higginsp

"The people only make up the free market when they are doing business. They make up the nation at all times." The distinction referenced by Robert Rak between abstractions and actual existents applies to both concepts you reference here: the free market and the nation. Neither of these are existing entities. Instead they are notions within our minds that 'exist' only conceptually -- they have no physical referent, but are rather terms describing alleged characteristics amongst a group of actual existents. Things like a 'common bond' or 'shared language' are not actually existing things; they are conceptual attributes. "A nation is a real thing, it is a population with common allegiance, usually laying claim to a particular territory which they maintain in order to continue to exist as a people and to safeguard their self-determination, This is more tangible a thing than abstract ideas which people here would not call into question, like 'liberty' and 'morality' and 'virtue'. A nation owning a homeland is no more abstract a notion than three brothers each co-owning a single car." The same analysis applies here as well: a nation is not a real thing in the same sense that a physical object is (and for that matter, neither is a population). Both of these words are conceptual terms denoting a relationship between things (e.g. a relationship between individual people in an arbitrarily delineated geographical area), but the relationship itself similarly does not exist outside of our conceptual awareness. So it is not accurate to equate the ownership of a thing by individual people to the ownership of a thing by a concept referring to people as a conglomerated whole. There is a difference between the two, and you yourself have identified it: when you say that 3 people co-own a car you are saying that each of them as an individual has an ownership claim. It is not that they form some new 3-brother-based-entity that now has a new and unique ownership claim. Their ownership claim derives from their status as individuals. The error you commit is in assuming that the nation as a whole has an ownership claim akin to a 3-brother-based-entity. In other words, by comparing the ownership of a car by 3 individuals to the ownership of land by a conglomerated whole, you are tacitly concluding that the 3 individual brothers constitute a new entity apart from their status as individuals (in the same way that you explicitly argue that people with 'common bonds' living in an arbitrarily delineated geographical area constitute a new entity apart from their status as individuals). This is fallacious. "Dissenting and dissociating from the nation-of-origin is fine, both culturally and financially, in my book. So you can reject a national identity without being physically booted out, and you can opt out of taxes, etc. but just don't expect any support by the rest of the nation. As for passage across borders, that depends on the neighbouring nation, doesn't it? Your right to enter a foreign land is outweighed by the rights of the foreigners to say who they want to let in. It's funny that few advocates of open borders have taken out the walls and fences separating their homes and gardens from those of their neighbors." I don't think anyone here is opposed to the idea that associations should be voluntary, and that if you have not entered into a mutual association then you should not benefit from it unilaterally. That is a completely amenable proposition. The problem is if you think any particular organization ought to have a coercively enforced monopoly on any of these so-called public services. If that is the case, then you have stepped outside the realm of voluntarism. As for immigration: it's important again to make sure you do not conflate the nation with individual people. The 'nation' as a concept referring to a conglomeration of arbitrarily delineated individuals is not embedded with some special moral status. Groups do not gain rights or enter into alternative moral categories by virtue of being collectives -- whether you call them groups, nations, clubs or whatever. The way immigration ought to be handled is voluntarily: according to the desires of the private land owners and potential arrangements made between them and new-comers wishing to relocate.

