richardbaxter

Nice Andi - very practical :). What we want to know is that final change to the reconstructed physical system (e.g. x neural connections) where you no longer experience reality and someone else does. Because if there is such a change it implies something determines when a new instantiation of sentience is assigned, and if there isn't - that we live in a pantheistic world. With respect to finding out how the brain works, I agree that this is an extremely worthwhile enterprise for a number of reasons (in fact so important that a significant proportion of all research should be directed towards the human connectome). But assuming we found out how it works, and it behaved according to the known laws of physics (or any others discovered within the existing paradigm), mental properties could confer no advantage on the physical system. Nor could we ever know for certain which systems exhibited them. So it begs the question, what are they there for; and why would they be restricted to such complex information processing systems? Perhaps they are an inherent property of all matter/energy and consciousness exists in gradations, etc. Furthermore (although this is getting increasingly off topic), I hope you appreciate that we have just defined a method to resurrect a body, which moreover according to the materialist framework will be the same person. It is fortunate the laws of nature are so fine tuned as to necessitate an infinite multiverse. Because with an infinite multiverse there are going to be an infinite number of exact copies of our bodies anyway. So let's put all the sola materialist assumptions in the box and see what we get; resurrection of the body, reincarnation, and life after death. Wait, what? Is there an error somewhere? Was it perhaps the assumption that design optimisation can't involve evolution based on a simple algorithm and unlimited computational resources? (Cf planet earth from the hitch hikers guide to the galaxy). Maybe it was realism itself and we are living in a simulation? (Cf discreetness/quantisation of nature + indeterminism). Such would concord with the assumption that we are reasonable creatures; but it doesn't explain the source. I do think it therefore worth promoting open mindfulness. For the sake of science it is profitable to assume that all reality will ultimately be accessible to it - but should we be projecting this ideal as a philosophy?

Try to imagine variations on this scenario (from Zuboff's "one self: the logic of experience"); - what if I added an additional 795739528073 atoms to its neocortex? - what if I created two identical copies of the reconstruction?

What if you died and they reconstructed you? Would it still be you or would it be someone else?

Hi Andi - but what if I were you and you were me? What part of reality would differ to accomodate for this fact?

Cheers Richard - thanks for all the references.

In order to analyse a phenomenon one has to not make any implicit assumptions regarding it. For example a) reductive physicalism (which few adhere to as although mental properties may be mapped to physical properties they are not reducible to physical properties given how information is distributed across neural networks), or b) "emergence by necessity" (the assumption that mental properties just appear given a sufficient level of physical complexity - like when a machine declares itself to be conscious - without explanation). "Ghost in the machine" could be interpreted to mean anything from substance dualism to property dualism to simulation theory so I can't recommend the phrase here. Max Tegmark (an "informationism" architect) does however recommend the book/film when discussing simulation theory in the context of numerical simulation of physical systems and VR. In terms of property dualism, I figure it is more probable than a ghost without a machine, a machine without a ghost, or a machine with 73 ghosts.

Physical properties are uniquely assigned because they are part of a bigger indivisible system. Are we suggesting that mental properties are also? The problem is that to suggest some substances don't have mental properties but others do is to introduce differentiation - and there must be a reason for this differentiation. To interpret "you" or "me" as a physical entity in this context is to assert an unnecessary reduction which avoids the question. Perhaps I could be you (rather than me) if indivisible centres of awareness are randomly assigned to physical entities. But we must then ask what determines the mapping? Does the universe itself (nature) generate a set of discrete instantiations of sentience? Then why would a new one be created? Why not use the same one? (This is Arnold Zuboff's argument). Is the fact we don't have any memory of alternate references of experience (like we don't have memories of our infancy) a sufficient argument?

Why am I me and not you? Why is my experience of existence mapped to physical entity x and not mapped to physical entity y?

I think this is a fair point. At any day we might get wiped out by an advanced prokaryote (or retrovirus) and the process might start all over again. Assuming the more intelligent species doesn't get wiped out by an asteroid or nuke their planet.

For the weaker form of the definition, it has been suggested that the word 'threatens' be replaced with 'prevents'. Ie; Any entity (be it not for national security) that prevents freedom of speech is a terrorist organisation.

Another way to look at the problem is in terms of utilitarianism/deontology. Should we kill (or let be killed) a human being to save a more intelligent more sentient machine, or 500 puppy dogs? If not, why not?

