
TDB
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Your reply does not address my issue in a way I can see. I am trying to understand the treatment of infants, Alzheimer patients, and other "gray area" cases. If we just give them a pass, why not give one to the man in a coma? But Stef puts weight on the "man in a coma test" which depends on him not getting a pass automatically. Any positive obligation involuntarily placed on me, gets placed on everyone else, including the man in a coma, hence positive obligations are disallowed. But that means that UPB applies to the coma man in every sense. Because he is unable to move, it seems unlikely he will violate UPB, but this can't be said for children, Alzheimer's patients, etc.The quote from Stef above seems to recognize there is a problem drawing the line between adults and infants. But the problem is worse than that. Assume we could easily draw the line, we need an explanation (part of UPB) for the fact that there are two distinct groups of human beings. Or we say, okay, no problem, there are two groups by assumption and we throw away the man in a coma test.Or maybe Stef is being even more tricky, and the man in a coma test does not actually depend on what I think it does, but rather, the man in a coma is used as a standard, not a justification of the test. That is, the man in a coma gets a pass as a member of the infant group, but there are other reasons for objecting to positive obligations, and the man in a coma test is just a simple heuristic for letting us see whether a proposed moral proposition violates universality. If so, I failed to notice the other reasons, I thought it was literally "if there are involuntary positive obligations they obligate everyone including the man in a coma which is absurd."
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Terms that need to be defined for full comprehension of UPB/NAP
TDB replied to labmath2's topic in General Messages
I have a <a href="http://brimpossible.blogspot.com/2014/01/upb-jargon.html">blog entry </a> on this subject. I list some statements from the book that sound like definitions. I would add these to your list:Aesthetic = avoidable, not within ethics, not violent.Avoidable = consensualBinding = logically requiredEnforceable = involving use of forceEvil = in violation of a moral proposition validated by UPB testsGood = not in violation of a moral proposition validated by UPB testsPreference/preferable/prefer/preferred/preferential. = ??? universally preferred = not prohibited by a moral proposition validated by UPBHere's stab:Universal = applies to all moral agents at all times and at all placesConsistent = employing valid logicEthics = morality, see blog entryOwnership ~= control of, authority over, responsibility forAggression = use of threats, violence, or harmful deception -
We can never say that "the act of X is intrinsically rewarding" even when X = sex. It always depends on the person's interests and mood. We can only say, "this person in these circumstances found this act intrinsically rewarding."
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Thanks, I think I understand better now.
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Exactly, but why describe this as obligation? When you accept the first, you implicitly accept the second, because the first is the general case of the second. Why would anyone use the word "obligation" to describe this acceptance of both being logically inseparable? Obligation has the wrong connotations for me. So the bully's preference for having his victim's lunch money is an enforceable preference? If so, I finally understand, but I think Stef might have done better to call it a glyphnork preference, and then define glyphnork. That is *so* not what I thought when I read "enforceable." You use the word "justify" differently from me then. Using my interpretation/definition, if they are incorrect, they have not justified. I'm sorry, I tried to explain my confusion. I think Stef often uses words in an unusual way, and when I plug in their ordinary meaning it sounds wrong. I read those quotes and was just baffled. Slowly I am working through this. I appreciate your willingness to stick with me. Maybe I'm close to getting a grip on this.Can I define "binding" as "logically necessary?" Does that work for you?
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Yes. But the original point was about Kohn, and his hypothesis that sometimes having someone else use extrinsic motivators can have a negative effect on long-term intrinsic motivation. I've lost track of how we got here from there. Reading about something that fascinates you is intrinsic. Writing about an idea that excites you is intrinsic (example = everything written in FDR forum). Some people even find arithmetic intrinsically motivating, they are called mathematicians. True, this is not what is happening at every moment during education, especially in school. But clearly, education can ignore this or make use of it, and making use sounds likely to be much more effective. Saying it and doing it are not the same thing either. It sounds easy.
