TheRobin

I can't tell you Stefs reply, but meanwhile here's how I would look at that argument.First, the most annoying thing about it is that it's actually true (unless you're somehow unable to move physically). It's also completely irrelevant though. The question isn't whether you can leave, but whether the claim of the group who claims ownership of all the land in a large area is legitimate (or true, or correct). Because if it isn't then it doesn't matter that you could leave to make a case against the violence used against you for residing in that area and doing whatever it is that you do that doesn't harm others.The "you can always leave" only works if the area you leave actually belongs to someone (like in, if you're in my appartment and you don't like the rules you can always leave my appartment), but simply claiming ownership by writing "I own the land" on a piece of paper isn't a valid way to actually own anything. And if I don't own anything I can't rightfully impose my whims/rules/laws upon others.

Using your definition ("Determinism is a metaphysical philosophical position stating that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given those conditions, nothing else could happen.") here's why I don't see how it could be proven. It's the "nothing else COULD happen"-part. You can't run an experiment on what could've happened (or you can't turn back time to prove or disprove that). So by definition there can't ever be a proof or disproof for that hypothesis. So we have a theory about reality that can't be verified ever. Essentially identical and practically similar to the "reality is all a dream" or "brain in a jar"-theories, which also can't be proven and serve equally no purpose. And I'd also had to "concede" that these theories are possible (including with literally every other theory that is hypothetically possible but can't be proven). Which is why whenever someone advances a theory that is counterintutive that he or she's the one who has to present the evidence for it. Usually disagreements are solved by evidence (i.e. reality), but since this isn't possible here, there can't be a solving of disagreements basically. So, what is the point in advancing such a theory? I don't think it's the "changing people's minds"-part that's the problem it's more the why bother, if it's already determined? The only answer determinism can give is: I can't chose to act differently because it's all determined. Which is just another why of saying that one can't and shouldn't be blamed for his or her actions, because they don't have the power to change them. But if that's the basis of the interaction then it's equally true for whoever's mind you want to change with the interaction, so you shouldn't expect other people to change their behaviour either.

generally, whenever someone uses the concept of "infity" it stops being an explanation of how things work in reality and becomes a meaningless myth."infinite" is not a description of anything that can ever be measured or understood or experienced, so it can't be an explanation for anything.Try doing some math and joxtapose a variety of probabilities that all use an infinite somewhere and you see what I mean, I guess

I'm a bit curious what exactly you find intersting about this debate.Correct me if I'm wrong, but Determinism (the theory that people couldn't have made a different choice) is by definition not verifyfialbe or falsifiable, so it's not possible to ever prove or disprove it, making it in essence no different from any other myth that people want to believe in despite evidence.And in the absence of even the possibility of verification, I find it hard to see what is so intersting about debating it. We might as well debate the lore of Lord of the Rings, if you know what I mean.Which is also why the question of motivation comes up and why the psycholgical or emotional question is probably the most relevant one if you want to get anywhere with the question of why you (or people in general) tend towards determinism.I hope that makes some sense

I'm not sure which argument you mean here. From what I get from your post, you've just proven that being able to drive an 18 wheeler (or having a certain professional qualification) logically can't be the definition fo "good".

Thanks for the suggestion. Spoiler alert: I found the ending complete BS though. it's not even an "open ending" it's just placing an arbitrary contradiction on top of the movie for no reason whatsoever. Imo that's just bad writing. I didn't find it too thrilling a movie though. Not bad and certainly better than what usually runs in theaters (or what did run in theaters last time I actually checked, which is over a year ago anyway), but I found its kind of the usualy arbitrary divide of reason and emotion mixed with lack of communication skills and partial dishonesty and emotional unavailability of the protagonists, so I didn't really get much out of it. What about the movie did you find particularly intersting or exciting? Btw, if you like this one, do you know the movie "Safety not garantueed" and "The Man from Earth"? If not I have a feeling you might enjoy those as well.

