bugzysegal

yes, yes arguments would render each of the problematic things non-problematic if everyone accepted them. Hell even if a lot of people just accepted them. But would my example of anarchy satisfy your demands? Presumably everyone there who elected the spokesperseon, as well as the spokesperson would accept the arguments for anarchy, no? I mean what would you have instead of all those things I mentioned wouldn't be there?

Would a certain geographical region that was completely autonomous with no governing body, who unanimously chose someone (including that someone) to speak to the ruling states so that they would be left as "sovereign", and had no law other than the private arbitration of contracts, fit your definition of anarchy? In other words, how would you strip down a state to anarchy? No constitution? fine. No monopoly of force (tricky because theoretically this could arise in a market, even though no monopoly has occurred without the state)? you got it. No politicians, (domestically because one might call the spokesperson a politician of foreign affairs), sure. What else?

I would ask how these facts are relevant if you are not conscious by any regular use of the word. That is, is there sufficient reason to suspect that one is not fully conscious during their actions after they have imbibed the alcohol? If so, the voluntary nature of that drinking of 1-51 is irrelevant. I'll analogize to the anesthesia example. Drinking is voluntary, undergoing anesthesia in a medical setting is voluntary (hopefully). Signing a contract for becoming an organ donor after the point the anesthesia has taken effect is an act that would otherwise be consensual, and having sex while still moving about is one that would otherwise be considered consensual. In both instances, I would argue that at some point, despite there being motor function, the impaired state renders the actor incapable of consent.

factoring in prison rape, correct? Also, yeah I get the point Ace was trying make, but my objection was to rottenx's definition.

