vahleeb

You can never underestimate the collateral political gains through this dogma. Sustaining that there's a "wisdom of the crowds" inadvertently props up the "democratic" political process as a "wise one". Yes there is a case where if you have a crowd that is reasonably informed on a topic, the probability that more people will come up with the correct answer than those that come up with the wrong answer is significantly large. Where the whole construct goes off the rails is in assuming a crowd will chose a valid answer regardless of their levels of instruction. Not only is there no consistent empirical evidence to support this theory, but the reasoning for it is highly shaky.

You can't focus on Iceland because you can't have an AnCap country. The concept is self contradictory. Either the world is AnCap and the concept of countries doesn't have any relevance, or there is no AnCap.

For someone "as obsessed with precision in language use" you sure don't seem to have that obsession when the question is what entitles you to believe that X and you answer I don't know if X or not but I'll go ahead anyway.

First the argument: There is no problem with the red part because "This is an overarching discussion about morality. Morality is something that can only be applied to actions. THEREFORE whatever terms we use in this conversation, their definitions will have to be linked to actions. THIS IS WHY we might end up with restrictions of the "standard meaning" of words." <- from the post above you just ignored. So I guess we're gonna have to go from effect here. If you cannot convey your (A) argument across to me (who hasn't invested 30 years in coming up with this system and do not have any of the emotional attachments to the theory that Stefan might have) and you close out the debate after tuning out all of my last few posts, what entitles you to believe that "calling in" won't be just a waste of time (yours, Stefan's and the listeners')?

https://youtu.be/Tv74KIs8I7A?t=13m46s This video has a pretty nice handle on what happened.

Hi utopian, Just trying to re-frame the conversation from your original post. That needs to come with a definition in order to restrict it to something that is only in our head. Stefan's definition of morality is that it is Universally Preferable Behaviour and that is clearly in contradiction to something that is "only in our heads". Second, the fact that something is "fairly well known" is neither an argument nor is it proof of existence. The bible is fairly well known. To further contradict your statement empirically small children are far more rational than most adults, in fact they "know right from wrong" at a much higher rate than adults provided they have not been propagandised against. This is what is called a non-sequitur. Presenting a conclusion based on faulty reasoning. We accept things as valid if they are valid (proof, reason, the whole nine yards), not because of some kind of "legal precedent". The non-sequitur above makes you end up with a false dichotomy. If you wanted to create a clearer example for why "False => Anything" I don't know if it were possible.

What arguments, labmath2? Point me to one argument you have made. Here's the one I've been making (maybe the example will serve you by pointing out the difference between an assertion and an argument): This is an overarching discussion about morality. Morality is something that can only be applied to actions. THEREFORE whatever terms we use in this conversation, their definitions will have to be linked to actions. THIS IS WHY we might end up with restrictions of the "standard meaning" of words.

From my Facebook share of this very video a few days ago: This is absolutely why Trump is winning. He's just talking to more people and the way he talks to them just "feels" more natural. Of course, the guy making the video has to shoot himself in the foot by calling Trump "not smart" (is it really "not smart" to make yourself "heard" by the most people when you're trying to win a popularity contest?) while he may be right that Trump's not the most informed (although that's just an assumption) and, of course, the video's message is simply not going to be received by the people who have bought into "The Trump Train". And ultimately, that's WHY Trump is good, because something so simple can be so hard to implement.

Look labmath2, we can go on back and forth about this a thousand ways from Sunday, but if instead of rebutting (with arguments) the definitions that I provide, you just come up with different definitions then it will not be a productive conversation. I will quote again my very first post with regards to preference: And a quote from a later post that is meant to further clarify that. This means that when I am discussing preference I am only referring to exhibited preference and not about theoretical preference. If you cannot understand that (your last post is literally giving me another example of theoretical preferences) then I don't know how we're going to go forward. If I am wrong with linking preference to behaviour in this way for the purpose of this conversation then you need to tell me why that's wrong. Just to state the point again with another 2 quotes: And just so I don't have a post for just quoting myself, you say: First of all, nowhere do I contradict that. I even go into some lengths to explain that an action is a combination of both mind and body. But that type of preference (mind only and not exhibited) cannot be measured, cannot be related to behaviour and thus it is irrelevant to the conversation. Why? Because we are ultimately discussing about morality and morality is an attribute of actions not of thoughts.

