greekredemption

It seems this is one of the great unanswered questions of physics. Again, to quote Christopher Hitchens, "Yes I have free will; I have no choice." It's plain that I am operating as if I have free will - certainly that's how I'm experiencing it - but it is also possible to recognise that my perception may not in fact be the truth. We must accept our biological limitations I think. Yeah it's a cognitive dissonance but it isn't entirely irreconcilable. And furthermore, the effects of not believing free will are not relevant to its veracity, as you know.

Maybe I'm struggling to comprehend your exact argument because I don't see what's different between those 'forms' of causality.

Suffice it to say that when all things appear to be effects of causes, and causes of effects, to exclude ourselves from that requires some pretty extraordinary evidence, which does not seem to be forthcoming. You know full well I can't account for those things - I am no psychologist or neuroscientist - but to be consistent with the universe as we know it those qualia must simply be effects of causes of effects of causes... and so on. In any case, it seems to me that your definition of free will fits in perfectly fine with the determinist view. You aren't claiming that free will exists outside of causality but is instead a part of it. Sounds valid to me.

I'm referring to the traditional liberal justification for property. Sometimes this is expressed as homesteading, sometimes thusly: From the mighty John Locke. If anybody wants to offer an alternate account of property, that'd also be good. I'd also be interested in how seriously the Lockean proviso should be taken. Yes, I was admittedly inexact with my wording. Suppose I reworded it to say, "A person appropriates for his own purposes 99% of the island's land, natural resources, etc." By most liberal accounts this is a legitimate justification of property. Also: I think this point stands in spite of my clarification. If I've read UPB correctly, appropriating stuff causes it to become property (it's slightly more nuanced than that - it is an extension of yourself, as you own yourself, A=A and all that). That is the universal standard. Claiming already owned property would be theft, which would - again, if I understand correctly - violate UPB. TheRobin - what makes claims on unowned stuff non-arbitrary?

Hey, you know, that may be a great description of free will as we experience it - the continual input and output from person to environment could well be what we call free will. But even given that - the reciprocity as you called it - the causal chain is still linear. I mean, it can't be any other way. The arrow of time only goes in one direction. But as you say, we can very well describe the complex interplay between what we call a person and its environment to be free will. That it is still operating in a linear causal chain (again, which is must do) precludes the existence of a free will outside of that chain. Intelligence I would suppose is a different arrangement of neurons impacted by given environmental factors. Just like all these other qualia. None of these things is necessary 'spared' by determinists. What determinists assert, in short, is that we do not in fact have choices. This does not preclude the existence of complex systems.

Of course it would be fatuous to say nature is restricting liberty - like humans can't fly, but so what? I'm fine with that concept. The traditional liberal definition of liberty is the absence of impediment, however we describe that. Most libertarians subscribe to the Hobbesian view that the only true impediment of liberty is direct and physical coercion (or the threat of it), in whatever guise that takes. "Coercion means someone is actively using force to prevent you from certain choices and opportunities." Yes, okay, so if a group of people are enforcing a policy which prevents you from certain choices and opportunities, is this a restriction of liberty? Take your desert island example. You and another are on a desert island, and the other sets about claiming property on 99% of the island, leaving you with 1%. According to the libertarian account, you've no recourse there as your liberty has at no point been infringed and yet, perversely, were you to steal some fruit from the other's land you'd be infringing his liberty. Now, I accept that the other person with 99% of the island has not visited any direct and physical coercion on you, but the fact he has claimed and is willing to defend - with force - his land could be seen as a type of coercion. In short, you've no choice but to comply with the stronger man's policy. A corollary of this view is that it implies that libertarians are erroneous in conflating property rights with liberty, but perhaps that is a different topic altogether.

This is not a hoodwink attempt. It is an attempt to inject something that isn't the majority view here for the consideration of "people smart enough" to deal with philosophical concepts. We don't always have to abide by dogma in, as you put it, "seeking the truth." Your social contract point is somewhat relevant, but doesn't address the idea directly, as you'll see if you follow the trail back and if you see my response to your post. Overall, I'm suggesting that the libertarian concept of liberty is too restrictive in that it does not allow for non-physical techniques of coercion (like structural coercion), and, perhaps, could benefit from an expanded definition. Perhaps. Or, at least, this is similar the anarcho-communist critique of the libertarian concept of liberty, and ought to be considered as a point of philosophical rigour. FDR doesn't have to be an echo chamber. It is possible for a person to present a view they don't necessarily agree with and debate it in a civilised manner without being shut down by armchair psychologists and parrots of the received wisdom.

