Kikker

The point is that you're very unhelpful, you can't seem to present your case in a comprehensible way. You even don't seem to understand why it is incomprehensive. To start of you use several re-definitions of concepts like pain, instinct, instinctual realities, type and anti-type. To elaborate, you seem to expand the meaning of pain to the meaning of discomfort but why you don't use that term remains a mystery. You seem to diminish the meaning of instinct till the point where it may just be called an urge. The term instinctual realities is confusing at best since one person saying his/her instinctual reality doesn't fit your description completely destroys any argument using it as a premise, people have to believe your description first in order for you to prove that the description is right. Type is utterly confusing since gender identity is per definition conditioned and not instinctual. Anti-type is even more confusing since it isn't even clear whether anti-type is the denial of types or a classification which is conflicting with your use of types. Furthermore your second source (https://www.psycholo...still-declining) is advertisement for self-help expert, not research about declining women's happiness. I don't know why you would include that. Your third source (http://www.cnn.com/2...-balance-study/) supports equalitarian marriage without gender roles as why to have a happy marriage, that seems to contradict your whole argument.

If every militarized insurance company can't sustain itself by coercing then a military insurance company which is able to coerce can't exist, since coercion would be suicide. Proof to me why a military insurance company can't sustain itself by blackmail but a government can and you have proven your point. And I may have run into a definition problem there because a government able to coerce but doesn't may be named otherwise because it doesn't use coercion to sustain itself but it also can't be a DRO because a DRO is unable to coerce. So not because a governing entity is always coercing.

For something to be predictable it has to be fixed. If something is fixed it is predictable. You have a relation here which works not only one but both ways. So you can easily disprove that relation by proposing a situation which is predictable but not fixed or a situation which is fixed but not predictable. Since the rest of your reasoning is based on this premise being false(For something to be predictable it has to be fixed) I will only target that premise.

Yes in franklins experiment with doctor black he provides the argument that you don't need alternative options in order to exercise free will. The thought experiment goes something like this: Dexter is planning to rob a bank, he does this because he wants to and is already planning for multiple weeks. What he doesn't know is that a mad scientist, doctor Black is observing him. Doctor Black really wants Dexter to rob that bank, so before the robbery he implants a chip into Dexter's head within him knowing. That chip will activate when Dexter suddenly stops trying to rob the bank and will force him to rob the bank anyways. On the day of the robbery Dexter robs the bank and the chip didn't need to be activated. Did Dexter rob the bank out of free will, even though he had no alternative actions? Furthermore determinism doesn't mean a person isn't responsible for his/her actions. You can still have a "bad brain" which produces unwanted consequences in very normal or common circumstances. Determinism makes retaliation impossible but doesn't prevent people from protecting themselves, rehabilitating people and deterring other people to perform criminal acts. The main factor in punishment would be repeatability, if a person is very prone to murder someone again then he/she could easily face a life sentence if that chance doesn't change. On the other hand if a person murdered someone but changes her/himself to the point that it is very unlikely to happen again then he/she could possibly be released in a few months. A brain that goes against any experience is random, not something to be proud of or to strife for I would say.

I made a mistake there in formulation by not mentioning the causes first. But I already said essentially the same thing the first time I responded to you, if you don't think this is a logical proof which needs to be refuted before doubting it's outcome then in don't know what to say. In the physical world everything has a cause, The physical world is governed by a fixed set of laws, So theoretically you can, with the cause known and all the laws known, predict anything, This includes the decisions you have yet to make. I also explained how this doesn't mean free will is an illusion but I can elaborate on that. Because even though any change in your consciences is fixed, that doesn't mean that nothing changed, in fact you consciences can change things. A important note is that consciences then simply becomes a term which describes a process in your brain which turns stimuli into actions, and can be both described as a conscience experiencing itself and as other consciences experience another conscience. By the way I don't know if it's possible and by all means don't do it if you don't want to, but if you have changed your opinion about my previous post please retract the downvote since it will hide my comments eventually. I am assuming ofcourse you did downvote it, ignore this if you didn't.