This is literally like saying what if the thief believes in property rights but decides to call it something mystical like "control". We use words to mean what they mean or we don't use them at all. You have above a definition of stealing. If you wanna set up a universe without property rights, that's fine, but then there is no more stealing and as a result no more thiefs. Just one guy who ends up controling everything by killing everyone else. Eventually he'll die out and evolution will repopulate the planet with people who believe in property rights.

First up that's a false dichotomy. Second I have provided the definition of UPB in a post above. Third i have no ideea under what universe the fact that you cannot drink all the time precludes drinking from being UPB. but the fact that you cannot rape all the time defines rape as UPB. I count 3 errors in your post. Are there more? LE: ok, two of them you have edited out. You're still left with a false dichotomy. It will help if you read the post above where I define UPB as UPUB. Rape is not universal behaviour (Not UB). The all the time is the UP part of UPUB.

Hey, Nick900! Let's take theft as it is the simplest to connect to property rights. The thief doesn't believe in the property rights of their intended victim which is why the thief believes it can take stuff from the victim. However the thief believes in property rights for himself/herself otherwise he wouldn't take the object but just destroy it. Stefan usually puts this as: if the thief were to not believe in property rights at all (meaning not for himself), then he wouldn't steal because as soon as he did steal, someone would steal it from him/her and they would never get any satisfaction from the theft. The problem with your reasoning from your original post is that you fall into a false dichotomy here: There is also the third option: indifferent. Besides most, if not all (haven't really thought it through, appreciate if someone could provide a counter-example), immorality comes from the initiation of force. The correct dichotomy is: "initiation of force - immoral" / "non-initiation of force - moral". There is an open question as to the point where the excessive use of retaliatory force becomes immoral (thusly a new initiation of force), but that's debatable only after you come to understand the above.

You're absolutely right, DCLugi, if we can shake off the emotional baggage and the propaganda, then what else is there but UPB? And I can tell you from personal experience, we don't even need to shake off all of it, just enough that you see it. Is this a false dichotomy? If you don't see it then you haven't shaken off enough? I don't know. I don't think it's false, but ultimately I can't prove it. Here's what I do know: the theory of UPB is consistent and it was the abandonment of certain emotional preferences that helped me see it, or if you want more technical "psychobabble", it was taking away the guns from my false self that allowed me to look past the fence.

Physical limitations. You can't drink "all the time". I assume the question was why isn't drinking UPB.

How do you know? The difference between an assertion and an argument is that the argument tells me how you know. Also since you put forward the concept of a limited government candidate, who is that candidate? And how do you know that THIS candidate you will single out will in fact be a limited government president, considering no limited government candidate has successfully converted into a limited government president? I don't plan on making this a monotone repetition but how do you know? If there isn't even an economic section on his website, how do you know his plans make no sense? Did you ever hear these "economic plans" in their entirety? How do you know that you did? How do you know? Has he said: "I will not cut into the deficit!"? And even if he had (which he hasn't), how do you know that's "the plan"? Absolutely. What is the likelihood that a career politician have that? Or let me put it in terms more applicable here: who is more likely to have "some" ethics? A successful business man or a successful politician? No, but then again you misinterpret the causality. You "get your balls back" by standing up to the verbal abuse of leftists which makes people stand beside/behind Trump. You have an emotional reaction to Trump. Which means you have an emotional reaction to Stefan's defence of Trump. But there is no emotion in the "defence" it's just truth statements. I am not a Trump supporter, I'm not even an American citizen, still I wrote an article of what could constitute 12 reasons why Trump should win. You can find a link to it in this very same current events category. It's called 12 Reasons Why I Think Trump Should Win The Presidency.

