AustinJames

"There is no progress like a wise man's doubt. There is no stagnation like a fool's certainty."

Mises Institute. They only put out pure gold.

I deactivated my Facebook profile a few months ago, and reactivated it recently. I deactivated it because I was discouraged with the quality of information and interaction between myself and my "friends." I reactivated it because it is a valuable resource for the dissemination of information that I am unable to replicate otherwise. The problem is that my profile and "friends" list was formulated during a time that I lacked self-knowledge, and I'm not sure how to go about changing this, except to block, defriend, or un-follow anyone who particularly grates me. Having done this, my news feed is limited to the handful of friends and family I have maintained through my start in philosophy (which is still not very expansive), and I'm unsure about how to go about finding new friends in my geographic region. Has anyone else been frustrated with Facebook in this way? My strategy to improve my situation is to invite members of this forum to add me as a friend on Facebook. My name is Austin James Sharette. What do you think of this strategy? I was reluctant to enact this idea, but I'm not sure why. Any thoughts would be appreciated.

Perhaps accuracy in reference to subject matter is not paramount in selecting a title. I once titled a blog, "Sex, God, and Coke." The forthcoming article had little to do with either Sex, God, or Coke (it was about propaganda and data manipulation); I just thought this title would grab people's attention. It also set me up to draw a few ironic speculations about the subject matter, in reference to the audience's reaction to the title. The point is, perhaps the most accurate title, according to the subject matter, is not optimal for the purpose of evoking a desired response. A controversial title may be more effective in producing a meaningful conversation, or attracting more members and potential donators.

I have recently come to the same conclusion, but your post was a very helpful reaffirmation of this principle. Just a resounding "Yes!"

Identify the universal principles you've discovered, and apply them to your future actions.

In The Origins of War in Child Abuse, Chapter 10, the first heading in bold reads, "IDEALIZATION BY ANTHROPOLOGISTS OF TRIBAL CHILDREARING." In the following passage, the author describes and explains the shortcomings of traditional academic anthropologists. This passage may be especially instructive in this discussion, if the root of the controversy is as I perceive: the constants in biology concerning sexual drivers. DeMause writes, "Idealization of other cultures is the rule in anthropology, we found in publishing The Journal of Psychoanalytic Anthropology, by leaving out crucial details—as did Margaret Mead in her portrayal of the ubiquitous raping gangs of Samoa as an example of “sexual freedom” that we should emulate.10 As I discovered when I took classes with Mead at Columbia University, she routinely idealizes tribal childhood as “spoiled and pampered.”11 Most anthropologists do not just idealize childrearing, they baldly state without evidence that tribal mothers are “rarely abusive,” as when they say that children who are forced to eat every second sibling “are the favored ones who started life with no oral trauma,” and that eating one’s siblings believed to be demons “doesn’t seem to have affected their personality development.”12 Dozens more statements as bizarre as this are analyzed in the forty issues of my Journal of Psychoanalytic Anthropology." Sex at Dawn (I have not read it, so let me know if I misunderstand) does not focus on forming objective conclusions about what is optimal in human sexual behaviour. I perceive it to be a book that attempts to justify, or at least explain the need for a variety of historic and modern sexual behaviours based on environmental factors. Stefan is, as a philosopher, probably less interested in such an examination, and more interested in defining an objective standard for optimal sexual behaviour in modern society. Reciprocally, most anthropologists have a singular aim to objectively explore and describe a variety of human societies, and are therefore less interested in forming objective moral conclusions that would distract from this. One could argue that anthropologists are better off not forming moral conclusions, because they're not philosophers. Conversely, perhaps philosophers should not attempt an amoral and unbiased analysis of history or anthropology, because it would not be conducive to the goals of a philosopher. You listed a lot of Stef's "assumptions" that are actually your assumptions of him. You assume that he assumes these things, he never said any of them, with the exception of the last: he does assume to know "our biological drivers," but only those that are objective. There are consistent biological drivers, and these exist independent of the cultural manifestations of such drivers. Cultural expectation, therefore, is a byproduct of these constant drivers. His argument is formulated, as you say, by listening to what "society has told him," but this does nothing to substantiate your objections. You're complaining that Stef describes society as he perceives it, when the goal is an objective, moral analysis of society as he, and others, see it. If he did not listen to what society told him, he would just be making stuff up about how he imagines society might be, with no objective standard of reality. When you say "I feel like there is more to it..." you are proving Stef's point. When was the last time you heard, of a man who cheats and lies to their family (or exhibits any bad behaviour, really), that "there must be more to it. I'm sure there were a lot of factors at play, and it might have been a really complex situation." --? I have never heard this of men's bad behaviour when it comes to women and family, but I hear it all the time describing women's actions.