Is human life worth more than animal life? If so, why would human life be worth equal to a more intelligent, more sentient machine?

Because mental properties have no functional impact on the system. If one considers natural law (physics) to be a complete description of the behaviour of the universe (a prerequisite of naturalism), then only physical properties can affect the evolution of the system (eg neuronal/ionic information processing, genetic code, etc): non-physical properties by definition cannot. The point is that we don't know. The fact we don't know something means that we must consider all the possibilities. And if it so happens that a i) complex organism or ii) computer simulation of a complex organism can produce emergent mental properties (although we will arguably never be able to demonstrate this under the current scientific paradigm; see transcendence quote), then we must ask why. Does it just happen magically because it was designed that way (teleology), or is there some fundamental reason for the emergence (eg b, c). There is nothing wrong with making arbitrary philosophical assumptions in science - people do it all the time (eg methodological naturalism, non-reductive physicalism, etc). It would be very difficult for science to progress without these. But it is not the job of philosophy to make arbitrary assumptions and then make no effort to ask why these are being made. The reason there is so much variation in historical/intercontinental philosophical thought is because people are not ideological in their beliefs and are willing to question the reason for their assumptions. Perhaps there are reasons for making such assumptions however? The problem is that a blind adherence to inherited western materialism is not a very good one - because it emerged from teleological thought. I gather that we are trying to produce systems of thought that are not dependent on teleology. Cheers - Richard

Hi Andi - I agree with a lot of what you are saying here. The problem of not knowing 'how it works' is equivalent to raising explanations for why it appears to work the way it does under the assumption of naturalistic mind (at least a-c). The issue however with equating strong emergent phenomena (mental properties) with weak emergent phenomena (like wings, crystals, neurons) is that weak emergent phenomena are reducible to the physical construct. Only with a platonic outlook does one even believe that wings exist, as something more than ("over and above") the underlying physical system. With enough computational resources one could simulate the emergence of wings from the laws of physics and some initial conditions. Yet regardless of their platonic/nominalistic outlook, there is a qualitative difference between a network of neurons firing and one's sensation of lavender. Even with enough computational resources, one will not necessarily be able to simulate the emergence of the sensation of lavender from the laws of physics and some initial conditions (it depends on the preconditions of such emergence). This is why philosophers don't take for granted that the 'how it works' explanation will belong to the same category of explanations (weak emergence) that derive atoms from subatomic particles, molecules from atoms, life from molecules, complex life from living cells, computers from complex life, and self-referential computers from their less intelligent or adaptive predecessors. Weak emergent systems may be supervenient on their substrate but this does not imply that every supervenient system (like naturalistic mind) is weakly emergent. The question of whether the emergent property of wings exist, or the emergent property of a self-referential computer exists is relevant to evolution, but the question of whether the machine (organism) is self-aware is not. I agree that if we could find out what were possible within the constraints of nature we could know what were inevitable - but the problem is that we do not know what is possible. We don't know the preconditions; as you point out we can only guess at them at this stage. Furthermore, discovering (guessing) that a phenomenon is inevitable given its environment is not an explanation (pertaining to internal consciousness, this is an example of the misapplication of the anthropic principle). One must still explain (eg provide some naturalistic explanation for) for why the neuronal-mental correspondence/mappings exist (hence a-d). What are the prerequisites for sentient beings - perhaps there are 5 identical sentient beings for every CNS, perhaps there are zero sentient beings for every CNS, perhaps there is one? What in nature specifies the rules, because the current laws of nature (physics) make no reference to such phenomena. Cheers - Richard