Stefan points out that the axioms described in the “UPB in a Nutshell” section of UPB are ones that must bind any moral system. As such, the ethical framework I forward will hopefully arise under these axioms without contradiction. In regards to Utilitarianism Stefan had this to say: “I do not believe that morality can be defined or determined with reference to “arguments from effect,” or the predicted consequences of ethical propositions. Utilitarianism, or “the greatest good for the greatest number,” does not solve the problem of subjectivism, since the odds of any central planner knowing what is objectively good for everyone else are about the same as any - 10 - central economic planner knowing how to efficiently allocate resources in the absence of price – effectively zero. Also, that which is considered “the greatest good for the greatest number” changes according to culture, knowledge, time and circumstances, which also fails to overcome the problem of subjectivism. We do not judge the value of scientific experiments according to some Platonic higher realm, or some utilitarian optimisation – they are judged in accordance with the scientific method. I will take the same approach in this book.” This is quite a piercing and accurate criticism. The problem any theory which tries to aggregate some good faces, whether it’s pleasure, happiness, or some other “good”, is that it inevitably cannot measure that good objectively. Therefore, there is no way an individual, let alone a central planner could assess what the correct moral decision would be. Call this the measurement problem. Utilitarianism faces various other problems as well (such as the repugnant conclusion, and the utility monster and probably a few others I’m unaware of). Though this seems to be the most condemning problem of them all, since without its solution, Utilitarianism doesn’t get off the ground. Let’s turn to a quick thought experiment. There is a choice machine. This machine knows all of your current preferences and it updates each time your preferences change. This machine has a phenomenal grasp of deterministic physical forces and can assess the various outcomes of any set of decisions. This machine will best choose the decisions you have before you, in accordance with whatever outcome would best suit your preferences. The machine does this job without fault. Do you choose to let the machine run your life? There is a second choice machine. It too knows all of your current preferences and it updates each time your preferences change. While it doesn’t make the best possible choices in accordance with outcomes and your preferences, it makes the choice you would have made. Do you let this machine run your life? Making decisions can be quite stressful and you would get the exact same life you would have had, but without any of that stress. If you would not let either of these machines run your life, it is likely because you are a rational person. Any rational person innately values choice. But what if we plugged choice itself into the principle, “whatever maximizes x, is good”? Well let’s take a quick look at the meaning of choice. Choice is the willful use of a conscious mind. So a coma patient that is still conscious is making choices about how to direct his attention. Lifting your leg is a choice, as is not lifting your leg. So choosing not to make a choice is itself a choice. Seems pretty straightforward. In fact, so long as there is a conscious person by themselves(in total isolation from other actors), they are making as many choices as they can. That is, choice is always maximized On the other hand, when more than one moral agent gets involved, things get interesting. If A and B decide on an exchange, both of them will the exchange to happen and so you have two choices resulting in one exchange (mutual assent). However, if A were to replace B’s items with his own, despite the fact that B may have traded anyway, there is one less choice than there could have been. A abolished a choice of B’s. When A murders B, A takes away B’s choice for euthanasia, or to remain alive. When A rapes B, the option with greater choice is that where B and A had consensual sex. I know what you’re thinking, A’s a real asshole. I agree. But aside from that, where do A and B get off claiming they have the right to bodily integrity? Well Mill makes a good point (at least there’s one), that human beings are themselves outside the consideration of exclusively being means to other ends. That is, an any given time, we humans are ends in and of ourselves. Preservation of conscious entities and indirectly the shells that sustain them are inherently valuable. If you see a baby drowning in a puddle and there’s no one around, you at the very least get the baby out of the puddle. If not, you are A a psychopath and B not fully rational. More on this later. Choice and Markets How could one go about maximizing choice? Doesn’t this version of Utilitarianism suffer the same measurement problem as the others? Well, no. So, choice is binary in that you either opt for A, or you don’t. In another sense it’s pluralistic in that you may be giving up a litany of other choices by making any one choice. This is what economists refer to as opportunity cost. By saying that somehow making a choice isn’t a choice because of all the other opportunities you pass up, you’re sneaking in a requirement for choice that wasn’t in the original definition. In any given circumstance with more than one conscious actor, you can have an exchange where there is mutual assent. In each of these exact instances there is maximal choice occurring. What’s interesting is that went a voluntary interaction occurs something new is generated. If A gives B his pencil for a dollar, A values B’s dollar more than his own pencil and B values A’s pencil more than his own dollar. Also, A values B’s dollar more than B does and B values A’s pencil more than A does. Net economic value is necessarily created. Involuntary exchanges, however, are zero-sum. With the creation of economic value comes the expansions of resources. Choices are expanded directly as resources expand. If a market is merely the sum of all consensual interactions (including gifts, charity, etc…) then the market is at that point the most ethical state of affairs possible. What’s fascinating is that we know empirically that markets create the most resources netted compared to central planning or other involuntary exchanges, while simultaneous creating the greatest distribution of those resources to the greatest number of people. Voluntarism is necessarily the moral course of action as a direct result of maximizing choice. Then there is the question of how resources come to be decided upon, and by whom. For this, see Rothsbard’s Applications and criticism from the Austrian school. The basics are, in regards to the control of materials external to the body, if you work with something that no one else has a claim to, it becomes yours after a time. A farmer comes to a new territory, puts up a fence, and works the land. That land is his. I reject that the ownership of the self is necessary through these means, because the integrity of the body and its directed use by consciousness within its brain, is innately valuable. Other than that, this method of acquisition is unlimited. Let’s recap. We have free-markets as dictated by the maximization of choice, the respect for property rights due to the homesteading theory, and the intrinsic value of human life. The Intrinsic Value of Preserving Conscious Creatures Let’s revisit the conclusions we drew about the drowning baby. From the notion that one happens upon a baby drowning in a puddle, it is reprehensible that anyone should let it drown, despite perhaps desiring not to bend down. That is, bending down and saving the baby wouldn’t be their choice. This strikes most as intuitive. Similarly, if someone were to happen upon someone who had experience vertigo and fallen into a body of water and was drowning, it would be equally vile not to throw that person a nearby self-inflating life vest. There is also the popular flag pole scenario (though this seems the most farfetched I’ll admit) where a man on a balcony of a very high building loses balance somehow and falls off the balcony. Luckily he grabs onto the flagpole outside the window of the story immediately below. Should a person deny the hanging man the ability to kick in the glass, or land on the balcony(which magically appeared to change this into a different thought experiment), or worse yet actively seeks to defend his balcony from the man trying to set down on it, we would say this strikes us as unsettling behavior. Yet none of the options that would ruffle our feathers in any of the above scenarios is one which there would be less choice. There is another value at play, and as you might have guessed that value one intrinsic to preserving conscious creatures. Only in these rare instances which pose negligible risk to moral actors does that intrinsic value necessarily outweigh the value of the choice to do nothing. This has certain restrictions. If for instance the person in the river did not fall there because of vertigo, and instead was trying to drown themselves, no one should interfere. Worst case scenario, the suicidal person is rescued and must commit suicide slightly after they had wished to initially. Also if you try and maximize conscious creatures, al the value problems and other problems of utilitarianism arise. That only happens if you try and directly create a greater aggregate preservation of consciousness. If in all circumstances where there are conscious actors with the ability to preserve their own lives(such that they are not in danger), choice is deferred to as the vehicle of maximization, then all is well in the measurement department. An immediate imposition of danger would be required for the value of life to be considered and what qualifies as “immediate” or as a “negligible risk” to the moral actor is no more or less than how we use those words. All words with meaning get that meaning through inter-subjective agreement. What would it matter if we could say such people were wrong for refraining from acting? A lot to the families of those imperiled. Compensatory damages to the families or the victims themselves, should they survive but not unscathed, would be a moral right. By abstaining from action, the bad actor injured the victim. They would be obligated to make them whole again. Similarly in the event of death, emotional damages should be compensated to the extent that they could be. What you wouldn’t get is some central planner telling people they have to wipe the noses of passers by. If you have read this far, thanks. The only thing I ask, before you issue your criticism is that you do your very best to defend this position first. Before you ask your question or point out a flaw, anticipate how I might respond and play out the back and forth. Again thanks for reading and have fun tearing it to pieces lol. EDIT: Mill further describes the relationship of people being ends in themselves, and this establishing the argument for self defense, where he says "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others"

