EclecticIdealist

Nope. $100 does not equal $1000. The height of the mountain doesn't change depending on the day, the time of day or the person climbing it. Value is subjective. Altitude is objective. No, but now you're talking about objective, empirical quantities, not economic value. Economic value is not a zero sum game.Here is one great thing about mathematics, you avoid muddy definitions. Let's see if I have this right. Person A cost = $99.99 + $0.01 or Person A cost = ca + va Person B cost = $0.99 + $0.01 or Person B cost = cb + vb You're saying that because va = vb that you can simply ignore ca and cb? That they don't factor into the value? Were you taught economic theory by Karl Marx or one of his followers? What you're saying simply doesn't make any economic sense whatsoever. Value is subjective. Preference is subjective. In fact, Value is nothing more than an expression of relative preference... value is preferring one thing more than another thing or preferring something more than nothing, or preferring nothing more than something one does not want at all. if you want to express UPB in terms of some kind of economic formula of sorts, it would be rendered something like this: wa = economic value (wealth) possessed by a wb = economic value (wealth) possessed by b vn = economic value (wealth) transferred to b from a vm = economic value (wealth) transferred to a from b p = perceptual modifier of a q = perceptual modifier of b ( pwa - pvn + pvm ) + ( qwb - qvm + qvn ) >= 0 where pvm >= pvn and qvn >= qvm ( pwa - pvn + pvm ) + ( qwb - qvm + qvn ) < 0 where pvm < pvn and/or qvn < qvm

Congratulations. You've demonstrated that from the perspective of the "couch potato", they value $100 more than the time/ease of not reading the book. From the perspective of the person offerring the cash, they value the person reading the book more than $100. Yes. But you have not established that $100 would be enough incentive to get the couch potato to read the book at some other point in time, nor that any other person would be willing to read the book if paid $100. Many might be incentivized to read the book for less than $20, and others might not be incentivized to read the book by any amount less than $1000. Furthermore, you have not demonstrated that the individual paying the $100 would always be willing to pay $100 for someone else to read the book. The individual at some other point in time might only be willing to pay someone $10, or at another time may be willing to pay someone as much as $10K. Furthermore, you have not established that Everyone would be willing to pay the person $100 to read the book, or even $1, much less $1000 or more. I think perhaps you simply misunderstood the point I was making.

Indeed, it is as if we read completely different books; or rather, it is like one of us read the book, perhaps a couple of times, and the other read it many times, analyzed it, explored the logical fallacies it presented, determined what value there was in it, and then set about to share those insights with others. I find it unfortunate that you consider my analysis and difference of opinion with you (and quite probably Stefan) such heresy that you refuse to discuss it further or back up your position with logic and reason. Nevertheless, I will defend my usage of the term "preferred" by citing references from Stefan's book as well as appealing to reason. On pages 9 & 10 of UPB (pdf version), Stefan lays out some ground rules he will adhere to in his quest to "define a methodology for validating moral theories that is objective, consistent, clear, rational, empirical – and true." In rule 7 he refers to "the ethical instincts of mankind" and "near-universal social prohibitions". He uses the propositions that assault, rape, murder, and theft are immoral to test his framework for validity -- an empirical test of external consistency if you will. This suggests that Stefan holds the near-universal judgment of mankind or society on what is moral fairly highly. But that is not all. On page 30, he states "Ethics as a discipline can be defined as any theory regarding preferable human behaviour that is universal, objective, consistent – and binding." He also states, if I tell him that it is moral for sons to obey their fathers, and immoral for them to disobey their fathers, then I am proposing a preference that is universal, rather than merely personal – I am trying to turn a 'little truth' (I want you to become a baseball player) into a 'great truth'." Thus we see that Stefan in talking about ethics is talking about preferences for behavior; not just behavior that is possible to be preferred. Stefan goes on to say, "When I speak of a universal preference, I am really defining what is objectively required, or necessary, assuming a particular goal." Again, it is quite clear that the meaning of the term "Preferable" in UPB is that of "desired or selected above or before other alternatives." And yet, on page 31, Stefan begins redefining the term "universally preferable" to mean "objectively required (given a specific, desired outcome)". We must never forget that second part. If we forget that second part, we don't have the whole truth, we have a partial truth which is better than an outright lie, but is nevertheless still a falsehood. If we were to play the substitution game as Stefan has done (which I highly recommend anytime the meaning of a word seems ambiguous or in question), the title of his book goes from "Universally Preferable Behavior" to "Objectively Required (given a specific, desired outcome) Behavior". Of course, it doesn't have the same ring to it as the present title, but at least it is clearly stated. Of course, it leaves open the part about a specific, desired outcome. Who desires the outcome? What specifically is the desired outcome? THAT is what Stefan establishes with the rest of his framework. That is where the libertarian principles get injected into his framework in such a way that for most, they become inseparable until they carefully examine it and evaluate it and seek to understand it so as to utilize it. Still, on pages 35 and 36, in the discussion of those premises you cited in the other thread, Stefan goes back to using the term "universally preferable" to refer to a (near) universal preference or as I might term it that which is (nearly) universally preferred. That you take such issue with my use of the term "preferred" rather than "preferable" suggests to me that you have a different understanding or hold to a different meaning than either of the meanings that Stefan put forth in his book in the passages I have cited (one of which I consider to be problematic and completely fallacious without the implicit qualifier at the end). On page 41 of his book, Stefan actually uses the term "universally preferred behavior" multiple times in his 2nd syllogistic proof of UPB. But perhaps you're really taking issue with my usage of the term "universally" in reference to the near absolute commonality of a preference? I then refer you to his 3rd syllogistic proof and more importantly, the (nearly) universally held moral prohibitions against assault, rape, murder and theft as well as the very concept of morality itself -- the rules of behavior decided by or agreed upon by the members of society which are obligatory upon all members of society (whatever the size or composition of that society happens to be). Again, I'm not disputing the fact that Stefan attempted to discover or identify an universal, objectively true standard of morality. I'm simply saying he failed to do so because it is impossible to discover something that cannot exist. Objectively True Preferences don't exist, therefore, Objectively True Morality cannot exist. Arguing that it does is like arguing for the existence of dehydrated water.

