bugzysegal

You complained when I didn't address your problems with Utilitarianism, now it's wrong because I have addressed it? Make up your mind. Utilitarianism is itself a moral theory. That which maximizes well-being is good. The actions which produce consequences of higher net well-being are the good ones. Yours isn't even close to an accurate representation of Utilitarian thought. Taking into account harm to the victim is a part of net "good" assessment. I'm not weaseling out of anything. How are you using objective? Do we both recognize property rights? Sure. Are they reasonable to anyone with some semblance of intellect? Sure. That doesn't make them the only reasonable moral positions. That doesn't mean they can't be superseded by other objective moral concerns.

Yes it does seem as though an infinite regress might be started. I don't, nor do I necessarily in the future(I'm looking into this now), suggest that one should seek to evaluate their axioms. "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.'" At the bottom of our reasoning is action, action unreflective and certain.

It stands as a practical measure, just as the scientific method, but it does not validate it's own principles. To be precise: validity is correctly drawing inferences amongst propositions of arguments. This technical term cannot be applied to axioms. This discussion, and the one I have in the thread about intuitions of ethics, is a meta-ethical one: a discussion a level above the one about individual evaluative systems. Instead it compares evaluative systems amongst each other. That begs questions like, "how do we do that without reflecting to the belief systems, which are out of bounds?" I tend to think the best answer is "you don't, you proceed with what is useful and discard what is not. Also, act with empathy." And yes I realize this is heresy. Oh and if I'm misrepresenting the posters views, please disregard me.

OMG this post is beautiful. Where the hell were you in all my other posts? There is a distinct problem with asserting absolute consistency in the laws of nature.

I will be calling back! I was apologizing as far as my candor turned people away from the arguments and further embittered them to me. It is really tough defending attacks from all sides and I have the tendency when undertaking an avalanche of criticism and get hot headed. I have to mindful of the fact that alien ideas are treated like intruders and that the whole point was to open the flood gates for criticism. In short I don't think anger, on this occasion, was a reasonable response. This is distinguishable from my continuous effort to respond to each post without being vague or misleading. I also think there was unnecessary hostility leveled my way in certain instances.

Squared. Also, to this yes. It is perhaps reasonable that Wittgenstein's conclusions are limited in the way Stefan described, that they cannot outpace the millions of years of evolution that resulted in our brains. Science, which is collective thought of some of the best minds, might be better suited to tell us about language acquisition and its implications. It is interesting to note, however that as of yet science has not outpaced or disproved Wittgenstein's main tenants. I would be fascinated to see that it does. Some "experimental philosophy" has attempted to test these claims, but these efforts have been criticized widely as being unscientific and poor philosophy. The"fuzzy edges" is a fantastic metaphor to get across the transience of language. It somewhat avoids the contextual and social notions I re framed the argument to reflect later in the call. I was mistaken about the usefulness of "family resemblance" in this regard. This is something I kind of realized over the course of this thread as well.

That's about right. You've correctly represented my views (well almost perfectly I would say those reasons may endanger UPB so my claim is a bit weaker). I really am not trying to troll. Wittgenstein was literally the bane of my existence for quite a time and it is extremely difficult to articulate, mostly because he tends to avoid straightforward dogmas.

So you don't believe in UPB? Don't give me that "It's simply the rules of reasoning" bullshit, because I'm questioning the very rules of reasoning(or at least the classical ones that compose UPB). I'm getting annoyed at your use of emoticons. Are the genuine or simply poorly veiled passive aggression? What would you even mean by "winkey face"?