I didn't want to imply that things are random because of that.But certain system can become impossible to predict if the accuracy required for an actual prediction is higher than what can be obtained. And accuracy is also limited to a certain degree (see Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle for that). So it's not that it could be predicted, but we don't have the technology, but that it will never be able to be predicted as a result of how matter behaves. Or at least that's my understanding of it.

Without going into the free will debate, I just want to point out that, just because something has rules according to which it works doesn't mean it's necessarily predictable. Because the relation among individual parts may be so that a slight change in one can have exponential change in the whole, thus making predictions impossible or extremely limited. A good example would be the weather. You might want to see the so called Butterfly Effect or Chaostheory (or Systemtheory in general) for more thorough explanations, if that interests you.

An emergent property isn't independent like it exists without it's component pieces, but it is absolutely independent in quality. I don't understand what you mean with "independant" then. Independant of what? Not quite, I think. To say a thing as a whole is necessarily the same way as all of its individual pieces is a fallacy. But things are what they are because of its components and their resepctive interactions, aren't they? It is also fallacious to claim that a property (if it is to be stable) can negate the properties of the parts out of which it emerged in the first place, I think. Else it would be eating its own tail and will destroy itself. (There are some cool chemical reactions that actually do that, constantly switching from one property to another for quite some time ) A good example would be the state, which emerges out of a society, which can only be formed if people acept the NAP. But since the state violates the NAP this is leading to the downfall of society and consequently of the state. hmm, though I guess "stable" is also relative to the timeframe with which one wants to measure a system and its dynamic. btw, just so there's no misunderstanding, I'm not really arguing for or against anything here, I just wanted to insert a correction in regards to the emergent properties thing (which I think is in and of itself an important thing to get a good grasp on). In regards to the topic at hand though, see my other post/question in the other thread, if you want to help me understand the debate. I'd appreciate it.

An emergent property isn't independant of whatever came before it, but a result of the interactions of the single parts that make up the new whole thing. An example would be a crystal-molecule is an emergence of all the single atoms that go into it and has different properties than each individual atom. But the property of the crystal molecule are the direct result of the properties of the individual atoms none the less.Or to quote from the wiki for a more general exlanation: "An emergent behavior or emergent property can appear when a number of simple entities (agents) operate in an environment, forming more complex behaviors as a collective. If emergence happens over disparate size scales, then the reason is usually a causal relation across different scales. In other words there is often a form of top-down feedback in systems with emergent properties.The processes from which emergent properties result may occur in either the observed or observing system, and can commonly be identified by their patterns of accumulating change, most generally called 'growth'. Why emergent behaviours occur include: intricate causal relations across different scales and feedback, known as interconnectivity. The emergent property itself may be either very predictable or unpredictable and unprecedented, and represent a new level of the system's evolution. The complex behaviour or properties are not a property of any single such entity, nor can they easily be predicted or deduced from behaviour in the lower-level entities, and might in fact be irreducible to such behavior. The shape and behaviour of a flock of birds or school of fish are also good examples. One reason why emergent behaviour is hard to predict is that the number of interactions between components of a system increases exponentially with the number of components, thus potentially allowing for many new and subtle types of behaviour to emerge. On the other hand, merely having a large number of interactions is not enough by itself to guarantee emergent behaviour; many of the interactions may be negligible or irrelevant, or may cancel each other out. In some cases, a large number of interactions can in fact work against the emergence of interesting behaviour, by creating a lot of "noise" to drown out any emerging "signal"; the emergent behaviour may need to be temporarily isolated from other interactions before it reaches enough critical mass to be self-supporting. Thus it is not just the sheer number of connections between components which encourages emergence; it is also how these connections are organised. A hierarchical organisation is one example that can generate emergent behaviour (a bureaucracy may behave in a way quite different from that of the individual humans in that bureaucracy); but perhaps more interestingly, emergent behaviour can also arise from more decentralized organisational structures, such as a marketplace. In some cases, the system has to reach a combined threshold of diversity, organisation, and connectivity before emergent behaviour appears."