UPB is not a method of choosing a standards, it is a method of comparing ethical or aesthetic propositions against the standard of the UPB or democratically selected aesthetics and esthetics that are only superseded by universal private property ownership and the NAP. It is a method of determining whether the proposition conforms with this standard or not. It enables an objective and rational evaluation of the proposition, but the standard of UPB/NAP has already been chosen as a consequence of subjective "whim" or sentiment. It challenges the whims of society by virtue of the supremacy of the NAP and its corollary in the protection of private property ownership.

Value is subjective. Any voluntary transaction that is free of deception will increase the subjective value for both parties. This is how wealth is created for both parties in a transaction. It is why both parties benefit from a voluntary transaction. In the case of a person buying a car, the car is worth more than the money they part with to the person buying the car. In the case of the person selling the car, the money they receive for the car is worth more than the car. Economic states can only rightfully be measured subjectively, from the perspective of each individual whose economic state is being measured.

Nihilism isn't a level, it's a perspective or philosophical outlook. Standards and Ideals are chosen based on sentiment or "whim". Principles are rationally chosen based upon the outcomes they will or are likely to create. The NAP for example, is the principle that universal non-aggression will result in a peaceful society and provide the greatest opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation in society. It is chosen due to the sentiment, "whim", or desire for such an outcome combined with the rational belief that adherence to the NAP is likely to bring about such a desire. I don't believe this is the definition or hallmark of nihilism, although it is not incompatible with nihilism. The desire to enforce a particular language as the only language that may be used (in a society) will be based upon the desire for a particular result and the belief that enforcing the exclusive use of such a language will bring about such a result and that the benefits of such a result exceeds any deleterious potential consequences.

What is fair can only be decided through reason against a standard or ideal which is chosen on the basis of sentiment (what some might term "whim").