I think the biggest problem I have with his article is the obscurity with which he uses the term absolute vs non-absolute. In some cases, his distinction between an absolute and a non-absolute truth seems to be accurate, but not particularly of much consequence. He gives an example of a statement along the lines of "my car exists is absolutely true"; here he argues that this claim is not absolutely true because absolute truths must be in effect 'eternal truths.' I find this to be a peculiar point to make. I doubt very much so that anyone who claims that the proposition 'my car exists is absolutely true' implies that their car exists eternally. However, from what I can gather his point seems to be that for something to be 'absolute' it must be divorced from all possible conditions. So for example, the reason 'my car exists is absolutely true' is in fact not absolutely true is because for this statement to be absolute, it must be completely and utterly unconditional. It must be true in every possible circumstance, in every possible time and place without relation to particular persons. Clearly, he is correct in suggesting that if I were to go back in time 300 years and utter this statement again: "My car exists is absolutely true" it could not in fact be true because the statement's truth is contingent upon a certain time period, and I similarly couldn't possibly claim at this previous point in time that my car will exist because I would have no access to future knowledge to make such a claim. This so far is all well and good. Where it gets obscure, however, is with his attempt to deny that the epistemological claim itself is not absolutely true; specifically, he argues that the claim, 'there is no absolute truth', is not an absolute truth. But if we were to use his previous definition of 'absolute truth' (i.e. that a proposition must be true in every possible circumstance, in every possible time and place), his statement could not be epistemologically relevant if it were temporally contingent, place-specific or person-dependent. So, if it were the case that 'there is no absolute truth' was not eternally true, it would seem to me that he could not really claim there is NO absolute truth, or that it is logically impossible to come up with one -- which is precisely what he argues a little bit later on in the article. This is where things get obscure: clearly, if the previous definition of absolute truth were to be applied to his epistemological claim that 'there are NO absolute truths' (that absolute truths are necessarily contradictory and impossible) this claim would meet his prior standards regarding unconditionality. At this point in the article, however, he seems to shift his critique of absolute truth in order to avoid this conclusion. As opposed to absolute truth being concerned with unconditional truth with respect to all times and places -- in all conditions -- he now is concerned with 'relations' between things. This is the definition of absolute to which he later refers: “a value or principle which is regarded as universally valid or which may be viewed without relation to other things." He concludes that since concepts (including those used in the notion of 'absolute truth') are necessarily meaningless without relation to other things (e.g. humans, the universe, I suppose) that they by definition cannot be absolute. In other words, he's arguing that the concept of 'absolute' is 'necessarily dependent on an observer-established RELATION between two or more objects', and since absolute per his definition means as valid without relation to other things, therefore nothing can be 'absolutely true' per that definition. This to me seems to be a distinction without consequence, at least from a fundamental epistemological perspective (deriving skeptical conclusions from such a distinction would be contradictory). All he seems to be pointing out in the end is that concepts are necessarily concepts formed by an observer in relation to things. His previous definition/use of 'absolute' in his critique of the existence of a car would not be useful here at all, however. If we looked at his epistemological claim according to his prior analysis (that absolute refers to unconditional truth with respect to times, places, persons, etc.) we would have to conclude that this claim is indeed absolute. It's logical status -- the fact that even a claim that there are no absolute truths necessarily involves the use of observer dependent concepts -- could never be denied in any conditional context. Fatfist doesn't seem to be willing to go far enough to embrace skepticism (he does after all call himself a rational scientist or what not), so it's difficult for me to see the importance of his conclusion beyond stating an epistemological fact. He's not saying there is no truth, but simply that there is no statement that can be conceived of which does not involve the use of concepts, which are necessarily dependent on an observer-established relation. What I am concerned with, however, is his sort of implicit, hazily referenced epistemological agnosticism. Perhaps I have misjudged him, but it seems as though he is not far off from epistemological relativism. On the other hand, he may just be out to point out some obvious epistemological facts: that there is no way to conceive of truth or concepts not in relation to an observer. For there to be any proposition, there are certain presuppositions involved: namely, there must be an observer proposing, and concepts used within the proposition. If that is his only conclusion, I would have to say I find no real fault with it. If he goes on to then argue that knowledge is therefore an illusion or something along those lines, I'd find that problematic.