I refuted your premise that the only position a determinist can have in relation to free will is the one you described. Just to get this straight, you agree that consciousness exists out of neurons? If so what is the problem with the statement: "If it's our neurons which do the choosing (prior to consciousness), then reason is not a volitional process, but an illusory, superfluous, inconsequential one." If you believe that neurons make up you consciousness. You just need to say neurons=consciousness and the whole argument of your "determinism" falls apart. You don't need to write 4 paragraphs about it. Even if the claim is prior to consciousness, to clarify, the empirical claim that neurons can be observed making decisions before the person self is aware of it, can be easily refuted as a difference in delay. It's simply a different way of observing the same thing. "Fixed laws" means that only one option is chosen, previous events caused that option to be chosen thus the option was predictable and therefore fixed beforehand. In this case free will is part of the equation, so even though a consciousness gets multiple options, the one chosen was already fixed beforehand by the different idea's, thoughts and urges present in that consciousness. So some people may call free will an illusion, since your decisions are fixed beforehand. This easily refuted; in order for free will to be a illusion it must contain a false premise, but if your definition of free will is within a deterministic world, then free will as a concept isn't an illusion. It is describing a part of the decision making progress. Doesn't mean your description using free will can't be factually wrong. Using the same word for a deterministic worldview and for a logical claim with a deterministic world as a premise is obscuring the debate (that there is no free will because determinism is true). You yourself already rightly complained how free will gets confused with a logical claim with free will as a premise (that free will can't have a cause). So I am unsure why you're still objecting to my comment. You mean a hard determinist.

Using the same word for 2 different positions is illogical at best, kevin himself already complained how the word free will got interlocked with a claim with free will as a premise (free will has cannot have a cause), rightly so because that would be a misrepresentation of free will. On the other hand you shouldn't interlock determinism with a logical and empirical claim with determinism as a premise (decisions are made regardless of your reasoning).

I refuted your premise which means that any argument coming from that premise isn't trustworthy. You say you believe in a world of causes and a fixed set of laws, yet you believe you have multiple options, yet you believe that consciousness doesn't include neurons. It's contradictory. It's not 'my' definition of determinism, it's the common definition of determinism. Look it up, the first page of google all use the definition of determinism I used. And like I said that is a compatibilist position, a world where determinism doesn't contradict free will. You obscure the debate when using determinism in a different manner or when you misunderstand your own position. Also you seem to refuse to believe you're a compatibilist due some disdain to the word itself instead of logical reasons. Secondly you argue that a determinist thinks that we should give in to our instincts and desires when even Schopenhauer, the name of this topic, argues otherwise. You're arguing against a position which doesn't exist in this discussion.

How about this: In the physical world everything has a cause, The physical world is governed by a fixed set of laws, So theoretically you can, with the cause known and all the laws known, predict anything, This includes conscientiousness, as long as it is part of the physical world. This is the basis of determinism. Important to note is that free will and determinism aren't opposites like you suggested. There are 4 positions: 1. Determinism is True therefore free will doesn't exist (hard determinism) 2. Determinism is False therefore free will exists (libertarian) 3. Determinism is True and Free will exists. (compatibalism) 4. Determinism is can be either true or false but free will doesn't exist (Hard incompatibilism) Your position seems to be compatibalism. Meaning that Free will exists in the physical world, ("Free will isn't free from cause and effect in the physical world") therefore decisions can be predicted if the cause and the rules are known. ("If you set me up with my same desires, my same options, etc. – the fact that I choose one repeatedly and that this is knowable,") The obscure thing about your argument is that you define free will within the bounds of a deterministic world but then proceed to change the definition into the conclusion of determinism. ("Determinism (as it relates to free will) is taking the accuracy of causally deterministic descriptions and concluding that this must mean that our subjective experience of choosing between multiple options is illusory") First of you don't need multiple options to make a decision of free will, Frankfurts thought experiment "Docter black" illustrates that. Secondly, in a deterministic world (as I have defined) you don't have alternative options to begin with. "that the actual "decision" is being determined at a lower level than consciousness. Talking about a series of causal events in terms of desires, decisions and other mental states is not very satisfying to most Determinists who conclude that a more deterministic level of description (i.e. at the neuronal level) must be more true / scientific." A more deterministic level doesn't exist, something is either deterministic or not. You say that a series of events in terms of desires, decisions and other mental states can be deterministic and compatible with free will but a explanation through neurological events cannot. That is highly contradictory. You can argue about the accuracy of reasoning from neurological observations but that doesn't contradict the notion of series of events in terms of desires, decisions and other mental states which would lead to a decision. Therefore my question is: how do you define free will and conscientiousness?