That's right. A lot of people in the world are not moral according to the subjective moral standard of libertarian ethics or Stefan's conceptualization of it in UPB. Morals are not Objective because unlike truth, preferences are not objective. Preferences are subjective, and so any standard of morality that is based upon preferences (which all of them are) is subjective, including UPB. The only thing that UPB has going for it that most other moral standards do not, is its lack of superstition to provide its authority. Instead, the authority of UPB is the consensus of the individual members of society--"universally preferred". The key to solving the immorality in the world is obtaining consensus in the hearts and minds of all members of society as to the ideals or values one should hold, and this is not an easy thing to do when there is so much pain and violence being experienced by people in nations around the world including our own (wherever you happen to live). For some reason, my original response to this post has not been approved. Therefor I am re-writing it and adding a little. These are the premises that must be accepted for engaging in an peaceful debate or argument. Not the premises of UPB. The NAP is never explicitly stated, as a fundamental premise of Stefan's philosophy, but it is an integral part of the ethical framework he has constructed. The NAP is the universally applicable principle of not initiating force against others to maximize liberty and peace in society. The initiation of force makes an act unavoidable, which is the defining characteristic of an immoral action according to UPB. You might claim that I have it backwards, that UPB justifies the NAP, but that's question begging because it hasn't been established WHY the unavoidability of intentional actions is the sine qua non of ethics vs aesthetics. Why not some other standard, such as whether the act is kind or beneficial vs cruel or harmful, or whether the act is in submission to the will of Allah or in opposition to the will of Allah? Avoidability divides "the moral good" from "the aesthetically positive" in UPB, but it has no explicit underlying justification. It is an implicit axiomatic premise, a subjective bias that one must agree with to accept UPB. Naturally, if one has libertarian leanings, one will be inclined to accept it. If one does not, one may not.

UPB makes reference to Rape, Assault, Murder, and Theft which are all tested against preferences that are "already in vogue" by virtually everyone. Furthermore, UPB is an argument for a rational (internally and externally consistent), universally applicable (to all under all times, places and circumstances) morality, i.e. a code of conduct which is applicable to all members of a society based on behavior that is preferred by all (or at least most) of society. One could hardly hope to construct a moral standard that is not preferred by at least the majority of society, or if not, at least a strong majority of the most powerful and influential who can exert their influence and will over the rest of society. UPB is not what people "ought to prefer" but rather, what people "ought to do (or not do)". The purpose of morality is to dictate behavior, not sentiment. Here's a flow chart for determining whether a proposition is UPB: 1 - Is it an action or behavior or not? Not? It's not UPB. 2 - Is it Intentional (as opposed to unintentional)? No? - It's not UPB It's either an accident or not caused by human intention and therefore not an aesthetic or ethical proposition. 3 - Does it pertain to a universally held preference (as opposed to an individually held preference, or a preference held only by some)? No? It's not UPB. It pertains to an individually held preference such as one's preference for a particular flavor of ice cream, or a particular musical artist, etc. It's not UPB. 4 - Is it universally applicable (as opposed to only being applicable to an individual, class, or group of people, or applicable only in certain places, or only under certain circumstances, or only at certain times, etc.)? (Can the preference be applied universally, i.e., to all persons at all times, in all places, under virtually all circumstances (exceptions for being in a coma, being alone, etc) ?) No? It's not UPB. If it doesn't apply to everyone it's not UPB. (This is also when one generally determines the rational internal or self-consistency of the proposition, i.e., is it even possible for everyone to do it (or avoid doing it) if all wish to act morally?) If it's intentional, a universally (rather than individually) held preference, and it's universally applicable, it's UPB! What kind of UPB is it? 5 - Is it optional or avoidable (as opposed to obligatory or unavoidable/inflicted)? Yes, it's optional or avoidable. It's an aesthetic. While it is universally desirable and applicable for all to conform to this preference under all circumstances, etc., one cannot justify the use of force to compel compliance. Next, determine which aesthetic category the action or behavior falls under (positive/desirable or negative/undesirable). or No, It's obligatory or unavoidable/inflicted - It's an ethic. It is universally desirable for all to conform to this preference, and one can justify the use of force to compel such compliance. Next, determine which moral category the action or behavior falls under (moral or immoral). In short, UPB = Intentional, Universally Preferable, Universally Applicable, Behavior. UPB Aesthetics are optional or avoidable and unenforceable. UPB Morality is unavoidable or obligatory and enforceable. UPB morals are inherently libertarian because it tests for the Universal application of the NAP. A similar framework could be designed to instead test for conformance to Islamic ideals, Christian ideals, Marxist ideals, etc.