I work with children from low-income and refugee families (lots of abuse) 65 hours each week, and I deal with this dilemma every day. I see clear evidence of abuse, but feel powerless to stop it. If I call child services, it is likely that nothing will happen; except that the abuse may worsen, as the abusers will blame the child for 'betraying' them or 'lying.' Moreover, the abusers may gain confidence after being absolved. Even if the child is saved from his primary abusers, the prospect of being a ward of the state is less than inspiring; it's terrifying. There is no guarantee the child will be better off in the care of foster parents. However, there are some lines that, if crossed, I have resolved to resort to a state solution. Some of these lines have to do with moral principle. Some are to do with self-interest, as I will be held responsible for NOT involving the state authorities, should certain events come to pass. In most situations, I agree with the advocation to model positive interactions. For many of the kids with which I work, I am the only person in their life that exhibits curiosity and empathy, and I make a point to promote these characteristics in my interactions. When there is talk of abuse, I always take a moment to de-normalize it. For example, if a girl tells me her mom yells at her and slaps her, I may say, "Oh my god, are you serious? That's terrible! That's no way for someone to behave-- especially if they say they love you. Do you know she could go to jail for that? I don't think anyone should hit children. It's despicable." To the older students, I have recommended Stef's Bomb in the Brain series, and asked if they would share the videos with their parents. An important distinction the OP did not address is the fact that the people Stefan was talking about believe in the moral authority of the state. If an anarchist doesn't call the state authorities, I don't think Stefan would fault them for being skeptical of the effectiveness of such action. However, if someone who claims that the state is moral (or just, or efficient) does not call the authorities, they are either hypocrites, cowards, or both. If one seeks state solutions to social problems in their life, and they want to solve the problem of abuse, they will call the state authorities. If one does not seek state solutions, they cannot be held accountable for seeking alternative solutions and avoiding involvement with the state. If one advocates state solutions, but does not call the state authorities, they must not want to solve the problem of abuse; and that is what Stef is holding them accountable for. I know I don't have to speak for Stef, but I never got the idea he was angry at people specifically for not calling the cops; he was angry at them for not doing anything. They would just completely ignore it and pretend they didn't hear or see anything. I agree with James that you "came in a little hot." This would make a great conversation, and I suspect you and Stef may not disagree as much as you think.

It seems to me (based on your definitions, and my modest knowledge of economic history) that Rothbard and Mises may have disagreed on the proficiency of fractional reserve banking. I don't see how Rothbard has "changed [Mises'] work." It's a rather marginal issue: in a free society, a fractional reserve banking system may fare well under certain conditions, and fail under others. What is the underlying universal principle in this disagreement? What is your opinion?

What are these "different ramifications" that you see?

If I were a DRO entrepreneur in a free society, I would have a clause in some insurance contracts stating that, in the event of a suicide, homicide, or other act of violence committed by anyone covered under the contract, the contract would be suspended, and the DRO would reserve the right to ascertain information about the event to the degree that the DRO deemed appropriate. If those involved with the contract refused, or showed resistance, or were found to be at fault, the rates would be renegotiated, or coverage denied, based on this information. In our current society, I would be glad to see a law requiring such an interrogation; much like I am glad to see laws protecting children from abusers, or laws that limit the power of the government to tax. Would I vote for a law requiring this? Well, I don't vote, so no. Though no amount of laws will ultimately end these kinds of problems, laws intended to eradicate evil are encouraging to me-- a kind of social barometer for libertarian values.

Apparently my answers are not satisfying to you. I guess I'll bow out.

"GMO foods" is not enough information to draw a conclusion. The controversy that I've heard most often involves the modification of corn to produce a certain protein that is poisonous to some insects. It seems the anti-GMO crowd relies heavily on a study conducted by Gilles-Eric Séralini, which concluded that there is a strong positive correlation between cancerous tumors in rats and GMO corn with this insecticide protein. This study has been roundly criticized in the scientific world, but the anti-GMO people I've spoken to cite the corruption and intimidation of the agricultural lobby. From what I can tell, the criticisms of the study (mostly to do with sample size) are valid. The main body of scientific evidence indicates there are no harmful effects associated with GMO foods, though it is not conclusive. I have not been able to find a good study that provides evidence to the contrary, but I have not researched it very thoroughly. I would be open to the idea that some GMO's are dangerous, but there is not evidence enough to conclude that any (much less all) GMO's are harmful.