You tried to generalize a meaning out of his text without referencing the text, that suggests that you don't understand the text. The fact that you responded with an argument which doesn't relate to the text confirmed my suspicion. To explain: the text already said that the embodiment of Free will is caused (and thus deterministic) but you respond by saying that someone can never be truly free of causation because you still hold biases, which is obviously part of the embodiment of Free will (according to the text). It's more likely the point that things exist without a cause but don't have to be defined that way. But you (or I) would probably need to brush up our knowledge of logic in order to fully understand that statement. You seem to support Kant's version of free will in which where he proclaims that exercising free will is to obligate yourself to universal morality (rough translation). Well I would say that my will is determined in the sense that it is caused, while I also would argue that free will is a contradiction. First of causation is more than environment like you seem to believe. Ideas are also caused and cause decisions, for example by reading this topic you're influencing the way you respond to the question "is there free will". If you concede this point that all aspects of decision making are caused then where does Free will fit in? If all aspects of your decisions are caused except for the free will you exercise in that decision what is free will then? It becomes a empty term with no meaning. You will have to redefine free will, instead of "free from anything" you redefine to "free from something" in which something can refer to coercion, physical restraint or force. Now you run into the problem of will because your will is also caused making coercing others also involuntary. And if your will isn't caused then what is it, if it's unpredictable then why do you even want your will to be free? Point being that a Rational decision is a caused decision and a uncaused decision, whether that exists or not, would be a unpredictable one. Doesn't mean people aren't responsible for their actions, I'll explain if you ask but I have not all the time in the world.

Well you seem to be mostly projecting onto the text. The piece Dr. Birchall wrote begins about a problem in analytical philosophy in general which he calls "phenomenological blindness". He explains that it is the tendency to define things in relation to other things, which is deluding the debate about freewill. This is because relation implies causation and causation implies compulsion. In the way that we define freewill (in relation to), it can not exist, as any cause of freewill would make freewill compulsory which is a contradiction. Out of that contradiction 3 different philosophical standpoints can be made. 1. Is determinism which could be summarized to the notion: Freewill can't be caused therefore it doesn't exist. 2: indeterminism which could be summarized into the notion: Freewill exists, since freewill can be vaguely observed, therefore it isn't caused. 3: Any middle position which can be summarized as: giving freewill some wiggle room in a deterministic world. Dr. Birchall standpoint is, is that the embodiment of freewill (a human body) is caused but the embodiment of freewill doesn't explain the whole picture. After that he points out that things don't need to be caused in order to exist and proposes to define Free will as: with and becoming instead of in relation to and being. He also seems to support Aristotle with his version of destiny and Nietzsche concerning mass culture.

It would help if you actually say what matters.

Yet they are both acts of removing an obstacle in order to accommodate the will of Person A. In the example I changed the obstacle from a locked door to a vast amount of space and/or a body of water.

Imprisonment is a matter of intent. You ask me from which time frame something is imprisonment, I can ask you when something isn't imprisonment. When there is a locked door but Person A has a key, a normal person wouldn't call this imprisonment. However if person A takes 30 seconds to open the door, person B (host) takes 10 seconds to open the door and Person A asks Person B to open the door for him, Person B refuses, then it's technically also imprisonment. There is always a cost to any action taken, so your argument is a utilitarian statement about when a cost is or isn't significant. A definition in which your situation of being a prisoner or being trapped is depended on the time it takes you to free yourself vs the time it takes for others to free you, isn't a sensible one. So I would say that until Person B actively prevents Person A from escaping his undesired situation Person B isn't imprisoning Person A. Inaction isn't imprisonment. That doesn't take away the argument that not helping someone who is trapped within reasonable bounds is immoral. So person B warns Person C and proposes a deal to Person to free him quicker than Person C can, for a price. Is it voluntary? Or simply a property which has the warning "enter at own risk".

You don't seem to get what the word perfect means. But you're telling me now that you used the term perfect world sarcastically to describe what other people believe instead of yourself? So happiness is a something that should be pursued on it's own? You just agreed with statement 5 which I concluded to be a contradiction. You need to take your own words more seriously.