Wait what, I somewhere lost complete track of your train of thought. I was distracted, because I had typed up 65% of the thread I'm about to start and hit "back" thus deleting it all. You can't imagine my frustration. Sorry I'll go back and read what you said. (hooray for word documents btw) Ok, "for any action you do while under the influence because you are in that state of consciousness by your own choice." So as you are being anesthetized you loose track of what's going on and lash out and strike the nearest doctor. Are you responsible? I don't think so, or at leas I'm unsure. Under this broad definition, could an unconscious girl never be raped, since she achieved that state of consciousness by her own choice?

Consent is something that can be given in certain ways. What can't be done is consenting of an unconscious actor. You can have DNRs and such to describe what should be done to you in the even you lose consciousness, but merely imbibing alcohol doesn't cede your right to make decisions. I also chose to put on socks today. Doesn't mean I consented to you raping me in my sleep while I wear socks. Saying that is like saying you consent to whatever happens to you under anesthesia. That's insane.

Well both. The problem, as Stefan points out, is that any theory needs to both conform to those axioms and explain murder, rape, theft, etc. So in my attempt to play ball I will forward an ethical framework fitting in under the overarching maxims of UPB listed above and do so without using self-ownership as the foundation for theft(and omitting self-ownership all together).

Drugs don't make you do anything you wouldn't unless you have underlying comorbid psychological conditions, but let's talk about stages of drunkenness. You can be buzzed where you only have slight impairment in motor control and reaction time. You can be drunk with greater losses in motor control and executive functioning. You can be blacked out, that is you will have no memory of your decisions and still mobile acting as though you are full conscious. And you can drink until total unconsciousness as distinct from sleep. If you drink to unconsciousness and someone slips it in you...that's rape. If you are moving around, but are blacked out....this seems like rape. Just buzzed...not rape. Where these points meet, I don't know. Consciousness is emergent and quite complex. The point at which you no longer have control is hard to measure.

The argument for property is separate from the core arguments of UPB: 1. Reality is objective and consistent. 2. “Logic” is the set of objective and consistent rules derived from the consistency of reality. 3. Those theories that conform to logic are called “valid.” 4. Those theories that are confirmed by empirical testing are called “accurate.” 5. Those theories that are both valid and accurate are called “true.” 6. “Preferences” are required for life, thought, language and debating. 7. Debating requires that both parties hold “truth” to be both objective and universally preferable. 8. Thus the very act of debating contains an acceptance of universally preferable behaviour (UPB). 9. Theories regarding UPB must pass the tests of logical consistency and empirical verification. 10. The subset of UPB that examines enforceable behaviour is called “morality.” 11. As a subset of UPB, no moral theory can be considered true if it is illogical or unsupported by empirical evidence. 12. Moral theories that are supported by logic and evidence are true. All other moral theories are false. You may argue that self-ownership is derivative of one or more of these axioms, but that's where I step in. I will argue it's not and that the phenomenon that must be explained for it not to be derivative, are explainable. From what I remember, Stefan establishes self-ownership on its own and then integrates the affects of accepting both UPB and self-ownership.

Well thats presuptuous and might neglect some relevent details. You might be right though.

The argument against this, is that at a certain point you are no longer conscious of your actions. So.ewhere between sobriety and blackout. We dont hold sleepwalking people responsible because they elect to go to sleep.

I'm intentionally leaving out the phrasing I would use to describe what's going on. My framework has nothing to do with might makes right. Eventually I will post it. Just trying to work out the basics.

