richardbaxter

This is correct. Not only is the empirical method inherently probabilistic (one can only conduct an experiment so many times to rule out anomalies; hence its determination of p values against a null hypothesis), but it is based on philosophical assumptions which are inherently unprovable (ie axioms). More generally, these include the validity of logic, the existence of self, the validity of mental properties to capture/experience a "real" (objective/physical) world etc. The empirical method is based on an assumption of causality in the measured system; it was not designed to vindicate philosophers of the existence of a causal relationship between their personal experience of reality and reality itself. In fact, this relationship will vary heavily due to subjective biases (psychophysics). One does therefore not conduct experiments using subjective measurements (unless the underlying construct is difficult to measure otherwise; eg in psychology, in which case any differences between experimenter ratings must be considered systematics to be partialled out). To quote the Lady Jessica from the Children of Dune; "All proofs inevitably lead to propositions which have no proof! All things are known because we want to believe in them!"

Can you please explain your basis for this? The scientific method requires empirical measurement and such measurement has no access to mental properties (it therefore cannot use them per say). Measurement only has access to physical properties (eg the state of a particle, neuron, etc). Under physicalism such physical properties are assumed to correspond to mental properties - however one would struggle to find a neuroscientist (speculating about philosophy) who adopts reductive physicalism (a 1 to 1 correspondence between mental and physical properties) based on how information is distributed across neural networks. Most physicalists uphold non-reductive physicalism; specifically the thesis of supervenience (that there cannot be a change in a substance's mental properties without a corresponding change in its physical properties), or attempt some form of eliminativism. Under the peculiar form of the Copenhagen Interpretation discussed, measurement requires mental properties but it does not use them per say (it still has no access to them).

@Kikker as you point out all human sensual experience (under naturalism) corresponds to a heavily processed reconstruction of reality (including object recognition, motion detection, categorisation etc). When the creature is in a "conscious" (aroused) state this experience is generally derivative from some external reality, but it all nonetheless corresponds to physical reality (the neuronal processing of objects, concepts, etc). Note even in our dreams/hallucinations/thoughts (internal verbalisations) one is still experiencing physical reality. It just so happens that the part of physical reality being experienced doesn't correspond to any reality outside of the organism itself. The empirical method (measurement) doesn't need to be conducted by a sentient being (one could imagine an intelligent non-sentient machine deriving many truths about the world using the method and then stating its conclusions in a text box). This is the advantage of the method; it is entirely objective (based on its assumptions). One could argue that the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM suggests that measurement might require a sentient being however (many have). Taking its proposition of denying local realism, and then making the additional assumption that the wave function collapse occurring during measurement is caused by sentient observation. (Note this has got nothing to do with 'the observer effect'; the physical consequences of measurement on a system). Many however suggest that the wavefunction collapse during measurement is not a product of sentient observation, and suggest various alternate conditions for its collapse (for example decoherence and a spontaneous "minicollapse"). Likewise, even if sentient observation were required for measurement (and the outcome of reality itself/the collapse of the probabilistic wavefunction into a definite solution), it would be difficult to argue physicalism (given the primacy of mental reality; something akin to simulation theory). It does however solve the redundancy problem. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_locality#Copenhagen_interpretation

Hi Kikker; Mental properties are a sentient being's internal experience of objective/physical reality (this 'stream of consciousness' will include things like the smell of a particular flower or the colour of a particular region of one's field of view). Our own mental properties by definition can be observed (sensed/felt) by us, but; 1. We have no direct access to another being/machine's mental properties (and we only have indirect access if we make some philosophical assumption about their correspondence to observables; eg physicalism). 2. Mental properties cannot be measured (empirical observation). One cannot measure or confirm the existence of one's own or another's internal experience using the empirical method. In regard to Andi's analogy, (under physicalism) our brain will encode some representation (through its neural networks) for this colour or smell, and this can be measured.

Hi Goldenages, It is important to note that mental properties are not the same as physical (empirical) consciousness. Imagine a computer with a model of self (physical consciousness). It acts like an intelligent conscious being and its CPU (brain) and speaker (mouth) inform us that it is self-aware. We can measure this model of self and how it has been encoded in the computer ("I", "HAL", etc). Yet we have a choice (or must come to some philosophical conclusion as to) whether to believe that this model of self corresponds (maps) to an internal reality, or, conversely, whether it is merely a software program telling us what it has been programmed to tell us. In the case of mammalian/human evolution, I think it is very likely that physical consciousness evolved for the purpose of enhancing the species' survival (ie it is adaptive, as opposed to being a byproduct, as referenced by ofd); but this says nothing of the reality of internal existence. Mental properties are functionally and therefore evolutionarily irrelevant from a physicalist perspective. The central nervous system of homo sapiens is declared to operate according to the laws of physics, and such laws only reference physical (eg neuronal) properties. A substance dualist could argue that mental substances (and their properties) serve some biological function, but Cartesian dualism has many problems not worth examining here (eg interactionism). Cheers, Richard

