RestoringGuy

The main argument in favor of property is that a thief wants to keep whatever they have stolen, so by keeping goods and not allowing their victim to keep goods, it's a performative contradiction. It's "K and not K", so property cannot be denied. This idea could be called reciprocation, because to be consistent you have to respect property rights in order to possess them. But death erases the ability to want or respect anything. Whatever wishes I have before death, well they're gone, along with every other trait my consciousness exhibits. So the logical argument for property no longer holds.This is one sore spot anarchocapitalists keep secret, knowing that their stance is flawed. There's nothing that legitimizes inheritance, at least not in any logically proven way. You say the contract is executed, but between whom? How do you prove it legit? To prove a contract is executed, like proof in the sciences, requires some ability to review and reproduce results. Not just compare notes. Since the writer of the will does not exist, you can only compare artifact with artifact. You can never examine the mind of the dead owner, whose ability to own I am saying either does not exist, or at a minimum cannot be confirmed by the logic of reciprocation that makes property possible in the first place.Some of your points misrepresent what I say. We are not adversaries, and I do not dispute the useful importance of inheritance. I only mean to say it evades the notion of objective ethics. Like good manners, it's a cultural choice and an agreement between surviving parties and nothing more. The DRO idea may carry it out, but there's no ethical requirement for competing and disagreeing parties to do so.

Why? I never conceded such a transfer was possible. I explained why it's impossible, being an act of religious faith that makes consciousness of dead people somehow real. Even if it's possible, it does not prove it happens by way of contract. The burden of proof is on whoever says the contract is good, because it is the contract that makes new distinctions of what obligations exist.

Sure there seem like good reasons why a store would want to do business that way, just as there are added services I'd want to tack on for them (free delivery, installation, disposal of packaging, etc).. But why does their way get to be assumed, but customer requirements have to be explained and pre-approved before they have weight? Sometimes they spell it out (some assembly required) but most of the time they have no further obligation to help you. Fair enough, but you shouldn't somehow have obligation to help them.There are times I paid for something, and they give me a ticket and I have to drive around back and wait a half hour. No warning, I must jump though hoops and my property is hostage until I do so. Or maybe I get charged wrongly, or charged twice. Or countless other fraudulent tactics I have witnessed. I have to raise a fuss to even slightly influence how things go, but their influence is not always constrained in the same way. Sure sometimes it is constrained, like at a restaurant you can refuse to pay until they make things right.My question is, if I just drop money on the table and leave, am I doing the transaction unethically? Not whether it's good for them. Their inventory system is precisely not my concern, just as my unspoken wishes are not their concern. Often there is no explicit request on their part, you are supposed to assume you are a slave to their inventory and loyalty system. I take free market to mean they do not get implied privileges over the customer. All parties are equal. Both sides can equally refuse to comply with requirements of the other. If one side is allowed to make sneaky assumptions, the other can also make sneaky assumptions. If it stays asymmetric, it seems like statism by a different name.

I agree with that totally. Why do you seem to assume one cause must have only one possible effect? I think every effect has a cause, and every cause has an effect, but they are not one-to-one in some time-reversible world where eggs can unbreak and gravity flows backwards if only we could reverse all the vectors. The concern is how these causes and effects are mapped to one another. In quantum mechanics, you can have a single causal state in a superposition that results in two different exclusive effects, let's say A or B. The universe so far seems to allow this. Sure some people will say that's not good enough. If A and B are both allowed, that is still somehow not sufficient for free will. It's just random noise and consciousness is magically something else? Well my point of view is that there are two ways to misunderstand consciousness: (1) complexity and chaos are at work, but in some deterministic way, and (2) randomness is at work, but in some stupid and meaningless way. However, I think maybe you cannot randomly generate consciousness using independent events, but once those events are causally connected (probability of one thing will skew the probability of another, and create joint probability densities), it does not seem like that limitation exists. If molecules are shaped just right so that consciousness happens, it does not mean the brain is pre-destined to think some particular thing. But it can mean there's an assortment of possible thoughts that are accessible, and I will think some of them. A clone with an identical brain will have different thoughts than I will, but still limited to the assortment that is available. In this regard, free will is not totally unrestricted. You can only do what the brain is atomically capable of, just as rats probably cannot do calculus, but identical rats might run through a maze in different ways. I'm not sure how this line of thinking would seem disturbing to anybody, it treats brains and atoms in essentially the same fashion, but also leaves room for free will where our thoughts simply cannot be predicted nor do they carry any status of absolute certainty before they happen. Choice is limited, but still available.