I'd just like to say at this point I'm very much enjoying this little debate. It's a lot more insightful and civilised than usual, which pleases me.

Okay, so you were talking about the social contract. Great. What I'm asking is slightly different. In essence there seems to me no functional difference to the individual between being indirectly coerced into a certain course of action by a corporation and being directly coerced into a certain course of action by a state. They operate at a similar level of authority; it matters not that the state claims moral ownership of persons while the corporation doesn't if they both operate as if it is were true. And considered from the PoV of the peasant (pauper, prole, whatever), he is as free to turn down work as the first world person is to stop paying taxes. Any thoughts?

Okay, so why don't libertarians leave the country that oppresses them? is that functionally different to the peasant and the corporation?

Nobody's saying 'causality...[doesn't] have free will', but instead something more like 'causality precludes free will'. Despite your having more than one definition of causality, it still seems to me as if causality still precludes free will. Of course, your definition of free will still allows for determinism, and is probably not even that far away from the determinist position, insofar as no determinist is going to disagree that you experience the world as causal and that your apparent choices in the world appear to you to be causes in themselves. What I (and others, perhaps) am saying is that while this may be a valid way to look at the world (as you point out, to look at the world in any other way would probably result in insanity), from the point of view of the universe it is unsound and very probably incorrect. This is because, unfortunately, it has yet to be demonstrated that free will, where a thing can be the genesis of a chain of causality, actually exists in the universe. Defining free will, as you have done, as an emergent property of biology does not tell the whole story and definitely doesn't contradict deterministic propositions.

That doesn't seem to be the case in some parts of Europe.

Emergent properties are completely dependent on the simplest reductions; a lattice is dependent on the interactions of particles, in the same way my typing this post is dependent on the interactions of particles. These 'kinds' of causality do not actually add anything to the phenomenon of cause and effect. A leads to B. That B may lead to C, and C to X, does not imply a different kind of causality. Being honest, I'm not sure what your point is with these different kinds. I mean, you say later in your post: Yes, at a higher level it is practical to see it as your choice for your arm to go up. But ultimately particle interactions determined that your arm would go up. Your 'choice' is merely an emergent property of these particle interactions - according to these interactions, if you ran that sequence again and again either the same 'choice' would be reached every time OR your choice would be random each time. You're right. In hindsight, my point was badly phrased. How about, "There is not, I think, any controversy in suggesting that free will is an emergent property of the interactions of particles." Ah, well, we've now run into the problem of induction. You know as well as I do that I cannot justify that an effect will always link to a given cause, except to say that it has happened in the past and seems to work. Notwithstanding that.... Using induction, we can show that given causes have given effects. And that if the given cause is the same the given effect is the same. A rock falls down a hill, and its trajectory, speed, the way it bounces, where it lands, are determined by the inputs, whatever they were. So, if we take your arm moving, you say it was caused by your choice to lift your arm. What caused your choice? You may say various environmental inputs. Or perhaps genes get involved. Or memories. Is this the sum total of your choice to lift your arm? If so, whence the free will? if not, what is this literal uncaused cause that would allow free will? It seems to me the 'choice' step is unnecessary. The fact remains that given inputs lead to given outputs (causality if you will), and each of those apparently discrete inputs can be described in terms of the interactions of particles in precisely the same way as a rock falling down a hill. It doesn't confer enough rigour in the argument. A performative contradiction may show a person's beliefs to be incorrect, but it does not necessarily say anything about how the universe functions. That I act as if I have free will does not actually mean I have free will. If it looks like a horse and sounds like a horse, it may not actually be a horse! Perhaps you could define 'free will' as you understand it?

