufficiently defined to be owned). I claimed some symbols and a word...which I will now refer to as a piece of land. This land is free of the mineral which creates an exception to your moral rule (it's pretty tough to claim the symbols 'r' and 'R', as well as the word "Alexander", are either conceptually fuzzy or a process). You are now walking all over my land without my express permission. So, I'm waiting for you to either respect your own moral principle and get off my land, or explain the next arbitrary exception to your "moral argument".

I'm glad you're willing to admit your definitions are wrong. I relinquish my invalid claim over argumentation. You'll need to change "Intellectual Matter - That which can be understood through language." to read "Intellectual Matter - That which can be understood through language, except anything which can be regarded as a process, or is not a finished work." Let's try another two and see if we can find all the arbitrary exceptions to your definitions. I own the symbols 'r' and 'R'. Both are explainable through language, neither can be regarded as a process. The symbols are fully drawn, there is no more production required for them, both are finished products. Each is highly distinct when compared to the millions of other symbols. I have used both, and claim ownership of them. Using either of these intellectual objects without my express permission is trespass, as I have a legitimate, exclusive, moral claim of authority to exclude others from use of these properties. I own the word "Alexander". It is clearly explainable through language. It cannot be regarded as a process. It is highly distinct from the millions of other words. The word is complete, as no additions are required, and is a finished product. I just used it to make this statement, and I claim ownership over it. Using this intellectual object without my express permission is trespass, as I have a legitimate, exclusive, moral claim of authority to exclude others from use of this properties.

Excuse me, you have trespassed on my intellectual object of argumentation. By trying to make a claim about some arbitrary exclusion from the definition of intellectual matter, which you established, you have trespassed into argumentation. Argumentation is understandable through language and, as you have stated, intellectual matter its that which can be understood through language. Argumentation is distinct from not-argumentation, and so it is an intellectual object. Any unowned intellectual property only needs to be used and claimed to be owned. I am arguing and I claim to own argumentation. As we discussed earlier, there is no public property, remember? Argumentation was unowned until I claimed it, just now. I'm afraid that I must use my legitimate exclusive moral claim to exclude you from arguing. If you continue to argue, I will assume you are not interested in keeping to the NAP or respecting property rights.

Are saying intellectual matter is a kind of UPB? Actually, I think that, by your definition, UPB is an element of intellectual matter. If I follow you correctly, all arguments are intellectual matter... In fact, the process of arguing must also be a kind of intellectual matter. So, I'm justified in using force against anyone who argues against my using force against them...because they are trespassing on my intellectual property by arguing. BTW, I own arguing, don't try to use my property to prove I don't own it. In fact, unauthorized quoting may be met with deadly force. Theft will not be tolerated. I believe this is the first time I've heard a serious argument for the moral validity of being a grammar Nazi (you wouldn't want people misusing your property).