Ofd - Decoherence depends on the environmental exposure of the quantum system (reduction of the probability of encountering inadvertently measured phenomenon or particles interacting with such inadvertently measured phenomenon). The level of decoherence experienced by a particle upon measurement will depend on the degree of information gained with respect to its momentum/position and the degree to which they constrain its possible pathways. For example, relative to the position and width of two slits through which the wavefunction must pass; if the measured position/momentum of the "particle" enables the experiment (or experimental measuring device <- undefined) to eliminate the possibility of the particle travelling through one of those slits, then it will be considered to have decohered. But if there still exists uncertainty in this question, the level of decoherence experienced by the "particle" during the measurement will be a function of this uncertainty. With no decoherence due to measurement (ie a complete failure of measurement) or external/environmental interference, the "particle" will behave according to its wave properties and proceed to pass through both slits simultaneously before interfering constructively/destructively with itself and collapsing to a definite state (at some other experimental measuring device such as a photodetector). The position at which it will be measured can be estimated statistically based on the probability wave function. For classical (large) phenomena like neurons, although they do interfere with each other, the level of decoherence observable by existent measuring devices is negligible. But this does not avert the problem of what causes the minicollapse (to a definite rather than a probabilistic state; even if that state were almost so certain to be definite). We all know that if some random guy aligns to a perspective it doesn't make it their perspective. If one looks at the founders of quantum theory; they were all discussing this possibility (the role of the conscious observer in measurement) back to the days of Schrodinger's cat. The problem is that nothing within the Copenhagen interpretation defines what collapses the wavefunction in its totality (irrespective of decoherence; such final collapse being coined "minicollapse" in the context of decoherence). It is also the reason why many physicists (speculating about philosophy) take seriously apparently less intuitive QM interpretations (like Everett's many worlds). Furthermore, it is a reason why some were keen to bring back a deterministic interpretation (De Broglie-Bohm). It is an example of a philosophical anomaly.

Goldenages - what we are debating here is the fundamental point of the argument. From a scientific perspective, the only thing that is relevant to the evolution of living systems are entities which can be measured using the empirical method. If the physical (natural) laws are deduced(/inferred by induction) based on these empirically observable properties, then there is no reason to assume the existence of any other phenomenon (non-observable properties; ie mental properties) as necessary for these processes to occur. Thus the amazing physical process (neural network processing/program) known as "physical consciousness" which enables the organism to survive in increasingly complex and threatening environments bears no weight on the existence of empirically non-observable properties (mental properties), and therefore their relevance to its evolution. Under the assumption of physicalism (a common type of substance monism) some substances pertaining to living systems (which for the purposes of the argument I will add are arbitrarily delineated subsets of space-time) have both physical and mental properties, and so one could declare the mental properties relevant to the degree that they are associated with particular parts of these natural systems that are known to evolve (which for the purposes of the argument I will add are also arbitrarily delineated subsets of space-time; neural architectures). This apparent arbitrary delineation of these apparent (under the assumption of physicalism) emergent properties makes philosophers ask what defines such delineation and the preconditions for mental existence. Is it perhaps information (b) - the fact that certain parts of the physical universe are highly complex and process a lot of information? Etc. To put it another way, there is no functional difference between AI that are programmed to have a self but don't and AI that are programmed to have a self but do (where their programs are identical). The "conscious ego" may be described in a specific scientific literature, corresponding to a precisely defined empirical construct (such as a tendency for the humanoid organism to exhibit the behavioural symptoms of self-awareness, volition etc). It may even refer to an internal philosophical consciousness, under the assumption of a correspondence between physical and mental properties as is commonly the case in post-behaviourist eg cognitive psychology (assumes that internal consciousness/experience is an emergent property of information processing in the brain). The existence of philosophical consciousness (mental properties) is however outside the scope of science to defend. We might use the empirical method to discover very similar living systems to ourselves (singular) which exhibit very similar patterns of information processing, and philosophically deduce that these probably also exhibit mental properties, but the question is ultimately irresolvable (at this stage of our understanding of the universe; within the current paradigm).

Note the most obvious issue I can identify with the definition is the possibility of a recursive interpretation (e.g. vilification being used to suppress free speech) and therefore self-contradiction. Although I prefer this stronger definition (I think it better captures the concept of terrorism), it could be changed to accommodate such cases (ie tolerate threats to speech via speech). The precise rewording of the definition to achieve this is however a matter in itself. The definition could be constrained to its weaker form by adding the qualifier; apart from the speech itself (allowing for vilification and the suppression of speech by speech). Ie; "Any entity (be it not for national security) that threatens freedom of speech (apart from by the use of speech alone) is a terrorist organisation". But you should be able to see the problems created by adding this qualifier. What does one mean by speech alone? Is this speech in exclusion to performing actions necessary to initiate that speech? Or if the alone (exclusive) condition is not added, what if the action used to prevent the speech just happened to involve speech but was more prominently using another method such as physical force? Alternatively, the definition could be constrained to its weaker form by adding the qualifier; by physical force or threat of physical force. Ie; "Any entity (be it not for national security) that threatens freedom of speech by physical force or threat of physical force is a terrorist organisation". The problem I see with specifying the type of action necessary to prevent speech (eg violence) is that it doesn't capture alternative means of achieving the aim of suppressing speech (eg financial punishments, threats of court, etc). Likewise the condition "threat of force" could also be read to contradict the statement also if the threat involved speech. This is why I did not attempt to specify a weaker version incapable of self-contradiction. Perhaps someone can think of a way of rewording it to avoid these issues?