Kevin Beal has made a couple of very erudite posts, but I feel we're at cross-purposes here. There is not, I think, any controversy in suggesting that free will is an emergent property of causality. We can indeed reduce all things in the universe to interactions between energy and matter, and human beings are no exception to this. The bottom line is the universe cares not for our thoughts and feelings, and, yes, a human being is ultimately subject to causality and other things in the same way as a spoon. The fact that humans - or life generally, however you define it - are essentially slow-burning and almost self-perpetuating chemical reactions doesn't really make them special in the universe. I'd also take issue with this idea: (emphasis mine) Evidently this is not the case. Simple interactions can produce complex results. Take the double pendulum, for example, where the inputs are very easily understood but the results are chaotic. Free will is an example of this. Basic interactions between particles can create very complex results (as the universe we see today), but all these interactions follow the same rules. The crude version of free will - that humans really do have the ability to circumvent causality in favour of their whims - is totally unsupported by evidence. The more nuanced version of free will - that free will is a property of the complex results of simple interactions - simply describes, as you call it, quale, the mad idea that we seem to perceive stuff. Where a lot of free will proponents then get confused is to suggest that these qualia somehow define how the universe actually works, which is where we get bogged down in the sophistry of the performative contradiction, as if petty human perceptions define the universe. In short, it is highly likely, in order to be conversant with the laws of the universe as we know them, that we are merely cogs in a huge machine and free will is an illusion - or a quale - in the same way the colour red is an illusion.

I count a credible threat and force to be the same thing.

It's just a thought. If we can consider governmental actions - characterised variously as civil oppression or just normal governance - as infringing on the liberty of persons, can we not also apply this to other persons or grous of power that superficially appear voluntary or otherwise legitimate? Is physical force the only means by which liberty can be infringed? I mean, consider the libertarian position on these two scenarios. In one is a middle-class first world white guy who's losing 30% of his annual pay to taxes. This is considered theft and is an automatic infringement of liberty. In the other is a peasant in some godforsaken part of the world who has no choice - unless he should choose to die - but to work for virtually nothing for a large corporation that has perfectly legally bought up all nearby land and is exploiting (in a literal sense) the natural resources; this scenario does not imply any infringement of liberty whatsoever. The peasant is merely unlucky. Is it then entirely unreasonable to consider structural coercion an infringement of liberty? Of course the peasant hasn't experienced any direct physical coercion from the corporation, but his lack of choices that might otherwise be available to him may, it seems to me, be construed as an infringement of liberty in a similar way to the first world 'oh noes, I'm getting £23k p/a instead of £32k p/a' guy. Three things: I see a lot of merit in the Georgist view of natural resources in resolving this apparent disparity. Does anyone have any thoughts on that? Let's not confuse what is right with what is good (i.e. you may say the peasant is benefiting from having a job, but that does not mean his situation is just). This also has nothing to say of obligation.

Perhaps it is worth differentiating between what is right and what is good.

Don't be stupid, we have no need for context or shades of grey here.

Okay, we're through the looking glass now. Someone else can pick this up.

Hydrocephalus? Progeria? And what about the rest of my post?

This is one of the things Marx described as a contradiction inherent in capitalism. And free marketeers see this as a method of achieving incremental growth. I suppose there's no controversy in that quote, but its implications are interesting. The question is, I think: is it good? This is distinct from asking 'is it right?'

It does no such thing. Both X and Y chromosomes were found in earlier DNA tests. And as far as I know, the analysis of the FOXP2 gene does not in any way indicate non-human DNA (has a conclusion even been released? I don't know). Maybe you'll be interested in this http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FOXP2#Clinical_significance And, look, this is all hinging on DNA. Let us suppose for a moment that this quack merchant is correct, and for some reason this skull is half non-human. Why can't it just be another species of human (of which there are many)? Why are you defaulting to the alien hypothesis? And furthermore, why would aliens have DNA at all!? The fact is that this skull is explained by existing theories. Skull deformations of this kind are relatively common. The DNA testing shows human DNA. What else do you want? Skullchild of the Gaps.

Testing shows the skull to be human, for one. Secondly, even if the skull were not human (by what means I'm not sure), if it contains DNA it doesn't seem to suggest extra-terrestrial origins. DNA is of course common to all known life, and all known life is terrestrial. Perhaps it's a different species of human? Why must it be extra-terrestrial? Can't it be fairies? Gods? The whole Starchild Skull thing has so many holes in it it's hardly worth talking about. That you can't see that baffles me in the extreme.

Oh I see, well that serves me right for not reading the entire thread. edit: by that I mean I read the first page and two posts up. Yeah, Internets 101. Anyway, carry on!