I find it rather sad that the one part of my post where I agreed you had a point is indecipherable... Maybe I'm using too many big words, maybe I don't know how to use them... Maybe I'm just stupid... Maybe my being stupid is not an argument? Nevertheless I will endeavour to restate it in a clearer fashion below. But before I do that... I do have a problem with you substituting preference for performance wile repeatedly asking to use words in their standard form even though I have explained to you before that preference to do something is a more accurate description of doing something. Thank god for a thesaurus that we can come up with performance. But your using performance instead of "preference to" is akin to removing want from any human being. It's like saying humans act independent of them wanting to act (it is a less complete definition of the actual behaviour). The wanting to act is the actual preference, everything that happens after that is the performance you speak of. And the preference that does occur even then, is the preference to continue the performance. You seem to have no problem with using the word preference with regards to the realm of the mind (as you have done with your 3 examples before) but why there is a line that cannot be crossed between mind and action, I can't understand. Because I am a human being, if I do something (outside of the autonomous nervous system) then I must WANT to do it first and while I'm doing it I must WANT to continue doing it. I can't just BE doing it like you suggest by removing and replacing preference wherever you get the chance. What I am saying is a more accurate description of the phenomenon of behaviour as it pertains to both mind and body. Of course you can reduce that for convenience to a smaller language construct, but you can do so only after you have agreed that preference is implied in every action that is executed (unless, of course, we are in a case of overwhelming external force). Then there's this: There are unlimited options between the numbers two and three when dealing with the REAL realm of numbers, and yet you say that there are only a limited amount of options available to someone at one time without even imposing any sort of constraint? That's literally saying that in a realm of infinite possibility there's a finite number of possibilities. Hello square-circle. I hope you see the mistake in that line of reasoning. I think you're wrong about that. Just to name one off the top of my head: thinking. And just because your sentence begs the question: why wouldn't there ever exist something that is possible for everyone to do (or not do - because we are including negative actions in this definition) all the time? How could you even prove its exclusion from existence? Dead people do not exist. How more plain do I need to make it? They were (as in existed - past tense) and now all we have left is their remains (which is why we call them dead). The people no longer exist. If you think this is arguable, please let's open a new thread on it, because I'd love to see what arguments you can come up with. I will try to restate the last part of my post now to make it more "decipherable" (it might help to go back and forth between that post and this one and see how the clarifications apply): Does objective preferred behaviour exist within the confines of given scenarios? Yes. Prerequisite behaviour is something that is objectively (universally - by everyone all the time) preferable when aspiring to a goal. Derived question from this statement: is it possible that universally preferable behaviour exist without the constraints of a scenario (in a state of nature)? There is nothing in the definition that is inconsistent, therefore it can exist. Has real life validated it thus far? No. Could it validate it from now on (say we call the time we begin the analysis moment zero) ? There is nothing in this proposition that is inconsistent, therefore it could. Will it? We'll see. What is the criteria for disproval? A single instance of preferred behaviour that differs from what we state as universally preferable. Second derivation: If universally preferred behaviour can exist without the constraints of a scenario, wouldn't that behaviour by definition have to be moral? Yes. Is there an equivalence between universally preferred behaviour and morality? If the first exists, then yes. Why? Because nothing can be committed if, in the moment, knowledge is held of its immorality, therefore if something can be committed then the actor must think it moral or ascribe to it no moral value (which means it is not in the sphere of our analysis) and if something can be committed all the time by everyone then everyone and at all times must regard that as moral thusly acquiring a common to all (objective) definition of morality. By submitting UPB as prerequisite behaviour to the goal of morality, you are breaking the very definition that states its equivalence. Which is funny because then you complain about circular logic. A is equivalent to B means that A implies B and B implies A. To paraphrase your chain of thought/reasoning: You say: Morality implies UPB (B implies A). But why then do you define UPB as morality? (because A implies B). Isn't that circular logic? (No. It is the very definition of equivalence.) This is the shift that occurs between the definition of UPB within a given scenario on page 30 and the definition of UPB outside of any scenario on page 33-34, it is the shift from B => A to A <=> B. This is why you have a problem with the book, because you do not see this change from unidirectional implications to bidirectional equivalence. From there on, the rest of the book is just a couple of case studies of wether or not tenements of what we call morality ad hoc remain valid under the scope of UPB. He is looking for that single instance where something that we resoundingly ascribe to as being moral today will contradict the principle stated. And nothing does.