... You said: So I put the situation in your sentence then I don't think how it came to pass is relevant. B invited A over and A's presence in the USA-airport did not create a debt to B. It's B's property and A makes it clear he wishes to leave. If B doesn't make a reasonable effort to return A to Australia-airport, he is then deliberately binding A without his consent. I wanted to know if and why those situations aren't similar, because in my mind they are. In both cases Person A traps himself. In both cases Person B isn't directly responsible. So in both cases I argue that Person B isn't obligated to provide that service for free.

Well technically, omnipotence and omnipotence are mutually exclusive That's why I use the term almighty, to avoid the omnipotence paradoxes. Maybe that takes away from the original meaning though, so if Silverman actually made the argument with omnipotence in mind then his argument is indeed flawed from statement one.

The important question is: Is this group significant?

"To be intellectually honest, one either has to accept that God is evil, or they have to say that God doesn't exist! Perfect argument." Not really, you can argue a bunch of things. You can say god is almighty, all knowing but not good (as you implied). You can say god is all-knowing, good but not almighty. You can say god is good, almighty but not all-knowing. You can argue that the biblical story isn't an accurate source for the deeds of god. Although the argument would force you to admit one of these 4 things if you're religious and logically consistent.

Isn't the whole argument against government that it is able to coerce? Why isn't that the case with insurance companies? Would you have no problem with government if it was still able to coerce but didn't? I may have run into a definition problem there if you think coercion is an inherit trait of government.

(I already responded to your post it disappeared, probably something to do with my account which was validated while the post still needed to be validated by the moderator.) Is Person A really imprisoned though? He can get out within a day. Furthermore the host disadvantaged person A by accident, although I admit this is hard to imagine in the real world. Also the host isn't preventing Person A from escaping. He is willing to lend his hand for a fee. But you would probably argue that any consequence is still the responsibility of the host regardless of his awareness of those consequences. So it wouldn't matter if he was actually imprisoned or not. More interesting is the question whether something changes when the cause is different. Is it still coercion if person A trapped himself or a third party (person C) trapping him? Or would you need to change the location to be owned by a third party (a public bathroom with a broken lock) to make it a voluntary exchange? Or does none of this matter? Personally I think if Person A trapped himself or was trapped by someone else and made a deal with person B who does not own the location then it would be a voluntary exchange. That is because you could argue that being invited to a party implies safe exit from the party with the host held responsible for any preventable hazards.

Important is that Person A can get out within a day, he is only temporary trapped (or immobilized). If he trapped himself then person B isn't directly responsible except for owning the basement and the key. By the same logic Person A could walk into an airport and claim he's trapped in the USA because it would take hem years to build a craft an travel to Australia on his own, not even discussing the dangers. Realizing that the country is trapping him, they offer Person A a free flight to Australia. If those situations aren't simular, why?

A perfect world would be boring? If a world is boring it wouldn't be perfect as a perfect world wouldn't have any negative traits. Secondly if a perfect world constitutes a world which is boring, logically, any industry or activity that prevents boredom is actively preventing a perfect world, which we all should strive for according to you. Your very first sentence is already utterly flawed. So you reasoning is as follows: 1: Our world is imperfect, 2: We should strive for a perfect world, 3: In a perfect world happiness is optimized, 4: People with property make other people feel unhappy by actively preventing them property rights, 5: Supporting absolute property rights is the same as supporting people preventing others to attain property, 6: Thus property rights should be abolished I mean should people even bother to argue about such a flawed argument? I'll do it anyway. The first three statements are begging the question, a world is perfect because happiness is optimized and happiness should be optimized because then we are closer to a perfect world. The fifth statement is a contradiction as supporting property rights means that you support everyone having property rights, if people prevent other people from having property due to personal believes then they don't support full property rights. There are no unlimited resources, only renewable ones, which require limited resources to produce.

Well you purposely misunderstood what other people said so it seems like you want to waste everyone's time, regardless of my presumed emotional state. Better to call you out on it.

"Actually, it is. If you do a simple google search on the word "argument" you will find the following definitions;" Well aren't you a witty one, it should be obvious to anyone that MMD meant that you used invalid reasoning to support your point. "I don't deny I have some low quality friends. They entertain me, and I'm always happy to extend a hand of guidance if they care to take it." You are a generous god I must say. Anyway, inductive reasoning isn't the way to go when trying to establish to other people that the reality is different from their experience. If you're mad that people ask for statistics to back your empirical claim then you're on the wrong forum.