No, it does not. The implication of the word "universally" combined with the word "preferable" and "behaviour" is that the "goal" is the ends of all human action. It follows that the "whom," therefore, is the whole of humanity. Preference can always be reduced to a binary categorization. If one prefers [1] to [0], the word 'prefer' implies that the individual would like, want, or tolerate [1] over [0]. If you can think of a preference that cannot be reduced to a binary categorization, I would love to hear it. If something is universally preferable, it is, therefore, objectively measurable. The only way one could deduce whether something is universally preferable would be to measure the preference according to an objective standard. You are saying that Stefan (as you refer to his proof) communicates poorly. If that is true, I don't know what to call what you are doing. "Don't murder" is a conclusion, not a methodology. UPB is not a list of conclusions, it is a methodology. Whether something is easily understandable is not a measure of its truth value. Calculus is confusing to the "uninitiated," but this does not devalue its proofs. If an action does not violate universal moral propositions, it is objectively preferable to those actions that do violate universal moral propositions. Therefore, there is preference. x= be virtuous (accepting that virtue leads to happiness). If you do not accept that virtue leads to happiness, then x= pursue the perceived benefits of human action (health, happiness, well-being). Nobody "gave us" non-aggression. Nobody "gave us" property. The answer is, simply, no one. There cannot be a preference without a preferrer, any more than there can be an act without an actor. I don't know. It is not my assertion, nor is it my objection. I don't know where you're getting this. I wrote, "The difference between personal preferences and universal preferences is purposefully implied. Personal preferences are things that have no moral bearing in universal application, such as preferring chocolate ice cream to vanilla. Preferences do refer to a ranking, and this is apparent in Stefan's proof. 'Not murder' is ranked as preferred to 'murder,' and 'chocolate ice cream' and 'vanilla ice cream' are morally indifferent." In response, you quoted this segment and wrote, "You are making my case for me." So now that you have the full context, what is your case? "Don't murder" is a conclusion drawn from UPB. UPB is a methodology to render universal statements of preference. UPB is more than a list of conclusions, and this is what makes it such a substantial proof. Moral propositions cannot "prohibit" anything. They have no capacity for action. "To prohibit" something is an action.

Correct. They are both accountable for their actions, and the effects of their actions, but not for all the consequences of their actions. Placing a baby on a swing-set during a lightning storm is either a neglectful or malicious thing to do. Placing a baby on a swing-set in calm weather conditions is not neglectful nor malicious. The level of control is also related to the knowledge possessed by the individual. Your proposition is akin to: 1) A man invites another man on a hiking trip, and the man who was invited is mauled by a bear. 2) A man ties another man to a tree, who is then mauled by a bear. Do you really not see the difference between the two, or are you just being obtuse? If you do see a difference, how would you articulate it, that is different from how I have? If you do not see the distinction at all, there's not much I can do for you. I have made the distinction. The reason you are unable to comprehend it may be buried in some past trauma, and I think this is well worth addressing. Your interpretation of my comments as 'ad hominem' is evidence of this, as is your assertion that I "play the victim;" they are blatant projections, not arguments.

No. You are in control of the baby. Non sequitur. You're talking about two different things: my having control over lightning, and my having control over the baby being hit by lightning. I have no control over lightning. I have some degree of control over the baby being hit by lightening. The degree of control determines the degree of accountability. I get the idea that you're not making an attempt to understand ownership, but rather more interested in argumentum ad absurdum in attempt to debunk the reality of accountability; these seem like thinly veiled arguments for determinism. I'm tired of repeating myself. I recommend you reread these posts once you've had some time to absorb the meaning. I won't be continuing on this thread until I see some curiosity, or at the very least your own arguments and proofs. You keep moving the goal posts, and you continue to ignore the valid counterpoints I have offered.