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The correctness of the math and the correctness of the application are two separate things. Keynesian economists have various equations, which are correct as far as the math goes. But they are incorrect with regard to application, as in, they describe an imaginary economy, with no necessary relationship to the one we actually experience.I still don't understand what you mean by obligation in this context.The Pythagorean Theorem for example. Are you saying if I accept the proof I must accept a calculation of the hypotenuse of a triangle based on the formula? As if someone would accept one and reject the other in some case, so we need a separate word? As if there could be someone smart enough to understand the proof, who yet refused to accept the calculation because he lacked some desire analogous to the desire to be good? Maybe the desire to be sane? Is it just an analogy? I really don't get it. Because I am confused.I am trying to understand what Stef means when he says something is binding. At first, I was not able to follow at all. When I made this connection, binding=enforceable in the context of ethics, things Stef said made sense. Can you think of a case within the context of ethics where something is one but not the other? Since everything in ethics is enforceable, that boils down to "is there any moral proposition that passes UPB tests that is not binding, or in some other way enforceable but not binding?" By my understanding, the answer is no. So I think enforceable <=> binding, within the context of ethics. We can define them differently, perhaps, but the set of things with one property is identical to the set of things with the other.Or maybe I am way off target. Maybe I don't know what "enforceable" means either. How can a preference be enforceable? I know what it means to enforce a rule or a constraint or a restriction or a prohibition, and so I can think about which of those might or might not be enforceable. What does it mean for a preference to be enforceable? Perhaps that in order to act upon my preference, to choose my preferred outcome/action/plan/whatever, I must use force? May use force? "May" would imply it is justified, which I don't think matches. "Must" might work, but it seems incredibly jargony, the reverse of my intuition. "Forceful preference" would seem to express that concept better. "Violent preference" even better. For me to get my way, someone must get hurt. Is that it? Well, then it is an abstract goal. Morality is a constraint, not a specific outcome. Okay, I am not articulating this well, and maybe it is beside the point. Forget "too abstract."Maybe you're saying morality is a hypothetical, "if you want to be good, you must not violate these constraints." Someone can accept that statement as true, then reply, "I do not want to be good, so I need not follow the constraints, so it is optional." Is that what you're saying?My reading of UPB is that if someone claims "I am justified in violating this rule and no one is justified in enforcing it against me for the following reasons X," they contradict themselves (in spite of whatever X may be) because by arguing they must accept the norms and premises of argument, upon which the rule they deny is based. By denying the rule's applicability to them, they deny the premises and norms of argument, and contradict themselves.It is like they are saying "let's have a discussion and try to reach the truth, but I will do my best to trick you into believing a lie, and if it looks like the discussion is moving in a direction I don't like, I will 'win' by threatening to kill you if you don't shut up." Obviously, that discussion is not about the truth, it is about dominance and manipulation. When someone tries to justify violating a UPB validated rule, this is their message, put in less blatant language. You can violate the rules, you can remain silent, but you can't justify breaking the rules, that is how I was interpreting the optionality of morality. You can violate morality (optional) but you can't justify your violation (binding).
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If we assume the girlfirend's primary motivation is the happiness of her partner, it is extrinsic. If she feels desire and experiences pleasure, it is intrinsic. In a healthy relationship, presumably there would be elements of both.
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Thanks for the clarification. But "obligation" doesn't seem quite right either. A mathematical proof is binding in this sense, it's either right or wrong, sufficiently adept mathematicians would all agree. (There are some controversies in math, but they tend to get ironed out.) What obligation is created by a mathematical proof? Would it be fair to say that within the context of ethics, bindingness and enforceability are identical? Nearly so?And. I still disagree with your earlier quote: That sounds like you're saying that if you don't want to be good, you can deny the norms and premises of argument, and the derivation of UPB. Clearly you mean something else, but I don't know what. Quibbling as usual, but goodness is too abstract for a goal. It is more a side constraint we accept (or reject) as we pursue our goals.
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Concepts are imperfectly derived from reality and thus their application has some gray areas. I was not particularly satisfied by that section of the book. Let me offer an alternative. UPB applies in all cases. It does not specify what form rule enforcement must take, or punishment for violations, so guardianship sort of works. If a ward somehow manages to violate UPB, the guardian takes the punishment. When the child matures and opts in to the tribe of arguers, the guardianship must stop. The guardian voluntarily opts in to the responsibility. This helps Stef, since in deriving the coma test, he is assuming that a man in a coma would share any positive obligations others cannot escape. So the man in the coma must not be excluded from the group that UPB applies to. But the coma patient is very analogous to the infant, the Alzheimer's patient, the brain damage victim, all of whom get a pass. My twist claims that they actually do not get a pass, their guardians must bear the enforcement of any UPB violation they create.It helps with treatment of animals and rocks as well. Animals may opt in to the UPB group by starting to observe the norms and premises of argument. Since they do not object to our treatment of them, and they seem oblivious to UPB violations, they can be treated as property.
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Thanks for the advice, but my problem is more profound. I did start the thread from the beginning, but I didn't get it. Thanks for clarifying.So why not an exception for man in a coma? Is the explanation of each exception the same?