It's taken me two days to figure out why comparing these two words bothers me. I now know. "Meaningless" is a subjective word, "illogical" is an objective word. That is, logic is a type of argumentation (actually another flavor of UPB), while meaning is the subjective classification of an object into a context. If a claim is logical, there is a mutually preferable system for proving that it is so. A claim may be meaningless to me, but very meaningful to you. As such, there is no mutually preferable system for determining meaningfulness. I do not believe the two words are comparable. People don't knowing believe false statements. I kinda want to say "that's a fundamental rule of epistemology", but I think that would be impolite and that feels like some kind of fallacy to me. I'll examine the opposite of the of the other statement (If you are going to make a statement, which you expect anyone else to believe, it ought not be false) to illustrate why it must be so. Suppose that, if I am going to make a statement (we need that part), which I expect people to believe, it ought be false. Now, should you believe that claim when I advance it? If I'm correct in my claim (if it is true), then I've violated my principle to explain it. So, that version of the claim is impossible. Alternatively, we can try: If I am going to make a statement, which I expect people not to believe, it ought be true. Should you believe that claim? If the claim is true, then it requires you not believe it. One more claim to evaluate. How about: If I am going to make a statement, which I expect people not to believe, it ought be false. Should you believe that claim? In fact, you could without contradiction. However, that is actually the opposite of the claim which I started with (statement, believe, true). Thus, any claim besides (statement, believe, true) and (statement, not believe, false), both of which are actually forms of the same claim, is irrational to believe. So while I might not have shown all my work, I assure you, if people do not knowingly believe false things, then statement, believe, true. Now, you want to include the possibility that you make a claim, which is false, but the other person doesn't know it is and you'd like them to believe the false thing is actually true (a Christmas present full of poo). Here's why that doesn't work. I'll make the claim: If I am going to make a statement, which is false, and I expect people to believe it, they ought to believe it is true. I'm going to call that claim "lying-1". Perhaps that is a practical claim, I don't know. What I do know is that it doesn't universalize. You cannot simultaneously possess a preference for truth and produce deception (that's within the UPB two-guys model). As such, lying-1 is not UPB. Thus, not lying-1 is UPB. Ethically, lying-1 fails. Pragmatically, who knows? I'm sure there are a million consequential reason to lie. I'm just saying that none of them are sufficient to place the activity within the sphere of UPB. Let me offer a second problem with lying-1. The last section "they ought to believe it (a false statement) is true" is contradictory to peoples' universal preference for believing true things...which is part of a big epistemology argument I'm trying not to have. Anything which necessarily includes going against the preferences of one of the participants (rape, theft, murder, etc) can't be UPB. So, I'd say lying gets a seat right next to murder. If fact, any time you want another person to believe something you say, you will make an appeal to some kind of UPB. For example, if I want you to believe it's daytime, I might point at my watch and say "it's daytime". I'm making an argument which appeals to both truth and empiricism (both flavors of UPB). There is no claim, that ought to be believed, which resides beyond the scope of some type of UPB. Argumentation is a type of UPB, and under it are things like math, logic, and (to a lesser degree) language. All claims which can be evaluated, are evaluable within the framework of argumentation (I think that is argumentation's purpose). Why am I writing all this about claims? I'm not discussing what you (as a person) might do. I'm discussing what someone might claim people ought do. If, for example, you want to claim that people ought lie (always, sometimes, or never), I'm going to evaluate that claim for logical consistency and the ability to be universalized. See, there's a difference between what one person does and what people ought do. If the OP had been "can people lie", I'd have agreed in a heartbeat. The question, because it falls in an ethical context, must be examined as "ought people lie" or "ought people not lie", rather than "can anyone lie" or "can't anyone lie". I feel I should end on a high-note, so let me say: this is a fantastic conversation we're having right now.

Why would anyone believe a statement they knew to be false? As far as I know, people only believe false statements when they believe the statements to be true. There's no valid argument that people ought believe false statements. Heck, I can only use "true=ought believe" because the opposite is impossible. Now, if you mean that a person might believe a false statement while imagining it to be true, that is often the case. However, believing a false statement which you imagine to be true is a bit like a gift-wrapped box of poo. The outside appears preferable, but the inside stinks. That is, upon learning that the belief is false, the person will reject it in favor of some other true belief. It's not a contradiction. A contradiction occurs when when two propositions are logically incompatible. You making a "this statement is false" isn't a contradiction, it's nonsense. I don't mean that pejoratively, there is actually no reason in statements which have indeterminate truth values. Let's explode your example (as I understand it) into two propositions: "I don't want to make a true statement"; "I don't want to reveal my desire to not make a true statement". In that case, I can simply say nothing. There is no contradiction as the two propositions are not incompatible. All of UPB is dependent on truth being the preferable condition. Check it out. Why is rape not UPB? Because it cannot be universalized without running into a logical contradiction. Why do I care if the act of claiming rape as ethical is logically contradictory? Because I've demonstrated a preference for truth in this line of questioning, and contradictory logic is the opposite of truth. Suppose I say "But I don't have a preference for truth". Of course, that's not true. The claim "I don't have a preference for truth" is a truth claim...and a self-defeating argument. There's no way around it, if you're gonna make arguments, you prefer true to false. Any claims about what people ought do are gonna end-up being part of an argument. Of course, you may make all sorts of statements without regard for their truth value. UPB is not a guide to what is possible. However, as soon as you start asserting that the irrational statements you have made ought to be believed, you've wandered into a whole world of hurt. People believe things which they imagine as true. If you present an argument with an indeterminate truth value (or worse, a false truth value), nobody should believe you. You're correct that by lying (making false statements) you've ventured beyond empirical statements and argumentation (both are flavors of UPB). It is impossible to rationally argue for non-UPB as something people ought do. It is impossible to rationally argue that people ought to lie (make false statements). Thus, people ought not lie (i.e. if A is not UPB then not A is UPB).