Thank you for explaining. You could have a one billion dollar coin made of californium. I can explain why I think it is logically sound that contracts are invalidated upon death. DRO, contracts, etc. act only as a proxy for physical being, to act as a stand in for vocalizing "I want this" while not presently holding an item. Absent an immortal soul, my death brings an end not just to my body, but to me as an identity. I'd be no more conscious than somebody else's multiple personality, perhaps even less so. I could be just a pile of compost. My heir cannot say they have contract with me, because I have no existence. If you want, you could say the contract has some existence of its own, and the reader is allowed act as if dead people exist as owners, but it is fictionalizing in the sense that anybody could write an alternative contract. At that point we don't care about who is the author in terms of mental presence, it is all about what cultural choices of what pieces of paper you or I prefer.If you and Steve have a contract that executes upon your death, or 1 millisecond later, who is the contract between exactly? You don't exist. I get the idea that you are saying the property transfers right at that instant of death. Maybe you execute it 1 ms before death to play it safe. So who gets to be judge of when it was executed? The dead guy and Steve cannot agree on this. Afterwards, it is only paper just as any contract is. But now the paper does not match up with anybody's intent. Now if the parties of a contract were still alive, you could ask them "where did this paper come from and how did it end up having your signature?" It is legitimized by mutual consent, and your future credit rating, etc. all hinges on parties keeping their word. But in the case of the dead there can be no consent. Wills, like works of fiction, are artifacts with no proof they match up with anything real. So in the case where I found out your widget-mobile is serialized and registered, you're right I might have an obligation to give it up to Steve, but only if both our DRO's mutually agree to the same paradigm of inheritance. But if they do not, and I continue to keep it, I am just saying it's ethical to do so. In fact, if Steve tries to steal the item from me, with dead person's contract in hand, it is unethical (unless I am dead also). Please note that the dead person has no DRO. They are toast, so it as fictional as earth itself being a member of the DRO.The main point I make is property only exists by way of mental efforts, the contract only tries to copy our mental state, it has no life of its own, and unconscious people do not trade goods but they can only assert their rights when (and if) they wake up. If a finder has to call up the DRO, wait for paperwork to filter through, etc., that's definitely a state because you cannot opt-out. Otherwise you would be free to establish a DRO exclusively for the living, because living people are the only people who can reciprocate. The principles inside the foundation of anarchocapitalism seem based on reciprocation ("It's wrong to steal because you want to keep the loot, so it's self-contradicting"). Death seems to render those principles partly invalid. You can't want to keep stuff after death, you can't want anything, right?And if we go out on a limb and suggest some contracts are better than others, because they are signed by somebody who used to be alive, we now at least have to admit to forcing others to accept absolute and arbitrary cultural constructs. It's not a purely principled approach, but an illusion of principle I think we would be saying an eternal soul is present and, by not accepting a will, our memory of that eternal soul is being violated somehow. There can be no theft of an unowned item. An item ceases to be property upon death, because consciousness is what makes disputes over ownership possible.

I have thought a lot about this kind of idea. But I realize now the inheritor must initiate force against whoever finds the body. Let's say I die with 1 billion bucks in my pocket, and you find my dead body. By my atheistic way of thinking, my consciousness and any rights or contracts that emerge from it are gone. You find the money abandoned. So now my heirs must initiate force against you to retrieve the money. They may have my will in hand, but you didn't sign it, so you are not bound by it. The collectivists resort to many things, like circular logic and various unprincipled tactics, but they are more reasonable with seeing the errors of inheritance. So far I have not found any anarchocapitalists who can explain inheritance, what principle it comes from exactly. It is easy to assume that inhertance is legitimized by wills and family relations. I do not believe God exists, therefore God cannot give us some eternal identities that allow our wills and inheritance itself to magically spill over into our non-living property after the owner's death. Despite rigor in the living realm, anarchocapitalists lack an answer why inheritance is right. The argument is stonewalled and inheritance is just recycled, much as theists recycle the absolute existence of God.