These are merely the implicit premises that must be accepted by all parties wishing to engage in a peaceful debate (rather than settle a disagreement by some other method, such as chance, combat, or some other non-rational method). (UPB - p.34) The entire premise of the difference between ethics and aesthetics is determined by the NAP, although it is never identified as such. Instead, it is identified as avoidability or whether or not the action eliminates the capacity to choose (UPB -p.50) The unspoken ideal that must be presumed is liberty, and the principle guarding universal individual liberty is commonly set forth in principle by libertarians as the NAP. NAP deals with the intentional, unavoidable acts of others. That is also the test which Stefan has built-in to distinguish between ethics, aesthetics, and accidents. Without intention, it’s neither an ethic nor an aesthetic. With intention, but without unavoidability it is either a preference or an aesthetic (depending upon whether the preference is individually or universally held). With intention and unavoidability, it is a matter of ethics and either conforms to or violates the NAP.

With regard to whether the proposition should be performed (or eschewed) by everyone, it is based on the presumption that one agrees with the foundational premises of libertarian values which Stefan has built into his UPB test; specifically, Does it conform to the NAP? Does it respect/support private ownership property? Is the action, if in response to an aggression, an appropriately proportionate response? (e.g., not shooting someone for being late to a meeting). One could alter the framework to support a different moral standard and then apply moral propositions against the framework in the same way to see if they conform with the moral standard. The underlying or fundamental assertion implied and indirectly stated by UPB is that libertarian values or ideals are Universally Preferred by all members of society and applicable to all members of society.

I’ve read “UPB” and “Truth” about half a dozen times each and listened to each on audio at least twice as many times. Please understand that my position is not due to a lack of familiarity or understanding of what Stefan is intending, but rather a difference of opinion. Stefan states that truth is both objective and relative? (“UPB” - pdf pp. 22-23). If you are asserting that UPB is a truth according to Stefan, you must concede that it is true relative to those it pertains to — to the members of a society or those able to govern or choose their behavior as they interact with others. As I mentioned previously, Stefan has sought, as many do, an objective standard of conduct or behavior that would be universally applicable, that is, applicable to all individuals capable of taking ethical and aesthetic decisions. UPB deals with interpersonal ethics (morals) and interpersonal aesthetics (social customs, conventions, manners, etc.). Such preferences have no meaning outside of or apart from interpersonal interactions; in other words, they deal with an individual’s behavior as a member of society, even if that society is limited to two. The term “Universally” or “universal” is synonymous with omni-, all, or every. When using the term in conjunction with preferences, one is indicating that such preferences are the preferences of all or every being. Stefan also states that these preferences are universally applicable, that is, apply at all times, places and circumstances to all people. Of course, even Stefan admits this is a generalization. Such preferences are not in fact universally held. There are some who prefer such moral prohibitions only apply to others, and not to themselves in order to justify crimes such as rape, murder, assault, theft, and fraud that they wish to commit but do not wish others to commit against themselves. There are others who are cognitively unable to hold such preferences due to a lack of maturity or physical impairment. Clearly, the term “Universally” cannot be used in its most absolute sense. In fact, it only makes sense in relation or relative to one’s membership in society. Furthermore, the universality of various preferences are also relative to the society one is a member of. This is especially true of the various aesthetic preferences held by a society, but is also true to a limited extent to other “moral” questions such as those involving abortion and various expressions of human sexuality. If one is specifically talking about a common baseline of behavior that is held by almost every person on the planet, one is going to be limited to a very small number of ethical and an almost equally small number of aesthetic preferences. If instead, one looks at individual societies separated by geography, ethnicity, religious belief, and so on, then one can measure how well such a society conforms to libertarian standards (or any other standard one might measure the preferences of a society by). It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that UPB is actually what Stefan purports it to be, an Objective standard of morality. By the very fact that it is based upon the collective preferences of individual members of society, even if we include everyone, everywhere, at every time as part of that society, it is nevertheless INHERENTLY SUBJECTIVE because ALL preferences are inherently subjective, even if they are held “Universally” or by everyone. Your assertion that any moral proposition which infringes upon the (property) rights held by every person is a universally as opposed to relatively immoral is asserting a dichotomy between the universal and relative that is not being implied on my part. When I am referring to UPB relative to a particular society, I am only suggesting that each society defines by their collective preferences what may be termed Universally Preferable Behavior for that society. Relativity, in this case, refers to the scope or domain being sampled for the universality of preferences, not for the universality of rights. There are no objective moral standards or judgments, only objective processes for evaluating moral propositions against moral standards (which are inherently subjective moral sentiments).