Because, like I said, "sufficient" can be used to describe the dynamics of human action, but does not distinctly connote human action. "Universally Sufficient Behavior" begs the question, "sufficient to achieve what ends?" "Preferable" singularly refers to the ends of human action, whereas sufficient does not. If you say, "sufficient for my purpose," we then need to define the "my" and "purpose" in order to derive from that statement any meaningful course of action. Furthermore, to say "sufficient for my purpose" implies a subjective viewpoint, where UPB requires an objective viewpoint. I believe this distinction is semantic, but I will rephrase: the amount of chlorine that is preferable is dependent upon the amount that is sufficient to achieve the ends of an intended action. "Don't murder" is simply an authoritarian assertion. Why should we not murder? The answer is, "because murder is not universally preferable." The advocation "don't murder" takes us further from understanding. "Murder is prohibited," once again, connotes a party outside the realm of objective universality. Prohibited by whom? No distinct party prohibits murder, according to UPB; UPB simply states that murder cannot be preferred universally. Two people in a room cannot both prefer to murder one another, and agree to act on that preference, because then you can't use the word "murder" for the violence that takes place; you would refer to it as a suicide pact. "Murder is not universalizable" begs the question, 'within which system is murder not universalizable?' If it is within the system of human action, the word "preferable" connotes this self-same idea, without the overhead of distinguishing human action to all other behaviour. If it is within the realm of biological consequence, a lion would be held to the same standard in hunting a gazelle, and stalking prey would be considered immoral within the animal kingdom. If you were to state it succinctly, what is your "case" that I am making for you? At what "level?" I clearly identified a "categorization scheme" with more than two categories (i.e. more or less preferable, and more or less universalizable based of the ends of human action [i.e. preferable]). Even if what you say is true, and there are only two ranks, I do not see how this "overcomplicates" anything. Rather, you should argue that this 'oversimplifies' everything. How does UPB fail in "testing moral propositions for logical, practical, and argumentative feasability?" The proof provides a basis for this practice, and you have in no way repudiated it. Yes, it is a binary system; but like other binary systems, it can be extrapolated to communicate more complex ideas. It's not my job to convince you that "preferable" is the right word. The word is appropriate; you have not made a coherent argument to the contrary. If you don't think it's appropriate, then suggest another; but the ones you have provided are not sufficient for the purpose of the proof. Stefan, you say, either "disagrees or thinks it is not important..." but what is 'it?' If you are referring to the binary nature of the system, I don't see how this undermines the efficiency of the application of the system. Rather, it simplifies it, and universalizes it. Much like a binary computing system can be employed to process vast amounts of complex data, so can UPB be applied to render complex evaluations of moral content from complex scenarios. "The allower, prohibitor, evaluator, consists of the tests." -- What does that mean? "The test" of UPB cannot render, of itself, any independent observer. UPB is a system that the observer works within, or applies to achieve certain ends of morality. To say that the "allower" consists of the "test" is a non sequitur. It would be similar to say that "the scientist consists of the scientific method," or "the engineer consists of calculus." You keep asserting that "preferable" does not work, but you have yet to explain why it is a deficient term. "The idea we are trying to express is behaviour that conforms to moral propositions that pass the UPB tests. Help me find a word." -- Well, I think you need three words-- Universally Preferable Behaviour.

I have made this distinction, but I'll make it again, more succinctly. Any amount of control renders the separation. The amount of control determines the level of accountability. If one has no control, there can be no accountability. If one has complete control, they are fully accountable. If one has control, there is direct effect. If one has no control, there can only be indirect consequence; this is the distinction. I have provided answer to this circumstance, and your failure to acknowledge it leads me to question your intentions in this conversation. If you are holding a baby beside a large metal rod during a lightning storm, you are putting the baby in an endangered position, for which you are accountable (excluding any ridiculous caveats you may concoct). You have a responsibility to know what is safe and what is unsafe in regard to the child. If you do not ascertain the appropriate and available knowledge, you are neglectful, and are responsible for being neglectful. If you have the appropriate and available knowledge, and still put the baby in an endangered position, you are responsible for deliberately putting the child in danger. You have control over the child, so what happens to the child in result to your actions is a direct consequence. I'm interested to know what your childhood was like, and if you have children.

The distinction is made by the level of control had by the actor in any given situation. I have no control over lightning, and I have no control of the actions of others. If I have control over the placement of a baby, and if I place it in the middle of a road, I am accountable for placing the baby in that endangered position. If I have no reason to believe that I am endangering the baby, and it is harmed by the actions of others, or by some act of nature, I am not accountable for the harm brought to the child. I have control over the allocation of my financial resources. If I choose not to do business with a person, I cannot be held accountable for the subsequent misfortune that may negatively effect that person; I can only be held accountable for the interaction in which I was involved.

Wrong. There is no ambiguity in my comment, and I don't know why you're trying to inject some. The terms are self-defining. A direct effect of an action can be inevitably and mathematically connected to the action itself. An indirect consequence of an action is not inevitably connected solely to the action, and requires more factors to come about than the original action. The direct effect of placing a baby on a road is: the baby becomes endangered. If the baby is harmed, the adult is accountable for it because it was a direct consequence of the adult's actions. If there was someone driving drunk that hits the baby that might have otherwise avoided it, they are also accountable. If an adult places a baby on a swing-set that subsequently is struck by lightening, they are not accountable for the baby being harmed, because the harm would be an indirect consequence of the adult's actions.