As far as I'm concerned, the only argument in his article worthy of serious consideration is the following, which is not uncommon: "Let us turn then to the counterarguments, beginning with the principle of self-ownership. There is something powerfully intuitive in this principle, something that captures our moral judgment that human persons have an intrinsic dignity and therefore must never be used by anyone simply as a means. But on closer examination, the defects in this principle become clear. Some readers will notice that the language I have just used comes from Immanuel Kant, and indeed it is to Kant that Robert Nozick appeals in making his case for the principle. Nevertheless, Kant himself explicitly repudiated this principle. In the first place, Kant regarded the notion of self-ownership as self-contradictory: Persons are subjects of ownership, whereas ownership is of things. Were persons to own themselves, they would be simultaneously persons and things, which is impossible. The only way to avoid this self-contradiction, Kant suggested, is to divide the self partly into a person (such as the conscious, thinking part of the self) and partly into a thing (such as the body part). But this entails an untenable body-self dualism. As Robert George has written, "The dualistic view of the human person makes nonsense of the experience all of us have in our activities of being dynamically unified actors-of being, that is, embodied persons, and not persons who merely 'inhabit' our bodies and direct them as extrinsic instruments under our control, like automobiles." I'll just focus on his argument that there is a conceptual impossibility implied in asserting self-ownership. Specifically, he states it is contradictory because if ownership means 'ownership of things' then saying 'I own myself' implies that I am both the subject and object of that statement. The biggest problem with his argument is that he smuggles in a vague, unspoken definition of ownership. Even from his critique, it is not clear what he means by 'ownership.' Instead of defining what 'ownership' means, he simply alludes to ownership as a state in which something is 'the owner of things.' It is pointless to go into a semantic analysis of a predicate without first defining the concepts involved in the predicate. Without a definition of 'ownership', it is not certain that there is a contradiction involved in the concept of self-ownership. If ownership is defined as 'exclusive use' or 'exclusive control' over something, it is not clear to me that it is necessarily contradictory to say: 'I have exclusive use over my physical body.' The author could come back, however, and apply the same argument: that I have again made myself both the subject and object of the predicate. But I think this is shortsighted. There is no contradiction implied when saying, "only I can use myself" because we are capable of recognizing that the subject of this predicate ('I') is capable of acting upon itself ('myself'). More broadly speaking, it is not impossible for a thing to both act and for the object of its action to be itself. These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive; the logical status of a predicate is contingent upon not only its structure, but more importantly upon the use of the concepts involved. This is why definitions are important. If 'ownership' is left murky and undefined, it is easy to smuggle in unspoken definitions which only muddy the waters.

"Truths are inherently biased. Truth is what is dear to YOUR heart & soul, only. Truth means that the Priest had his way with you while you were in the confession box. For all intents and purposes, you can use the word “truth” as a synonym to the word “opinion” in every scenario, and you will not change the context or meaning of your dissertation. Just try it and see for yourself. Remember: TRUTH = OPINION." As TeaBagger and DaVinci stated: this dude is quite literally involved in a contradiction. He explicitly states that propositions state an alleged case, and that these statements can never be anything other than meaningless, subjective utterances. He then immediately proceeds to make a proposition (i.e. a statement of an alleged case), and operates as if this proposition is somehow magically excluded from his own premises. I'd generally recommend avoiding anyone who makes a proposition denying the possibility of valid propositions.

There is no primary Objectivist source that describes consciousness as being 'separate from the universe.' The distinction that Leonard Peikoff makes is that it would be logically contradictory to argue that volition (which emanates from consciousness) can be explained through an analysis of antecedent causes. Instead, what he says is that human consciousness must involve an uncaused cause, and that this can not be disputed as volition is epistemologically axiomatic (in the same way that Stefan argues that self-ownership cannot be denied).

Oh, I wasn't saying your thoughts were un-groundbreaking -- I was referring to mine, hah. I don't think it's crazy at all to assume people have reasons for doing things. Of course, people have reasons for doing things. My point was that it's likely unproductive to try to formulate a general theory for why people do or don't do this or that because the reasons are almost certainly many.

By 'doing good' what exactly do you mean? Do you mean being charitable? Being other-centric? Selfless in the colloquial sense? Based on what you wrote, I'll assume you mean something along those lines. I don't think it's useful or practical, however, to try to ascribe to every individual person an overriding motive for their charitable actions. This isn't exactly earth-shattering, but there are quite literally countless reasons for doing 'good' things. At the most fundamental, it is the value judgments one has made and the corresponding position of those in his/her value hierarchy that serves as the motive for any particular action made.

I think this analysis indicates some logical-conceptual confusion. To ask "How could things have always existed?" is to misapply the concepts of 'time' and 'existence.' The way you phrase this sentence implies that 'time' is outside of existence, and existence occurs within time. This is backwards. Time is a measurement of motion. It is not a 'thing' apart from that which exists. Your question thus rests on faulty premises: existence did not suddenly 'poof' into time. Existence is literally eternal insofar as 'time' is a concept without meaning outside of existence.