1. We can't measure sensation (mental properties themselves). We can only measure a) the neural correlates of what we presume to be sensation or b) self-report of sensation. Our inference of sensation/sentience is based on the logical extension of our personal belief/experience of sensation to like organisms, machines, etc. but there is nothing in the known laws of the universe which define their nature/qualia (eg the redness of red) or when they emerge. I think we need to clarify this concept of "empiricism" to the audience (which is really the combination of the epistemological primacy of sense data and non-reductive physicalism). There is nothing faulty/incoherent with non-reductive physicalism, however it is critical to distinguish such from the concept of empirical observation (measurement). 2. This distinction prevents us falling prey to the kind of positivism which purports that everything accessible to us is accessible also to the empirical method. Physical is by definition (in physics) what is empirically measurable, and there is therefore a significant proportion of known (inferred) reality which is formally non-physical. Under the philosophy of "physicalism" however (which is somewhat of a misnomer according to the definition of physical), we assert that all of our experiential reality (mental properties) are mapped to physical reality (observables). There cannot be any phenomenological experience which is not grounded in nature. 3. Furthermore, this distinction prevents us from automatically assuming that materialism (non-reductive physicalism) is a satisfactory ateleological philosophy of mind. Under naturalism, a physical system evolves perfectly according to the laws of nature. Therefore, ostensibly emergent mental properties are redundant (see Jaegwon Kim on non-reductive physicalism; in particular his thesis on overdetermination). The organism (including its central nervous system) functions perfectly according to the laws of physics (be they deterministic or indeterministic) without any unnecessary strong emergent phenomenon. Strong emergent properties are qualitatively distinct from physical emergent properties (like crystals) in that they cannot be empirically observed. Joseph Tagger: Can you prove you're self-aware? Will Caster: That's a difficult question, Dr. Tagger. Can you prove that you are? (Transcendence, 2014). The apparently arbitrary assignment and nature of mental properties (evolutionarily irrelevant existence; our brain functions and evolves perfectly fine without them) leads most contemporary/secular philosophers of mind to argue either a) eliminativism, b) 'informationism', c) panpsychism, or d) simulation. a) Eliminativism: that mental properties (or their perception of physical non-reducibility) are an illusion. Yet assuming that we take both our internal sentience (existence/experience) and our extrapolation of this sentience to like organisms as true (although such cannot be empirically verified), what is its basis: why does it exist? Informationism, panpsychism and simulation attempt to explain why some systems (peculiar subsets of the universe in space-time; eg human CNS, Pentium III, etc) have this apparently emergent phenomenon. b) 'Informationism': That mental properties are the natural product of complex arrangements of matter/energy above a given threshold of complexity (sentience is just as if not more fundamental than observables; in that the universal system "knows they are coming"). Informationism assumes that mind is the inevitable outcome of the arrangement of matter/energy in sufficiently complex states. Such however requires nature to be geared towards the creation of sentience, and is as such not indistinguishable from pantheism. c) Panpsychism: That all physical entities have (the capacity for) associated mental properties. There is no distinction between physical and mental substances, though unlike physicalism the material does not take precedence over the mental. Panpsychism asserts that consciousness is an inherent property of all particles (energy/matter) in the universe. Panpsychist models are however not without their own limitations. Apart from their animistic inelegance (hypothesising sentient rocks for instance), nothing in the laws of nature define which systems (collections of particles in space-time) should combine to form complex indivisible centres of consciousness like you or me (the Combination Problem). d) Simulation: That the material world as experienced by us is not the underlying construct of mental existence but merely the designated method for generating its experience. Simulation (like substance/Cartesian dualism) pushes back the problem of the underlying construct/laws of mind to another universe. This philosophy of mind has elements of theism (alien gods). 3. There is also another critical although somewhat unrelated limitation in the positivist analysis. Although one can observe a consistency between nature (regulated behaviour or causality) and logic, one cannot use nature to formally derive logic. This is a circular reasoning fallacy. One must assume reason as an axiom in order to make/process our empirical observations (follow the empirical method). For this reason logic (like mathematics) is declared to comprise non-physical abstract objects.