Mole

Blue and green can appear the same. However, the same cannot appear blue and green.

Don't take this as an excuse to stop thinking, but do what ever you feel like doing, literally! Emotions reflect beliefs. If you don't feel like being in university, then take a break! (that's what I'm doing). Don't feel like doing something? Then why do it? If you don't feel like being in university, it means for some reason you believe you shouldn't be there at the moment.

If you really want the money, then you will enjoy being an entrepreneur. If you won't enjoy it, you didn't really want the money. Do what you feel like doing. Learn the facts, and remember nobody can tell you what to do with these facts. Nobody can tell you how happy or sad you will be or whether it is worth it or not. If you are worrying about whether to do it, you will probably keep worrying and hesitate and end up not doing it, so you may as well try doing what ever feels good. Trust your emotions, they reflect your deepest beliefs.

I'm sorry to hear about your circumstance, it is quite tough. Consider where you would be if you didn't take the job. Would you be doing a job you hate? Well, your happiness is always primary. If a person is doing a job they hate it means they really deep down don't want to/shouldn't be there. Keep that in mind. However, you might have other opportunities. Maybe you can take the job for the time being and find out what you really want to do for the long-term? Do what you feel like doing and keep thinking about your situation and then change if you feel like changing. Your happiness and true desires are primary. Don't worry too much about your values because your emotions will reflect them. Sometimes we don't even know what we really value.

I'm sure you have more standards. Your health is an ideal standard. Science is an ideal standard. Wealth is an ideal standard. Etc. Your decisions are influenced by these standards. You see whether some action aligns with these standards and if they align then you will choose it. Animals cannot do this because they have no conceptual knowledge of standards like health, science and wealth.

Reason is the faculty that enables a consciousness to discover the nature of existents by organising perceptual units in conceptual terms by following the principles of logic (Peikoff, 1993 p.152). Note that the principles of logic are derived from the percepts themselves. A leaf cannot be seen as blue and green at the same time on the same point in the same relation. This gives us the principle of non-contradiction. Voila. All knowledge is derived from perception, and perception is a direct contact with reality. No room for intuition, convention, higher realms, etc.

Consider this. Nobody can measure the chance of a circumstance objectively. We know for certain John his a pedestrian and Winston didn't. So if someone were going to claim that they are both just as culpable, they will need some objective way to measure chance. However, that seems completely impossible because chance depends completely on a person's subjective knowledge. For example, maybe Winston has incredibly good tracking skills and he may claim that he 'knew what he was doing'. How could you give evidence against that?

Yes. Science is a pursuit of truth. Aristotle says the sciences have their own ends. E.g., the function/end/good of biology is to find the taxonomy of living things.

If the purpose of an argument is to convince someone. And if convincing someone in an emotional way does not depend on the truthfulness of the argument, then how is an emotional argument at the same time pointing to the truth? It seems like a contradiction to me.

Notes from Nicomachean Ethics translated by C.D.C. Reeve: Aristotle apparently commits the logical fallacy of inferring from the fact that there is a good that each seeks that there is a good that all (that is, all who practice crafts, follow lines in inquiry, do actions, and make deliberate choices) seek. This is like inferring from the fact that each boy loves a girl (but not necessarily the same one) that there is a girl all boys love. I 2 1093a18-b7 suggests a way to defend the inference. Any good or end is sought or desired either because of itself or because of an end or good X that is desired solely because of itself. If all such chains terminate in the same X, as the existence of an architectonic science with human good -- that is, the one unique good that all human beings, in seeking any good whatsoever, thereby seek. It seems to me that Aristotle hasn't said anything substantial over the fact that each means has an end. However, given this is the first line of his book, it is an appropriate starting point. If he wishes to substantiate that there is an 'architectonic' good, he will have to defend that in some other way.

Perhaps we should say that information exists on all levels, kind of indiscriminately. What I mean is that it isn't necessary that the irreducible particles of a diamond precede the diamond. The particles and the diamond co-exist and change together at the same time. In fact, imagining that the diamond precedes the particles is equally as bad. Maybe what is happening is that the information of the diamond is determining the structure at every level, so a higher structure is not any more abstract than a reduced structure. We are just used to thinking that reduced structures somehow precede larger structures because that's how we build buildings, ship, etc and how we try to understand how they work.

Specifically, what exists is irreducible. Even if information is reducible, it still means that higher level information is an abstraction and does not exist. However, knowledge is knowledge of abstractions. This means that knowledge is different from irreducible information, but that is absurd because the idea of information stems from our idea of knowledge. So, it should be rather that information does not exist.

Interesting. I genuinely appreciate your post. It posits that information is shared between matter, and not only to and between people. I guess one criticism that popped to mind of information philosophy is that information is reducible to smaller parts of information, fundamental properties are irreducible, therefore information is not a fundamental property. For example, how a living organism functions is reducible to molecules of the organism. This higher level information is created when lower level information is created. It makes me think that these information don't really exist and what only exists is what is most reducible, the most fundamental thing, which is actually the matter and energy. If information exists, I would expect that it wouldn't be reducible. Maybe it would at least exist on some particular level, like the quantum level for example, and there things would happen seemingly randomly and we wouldn't be able to reduce it any further or explain it with any other information and we would call this the real information. It seems more reasonable to say that only the irreducible particles exist, and that information is the abstraction of these irreducible particles and this can only occur in the mind. This does bring back the mind-body problem. Perhaps the particles actually depend on the abstractions, like in free will? Well, then we are getting into new metaphysical territory and that requires further explanation. However, assuming the theory is true it does seem to solve the hard problem of consciousness. If information is inherent in matter, then the matter is conscious to the degree that the information is integrated (look up Integrated Information Theory). This consciousness does not need some extra explanation because the consciousness is that information which is not the matter itself but something else. Consciousness and information are the same thing. It's just that consciousness becomes more complex and the information becomes more integrated. This seems to be a kind of dualism and panpsychism. Information in matter does seem to make more sense than information simply in our brain. Ordinary matter is much simpler than the brain. But that is precisely why it holds less information. A water molecule holds the information of a water molecule. A brain holds some information of a water molecule and extra. It seems a much more simplistic, intuitive explanation for abstractions, change, knowledge, consciousness, etc. It also gives purpose to the cosmos. Namely, to integrate information. It gives a philosophical explanation to some degree why there are humans and other animals rather than no humans and other animals. Unfortunately, I have doubts information philosophy is valid.