Hello todofixthis. I was just in Bangkok about 4 weeks ago (I actually left BKK on February 26). I'm currently in Korea, but I will be going back to Thailand this summer. I'll be sure to revisit this thread as that time approaches.

I think there are a number of problems in this critique. I'll just list a few with quotes for the time being: 1. "Alas, this does not resolve the anarchist's dilemma. In either 2(a) or (b), you have a de facto "legal monopoly" on the use of force -- the same "immoral" coercive situation for which anarchists denounce governments. Wouldn't 2(a) or (b) amount to "unlimited majority rule," or "might makes right"? In the final analysis, no one would be allowed to ignore or secede from the verdict imposed by the majority of agencies. If so, then what becomes of the alleged "right to ignore the state," the "right to secede," or the "right not to delegate away one's personal "right of retaliation"? Also, what becomes of the minority agencies which disagree with the majority -- or to any lone individual who is not represented by any agency? Where is "consumer sovereignty"?" His dichotomy is problematic. Part (b) of option 2 is not equatable with a government monopoly on violence unless it is stipulated that the income that drives their businesses (the protection agencies) is coercively obtained and/or that the agencies use coercion to prevent competition. If either of these two conditions are not met, protection agencies are not a coercive entity. Even if there were a framework whereby a collection of agencies resolved disputes through a mutually agreed-upon legal code, it could not be properly termed a 'monopoly' on the use of violence if the source of their market position was a result of voluntary exchange to begin with, and any subsequent shift in market sentiments could presumably alter the framework itself. This fact, however, that market sentiments will shape the legal framework itself is plainly obvious, and it seems to be the crux of his argument. He is of the position that because these private agencies would respond to the whims of the market, that it could lead to the same sort of outcomes present in the state-centric world now. This is clearly true. If, say, everyone in the United States believed that whenever a married man died prior to his wife that his wife must have cursed him (akin to a belief fairly prevalent in parts of rural India), it is likely that wife burnings could become legally sanctioned in such a society. This is why I personally (and Stefan as well from what I can tell) do not advocate anarcho-capitalism as something separate from a philosophical revolution. 2. In sum, what the anarcho-capitalist argument omits are the following vital contextual considerations that attend any use of force in society: that -- as a matter of individual survival in society -- one's use of force must be judged and evaluated by everyone else in society, by an objective procedure, in order to distinguish the aggressor from the victim (which is rarely self-evident); that, at some point, a final verdict by society on the use of force must be objectively rendered through that process, and that this final verdict must, at last, be imposed and enforced. To let "the market" pick a final arbiter on the proper uses of force is to leave it to the majority of consumers, whose "sovereignty" regarding the employment of force is to beunlimited. Leaving it all to "the market" means: "to the whims of whichever individual or group has enough money to dominate those who don't." His premises raise some questions: Is a procedure rendered objective merely by means of being forced upon others (as is the case now)? Or is a procedure objective only if it adheres to a logically verifiable philosophical position? If the former is true, it would make the term 'objective' somewhat silly since any set of potential procedures could be declared 'objective' in such a scenario. This would mean that a state simply imposing standards is what makes them objective, which would mean that no standard were objective. The latter scenario would correspond much more with the objectivist view -- that a state can only justifiably respond to the initiation of force, but never itself initiate it. But if this is the case, the current world is evidently devoid of an institution adhering to such an objective procedure, and as such the use of force by current governments does not adhere to his 'vital contextual considerations.' Further, he argues that an anarcho-capitalist society would result in competition regarding the evaluation of rights. While he does not make this explicit, I think he is suggesting that a 'just state' derives its monopoly on violence by adhering to a proper, i.e. objective, evaluation of rights (which would mean that every single state in the history of the world was unjust). But, let's imagine a scenario. What if another agency were to pop-up, which adhered to the same exact evaluation of rights as this 'just state.' What would the justification be to prevent this new institution from adhering to the same standards, the same precise procedures, but say at a lower cost? More fundamentally, the problem is that the author never justifies the authority of the state. He never explains how a single institution can lay claim to this role in a morally justifiable way. Those are just a few thoughts I had while reading this.

I'm an American ex-pat living and working in South Korea. I've listened to FDR off and on for a while, so I thought I should join the forum community. Looking forward to engaging in some meaningful conversations.