I phrased it that way to avoid use of "possession" which will have people insisting that I'm piggy-backing self-ownership. Like I said, I'll detail everything in private if you like. I'm not sure what your guess is, but I would guess it's not what I've come up with. And no, it's not a bridge or snake oil. Those are much to valuable to just give away in a PM

In the first bit, fair charge. It doesn't do anything to address why the exercise of control and the prevention of that exercise in another would be internally inconsistent. What it is an attempt to do, is to highlight the possibility that self-ownership might not be the source of that inconsistency. To your second charge, I'm saying the theory of property rights is like the old Aristotelian version of the elements, and that I've got Bohr's model and Newtonian physics in the pocket. You heard me right. For a while now, I've been chugging along developing an alternate theory that would not only have the same power of a self-ownership founded theory, but is even better at addressing objections than the self-ownership theory. If you were suggesting that I have some deep seeded emotional disturbance, unconsciously or consciously pushing me to forward silly objections or resist solid arguments for bad reasons, I would say no. Self-ownership strikes me as intuitively lacking. I only accept property rights in order to contemplate the accuracy of property rights, if I have no other account of how one might do so. Do I have an ulterior motive? Yes. Am I required to accept your theory, well no so long as my theory is accurate. The whole purpose of this was to open up the line for discussion of alternate versions of UPB. Would you accept a moral theory if it did the following: Explained why you and only you have the right to do with your body and external bodies over which you exert control, what you will? Gave a robust defense of the market, such that all transactions (exchanges of benefits) were voluntary. Resulted in a respect for the NAP, voluntarism, anarchy etc... Was internally consistent, universalizable, and adhered to the laws of logic. Did not invoke self-ownership as the foundation of the above(despite not seeing how such a thing could be done without this). I suppose if you answer no, in light of the last feature, I'm not sure what I'd have to say in response other than, What other requirements of a moral theory would you have? As a quick follow up, I'd be happy to disclose that theory to you in private correspondence. The reason for doing it that way is 1. It's not done yet lol. and 2. as I have learned from my interactions on these boards, a robust theory is hard to defend while trying to navigate multiple attacks simultaneously. Obviously, it must be able to withstand them, but I think it's best that I work through the major objections as they come from private correspondence.

You say yes, LiberT says no. Explain.

It is the arbitrary nature of emergent conscious control, demonstrated by the fact that such control can be relinquished, which makes me doubt that there is some objective ought about who should control. Thus if an ought is true from arbitrary circumstances, then some contradiction that might arise from the violation of said ought is equally trivial. You can say, sure moral axioms arent themselves proved, but they are necessary for moral conclusions and tracing human behavior(descriptive). Fine. Science is equally necessary, but for predicting the behavior of matter. UPB and property as a subset is, after all, evaluative. However, what you cant say is that some other moral system with equal or greater descriptive power than the property model, couldnt be asserted, so long as it explained the reason speech acts and voluntary behavior were moral. Without some other theory and moral conclusions to explain, you go with what you have. But that doesn't make that moral framework necessarily "True", just the best. Property might be the best theory we've got, but it isn't contradictory to assert that it might not be the best theory possible.

Such requirements would in deed be wise, but would they be necessary for a valid contract? (as you said this is more of an intellectual curiosity when it comes to contract theory) The real question revolves around the fact that who controls our body is merely an accident of nature. The "ability" that generates, or is itself, "responsibility" is assigned arbitrarily through biology. Moreover responsibility, as you see it, is supervening on that ability. This axiomatic base seems, 1 implausible, 2 not how we use words like "property", and 3 doesn't seem to account for intrinsic value. By that last bit, I mean that thought experiments like the experience machine, or drowning scenarios, will highlight the fact that rational actors intrinsically value certain things (choice and life).

Right, and yes these are different. I would then modify the body control scenario to better fit the analogy. So then A signs a contract with B such that B will control A's body for an indefinite amount of time and deposit x amount of dollar to be paid each time y amount of time elapses. At that point you have for all intents and purposes relinquished all property rights. You may never even be able to use that money. You've created a contract that can't be voided, violated, or nullified, because we would have no way of knowing A's desire for any of those things. Is it only immoral if/when B doesn't put money in the bank?

I wasn't saying it should have been obvious what I meant the first time. What I meant was the argument is easily remedied to preserve my original point. We think differently (we are vollying arguments back and forth) so it's foolhardy for me to assume you will do a better job of building my argument, than I would. I will do my best to forward the strongest version of my arguments and pay closer attention. Keep in mind I am making many of these statements for the first time, because I havn't had to flesh out the arguments this far before.