Hi Anders, I think that the reason why you and most people have these kinds of problems with the NAP is because it is formulated in such emotionally charged terms. Aggression is something that is very personal to many people and they have completely charged the term with their own personal meaning and their own personal emotion. A more correct statement would be Non-Intiation of Force. Bullying is the initiation of force, therefore any answer to that is warranted. We usually say that you can walk away from verbal abuse, but the only reason why we say that should be the preferred behaviour is because there are very small costs usually associated with that. This is why we accept that it's ok to stop bullying by yourself if you are in someone else's prison and the guardians refuse to step in, because the cost of walking away is too great. However, if the reason why we choose walking away is something that has a connection to costs, then we're no longer choosing on the principle of non-initiation of force, but on the principle of least personal cost. Now the problem becomes: "at what point does retaliatory force become excessive?" and we can debate that if you want. But still, no break of the non-initiation of force happens on the side of the person that is responding to bullying.

Hi B0b, 1. writing this text 2. breathing, eating, drinking, thinking, selecting ( or any negative action - see definition above - that is obtained through the negation of a positive action that is, in turn, divisive between actor and acted upon). 3. the non initiation of force

Hi labmath2, I did pay attention to your original argument, and I would have gotten to it within the next two (at most) posts. What I did was trying to lead you down the path in a way that when we would get to your argument we wouldn't have to backtrack all over the place. (I needed to break up your post in order to post my reply, hope it doesn't bother you.) It might be simpler (more succinct), yes, but it is a less accurate (therefore not more clear and precise) description of the process because "in the moment" you have a virtually unlimited number of actions you can do, yet you still choose to do one of them, thusly you indicate preference for it. First of all, you saying that by my definition UPUP doesn't exist is wrong. UPUB might not exist but that's not from my definition, that's from juxtaposing the behaviour of all human beings on top of the definition. The fact that humanity is imperfect doesn't disprove the possibility of perfection. And I will concede to you the point that without going into the "goals" factor that Stefan is speaking about, it becomes harder to explain and understand, but I will ask for leniency on your part for this and ask you to read the definition (for now) as: everyone can and will choose to do this thing out of all the possible options available all the time. Dead people don't exist (they're dead!!!), you can't use them as counter examples. Agreed. This is why I would ask for the concession from your side on the definition I quoted above. I admit that it didn't occur to me that I was presuposing a "goal" when I gave you that definition and it was your answer that pointed it out, but I do promise to tie "will" back in by the end. This is just another way of saying that if there is a prerequisite behaviour for achieving a goal, then you naturally will engage in this behaviour in order to meet that goal. You have no problem in understanding this: eat to live, breathe to live, drink to live, train to play ball, etc. The question is why would we call these preferences universal? Because in the given scenario (my goal is X) they represent the best and sometimes only action that will lead to the achievement of the goal. If I don't wanna die of hunger, I'm gonna eat something. If I wanna get my free throw percentage up, I'm gonna practice shooting free throws. And it's not just me, it's everyone. The fact that everyone would choose this action in this scenario, then it is a choice that is objectively (universally) advantageous. The next question that will occur to anybody who is willing to examine the question of universally preferable behaviour within certain scenarios, is: "can there be universally preferable universal behaviour?" Again, you have to look at this only on a theoretical level. Is the definition put forward consistent? Yes it is. Can it be achieved in theory? Yes it can. Can it be achieved practically? Who knows, maybe. Has it been achieved so far? Definitely not, because the only reason why we even have a term for a behaviour is that someone at a certain point in time did it (so even not doing something has been broken at least once in history). Tangent here to prevent another dispute on the meaning of words: to achieve means "to begin pursuit of" at a moment in time and to "realise the condition" at a later moment in time. This has the the following different effect on positive and negative actions. For a positive action everything can be achieved in the future if is situated in the realm of possibility and achievement is complete in a singular moment in time when the condition is realised. For a negative action (the absence of something, "thou shall not kill") everything can be achieved in the future, constantly, through each moment of time if, from the singular moment when pursuit begins, the opposing positive action is not instanced. The third question, however, that will occur to the student of behaviour in this scenario, is that once he/she has agreed that, in theory, there can be such a thing as universally preferred universal behaviour is: "wouldn't such behaviour by definition have to be moral?" The reason for this is that human beings are hardwired for morality, we need to justify everything we do from a moral standpoint and no human being can commit an immoral act while simultaneously holding the knowledge that it is immoral (they will deflect, they will justify, they may come about and regret it the next day, condemn it, but IN THE MOMENT it cannot be committed if you recognise it as being immoral). This is basically the reasoning that happens between pages 30 and 34, but the relationship that is described on page 30 is a little different than the one on page 34 because the situation isn't that UPUB is subordinated to the goal of morality/ethics (like on page 30), but rather that UPUB is equivalent to morality/ethics. And at this point we can tie back "will" into the definition because we have a goal (intrinsically stated).