This is one of the more intelligently written shows that you will find on TV in that in most (although not every) respects, it is a fairly accurate representation of how cyber security and hacking actually works. The show is about a very troubled "grey hat" hacker. He definitely has ethical or moral faults, no lily white hero being portrayed here. The first season follows him through a few short weeks as he works for a cyber security company protecting company networks from cyber terrorism and other hackers. Through the course of events, he comes into contact with a hacktivist group that draws its inspiration from the loose hacktivist community "Anonymous". He struggles deciding which side of the line to be on, as he agrees with taking the morally corrupt to task and holding them responsible, but he does not want to commit to the actions which may ultimately harm innocent people including those close to him. One might think of it as Anonymous crossed with Conspiracy Theory crossed with the Sopranos. There is one other aspect of the show I am deliberately leaving out as it is a significant spoiler, although observant people will pick up on it after the first couple of episodes, if not sooner... hints are dropped all along the way. If you're looking for a leftist apollogistic slant towards Hacktivism and the Occupy Wall Street movement / anti greedy,corrupt corporations, you will find it here. If you can't handle or simply don't like that so much that it would ruin an otherwise interesting show, then this isn't the show for you. If, on the other hand you can deal with observing and exploring multiple sides of these issues and not assume the show is preaching to you of how things should be, then you may enjoy this show. Or you might not.

Please elaborate as to the definition you are using for the term "objective". What you're saying here is that unjustified taking of property is cannot simultaneously be justified; or in other words !A != A. It fails internal consistency. But is this really a fair assessment of the action? I don't think it is. It is already prejudiced with the bias that the taking is inherently deemed unjust. Instead, the proper assessment must bet whether it is just for everyone to take whatever they desire (if necessary, by force). This removes the prejudice and still leaves the question open to moral scrutiny. Can we desire that everyone take whatever they desire, if necessary, by force? The answer seems obvious that noone wishes to have their own property in jeopardy of being taken by another; therefore, it is universally preferable that property be considered inviolate. This is not why murder fails to be UPB. It fails because, like theft no one wishes to be deprived of their ability to go on living, so it cannot be universalized by society. Killing in self-defense is not universalized either; it is simply accepted as an unfortunate necessity in some circumstances; but because it is not found to be necessary in all circumstances, it cannot be universalized as an option of self-defense in all cases... i.e., one cannot justifiably kill another person in defense of one's reputation, or even of one's property (unless such property is necessary to the continuance of one's life in which case failure to defend one's property with any means necessary in fact results in a loss of one's life, not merely a loss of one's property).

UPB is relative to the society. What is UPB for the world as a whole may not be UPB for the Papuans of New Guinea. What is UPB for 18th Century American Colonists may not be UPB for 19th Century Americans occupying the same land. What is UPB for Jews is not UPB for Muslims, is not UPB for Christians, in not UPB for Atheists, etc. Stefan sought to discover an objective standard of ethical behavior that is both universally preferred by all as well as universally applicable to all; a rational standard that is internally or self-consistent (the rules for others apply to oneself), as well as externally consistent (the morals are consistent with natural or intuitive moral sentiments common across virtually all cultures and societies), and he believed that such a moral system would be objectively true. This last point is my biggest point of contention as it makes as much sense to me as the notion that there would exist an objectively true genre of fiction, and an objectively true category of music, and an objectively true cuisine, and an objectively true movement or art, etc. Stefan did fashion a method of evaluating ethical and aesthetic propositions against a libertarian standard in a manner that is consistent, rational, and readily accessible to any person, in much the same way that one might formulate a method for validating whether a piece of music is Rock & Roll or Jazz, or a piece of art is impressionist or realist, or whether a cuisine is Chinese, Thai, or Indian. The method itself may be considered an objective method in much the same way that the scientific method is an objective method for evaluating scientific hypothesis and theories. Nevertheless, while the method may be considered an objective method which will reliably provide the same result for anyone who follows it; what Stefan presents as objective morality is inherently subjective, as it is dependent upon the subjective selection of specific ideological premises or assumptions defined by the libertarian ideal. It would be no different than claiming that a method for determining whether a piece of music conforms to the ideals and standards defining contemporary Rock & Roll makes any piece of music which successfully passes such a standard “objectively true music”, and anything that fails, “objectively false music”. Of course, as the standards for contemporary Rock & Roll change, music that would conform today might not conform tomorrow, and music that does not conform today might in fact conform tomorrow, all depending upon the sentiments of society which determine what is considered contemporary Rock & Roll. That is my analysis as well. That is because the Bible’s list of prescriptions and proscriptions are the dictates of authority, not the consequence of adherence to a specific set of independent virtues, principles, or ideals. While such virtues, principles, and ideals are sometimes referenced, in the vast majority of cases, they are not indicated as the defining ideals or virtues upon which the moral prescriptions and proscriptions are predicated. We should not. What’s next is convincing people that adherence to certain moral proscriptions or prohibitions is mandatory (i.e., no raping, no assaulting, no murdering, no robbery, etc.) for those who wish to participate in a mutually beneficial and voluntary society. Those who do not adhere to such a standard will find themselves shunned, if not punished for their immoral behavior.