if a shopkeeper has stepped away to use the toilet, and meanwhile you enter and make purchase by leaving correct money on the counter, is it theft? Consider another thought experiment. If you are in a store with a long checkout line, walk to the service desk, leave money on the counter, photograph it and walk out, do you not have adequate legal proof that payment was made? It may seem rude, but what is unethical and/or illegal about it? The price sticker says x dollars, it does not say paid also by waiting in line. By creating an implication that you must wait in line, I am seeing this as a statist-style demand, rather than a simple exchange of value in the free market. I say this because those conditions are never negotiated or agreed upon like prices can be. I am skeptical whether contracts are "implied" in shopping, but even if they are, the sale is nothing but trade between goods and money. It seems like only cultural baggage that decides what is the polite way for money and goods to be exchanged. Certainly both parties can totally opt-out of doing business with one another. But once they choose to engage, there can emerge a condition where one party must be polite "by implication" according to the other's cutural standard, but the other has to verbally negotiate for the same unspoken consideration. It seems to be a totally asymmetric relationship dictated by the state. It should not matter who owns the store. Whether you are in a store, the salesman is in your house, or both are on a neutral place like a sidewalk. I claim one exclusive side of the exchange should not be ethically allowed to assume a bunch of unnegotiated things.

That does not seem right. Physics and the facts discovered about the universe seem to point in the opposite direction. The uncertainty principle guarantees that all things are random. It is only through frequent observation and unique constraints on various particles (spin, charge, etc.) that the random distributions die down just enough that some variables appear determined. More specifically, the wavefunctions interact and you can say their interaction is determined, but they still do not collapse to a singular precise state. The free will advocate's main error is they believe the human mind is special, unique, or priviliged in some yet-to-be-identified qualitative way. Their error does not seem related to correctly ruling out determinism. I am aware some determinists will allow for this and suggest subatomic behavior is random and causal, yet determinism survives as a valid idea. OK, that is fine, but I try to avoid that definition because, by that standard, it is all to easy to think of determinism (in the QM sense) and causality as identical things.

I suppose I would support anarchocapiltalism, with the proviso that inheritance and things like IP and land ownership (an abstract boundary) rely on a religious argument that the owner somehow morally holds on to what they do not physically hold, as if their spirit remains with the goods. In that regard some weak form of collectivism, mixed with individual contracts, I think has a better argument. In any case, not of this matters if computer technology is controlled by a helix of corporations. Politics is only wasted time because whatever better alternative can be squashed.

There is some notion of fraud inside software. Consumer buys with the understanding that they can switch vendors, like switching from Coke to Pepsi. After your files are saved in MS formats, your assets are almost frozen. Imagine if Coca-cola could own or control your body after you drink it, or hold your assets hostage somehow. They can also force updates, steal bandwidth with unwanted background processes, and lock your PC into Windows using UEFI. If there is fraud in software, I question whether the money was justly obtained.

I donate to HFA for that reason, because much farm abuse is often intentional and there is censorship in that arena (not just state inaction). But this is all superceded by the presence of malice. Most of your examples are side effects, not deliberately intended end results. Polluters do not make their goal to pollute, it is an unwanted side effect which all we can say is they do not try hard enough to avoid. Philosophically, yes this is an area where capitalism and morality collide. But I insist that does not matter. Not right now. The state and its apologists engage in malice, attempting to murder and mutilate intentionally. So it is like the chicken and the egg. In the statist realm you can either (1) promote brutality on a widespread institutional scale so that a perceived greater evil is better recognized, essentially an authoritarian approach, or (2) create a mental blind spot against immense and avoidable evil, giving illusion of purity by focusing on all evil outside that blind spot, essentially a dishonest touchy-feely approach that backfires horribly. You could also take a mixed (centrist) approach, blocking out and censoring some evils, while trying to painfully draw attention to others. In any case it's a mixture of bad and worse and we wind up with a status quo.

It seems easy to abolish inheritance by logic if you believe the following. 1. When a will is executed, the writer of the will is dead. 2. Dead people have sentience equal to a rock. 3. Sentience is a primary factor in deciding property rights. Therefore, a dead person's ability to control property is equal to that of a rock. The only other way to dodge this conclusion is to hang on to a religious idea that something of them "lives on". It is not that inheritance is wrong. But an heir's morality seems equal to anybody else. Another alternative to inheritance is mutual agreement of all competing parties to share the loot. But ordinary inheritance simply has no moral basis.