Gotcha. You're talking about a situation where telling the truth results in a self-detonating proposition. The sentence is illogical. Just as-if I said "Right now, I'm lying". I think it's a round-about way of constructing a Godel statement (i.e. "this sentence is false"). Generally, such statements are regarded as having indeterminate truth values, in much the same way an empty or null statement (i.e. " ") has an indeterminate truth value. I think eating broccoli has the same truth value as a null statement, but that's just conjecture. I am sure Godel statements aren't false, I think they aren't true either. As such, if "making false statements" is prohibited, "making statements of indeterminate truth value" isn't. Though, I think that, in a polite conversation, people would think you were crazy if you started communicating in statements with indeterminate truth values. Murderer: "Where is Dave? I want to murder him." Me: "400 Tuesday hat: underground." *Eats broccoli* Here again we arrive at that same problem. If false is sometimes preferable to true, then why are you disagreeing with me? If my argument is wrong (false), this is one of those times when false is better. If my argument is right (true), this is one of those times when true is better. If this isn't one of those times when the preferability of truth works in my favor, then the preferability of truth always works in my favor. Because this is one of those times when both false and true are better than each other, you should believe everything I say no matter what... See how all that just fell apart? The performance of correcting an argument or making an empirical statement that someone else ought to believe ("Bob is at his house") pre-supposes a universal preference for truth. True and false are such low-level concepts that it is pretty much impossible to argue against true or for false. In fact, I'm pretty sure that "for" means "is true" and "against" means "is false". My point is, even if you make a false statement, you still want the other person to believe it is true. In the act of making the false statement, you're betting on the other person preferring truth. That is, you are demonstrating a non-preference for truth, while counting on someone else having a preference for truth. It doesn't universalize. The universal is either everyone has a preference for truth or everyone has a preference for false. If everyone, somehow, has a preference for false, then no one should believe anything anyone else says (and lying successfully is impossible). If everyone has a preference for true, then people accept correction from each other when a false statement is made. As demonstrated, I reject the "sometimes" condition because argumentation breaks-down during its application.

Sorry if I missed what you were saying. Your argument seems to be very nuanced. Wow... a non-self contradictory option of...I don't understand, I'm sorry. I think you've said something amazing, can you elaborate? Nope, I don't know what "acting truth" means. Your actions are always consistent with reality, the opposite would be impossible. Statements, claims, and arguments can be inconsistent with reality, but not actions. I know why "telling the truth", insomuch as it means "making true statements", is universally preferable to "making false statements". But I don't understand the phrase "acting truth" to compare the two ideas. If you are going to make a statement, which you expect anyone else to believe, it ought not be false (as the opposite position is contradictory). That's all.

So, you're saying that, because you would rather not tell the truth, making a false statement is preferable to you? I don't disagree. There are numerous instances of individuals preferring against universal preferability. Universal preferability is part of a logical argument, individual preference is a largely subjective. Claims about idealized behavior fall in the realm of universal preferability. That is, when I want to do things, that's a matter of individual preference. When I want to make arguments about what people should do, that's a matter of universal preferability. There can't be universal preferences for behaviors which contain logical contradictions when universalized, but there can be individual preferences for such behaviors. I may prefer to steal, but that has nothing to do with the universal preferability of theft. You may prefer to lie, that has nothing to do with the universal preferability of lying.