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Insight is rare and perfection is nonexistent. I take what I can get. If I am paid to cook someone else's dinner, and the money is all I care about, that's extrinsic. If I want to cook my family's dinner, and I am motivated to make it delicious and learn from the experience for the sake of the experience and as part of my identity, self-expression, that's intrinsic. To put it crudely, it's the hooker versus the girlfriend (assuming your relationship is healthy, and she feels genuine desire). Of course, we could imagine a horny hooker, who had both motivations, and a girlfriend with issues, who has neither. Very similar to the distinction between capital goods and consumer goods, capital leads indirectly to gratification, consumption gets there directly. Similar but distinct: Howard Roark was intrinsically motivated to create useful buildings, extrinsic motivation distracted Keating. I'm not sure I see the distinction you are making. By this measure, is anything ever external? I say that is extrinsic. I'm not sure whether you agree or not.
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Sometimes reading a book is not about absorbing information, it's about confronting a different perspective. I recommend the book, though as I recall, it might not be a bad idea to skim a bit. Just because the market system uses rewards and incentives, that does not mean everyone gets them right or understands how best to use them. The basic idea I took from Kohn was that the path to happiness lies in applying your passion, and that extrinsic rewards can goof up intrinsic motivation. Not that rewards are always everywhere counterproductive, but that badly designed incentives can ruin morale, and even well designed incentives are not the whole story. Kohn's books do suffer a bit from "don't do this" syndrome, that is, he goes on and on about what doesn't work, less informative about how to engage your creative passion or inspire your coworkers as a manager. At least, that' s how I remember it, I probably read it 15 years ago. I listened to his parenting book more recently, it had a similar "don't do this" feel to it. You thought you could read a psychologist uncritically? He found a piece of the puzzle, and latched onto it. His left-wing ideology perhaps helped him to accept it. His confirmation bias prevented him from applying it more broadly. In this he is hardly alone. Are you really so certain you have discovered all the lies you have told yourself? My self-knowledge is not that perfect yet.
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Thanks, I appreciate it.
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I have been interpreting "binding" to mean "enforceable." I don't think I have a good quote to support my interpretation and I am feeling too lazy to look for one. Do you have a quote to support your interpretation? It just doesn't seem to fit. OTOH, if Stef meant "enforceable", that is probably the word he should have used. Still, I am uncertain.
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I'm not sure what you are responding to. So why not an exception for man in a coma? Is the explanation of each exception the same? Maybe this was what labmath2 was getting at? Some humans cannot argue, yet we do not treat them as animals or rocks. How do we explain this using this distinction of engaging in argumentation? Such humans have a legal guardian who is held responsible for any UPB violation such a non-arguing human might accomplish. Does that help or make it more complicated? Am I missing something?
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Please add the UPB tag to this thread. I would do it myself, but only the original poster may do so.To me, the opposite/negation controversy is nitpicking. Stef reduced the possible cases to two. An ethical theory either creates a prohibition or an obligation. If it is not one, it is the other. In that context, "opposite" and "negation" mean the same thing, the other possibility. One might object that there are more than two possibilities, but that is a different argument.
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enforceable != enforced, that is, if I am justified in enforcing, that does not obligate me to enforce. If violence is justified, that does not imply it must be used.Also, Stef defines his terms in different ways in different places (and makes mistakes), I am trying to figure out a consistent meaning. If you apply his definitions strictly, you end up with gaps and contradictions. It is a puzzle, you have to solve it. My version of the principle of charity is, you must be able to summarize an idea before you can criticize it. And by summarize, I mean in the sense that the original author would nod its head and say, "Yes, this is just what I meant." Just taking a scrap and inserting it into your own system to show it doesn't fit does not amount to a serious criticism. [update] On the other hand, enforcement is a very important issue, on which Stef is mostly silent. This is a gap. On one hand, all of UPB seems to me to be a justification of enforcement, on the other, he says very little about it, and specifically does not show how it is justified. When it does involve violence, it fits in his category of ethics, and so if it receives the standard treatment, it is either prohibited or obligatory. Niether of those work for him, so it must be a special case, and needs a lot of explaining. By one interpretation of UPB, the moral standard is external to UPB, UPB merely shows whether a justification contradicts itself or not. Here is the set of justifications, here is the subset that contradict themselves or are practically impossible (defined as "false"), here is the subset that do not (defined as "true"). This is actually one of my critiques/questions about UPB, seems like criteria for "truth" should be more definite and positive. It sort of makes up for that in other ways, but still, makes me uncomfortable.