If some other ethical system is true, and not one that is rooted in ownership, then the wrongness of those actions(theft, murder, etc.) would come from that system. To say that these things can't be wrong unless you accept self-ownership is a fair bit stronger than saying "If there is self-ownership, then theft, murder, and rape are wrong." I suspect you endorse both of those statements though, no? My question then is, can't ownership theory be just as wrong about the source of morality as every one before it? Also, what you are essentially saying then, is ownership is inseparable from those moral wrongs. I disagree. Murder is wrong because it destroys one's choice to continue to live, or commit suicide. Rape is wrong, because it destroys the choice to have consensual sex. Maximizing choice is always moral. An alternate justification that doesn't rely on the fact that we own anything. Do we have a variety of abilities at our disposal, yeah but where did property come into the discussion there? Why choice? Well rational actors inherently value choice. Nozick's experience machine tells us that. What's fun is that it ends up at the same place voluntarism does.

I am not denying that I have the ability to do any of those things. What I am curious about is why you think controlling some sack of cells results in this foundation of morality, I understand the mechanics of how you attribute ownership to actions, but not why. You can repeat, "when you exercise control, then morality" or "who else would own" and my response is why not no one? Are you literally saying that conscious creatures would be un-able to causally affect the world around them, without self-ownership? If so, why? Saying something is self-evident, or necessary to make arguments, doesn't make it so. Could robots not make arguments? What are viruses if not the spreading of information(malicious information, yeah, but information none the less)? Someone asks me if the can rent my car for an indefinite period for x amount of dollars to be paid each time y amount of time elapses. Sounds like a contract to me. Does it make a difference to you that you bank account is piling up, as you are imprisoned in your own body? Hahaha. Ending it with a joke. Nice.

I would define it as my right to use something, over all other persons. I'm questioning where that right comes from. you say it is innate, and I say innate in what? You say in exercising power or agency. And I say why?

In the scenario I describe person A relinquishes motor and speech control to person B willingly for an undisclosed period of time. So far, everyone has merely acted voluntarily. From that point on, there's no force because it is impossible for person A to communicate with us. A doesn't want their body engaging in yoga any more, but B controls A's body and is under the impression that everything is gravy. Who's to say B acted wrongly, yet A acts against his will. At what point is their a contradiction? At least you drive right down the line and say there are no moral facts. Even in standard contractual slavery, one can break contract, though perhaps with penalties. In this future world, there is no breaking contract and nothing anyone can do about it. Self-ownership and existence are quite distinct. Existence is undeniable because the language you would use to deny it, denotes some kind of existence. It doesn't denote the material world people assume is real, but it denotes something. That is, you can assert we are in the matrix, but you can't assert that nothing is real, because someone's got to be existent to be in the matrix ...so on and so forth. Self-ownership simply doesn't strike me in that same sense. In other words, what other conditions about property have to be true because self-ownership exists such that asking questions is non-sense? Imagine for a second that free will doesn't exist(not saying it doesn't but it's useful here) because consciousness doesn't exist. We are simply complex biological computers synthesizing nutrients and stimuli to produce complex behaviors(hypothetically). The actions of these automatons would not generate property would they? Hurricanes don't own the trees they break. Introduce free-will and bam, you say self-ownership exists. What I want to know is how? I understand the roles of assigning blame, but these are relational moral concepts merely bind moral concepts to one another. Stefan draws the analogy between morality, science, and mathematics. The latter two are not merely evaluative, the strength of science comes, in part, from its ability to make predictive claims about the world we live in. Mathematics functions similarly. Self-ownership doesn't add any predictive power to the set of human discourse. Just because a definition of some abstraction you come up with is internally consistent, doesn't mean we should accept it. One's own existence is undeniable, but you have to do extra work to embed possession into that awareness....... Exactly right! "This reflects the factual ability to control, and the exercise of that control somehow implying self-ownership. <that implication is the part that needs explanation."

What I mean is that in the scenario of the drought, their is no moral connotation. "ownership" is a moral concept. We don't say the drought owns the poor yield. I don't deny that things might be different when you get a conscious entity in the mix, but the transformation of the a-moral causal connection between mind and act, becoming moral or being inherently moral must be explained. The whole point is to search for a theory of self-ownership. I'd like to know where the morality arises from. "smuggles" might be a bit fast and loose, but what I mean is that by using the term "responsible" in stead of "caused" Stefan embeds morality into the conversation without explaining how it got there. How do I possess myself? Notice that when Stefan defends this notion, he time and time again references the causal relationship between a conscious actor and its host body. You can look at the whole of his arguments. It begins on page 75 and I believe runs all the way through 76. Conscious beings exist. Fact. Bodily actions occur. Fact. The two are causally connected. Fact. Where's the morality? No one can be in possession of you? What about the sci-fi scenario I suggest above? Also "possession leads to abstraction" I would like to see fleshed out, as I don't really know what that means. Am I in control of my body? Sure. This is achieved through the bit of tissue at the back of my neck called the brain stem. What is so special about that?