On the individual level, that's true. There are a number of cases in which a rapist would prefer to rape rather than to not rape or a thief would prefer to steal. There are all sorts of instances where an individual would prefer to misbehave. I, myself, do lie from time to time. Individual instances don't change the problem of preferability In the cases of rape and theft, the behaviors can't be universalized as they require non-preference (so they cannot be universally preferred). Making false statements requires that the statement maker first demonstrate a preference for truth (by arguing and invoking "is true = ought to believe"), only to make statements which violate that preference (i.e. now believe this thing which is false). The contradiction is different, but evident. Let's indulge in a bit of lifeboat analysis. So, there's this murderer, and somehow I know this person intends to kill someone (who isn't me)? Presumably, if I provide accurate directions, the result will be the death of some unrelated third party. Keeping the entire thought experiment within the confines of my response, I'm not prohibited from rejecting their request for directions. I could say "I'm not telling you because you intend to kill so-and-so". That's the truth. If the murderer intended to kill me, rather than some third party, the exact same answer would suffice. The opposite of "making false statements" isn't "making true statements", it's "not making false statements". In response to the murder's question I can eat broccoli, as that behavior is not making a false statement. Personally, I'd want to know why there was so much murderous intent in the air, but that's just me. I'm not saying that true statements are universally preferable to not making statements, only that true statements are universally preferable to false statements. There are many times where silence is the better choice (i.e. the lost murderer). Murderer: "Hey, do you know where Dave lives? I want to murder him." Me: *Eats broccoli*

Intent is irrelevant. I'm simply pointing out that any argument in-favor of lying is logically inconsistent. "People should make false statements..." is always contradictory. It's actually funny, because argumentation is a process whereby we correct each others beliefs to more closely match reality. A lie (if intent is unknown) is just a statement which doesn't match reality. I suspect you want the word "lie" to mean something more than "making false statements". I'm reluctant to include any reference to intent because it is unknowable. I much prefer to discuss only the empirical (and sometimes the rational). There are no positive unchoosen obligations and all relationships are voluntary. If you wold prefer not to answer a question, don't. If you consider "not responding" as a type of lying, perhaps someone has convinced you that full-disclosure is virtue. I assure you, it isn't. I'm only addressing lying as "making false statements". Because argumentation requires a universal preference for truth, there is no rational argument for falsehood over truth. I don't know about all the rest of the nonsense people lump into the word "lying". I can't talk about the intentions behind omission or half truths. Perhaps a more general definition of what you believe constitutes lying would make this a more productive conversation. I don't follow you. As long as my statement is true, it doesn't matter what I say. I can reject your request, just leave, ignore you, or give you the information. All the statements in those activities will have the same truth value. Mandatory full disclosure is not UPB. That would be horrible (so many drinks would be thrown in faces). However, if telling the truth isn't UPB, we run into this problem: On what basis are you correcting my argument? If truth isn't universally preferable, it's only sometimes preferable, perhaps my entire argument is incorrect...false...but this is one of those times when false is preferable to true. There are too many problems with trying to make pro-false arguments. No, because argumentation rests on the assumption that true is preferable to false, and pro-true (rational) argumentation is UPB, I'd argue that making true statements is UPB. Certainly, we act like making true statements is UPB. When I say something which is false, there are waves of people who wish to dispute the veracity of my statement. I've yet to have a single person say "Your statement is false, but perhaps this is an instance of false being preferable to true, so I will not believe your incorrect statement over my correct statement"...just doesn't happen. Now, I will say that simply "making statements" has no status in the UPB model. It's more like "eating broccoli" than rape. There is neither a positive obligation nor a general prohibition with respect to making statements.