I would say rent is what you pay for space usage, so I would concentrate more on figuring out how much less you have to pay now, given that she will use part of some shared rooms, than how your roommates should split the cost.Here's a little math, that might help:you said 2 bedrooms 1 main room 1 bath and 1 "not much else" (I assume this includes a shared kitchen, if not, simply subtract that from the equation)so assuming we give "room usage points" to each room, where 100 being complete usage by you and 0 being no usage by you at all, then currently it would look like this.1 bedroom : 1001 bedroom: 01 main room: 501 bath: 501 not much else: 50making it a total of 250 for 5 rooms (out of a possible 500 points if you had the whole thing for yourself), thus since 250/500=.50 (or 50%) you currently pay 50% the rent.so with her being there that would change to1 bedroom: 1001 bedroom: 01 main room: 33(.33)1 bath: 33(.33)1 not much else: 33(.33)making it a total of 200 for you. so 200/500= .40 or 40% of space that you use now. (and not 33%), so I'd say it would be fair for you to pay accordingly and let them decide how they want to split.But regardless of all that, make sure you have an agreement beforehand of how to settle disputes that doesn't end up being a 2v1 situation. And/or sit down beforehand and come up with a lot of possible things that might occur and that would need to be adressed anyway (like who cleans what and when in regards to all the shared rooms, bathroom hygiene, kitchen usage and cleaning of pans/pots afterwards, possible noiselevel) so that you don't have to end up in a uncofortable spot after it's too late and you can't change anymore.Good luck and I hope that helps

Maybe someone of either position can explain to me this: Hypothetically: How would you differentiate between a higly complexly programmed organic humanoid robot (which presumably is still deterministic) and a equal highly complex (non-robot) human being (which presumably isn't deterministic)?Or alternatively (and in regards to the "change one's mind"-argument): How do you differentiate between someone who literally can't change his mind (due to say brainchemistery or neurological (i.e. determinstic) reasons) or someonw who doesn't want to change his mind (i.e. but still had the free will to do it regardless)? Because I just can't find a criteria that really works, and if I can't differentaite between a determinstic state and a non-deterministic one then I don't see what is really argued about to be honest.

I think there's an important distinction to be made when working with such abstractions as numbers. When you apply numbers to things (as in either an amount or a ratio) then they become description of external reality. But if you only work with them as pure abstractions you take away that part and just see how much you can derive from the definition of the axioms.In that sense numbers don't exist, just like "greenness" or "roundness" doesn't exist, unless you apply the abstraction to an actual thing and make it a property of said thing (for instance: green grass, a round table).And numbers also don't describe behaviour. Behaviour is an action and numbers don't describe actions. They can describe the ratio of comparing one action to another (like speed), but they themselves don't describe behaviour."different people (or the same people) will change their minds and we have no external testing method." This about sums up, why I don't see any reason in using the same term "verify" to describe the process of proofing (abstract) mathematics that I already use to describe the proofing of gravity. Because there we do have an external testing method and the result is not dependent on people's minds (as in people's thoughts)

My reasoning was that the "wave" interferes with the device (must, else no measurement takes place), so an equal interference must take place of the device with the "wave". But since you claim to know about the experiment, why don't you tell me how exactly the "wave" is being measured and how much force the wave exercises onto the device (and vice versa). as for math-equations: please see my other post about my issues with why they aren't "verifiable" in the same sense as claims about physical reality. (No need to repeat myself). And there's a huge difference between the question of whether we can call something "real" or whether we can verifiy it (i.e. proof somehow that it's true outside our heads) (and I asked for giving me something non-phyiscal we can verify not just naming something that we can call real but isn't physical, since that is what you're claiming).