What arguments, labmath2? You seem to have issues with the meaning of words. When I assign preference to behaviour I am clearly speaking of actions (which is WHY I say that at any given time you can only EXHIBIT one or at most 2-3 such preferences/behaviours). Your three examples of preference are theoretical only. That's not an argument that's changing the conversation. Then, there's this: We cannot all prefer to murder at the same time, because we cannot all act upon that "preference" because if we all murder at the same time, who will be murdered??? Again, this comes from the dissociation that you have in regards to the meaning of preference that is actually employed here and the way it relates to behaviour. Let me sum it up: what you prefer in your own mind and as a hypothetical is irrelevant to the discussion because we can only be concerned with what you do. That is why Stefan is talking about actions, because thoughts are not immoral, it is only actions that can have a moral value. Now, back to universal. I said, all the people and at all times. Sitting is an action that is not excluded by the definition of universality, but you can't say that everyone is universally sitting in your example because you're talking about just the people in the stadium instead of "all the people all of the time". What does all of this mean when we tie it back to UPB? (which mind you wasn't even addressed in my original post but you pushed my hand here) - preferred behaviour: to do one thing out of all the possible options available - universal behaviour: everyone can do this thing all the time - universally preferred behaviour: everyone can and will choose to do this thing out of all the possible options available all the time. PS: This reply might have been worded a little differently had you not pushed for a reply ASAP.

Inheritance is full disclosure so the situation you mention is not possible.

Sorry, labmath2, I missed the question when you first addressed it. Some contracts may abound by moral rules and some may not. For instance, you can sign a medical proxy that someone else be in charge of medical decisions once you are incapacitated (in a comma), but if then that person refuses to allow you to get any treatment because of their own convictions, that is obviously immoral. Let's go back to the HA example. The problem there is the process of decision. Decisions with universal (i know you love this word ) effects that have been made by majority rule and not unanimity cannot be moral because a majority implies opposition that does not want the effects but is forced to submit. If the word "forced" rears its ugly head into the conversation, this is how we know it can't be moral. And just because you signed a contract saying you'll agree, doesn't make it moral either because morality is not always what contracts are made for. Going back to a general situation: the problem stems from the fact that you are entering a contract where the provisions are forever likely to change without them being under your direct control. You obviously have every right to do that, but you will end up losing which means someone will be taking advantage of you and taking advantage of someone is immoral because it cannot be reciprocated.

Was that a rebuttal or the dead-stop that I asked you for?