I think that is an excellent explanation. There is constant struggle with deciding what is government/coercion, and what is free market. People can say words have meaning so this is free and that is not, so somebody might say "I can prove you wrong" etc. Sure I guess. But meanings are vaguely chosen and in constant flux even after they are applied to words. I can only communicate with somebody if I adopt their meanings and ways of thinking, at least partially.The examples you give are not examples I think are perhaps the highest priority, and you're right the free market would not fix them. But it seems likely to reduce them compared to the status quo, or as you said slightly better. I do not think Libertarian is a contradiction, but it could be strategically misguided. To me, whether state-of-last-resort is necessary in a few cases does not seem to be the main problem.Because of the perceived importance of talking about government or force, it is with some reluctance that I suggest software and computer systems are where the effort should be spent. Computers grow more centrally controlled (UEFI, corporate app stores, automated updates) and the very means we have to communicate distaste for corruption can be blocked and eclipsed by state/corporate media. Those with power have the kill switch, and they can use it whenever they might politically start to lose. I think libertarian competitiveness should be focused purely on tech, and not politics, because the tools of politics are now essentially technological and there is no other way to succeed.

It's a slight overstatement. Mathematicians often make leaps when it comes to foundational axioms. Maybe most math (basic linear algebra or finite combinatorics) has no confirmation bias, but I think there is some conflict and personal grudges with regard to axiom of choice, non-well-foundedness, continuum hypothesis, computability, law of the excluded middle, etc.

It's a problem in state-less society too. As an anarchist, I am appalled at the blind acceptance of estates and wills being binding on all non-agreeing parties. In anarchist society, if you go by any of these principles (self-ownership, etc.), nothing should exist after death. Estates and wills can only be agreements between the remaining non-dead people, if they are legitimate contracts. But most people did not agree, so they are technically free to claim whatever land and stuff belongs to the dead. It would seem to me, if one recognizes the state control as wrongful way for people to think, then the state-less executors of wills and estates are similarly equipped with erroneous thinking unless absolutely everybody has signed up, some even signing before their birth. Property, no matter its origin, would otherwise have to return to being in a state of nature, free for anybody to claim or "homestead". The "different spots" appear because people die.

That's true for socks, because socks are big and heavy enough that there is no uncertainty (other than mental uncertainty). What I'm talking about is if both sender and receiver are unaware of the ultimate message and physically it is uncertain. If FriendlyHacker could put on socks with eyes closed, all while totally isolating the socks and the message being sent from the surrounding environment (a practical impossibility), then suppose both sender and receiver could discover the sock information one year later. At that point you do not know what color the socks were one year ago. In a sense, that information did not exist one year ago. The socks themselves may indeed be year-old, but the resulting information about them is only generated in the present day. For practical purposes, this does not work with socks, but subatomic particles. FriendlyHacker, of course it's useful for computing, just as random numbers are useful. But I would argue it's not useful for boosting communication speeds in a physical sense because the sender has no control over the message. Once the sender exerts control over the message, it cannot be conveyed faster than light. I say this because once the selected message is sent faster than light, the carrier wavefunctions are totally free to deviate from the sender's selection process. Sender and receiver can sync up faster than light, relaying information in a sense. That is useful for certain computations (such as quantum computing), but it seems that practical communication is not one of those actions.

You're right, although I like to dive into what it means to convey information. I think one could say information is conveyed faster than light, if one gives up on the option to control or choose exactly what the information contains. Once I filter all possible bits information into a message of my choosing, forcing it to be a specific message (maybe that is what you say information is, something the sender is selecting), now all the carriers of that message are lightspeed or slower. But there is a loose sense that information is conveyed, not always when the sender selects it, but when the receiver discovers what it is. Suppose you send a math puzzle that takes minimum 2 weeks to solve (to suspend the "human brain" reasons why this is implausible, let it be a mechanically-solved puzzle), and it is started on by two people 1 lightyear apart. At completion, we probably would not say the correct solution was instantly conveyed 1 lightyear at the moment it's solved, despite both people in sync to the same information at nearly the same moment. But that is only because the solution was, in a sense, selected at the time the puzzle was sent. Now if the puzzle is not pre-selected, but built by entanglement and worked on after it's received by both people, there are now two transit times: the time for the puzzle to be sent (1 year) and collapsed into a specific puzzle, and the time for the solution to be derived (2 weeks). I am wondering at what point is the information, in this case the puzzle's solution, considered conveyed? FriendlyHacker, as for having a million bucks, if there is non-locality there is time travel and you can get the money playing the lotto.