Actually, UPB is nothing more or less than the collective preferences of society for or against certain behaviors. The method or framework which Stefan uses to evaluate those preferences is not UPB (although one might wish that it were); however, it is a rationally objective method in the sense that anyone may apply it and achieve the same results against the same axiomatic or fundamental ideals. In his book, Stefan builds his framework around the libertarian ideals of universal, individual liberty and private property. Aesthetic and ethical propositions are then tested against these ideals to determine whether the aesthetic and ethical propositions are universal, rational, consistent, and support these propositions for all persons under all circumstances. Naturally, the prohibitions against rape, assault, murder, and theft stand, under all circumstances as immoral, whereas things like tardiness, breaking wind, or simply being rude are not immoral but merely frowned upon as undesirable or aesthetically negative, thus validating the preferences against such things by nearly all members of society.

Yes, That is my biggest issue with UPB as well--the claim that it is objective. As to the notion of socially or culturally defined morals being "binding", they're only binding if one wishes to be considered moral by that society or culture. Your are correct that it is all just subjective preference; however, not objective, and only binding to the extent that violations of it may result in the use of force in self-defense or self-defense by proxy. The preference is subjective. The methods are objectively rational or irrational, reliable or unreliable, objectively falsifiable or unfalsifiable (and in most instances subjective), etc. What individuals consider best is subjective preference based on their preferred standard for determining what is best. Which method conforms most closely or consistently to a particular standard is in many cases objective.

Because all moral standards and ideals are inherently subjective, just like truth is inherently objective.

Good for you. s Yes, that is one axiomatic premise of UPB that must be assumed/presumed/mutually agreed upon without warrant. It is not the only one. Can you identify another primary axiomatic premise of UPB? I have identified three fundamental assumptions and one corollary. That is an interesting question. Can an act be moral under one set of circumstances, and immoral under a different set of circumstances? If so, what is it about the circumstances that makes the action moral or immoral? (hint: this relates to one of the three fundamental premises I referred to above) Is there a different way of describing these acts which removes the moral judgement? Might this also point to a fundamental assumption? As I see it, Stefan has created a framework for evaluating moral systems and simultaneously evaluated a specific moral system (perhaps without realizing he had built into his framework some fundamental assumptions). I contend that the "beast" as he refers to it, is alive and well. 1 - This is one of the great questions of moral philosophers including Hume. I share the opinion of Hume that morality is inherently a non-rational sentiment; and therefore ultimately subjective, although it is certainly informed by certain objective facts and principles. 2 - Yes. It is substantially more than that. UPB is the collective, subjective preferences of society. A moral claim or assertion can be evaluated to determine whether it conforms with the preferences of the collective and whether such a prescription or prohibition rationally conforms to such preferences universally. This is the primary strength of Stefan's UPB framework. His framework readily exposes the contradictions in certain behaviors which are presumed to be moral, but are not rationally consistent with our collective preferences or moral sentiments. These are what he describes as frequently being in the "null zone" where morality is stood on its head by the religion, family, the state, etc. in order to exercise control or otherwise exert its will under the pretense of morality. It is only determining whether a moral proposition conforms to the standards which Stefan has established for moral behavior. The problem is: UPB does not move morality out of the realm of subjectivity. The fact that it rests on the subjective preferences of society leaves it firmly in the subjective realm, no matter how well the collective moral sentiments of society might conform to the Libertarian Ideals and principles such as Property Rights and the Non-Aggression Principle. You are exactly correct. It is not objective. The beast yet lives. And yet there is still an argument that may be made about the superiority of various ideals or moral systems which conform to the collective moral sentiments of the vast majority of society.