Any entity (be it not for national security) that threatens freedom of speech is a terrorist organisation. Can anyone find any errors in this definition? (Speech is taken here in its most general literal sense to mean the transmission of words by any medium).

I am suggesting that there is no reason the US constitution should be subverted to protect pornography. Here is some clarification of the arguments; 1. I completely reject the possibility of historical interpretation of a constitution (apart from the time in which it was created), and I think it is more than slightly concerning that so many qualifications have occurred since 1900 (http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/what-does). Why should precedent have any place in constitutional interpretation? The point of precedent is to allow evolution of law and constitutions are precisely designed to prevent evolution of their law. If any changes are to be made, amendments should be proposed. The constitution should be interpreted literally, and if this means having to accept the reality that a population which will crush each other to death in the race to escape an imaginary fire is not worth saving (or must otherwise put some effort into finding someone guilty for murder for knowingly risking the lives of a group of people for no explicable reason - without any reference to free speech), then we should deal with it. Is the right to salute or burn the American flag worth changing (reinterpreting) the constitution over? Taking a constitution as up for interpretation might have all the good intention in the world behind it, but it is exceedingly dangerous. 2. What would the writers of the first amendment think now that it is being used to protect dehumanisation under the guise of artistic value; and that under the guise of speech? The writers were not infallible, but it is equally worth noting that any changes we make (reinterpretations we assert) are equally infallible. Thus I am rejecting one such reinterpretation (and all others in the name of risk management and proper procedure) while specifying my reasons for the rejection. The only grounds for not paying attention to our modifications appears to be a blind progressivism. A more cautious approach may have stopped any such fallacies from arising to begin with. 3. The pinnacle case is Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938); extending "the press" to "every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion". The fundamental limitation is that not all publications which afford a vehicle of information and opinion exclusively afford information and opinion. Roth vs United States (1957) and Miller vs California (1973) were introduced to prevent this new freedom from implicitly extending to "obscene" publications, but it was unsurprisingly impossible to objectively define "obscenity". Instead of upholding the constitution (by only deeming it relevant to the publication of information/opinions), they extended it to all forms of media with some arbitrary (completely relative) qualifier regarding artistic or social value. Again, there is a difference between creating amendments (eg the abolition of slavery - 13), or extending the specific voting base and changing (reinterpreting) the constitution. Going from freedom of speech to freedom of artistic expression might sound great until one recalls that individuals have quite enjoyed the artistry of experimenting on human subjects. And their subjects might have even enjoyed some of those experiments. Playing with such generalisations is a Pandora's box. Moreover, it invites the state to make endless qualifications in a growing pantheon of restrictions; which will eventually contradict each other as is occurring now. 4. Most people who support the practice of paying monkeys to dress up for sexual gratification do so in the name of the free market/capitalism (assuming they haven't been arrested by an animal rights group). But dehumanisation is the same no matter which system of economics one adheres to. There is nothing good or moral achieved by upholding a right to the publication of such non-information, and confounding constitutional rights with a right to precipitate dehumanisation (rather than the right to discuss dehumanisation) damages the reputation and subverts the intentions of the constitution. 5. Socialists with any moral fortitude detest modern day "capitalism" on grounds of sexual commodification, and l suggest that removing such commodification eliminates any moral basis to socialism. 6. I am specifically referring to the normalisation of prostitution (virtual or otherwise). Prostitution may have existed in a large number of societies but in any of these where it became normalised (the norm) they had not liberty or a future; certainly not a future for liberty.

Hi Richard - What I find fundamental about reason is that in order to speak about it one must assume that they are reasonable, but an assumption of their reasonableness (under physicalism) requires the physical construct to have evolved reason - the processing of information according to the rules of logic. Therefore, any communication is reliant on the assumption that our particular universe evolved in such a way that reason (conformity to logical rules) would be adaptive for the organism.