It's an interesting question though. I think what is intended is "at what speed does information travel while preserving causality?". Say I have a red and green marble in can, and draw one without looking, carry it to Mars and then inspect it. If it's green, I discover instantaneous information about what's back on Earth (a red marble). Of course this was decided before I left -- but it did not need to be, they could have been entangled and decided while I am on Mars by shielding the marble wavefunctions just so. Then the collapse happens faster than light, yet it is worthless for communication because there is no causality one can leverage. That is why I think wormholes, warp drive, and that crap can never work, because (intuitively) being on the initiating side of the transit point seems to imply causality stays intact.

Rationality and consciousness alone seems like a tough sell. Ability to become rational/conscious later on is probably the hidden value everyone intends to say. If I am unconscious but alive, and guaranteed never to have potential to wake up (in a permanent brain-dead coma), it does not seem bad if I am murdered. But if I am expected to wake up later, there's that projection or estimation of future events that seems to trump the value of consciousness in the present. I think that's why animals are a gray area, because how do you know what realizations or mental calculations they make? Probably it is less than human, but it is more than unconscious human. Unless it's a really lucid dream, I doubt anybody understands the NAP while taking a nap.

Sorry for my vocabulary. I differentiate between "existent" and "present". That which is present requires stricter proof, it can be demonstrated by observable proof. That which exists, a proof can be postponed or called up from historical record, allowing for truth of existence to be ongoing. The point I make is that there is something the conscious person does, or is projected to do, which gives us reason to believe their unconscious body has rights (the rights can be said to exist even while not present, in my terminology). This is like believing sunlight exists, as valid energy with knowable and persistent properties, even at midnight while sunlight cannot be witnessed personally.Although rights can not be immediately proven, I do not claim you can murder a child. It would seem one has to admit that sufficiently incapacitated people and inanimate objects or animals, etc., possess the same lack of whatever-it-is that you recognize as proof a person has rights under NAP. Once that is admitted, to enable the rights to exist, or be recognized as true, or however you want to say it, requires inventing or discovering the mechanism I describe. By natural basis, I mean to say that I believe that mechanism is a discovered thing, established by data in nature that can be reproduced, as oppose to a contract that can be written up however one pleases. I described earlier, for initiation, misery, and final result, that the weights I give are like 3,2,1 (probably that is not as steep as I would like, but let's go with it). So if act of kindness has negative consequences, and those negative consequences are over 3 times worse than the initiation of kindness (and suppose there is no intervening misery, so the coefficient 2 is moot), then yes it's all evil.Counterforce makes no sense with pure NAP. That has always been my grievance with it, because absent any consideration of final results, one falls into the time paradox I describe above (how does a present owner prove they are the rightful owner). Yet with a descending scale (321 as an example), one can include the value of the sleeping owner as a milder basis of their end result, yet it does not automatically justify initiating force as a flat sum model would.

Property rights and consent only seem to matter to the degree that there is rationality, because we don't grant them to inanimate objects. In most of the discussions here, rights/consent are mainly said to exist as a result of consciousness and/or rationality. An unconscious person can neither approve nor disapprove of anything in a literal sense. With the unconscious, you are interfering with nothing that can be proven to exist in a strict sense of interference. So for unconscious people, having no rational behavior as proof of their rights, we must rely on an alternate mechanism (such as asking what we think they might desire) as a stand-in for genuine rights and consent. Now some have argued these are contractual inventions, rather than innate and natural mechanisms. I do not agree, and adhere to a natural basis which does not shift and evaporate with all the contractual nonsense. But then, by accepting a natural basis, it seems I also have to give some property rights and consent value to animals, future generations of people, their ability to solve these problems better than we can, etc.. All these distant things have no apparent rationality in the here-and-now, but seem to have outward impact just as an unconscious person will later judge our present actions in the context of their property. The unconscious person's rights exist outside rational presence (it is a temporary absence of rationality), and whatever reasoning we use to explain their rights based solely on past/future rationality, that reasoning should be consistent, right? For sum total, yes I think NAP breach can be superceded by positive downstream effects. But the positive effect I think should need to be vastly larger and more than fully compensate the person breached by a generous factor. Saving people from a fire, etc. things of that nature come to mind, but spanking does not. Maybe if spanking would save their life, but that seems almost impossible to imagine such a scenario. Say a child is in evil scientist's chamber with a cylinder of nerve gas on a timer, and the only thing that disables the gas timer is spanking. I guess that's it.