Look for temp or consultative work, not full-time advertisements for permanent positions. A good way to do this is through a professional recruiting/placement/staffing agency. Hiring managers do not want to hire people who will only be with the company for a short period of time to fill a long-term/permanent position. Unless the job is inherently seasonal (tax preparation, fishing, construction, snow-removal, etc.), or has a high rate of turn-over (because the job is difficult, not well compensated, demeaning, etc) you will have a difficult time getting a job without misrepresenting your intentions. This is an area of morality where what is claimed and asserted is different from what is practiced. The majority of society will claim that it is wrong, but the majority of society will also lie on their CV to obtain a position or job. If you are fully qualified to do the job, there is nothing irresponsible or malicious in understating your abilities. It would only be irresponsible or malicious to claim an ability you do not have and do not have the ability of acquiring by the time such ability is needed/required. Many employers will expend a considerable amount of time and resources to hire and train a person to perform in a particular position. In such cases, the employee may not even become profitable to the company for 3 or more months. If the employee leaves just as they become profitable to the company, they have not realized a benefit in their employee selection, they have simply broken even. Such may even be considered a loss given the time value of their investment. Training an employee who intends to remain in the position for a significant time after they start being a benefit to the company would be a better choice. If you were to beat out such an employee, it would not be a win-win for the company, it would be a lose-win for the company and you (respectively). This may not be true. There may be a different way of looking at your qualifications than you have considered. A way in which your particular skill set my by utilized in a job outside of your old career if you were to examine such skills from a different, less biased perspective. It may be that you are uniquely qualified for a career that requires your current skill-set, but applied in a completely different Vertical.

In my opinion, most people do not properly understand Free will. Free will, properly understood, necessarily incorporates determinism. Free will is the notion that a person consciously chooses their response to situations--conscious self-determination, i.e., the individual consciously deciding how to act rather than reacting or acting unconsciously or according to the programmed response generated by another (through hypnosis or subconscious programming for example). But that choice is based on what? It is informed by past experiences, genetic and physiologically determined biases and preferences, and cognitive evaluation of the situation on the basis of past experiences, and presently held beliefs, and ideals. In short, Free will is choice that is actually predetermined by the person's disposition to choose and the physical sensations that inform that decision which will likely inform future decisions. A part of the brain processes our experiences and generates an emotional response to the experience. This emotional response is mapped onto certain ideas and concepts and informs future decisions.

That is a question that has intrigued philosophers, psychologists, neurobiologists, and others for a very long time. There are a number of theories ranging the gamut from early childhood association with particular sensory stimuli while certain areas of their brain which are responsible for feelings of pleasure or pain were also being stimulated. Others have opined a pre-programmed set of evolutionary cues and programming. There is even some indication that a form of memory may be passed on through DNA; and if so, this might have an influence as well. Scientists don't really have a full explanation and it seems there are likely a multitude of factors involved, including (probably) some element of choice (which is also a highly debated subject, especially by determinists).

Scepticism is merely another word for "doubt" or "disbelief". Faith, on the other hand is not mere belief, it is expectation of that which is desired. Fear is the other side of the coin of faith. Fear is the expectation of that which is abhorred. Both faith and fear may be rational, based on such premises as the consistency of natural phenomena, or the proven trustworthiness (or lack of trustworthiness) of an individual; or it may be irrational (e.g.., contrary to such rational premises, or predicated on superstition, etc.). Faith, properly understood is not suspension of disbelief, or a belief without evidence. These are merely a misuse of the term faith when what is meant is "unfounded belief" or "irrational belief" or "superstitious belief", or in some cases, "unfounded faith", "irrational faith", or "superstitious faith". Faith, like fear, is neither inherently irrational or rational; it may be either.

Objects are things which exist, which are perceived by the senses. Percepts of objects are the mental "pictures" or sensory data formulated by our brain of what our stimulates our senses. Concepts of objects are the abstractions our brains make of the perceptions from our senses. Concepts of relationship are also abstractions of the perceived interactions our senses convey to us from empirical "observation" as well as the perceived relationships we learn via transfer of concepts using language, drawings, and various other models demonstrating discrete and abstract concepts. In short, concepts are another word for ideas. They're what our brain makes of direct empirical observations of objects and phenomena (like gravity, magnetism, transference of momentum, etc.) and what our brain reasons out from ideas or concepts including those we learn from language and models of concepts, such as diagrams, drawings, pictures, audio and video recordings, simulations, and so on.