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I've got a bunch of blog entries on UPB at brimpossible.blogspot.com/search/label/UPB, 2 on universality and how I think you can get Stef's version from Stef's assumptions. I think UPB answers some questions. Was X justified in doing Y? That is, has X broken some rule we are justified in enforcing? By arguing at all, you accept any norms or premises required by the act of arguing. Stef discusses this in various places, but is not always clear and it is slippery to begin with. I have a blog entry about this at http://brimpossible.blogspot.com/2014/01/self-detonating-counter-upb-arguments.html. Stef used prefer etc. as a jargon term. If you go by his usage, UPB is always about a prohibition that can be enforced. It is not UPB to murder, steal, or rape, these things are prohibited, violations can be enforced somehow. Preference implies a full ranking, and by my interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the word, it would always determine a set of things you should (by some criteria) do, usually a unique action that is preferred, but possibly a set of actions preferred to others but among which you (or the universe?) are indifferent. Stef never talks about preferences this way.I've never understood why Stef uses the words (preference, prefer, preferable, preferential, etc.) in such an odd way. Clearly, the things he tests with the UPB tests, the moral propositions creat prohibitions: Don't murder, steal, etc.I've never gotten a good grip on whether I really understand UPB as Stef does, or maybe I have wandered off the reservation and he would completely disagree.
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Thanks for the intro. I stumbled on this thread following the UPB tag. I've started reading the Odessia and plan to look at your blog soon. I usually don't have enough patience for videos, do you have a particular recommendation for one of your videos relevant to UPB? One side-comment on the story, it is a bit of a headache finding the first chapter, then navigating to the second. Is there a trick for the lazy? Some table of contents page somewhere?
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I agree this turns the words into jargon, Stef does not use the common meanings. This risks ambiguity or equivocation. But you seem to think this is just wrong. I think he should define his terms carefully, that's all. Another confusing issue, I believe he defines the same terms in other places in slightly different ways, or uses them in ways that clearly his meaning is different. I think you could look at the entire book as a justification of enforcement, generally. I do wish he would be more explicit about enforcement. What if enforcement consists of a stern look? He really does not give any details on enforcemeent, if I recall. I do wish he had gone into detail on this issue of enforcement and how/when/whether it is justified and in what form. Could you give an example? I do not follow this in the abstract. When does ethically relevant stuff get generalized away? Okay, I saw your later explanation. I have some problems with the man in a coma also. I see UPB performing 2 functions. 1) When someone tries to justify a violation of the rules or a denial of the rules, or a bogus rule, I can call BS. 2) It is useful when justifying enforcement of rules. Those who do not want to be good have a choice. They can opt out of morality, in which case they are inviting us to treat them like animals. Or they can pretend to opt in, in which case they have no grounds to complain when the rules are enforced. Perhaps you are really asking a different question, something like "can philosophy convince Hitler not to kill Jews, and if not, isn't it useless?" I doubt Stef could teach Adolf to play nice, but I don't think that means philosophy is pointless, either.
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Avalanche, I think this thread should have the "UPB" tag. You, as original poster, have the ability to add the tag, if I understand correctly. Would you consider it. please? By the way, I just release 0.2 of my UPB FAQ. I am still not happy with it, but hey, something is better than nothing. Comment if you have new questions or better answers.
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It's not clear whether you agree or disagree. Are you saying "of course people will violate UPB if they believe their lives depend on it," or "that's not a UPB violation?" My reaction is strange. That's why I nit-picked your broad generalization, I guess. Hard to articulate. Maybe I am thinking that ordinary culture is so full of sophistic rationalization, maybe they can convince themselves they want to be good and are good. I'm pretty sure Stef would disagree with me on some level, though I'm not sure how he would express his disagreement. I'm willing to think about them, not willing to base my entire philosophy on them.
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Yes, and even if sociopaths don't care personally, they need to justify themselves to the people around them, or get outed and denounced. Of course, if you're a general in the Roman army, you participate in a massive social arrangement dedicated to justifying your actions, and few if any persons around you have an instinctive grasp of UPB, much less an opportunity to do anything about it. So if "ought" here means could we have saved Carthage by teaching the Romans philosophy, no, probably not. No more than you could end the empire by teaching Obama philosophy. But they would not want to hear philosophy, and the Romans would probably kill any philosophers who tried to spread the truth. Human beings are good at lying to themselves, especially when it is dangerous or costly to speak the truth. I don't think that holds in all cases. You've put it in abstract terms, maybe I am not understanding. Hmm... Does this count as a counterexample? Stef has defended a lifeboat situation where I steal rather than starve. We could make the example very elaborate, and have me be willing to make restitution afterwards, etc., but I do violate UPB. Does this mean I don't want to be good? Maybe that is not even a helpful way to express it.
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Going out, and practicing Anarchism- for real
TDB replied to Omegahero09's topic in Libertarianism, Anarchism and Economics
Google "intentional community" anarchisthttp://www.strike-the-root.com/51/lg/lg1.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_anarchist_communitiesNot all that encouraging.Maybe try to figure out what or who stops you from being free. Then evade that or outsmart it.