Hey, labmath2, let's work on the definitions for a second and break down universally preferable because this is how it all made sense to me. Also I don't have any kind of emotional charge attached to UPB which I hope will keep our conversation from degenerating. In order to define universally preferable we need to define the following two principles first which are completely separate from the concept of UPB and ethics. It is possible that Stefan slides over this step in the book because both definitions are mainstream references to the English language. A preference or to prefer means to desire some thing more than another. This can naturally apply to behaviour and we do it all the time. The realm of possible behaviours that we exhibit at a certain time is virtually limitless and yet we only exhibit one at a time (two, three if we're really into multitasking), like for instance I prefer writing this answer to all the other possible actions I could have done right now, and you prefer to read this answer to all the other possible activities. Because we have an infinite pool of behavioural options but we can only enact one or a few behaviours at a time, then we are automatically exhibiting preference. Even non-activity involves a preference for non-activity. The only literal reason for you not to exhibit preference is to be in a catatonic state akin to a computer that's stuck. Universality (in this particular meaning of the word) is simply the extension to all subjects of analysis at all times. When applying concept of universality to behaviour it has the effect to exclude all those behaviours or acts that have a clear division between actor and the one acted upon in their very definition. (A perpetrator and a "victim" if you will). And I would like to give you a harmless and non charged example of this: initiating philosophical conversations cannot be a universal behaviour because only one person can initiate the conversation while the other can only join it, conversely joining philosophical conversations cannot be a universal behaviour because if everyone is just waiting for a conversation to join, no conversation can be initiated. Naturally, the universal behaviour is having a philosophical conversation. When applying the concept of universality to preference it means that everyone and at all times would exhibit the exact same preference in a given scenario. The problem in your reasoning, from what I can see, is that you seem to bind universality only to one of the terms and not the other and switch it around when Stefan's going the other way. But the way to read Universally Preferable Behaviour is universally preferable universal behaviour. You do understand why that is not a book title nor an appealing title for a philosophy, but it is an acceptable language construct in order to avoid repetition to remove one of the duplicate adjectives and simply bind the first instance to both nouns and make it evident so in the text? I will stop here and invite you to comment if you feel I am misrepresenting anything.

Dsayers, if you do not inherit obligations with reference to use of property and connected to said property then aren't you in a position of perennial conflict? To illustrate. Say there's a few houses close together and person B lives in a house that is neighbouring the house of person A on the left and person C on the right. Do persons A and C, individually have the right to agree with person B that person B will not build anything on their property that exceeds 30 feet in height and vice-versa? I would say that they do, correct me if I'm wrong. And since the obligation is related to behaviour about the physical property then the contracts themselves are tied to the property. (This is accepted practice all over the world, from the US to Switzerland where they have property obligations that go back hundreds of years, and I don't see how it would constitute a violation of the NAP.) Why would people do these agreements since like forever if all it would generate is a potential conflict once one of the parties dies? If then person B were to transfer his property to person D through sale, then he is also transferring the obligation. He would, obviously be required to disclose the obligations that were connected to the property prior to the sale, but assuming both B and D are acting in good faith, the obligation is lawfully transferred to D. Again looks to me like no breach of the NAP has occurred. Correct me if I'm wrong. The situation is perfectly analogous to the transfer done between B and D through inheritance. Here's trying to preventively shoot down some foreseeable counter arguments: - B would have to be expected to ask permission from A and C before sale. You realise that that is not only impractical but conflictual as hinted above(maybe one agrees, maybe one doesn't). Then why were these contracts created in the first place (historically speaking, between private entities without any enforcement from the state)? - B is not allowed to create obligations that would transfer beyond his death. Not true. See dying in debt as described above. - B cannot sign a contract that creates an obligation in perpetuity because he will not exist in perpetuity to honour it. Maybe true, but this is why the contract is signed in reference to the property and becomes a part of the obligations of the owner, irrespective of the identity of the owner, a de facto addendum to property rights and obligations. It sounds to me that you have a dead-stop in your reasoning: a principle that you feel the situation I described above is breaking. Can you state it specifically and how the case breaks it? Thanks!