Gang rape is not a problem for utilitarianism. It would be if you just measured the pleasure of the rapists vs. the displeasure, fear, and emotional harm caused to a victim and said "look, more happy people than non-happy people." This is a restatement of the "Utility monster" problem. Mill put forward the notion that we can never treat people merely as means, but each is an end in themselves. Let's make the arithmetic cleaner shall we? Why should we not consider the pleasure of one psychopath as more valuable, immense as it is, than the suffering of a victim? Easy, pleasure is not the single measure of well-being. Sam Harris puts forth an argument for a "well-being" centered Utilitarianism in "The Moral Landscape" and he seems to do quite a good job. This fundamental interference with a persons ability to exhibit well-being is going to outweigh any momentary pleasure given to the rapists. In fact, the likelihood of the rapists doing this to others has now increased, if past behavior can be taken to implicate future behavior. The fact that they may be allowed to follow through with the rape without repercussion increases the odds of more similar losses in the future. If we allowed the sadistic pleasure of psychopaths to dominate our moral decisions, the world would suffer as a net. I haven't rejected your "objective" morality.I'll grant you that property rights do a good job of reflecting some intuitions, but not all. Consistent notions can still be inapplicable(do not bring up universality, I'm arguing for plurality and asking where you get your right to demand ethical monism). Also you can't rescue the "ought from is" with an "if/then" statement and think you've done anything but refer to consequences. You are smuggling in your definitions for these terms and saying you've simultaneously proved Utilitarianism inconsistent and that your morality is not. Here are the facts: my intuitions tell me that property rights notions are inconsistent when it comes to positive actions requiring one to help another. You can sit there and pretend that these situations never exist, but stop telling me how I feel. It's condescending in the extreme. You are also delusional if you think no one else feels this way. Your intuitions tell you that Utilitarianism leads to inconsistency in a variety of other situations. Great. There are arguments on both sides. Here I'll formally put forth an objective argument for Utilitarianism. We ought to do whatever maximizes the well-being of conscious creatures, because if anything has value it is within those bounds. (we are the ones that value things, not rocks, chairs, etc.) Since sentient beings are the ones that value, there is value embedded into the very existence of conscious creatures. Can we now leave the objective foundations of Utilitarianism alone? My question is why your intuitions are more weighty than mine or those of countless millions?

Your not quite representing my views accurately. Evidence is useful...to say the scientific method is "self-evident" is meaningless. Science works by evaluating evidence, no? But you can't say that the scientific method is proved by evidence, because that sort of investigation is one of science! Obviously it's useful though. Bridges stand and that is enough. To require science to prove it's own foundations as "true" or "false" is not only non-sense, it's circular.

It is the summation of the argument. I'm not just throwing around the word "meaningful" or "meaningless." I think you should consider those words carefully. When I say "'self-evident' is meaningless" what I mean is you haven't demonstrated anything about axioms or made any arguments for them supporting themselves(to do so would be circular). The whole notion of "self-evidence" is nonsensical. We use evidence to get us to a destination, but the practice of retreating to evidence isn't proved by evidence. It is useful to us none-the-less. For an example of any sentence with meaning, think of any you would use in daily life. "This is a tree" or "12x12=144" or "When we say 'this' we use it in the following way"

As a final comment on a thread that will likely die off here, I want to note that I've never been willfully misleading or vague. I have read every single post and to the best of my ability responded in accordance with what I believe is the appropriate answer from the Wittgensteinian perspective. If I was hostile at times, I apologize, but not once has my dissent been met with open arms. This is disheartening.

"The terminus of a chain of reasons is not a self-evident principle or experience (1969, §131) , but shared contexts of ordinary life and habitual, non-ratiocinative activity, characterized by unreflective confidence and the absence of doubt or hesitation. `[T]he end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting’ (1969, §110) or a practice into which a form of life habituates its participants through training and education (e.g. 1969, §§472, 476) ."

Refer to my edited statement and then see if you still need to ask this question. I often hit "post" before thinking of the best answer lol.

"self-evident" is meaningless. From my professor many years ago: The terminus of a chain of reasons is not a self-evident principle or experience (1969, §131) , but shared contexts of ordinary life and habitual, non-ratiocinative activity, characterized by unreflective confidence and the absence of doubt or hesitation. `[T]he end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting’ (1969, §110) or a practice into which a form of life habituates its participants through training and education (e.g. 1969, §§472, 476) .

The final part of that sentence carries all the weight "other than that is what we learn" Mathematical realism, the idea that the world is reducible to math, is basically "the Platonic forms 2.0". Stefan rejects Platonism, as should you. I shouldn't have started with the abstract. How do you know you are using the words "tree" correctly? You follow certain rules. These rules are not themselves true. You say nothing of them. Axioms are rules. To them, there is no truth or falsity. What we do when we speak, is we play language games. Games have rules and they are either followed properly or they are not. The rules themselves are not "true" or "false." "So evident as to be True without controversy" smuggles "True" into the debate without adding anything to it. We use axioms uncontroversially. The mistake is to say that "truth" is the only way they could be meaningful.

I never said truth was arbitrary. The call is the name of the post. I am the first caller on that date. We accept axioms because they are useful. We respect science, because it is useful. That doesn't mean we take it as "True" in some Cartesian sense. That is, the roots of science are not grounded in some sort of mathematical reality, but it is useful to proceed as though they are. Also I havn't made any claims about "uncertainty" being the only thing that is certain. I'm not trying to jerk you around. This is one of the hardest and most debated philosophical bodies of work.