I use the words in the sense that verification requires physical reality. But truth does not, because we all seem to accept a truth even after the verification experiment has been destroyed (otherwise how can you say that things are real once they become momentarily unobserved, you have now lost the physical link you have to them). For a thing to be "real", must it not reproducibly persist in order to demonstrate it is not simply a mental construct? That is a good way to phrase it. Conclusions are relative to the premises. But whether or not that is true is the mathematical fact that is being uncovered. If mathematics shows "A implies B", I am not saying B is inherently true or real. I am saying that the full sentence "A implies B" is true and real. No, you can't call pretty much anything "true", because the negative claim is false. If you concede that mathematics can prove "A implies B", then it is a reproducible truth and further the negation "A and not B" can never be true, it is universally falsifiable. Reality is not exclusively that which is physically tangible; one cannot touch gravity yet most people describe gravity as real. A thing can be said to be "real" so long as it's testable/provable, and whether it is made of solid matter at a given moment does not seem relevant. By checking whether something "actually matches reality", what are the things you are comparing? Your belief is compared to some observation, and to weed out errors that test must be repeatable, correct? Furthermore, whether or not that belief leads to predictable future events, that also lends credibility to that belief. Yet when we make a mathematical proof, we present a physical artifact (a "proof") that our conjecture is true, verifiable by other mathematicians. It predicts future events, because we now know which side of the fence (true/false) the conjecture must fall for all mathematicians in all of time. I think this is relevant because the claims about quantum mechanics and consciousness are plagued with strange conclusions about psychic powers, or the alternate view that somehow QM is irrelevant because our minds are thought to be deterministic pinball machines and that we cannot "know" anything unless the atoms of our brain are externally forced into doing so. By emphasizing mathematics, I am saying there is a mathematical world that is verifiable. It is testable. You can build a bunch of computers and they will all behave the same general way. We need not test every object to say gravity is real and predicts future events. But we believe a gravitational law is likely to be true on a new planet never visited. Mathematics is perhaps more real, holding everywhere. To explain how we can know about this kind of truth (rather than call math an imaginary construct), our brains require a way to discover such things (QM), and a way to subject them to physical verification (experiments with computers and various stochastic and deterministic methods). I used the word "real" a bit too loosely here, what I meant was external reality (i.e. everything that doesn't just happen in our heads as thoughts and intangible abstractions, and in regards to gravity: I'd call the movement of stuff very much tangible). The key difference being, that physical reality can't err while we can err with our thoughts, so giving both the characteristics of being equally proofable or true takes away that important difference imo. Mathematics is proofen by other people agreeing or disagreeing with what is presented. Claims about external realty are proofen if reality behaves that way. That's why I see there being two different distinct words for each and not just one for both (the word "proof" goes for both, so I don't see the need to use "verify" in the same way and ignore "validate" completely) Also when making claims about the physical world, what the claim represents actually exists. While, when making claims about abstractions, such as numbers, any such existence is absent. Numbers only start representing the phyiscal world when applied to things as either an amount or a ratio, before that they don't describe anything in existence in any way (except thoughts in our heads).

Because they work (as in function). Or sometimes they don't. That's how I can say they work (or not). Reality doesn't ever "stop working" that's why the concept of it "working" makes no sense imo. My senses are part of my body and transmit stimuli to my brain. Reality is everything that is, inculding but not limited to, my senses.

If you support such a claim obviously you know everything about ancient and modern knowledge which means that this post is not for you. It's for people who don't know everything, and are willing to explore different view points. Well, since you seem to know about it, answer me this please. Has anything ever been built using nothing but this ancient knowledge, that a) worked better in what it does than any modern thing b) couldn't have built using modern science c) without the builder using knowledge and principles from modern science. If there isn't a thing that fulfills all three points then the claim that modern knowledge > ancient knwoledge holds true. This isn't about "viewpoints" it's about what is true.

Not sure what you mean with reality then, if you define it as something that "works". The rest has nothing to do with my argument, which is that the concept of validity is missapplied when it comes to the senses because there's no standard to compare it to that wouldn't come from the same senses to begin with.