No, you don't own their starving. Rather, you own your personal boycott; you own them not receiving food by your hand only. Their starvation is not a direct effect of the act of one's personal boycott, it's an indirect consequence, compounded by the actions of everyone else in society. No individual would have the power to single-handedly restrict the allocation of food in a free society; that power would be inevitably distributed throughout society. Each individual is responsible only for the interactions he/she participates in. Once the action is compounded by the action of others, the responsibility shifts. To say one owns the effects of their actions is not to say that they are responsible for the ultimate consequences of their actions. If I plant a tree, and years later someone drives into the tree and is killed, I am not responsible for their death, though it can be argued that their death was the ultimate consequence of my planting the tree. The circumstance is compounded by the decisions made by the individual who crashed into the tree, and many other factors.

This is incorrect. Life forms at large do indeed develop behaviors that lower their life expectancy. Evidence of this is the fact that vastly more genetic material has become extinct than has survived throughout the history of life on this planet, due to some development of behaviour, or environmental accident. Developments in behaviour always occur in response to environmental changes, and these are largely accidental by nature. Logically, it would follow for a victim of sexual abuse as a child to say, "there must be very good reasons why my abuser committed this violent act. After all, life forms at large don't develop behaviors that negatively effect future generations." The same could be said of war, and genocide, which would be a logical contradiction. There may be a reason for the behaviour, but it is not necessarily a "good" reason.

What do you mean, you "agree" to the example that I made? Do you mean that you would refrain from saying that slavery ought to be abolished because "there still isn't enough evidence to support that [non-slavery] works in practice," and therefore we should "keep the option of [slavery] open in case [non-slavery] doesn't work?" Because that's what I was implying. In your second sentence here, you pit the morality of a free society against the effectiveness of a free society. I used the example of slavery because the morality of slavery has nothing to do with the effectiveness of slavery. In the same way, the morality of governmental coercion is independent from the effectiveness of governmental coercion. We should want the end of slavery first because it is immoral. The effectiveness is a secondary consideration. If you are hung on the effectiveness, and refuse to consider the morality factor, there is little or no evidence that Minarchism can sustain a reduction in human suffering. The evidence of the effectiveness of freedom in organizing human societies to reduce human suffering is pervasive. I think the most poignant modern evidence is the example of what has occurred in Somalia over the last decade, in comparison to what has occurred in neighboring countries. Stefan has a podcast on this subject that is both thorough and succinct. Have you read any Rothbard? For a New Liberty speaks both to the morality and effectiveness of government, and may help answer some of your questions. The Mises Institute provides this monumental "libertarian manifesto" free of charge, in both audiobook and PDF form. I would highly recommend it.

It's not the definition of "sufficient," because sufficiency does not connote human action, and a preference is always a reference to the ends of human action. The sufficient amount of chlorine needed to produce a chemical reaction is a scientific fact that exists independent of my preference for producing a chemical reaction. A meteor can have mass sufficient to level a house, but it has no preference. When we say "prefer," we are always referring to the ends of human action. When we say, "sufficient," the word itself does not imply that we are talking about human action. The difference between personal preferences and universal preferences is purposefully implied. Personal preferences are things that have no moral bearing in universal application, such as preferring chocolate ice cream to vanilla. Preferences do refer to a ranking, and this is apparent in Stefan's proof. 'Not murder' is ranked as preferred to 'murder,' and 'chocolate ice cream' and 'vanilla ice cream' are morally indifferent. This is not so. Though it is not explored explicitly within Stefan's proof, the more minute distinctions occur naturally with consistent application of the principles presented. Theft and murder are both violations of UPB, but a world full of thieves is universally preferable to a world full of murderers. A world full of people who are chronically late to work is universally preferable to a world of thieves. Therefore, the hierarchy of grievance is determined by the consequences (both inevitable and possible) of any human action made universal. Non-violations have a hierarchy based on the same principle. According to UPB, it cannot be universally immoral for a doctor to not perform CPR, but a world full of doctors who do perform CPR is universally preferable to a world of doctors who do not perform CPR. Therefore, there are actions that are more universally preferable and less universally preferable, independent of their moral content. It cannot be called "prohibited," because that implies a motive, and an end to the "prohibition;" it implies an outside "prohibitor" that may or may not exist. The word "allow" does the same thing; it implies an "allow-er" that is independent of the "preferrer." Universally "evaluated" behaviour does not connote human action, and therefore cannot imply a system that deals only in terms of human action. "Universalized" behaviour has the same problem: universalized within what system? It is unclear whether we are speaking of human action, or some other kind of behaviour.

Why do you want to be a designer?