The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 1. On what basis does the first amendment (freedom of speech) apply to pornography? Is their message that ineffable? The first amendment makes no reference to general expression (for example art); it only references religion, speech, the press, peaceful assembly, and petitions to government. 2. What would the writers of the amendment have to say? (At best their intentions had been exploited by lawyers; at worst hijacked by the unprincipled). 3. If a message cannot be put into words does it really exist (or is it really worth protecting under a constitution)? 4. Not all of what has been purported as capitalism is the free market at all, it is dehumanisation. To intentionally misrepresent a human being in the name of capitalism is no better than doing so in the name of nationalism, or communism. 5. If people stood up for this truth then they wouldn't risk being seen as hypocrites. Socialists would have no moral ground to stand on. 6. Civilisation is built on clothing: where prostitution (virtual or otherwise) becomes normalised, there is no future for liberty. These are my arguments - feel free to counter.

Cheers Andi - I meant that the question is irrelevant with respect to the evolution (survival) of the system. As you point out, if there is such a correspondence between mental and physical properties (as most contemporaries would agree on), it is extremely philosophically relevant. This is why philosophers debate the preconditions for strong emergence; when does it occur. Do mental properties just magically get assigned to complex carbon organisms in some primordial garden (as David Chalmers asks pointedly in his paper "panpsychism and protopanpsychism"), or is there a fundamental but presently unknown relationship between their apparent emergence and the underlying physical system (b, c, d). Perhaps we should start to question the existence of mental properties given their empirical irrelevance (a), etc.

Regarding "physical consciousness" ("a computer with a model of self"), as applied to a human being. A model of self may well have a survival advantage. One could imagine a skynet with a model of self versus a skynet without a model of self. The skynet with a model of self is going to have a higher probability of wanting to protect its circuits because it believes in more than just its circuits; it believes in the existence of "itself" as a non-physical being. Whether or not that self actually exists is irrelevant; it is another question entirely.

@Kikker; note in the case of psychophysics (eg rate how hot your foot feels on a scale of 1 to 10, is the horizontal rod longer than the vertical rod, rate how green the apple is, etc) one is not empirically measuring mental properties, one is measuring self-report (beliefs/conceptions) of mental properties. Under physicalism, the creature has evolved to believe in and value mental properties (the existence of "itself" as an observer/sentient being), but the reality of this encoded belief is irrelevant to its evolution - it only need be adaptive or otherwise a byproduct of related physical processes. a) One could say that the individual participants of the experiment are "measuring" (or classifying) their mental properties under the assumption of a correspondence between mental and physical reality. b) Likewise, one could say that the experiment is "measuring" mental properties under the assumption of a correspondence between the mental and physical reality of the participants. c) Furthermore, one could say that the experiment is "measuring" the participants' internal experience of this (non-empirical) "measurement" process (a) under the assumption of a correspondence between the mental and physical reality of the participants. But in none of these cases has empirical measurement of mental properties occurred. The only thing which has been empirically measured is self-reported beliefs of an organism. An example of empirical measurement is a system that detects and counts the number of specific objects moving across a specific region in space-time. One could employ either machines or humans to do this task (both will be imperfect at the task, and must be calibrated/taught accordingly). But at no time is one empirically measuring mental properties. Likewise, one could obtain/measure self-reported experiences and propose a direct correspondence between what is seen (eg specific colour of a specific region in their field of view) and what can be independently verified (eg specific neurons being fired), but this is not an empirical hypothesis. It cannot be denied by observation and the prerequisite of empirical science is that one can at least in theory devise an experiment which would demonstrate the hypothesis to be false. Even if one conducted the analysis on themselves (took as true their own self-reported experience) no one else could independently verify it. Yet just because a proposition cannot be empirically verified, it doesn't make it a bad assumption. Such assumptions are necessary for things as simple as respectful communication (and others like logic are necessary for any form of communication).

I don't understand this, the validity of local realism and the preconditions of measurement are directly relevant to content which has previously been discussed, and the focus of the discussion is not mental states or neurology. One can make objective statements about mental properties based on the assumption of their correspondence to physical properties (but this has little to do with empirical measurement). Obviously, one does not need to understand the brain as a Turing machine to make statements about mental properties. A Turing machine is just a model of AI; it needn't have any associated mental properties. I think you may have misinterpreted the word "against"; granted it is ambiguous - the p values refer to the null hypothesis. In fact one would have to be pretty confused upon encountering a series of significant low p values and non-significant high p values to think otherwise. Andi, I completely agree this; under the assumption of the existence of mental properties and their correspondence to physical properties. If an internal mental reality exists and has a relationship to the actions of the organism, then we would expect this internal reality to accurately represent external reality in a successful species.