The regenerated tissues are certainly not numb. A main upshot is dekeratinization of the glans. Many nerve fibres are simply concealed under keratin layers. There is the added bonus of not requiring artificial lubricants for comfortable vaginal intercourse. Intercourse can be prolonged with moistness held in place. This is the gliding effect, as opposed to the lubricant-required dry scraping feeling which comes from a tight-cut.

I know they are differentiators, but you can always find a scenario where they do not matter, using it as a thought experiment. Property and consent are irrelevant if a person is unconscious, has stated no prior wishes, and your ability to save them from death does not demand shoving them or their property around in any way. I suppose it is questionable how prior wishes even exist, given that people change their mind and unconsciousness prevents any sort of test whether that has happened. I think Ax+By+Cz still follows NAP strictly by allowing some of them to be zero, but I believe that doing so produces contradictions. NAP as a principle can never work in an absolute sense without sum totals, because effects themselves are totals. You affect an owner's property a microscopic amount by breathing nearby, so we are really talking about significant aggregate actions, and it is best-guess how far you can connect the dots. Now I am totally against taking the sum uniformly, as you seem to be against, but I can say NAP applies (just as natural selection applies to species). It applies in a strong sense but not absolutely. The main reason I argue for coefficient C being a (small) nonzero number is this: If you include the downstream effects during creation of life, there is also downstream secondary effects and so on, and NAP does not rule out such secondary effects. In fact, how does it distinguish between primary and secondary effects, because even bullet impact is like a secondary effect? So if there is a book written, or bridge being built/maintained, etc, then these secondary things will not exist without life, and there is impact to property however indirect. So like if Einstein's parents were like "let's not violate NAP by creating life", then for a few more years people would have continued to incorrectly understand space and gravity. I do not see this like spanking, where there is simply no real tangible upshot. Even if spanking had upshot, I think coefficient C (relative to A) can never legitimately be large enough to make it right.

Yes there are those differences, but I mean to put them aside for argument sake. Imagine if there is an unconscious person inside a burning building, a person floating face down in a lake, or lying on a railroad track, etc. Do you automatically violate NAP by rescuing them, either conveying them from the danger (or calling for others to act), knowing everything that subsequently follows will include bad stuff in their newly-extended lifespan? Philosophically, I do not think the approach has to be "or", it can be "and" and consider totals and initiation all at once. I am thinking like this: if x is how much violence is directly initiated (by way of property, consent,etc. as you mention), y is the intervening violence without regard for initial cause or final effect, and z is the resulting long-term life condition, then you can take how wrong (call it W) something is by a linear combination W=Ax+By+Cz, where A, B, and C are coefficients that are how much you weigh each issue. A person that only considers initial events (a NAP purist) would say ABC is 100, each digit representing a weight. If a person says "the end justifies the means", that's ABC=001, because initiation violence and momentary suffering don't matter. Nihilism is 000, and so on. I agree that B should be nonzero, but I think C is nonzero, so that shorter lifespan is worse than longer lifespan by some measure anyway. It should count for something. In terms of these ratios, I am probably ABC=321. This is how I think creation of life is not always the greater wrong, while at the same time the sum total can't uniformly steamroll over ideas such as NAP..

It seems you have to allow people to opt out of a contract they previously were bound by, and I think the same holds for DRM. I say this because the conditions that convince a person that the contract is a good idea are superceded whenever hidden consequences are revealed. There is simply no way to read all the fine print, and grasp all that might result, just as there is no way to guarantee divorce is unwarranted for all possible conditions. I think there is an onslaught of misrepresentation, as well as introduction of errors and software bugs both deliberate and sloppy. The retailers have made it clear, no returns on that kind of merchandise, no matter how many lies were told to market it. I do not favor a free-for-all, my third paradigm is a system of "DRM" except by neutral party, that enables the consumer to enforce grievance with an equal morality as the product creator. If a creator demands non-refundable payment or sneaky EULA, wants to be unaccountable for their lies, and enforce it all with DRM, then I think a consumer should be able to react. Once the relationship is symmetric, I think inflexible DRM would be seen as bad for both sides.