I'm not sure I understand the question in the way it's intended, but as I understand it I'd answer that I know of the senses, because they work. I know I have vision, because I experience vision. I don't understand what you mean with comparing what is sensed to the senses, could you give me a concrete example of that?

Valid compared to what? Compared to reality I guess. And how do you know of reality if not by the senses? (Cause if you answer that you know of reality via the senses, then you're effectively comparing the senses to themselves, but this would be quite an exception of how the idea of validation works and is applied compared to everywhere else where you apply the idea of validity, wouldn't it?)

Valid compared to what?

Yes, please do the "The" is mostly just there because usually my experience is that the Username "Robin" is already in use, so I didn't even try that one before signing up here. (Also it's kind of a linguistic joke in regards to how names and pronouns work in swiss german, plus that the swiss article is pronounced almost identically..basically in Switzerland one would introduce onesself in a way that has the "the" article before the name) I'm not sure what you mean with "emergence of reality" here. Could you explain what you mean with that? But to bring the circle/square example from above into it here. If the people in flatland would encounter a thing that would behave in such a way that they could best describe it as a 3d-object interacting with a 2d-plane (as in changing from square to circle), then it doesn't really matter whether that 3d-object really exists or whether the 2d-thing just happens to behave as if the 3d-thing exists, as for the people in flatland it wouldn't be falsifiable and there wouldn't be a difference for them. So basically whether in reality it is a 3d-thing or a 2d-thing is irrelevant and unknowable. (unknowable assuming there isn't any way for them to leave their 2d-plane of existence.) I'm not sure I quite understand the issue here. But if you make a model that accurately describes and predicts behaviour of things, then I don't see how it then becomes invalid to assume that deductions based on the model aren't also true. Like, if Einsteins equations proofed to be correct in all other areas, why not deduct that they lead to black holes and accept that too? Isn't that basically syllogistic reasoning in a way that, if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true? another question that bumped into my mind was that, if Harriman proposes that all theories need be based on experiment, then by what criteria does he know or decide what kind of experiments should or shouldn't be conducted? I mean wouldn't one need at least a hypothesis before making an experiment? Btw, nice music, thanks for sharing that in the other thread p.s. for future rants: could you maybe add paragraphs after you finished typing? It makes it a lot easier to read.

I don't see how the word "is" can mean more than what can be subjected to a testable description. A thing momentarily unaccompanied by a form of movement is unobservable. I thnk that is why energy of interaction is important in QM. We need movement to test theories. The objects of mathematics are verifiiable, but non-physical. You could build three computers out of silicon, spinning gears, and pure energy, and if they start out with some basic axioms, they would produce the same mathematical results. Physicality is required to do the mathematical verification, but the endurance of the (non-physical) truths they prove remains because you can isolate the machines or destroy them and later repeat the experiment. You seem to use the word "truth" and "verify" in a manner that doesn't need reality accompanying it. "verify", as I understand it, is when you check whether a claim about reality actually matches that reality. Mathematics doesn't make such claims to begin with. Math can be validated (as in checked against the premises to see if it holds logically) and can be correct or incorrect. But I don't see how truth or verification comes into play when doing math. Maybe as a better example: You can validate the conclusion of a syllogism relative to its premises, but that's not the same as saying the conclusion or its premises are true. So validation and verficiation are two different things. Or at least the way I use and understand the terms. But if verification and truth don't have anythign to do with reality, then pretty much anything could hypotheically called "true", so I don't see how it would be useful to use them that way. Hope that makes some sense. p.s. I'm not really sure how all the stuff about movement relates to the topic, or what you even really mean with it (I mean I get a vague idea, but nothing tangible), so I hope you don't mind if I just leave that out here. If you think it's relevant then please rephrase it a bit, cause as it stands now I don't see the relevance or what you even mean exactly.

first of all let him give you a methodology which he would accept.Else all solvings can be discarded at whim, by just making up stuff (as usually happens), so before he doesn't give a clear-cut answer as to what he accepts as proof I don't see any point in even trying to argue.