Your remedy is a practical one, not a moral one. Morality is supposed to guide human behavior, no? Why doesn't morality ever necessitate positive action? Why do we often have intuitions to the contrary? That is the fundamental question I set out to ask. You can A. summarily dismiss this as ever being the case, placing the burden of action on the person in danger or seeking to avoid it, B. devise a tidy thought experiment that fits your constraints, or C. pretend I'm a lunatic/imbecile who has nothing valuable to add. I would like to think that you are morally required to help those in moral danger, whom you can immediately effect (within reason). If I am mistaken, sorry? Explain why your intuition about property supersedes my intuition about life?

From Wittgenstein's "On Certainty": What sort of proposition is this: "We cannot have miscalculated in 12x12=144"? It must surely be a proposition of logic. - But now, is it not the same, or doesn't it come to the same, as the statement 12x12=144? 44. If you demand a rule from which it follows that there can't have been a miscalculation here, the answer is that we did not learn this through a rule, but by learning to calculate. 45. We got to know the nature of calculating by learning to calculate. 46. But then can't it be described how we satisfy ourselves of the reliability of a calculation? O yes! Yet no rule emerges when we do so. - But the most important thing is: The rule is not needed. Nothing is lacking. We do calculate according to a rule, and that is enough. Nothing makes it true that we don't mean to divide the first number by the second number when we use "+" or "addition" other than that is what we learn. The rules regarding "addition" are themselves grounded only in practice, not logic. Another way to approach this is that logic doesn't prove itself(that would be circular!). It is used and in this use there is meaning.

The opposite would not be true. "False" would also be meaningless. Just as it would be equally meaningless to assign the color red the label "positive integer" or "negative integer" The practice of adding is conventional. When you ask why do 2 and 2 make 4, the answer is "because this is how we add"...pushing the chairs together and saying "this is addition" is only meaningful because those are the rules we've accepted when it comes to math and addition. Also if it jives better, think about words like "this" or "that" we use them to point things, but they do not point to anything in themselves. There is no "this" to hold up. We simply use the word and it carries just as much meaning as the word "chair."

I will grant most of this but...B wouldn't be required to act to defend themselves. Let's say the only method of defense is murder. It is a zero sum calculation. Let's say they are both worth 1 value unit or 1vu. By taking a life person A detracts from the total value of the world 1vu. If B defends, 1vu is not necessarily detracted. It's not necessary that one life actually be worth less by the decisions they make. Utilitarians might have a way of arguing B would be required to act. I wont digress.

Sentience is valuable. Can I quantify it, nope. Don't have to. I don't even have to give you a rigid definition of it because you know what I mean. You know there is a difference between a rock and a person. More than that, the bounds of value must exist within the confines of human life. That doesn't mean it is a figure in the mind, to be speculated upon. "Value" and "right" must be deeply connected if "right" has any meaning. Why do our intuitions suggest positive moral requirements? Do they never?

The context is in the call. This message was directed towards those who heard it and were curious as to my reactions and interpretation of that call. That being said your definition of axiom is erroneous in the ways I described. We accept axioms, but to assign them truth value is meaningless. We use certain ways of thinking, certain axioms, but their correspondence to some physical state of affairs is non-sensical. Where is the thing that makes 2+2 actually =4? Can you point to it? The rules of addition are things we follow, not things we call true. In the same way we follow methods of reasoning.

Nope. You are the one insisting value is subjective. It's not subjective because the value of life isn't determined by people, it is predicated on people's existence.

I can give you a necessary condition of value....which I did: that it involves and requires human sentience and that is embedded within that sentience. Can I sketch you a perfect definition of "perfect value" or "absolute value", no but that is not necessary. "Value" requires us and is therefore not boundless. I'l borrow from Sam Harris on the connection of value to consciousness: "I think we can know, through reason alone, that consciousness is the only intelligible domain of value. What is the alternative? I invite you to try to think of a source of value that has absolutely nothing to do with the (actual or potential) experience of conscious beings. Take a moment to think about what this would entail: whatever this alternative is, it cannot affect the experience of any creature (in this life or in any other). Put this thing in a box, and what you have in that box is—it would seem, by definition—the least interesting thing in the universe. So how much time should we spend worrying about such a transcendent source of value? I think the time I will spend typing this sentence is already too much. All other notions of value will bear some relationship to the actual or potential experience of conscious beings."