The importance of rational ethics We are born into the world not simply to learn facts about the world but also to make choices. These choices are conscious and deliberate, therefore when we make them we are trying to base them off something we have consciously learned. Some kind of knowledge that allows for this decision making must exist, even if this knowledge is simply that we should follow our instincts. The knowledge for choices that are within our rational self-interest is called ethics. Naturally, we must find what ethics is if we are to be rational. What is essential to ethics is that it is rational, and any alternative is irrational or non-rational. If we are arguing for ethics, we are arguing that it is within peoples' rational self-interest to follow ethics. If our ethical system cannot be proven to be rational, it is not an ethical system. Indeed, people have criticised UPB for supposedly failing to prove ethics is rational (1, 2, 3). This is why when I read Universally Preferable Behaviour (UPB; 4) it was my intention to focus on why UPB is rational. It is imperative to prove that it is rational to follow ethics, as this is the only defence against nihilism. My understanding of rational ethics after reading UPB (UPeB) After reading UPB four times, I came to a specific understanding of ethics which I think makes a slightly different argument to UPB, but nevertheless works from the similar axioms. I mistakenly took 'universally preferable' to be synonymous with 'universally permissible'. A universally permissible behaviour (UPeB) is a behaviour that I can prefer and it doesn't necessarily conflict with any other person's preferences. In that sense, they are permitting my behaviour. E.g., I prefer jazz and everyone else could permit that I prefer jazz, therefore jazz is UPeB. I prefer murder but my victim necessarily does not permit the murder, therefore murder is not UPeB. My argument is laid out here in syllogistic form: 1. Preferred behaviours are deliberate. (Conscious, voluntary, etc.) 2. Deliberation requires beliefs. (Propositions, truth statements, etc.) 3. Preferred behaviours are based on beliefs. (E.g. I should listen to jazz, I should murder) 1. Preferred behaviours are based on beliefs. 2. Beliefs must be universally permissible to be true. (Reality is objective. Therefore, beliefs cannot be true for some people and false for others. Therefore, true beliefs are permissible as being true by everyone.) 3. Preferred behaviours that are not universally permissible must be based on false beliefs. 1. Preferred behaviours that are not universally permissible are based on false beliefs. 2. Falsehood is irrational. (I cannot think or deliberate without knowledge. That would be like trying to sail without a compass.) 3. Preferred behaviours that are not universally permissible are irrational. (Murder, rape, theft, fraud, lying, etc are irrational.) Stefan's understanding of ethics (UPB) When I skimmed the book recently, I realised I made a mistake. Stefan makes clear on page 51 that 'preferable' means preferences that are required for some individual to attain an end, and 'universally preferable' means required for any individual (objectively required) to attain an end. E.g., if you want to lose weight (end) it is objectively required (universally preferable) that the output of calories is greater than the input of calories. This meaning of 'universally preferable' seems to differ to my original understanding. UPB proper seems to deal with essential means to an end. My UPeB seems to deal with the objectivity of true beliefs. Is UPB rational ethics? The big question is, can UPB be proven to be rational? I.e., is someone who doesn't follow UPB being irrational? Stefan argues for why UPB exists in syllogistic form (page 55), but doesn't seem to argue for why UPB is rational in syllogistic form. However, he does mention that moral theories must be rational to be true (page 63), thus he implies that if UPB exists, it must be rational. I suspect that the proof of the rationality of UPB is similar to my argument for the rationality of UPeB. The proof of the rationality of UPB in syllogistic form would look something like this: 1. All rational beliefs have an argumentative form. (If I believe something, I should be able to argue for it.) 2. Rational preferred behaviours are based on rational beliefs. 3. All rational preferred behaviours have an argumentative form. 1. All rational preferred behaviours have an argumentative form. 2. The act of argumentation asserts UPB. (UPB are the preference for truth over falsehood, that we exist, that the best way to solve conflicts is peacefully, etc. This is similar to Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics; 5.) 3. Any preferred behaviour that conflicts with UPB is irrational. Looking at page 211 'UPB in a Nutshell', Stefan seems to be making the argument that UPB is asserted in any argument (premise 2 of syllogism 2 above). Further on page 65, moral theories are kind of theories about UPB. People who propose moral rules are proposing they are UPB, presumably because in the act of arguing for a moral rule, they are asserting UPB. This is the same as assuming the moral rule is UPB(!?). Stefan doesn't seem to make this explicit, which is why I have to do some guesswork to come up with this syllogism. I am not quite sure if Stefan would argue that ethics can be proven to be rational, ethics cannot be proven to be rational but only that ethics exists, or something else altogether. I would not be surprised by the second outcome as he says he fully accepts Hume's is-ought distinction (as do I; page 12). The differences and similarities between UPB and UPeB Argumentation asserts universally permissible beliefs. In this way, premise 2 of the second syllogism is similar premise 2 of the third syllogism in my original argument. The conclusions of my argument might be different to Stefan's. He might only mean that preferred behaviours that are in conflict with those UPB such as 'truth is better than falsehood' and 'we exist' are irrational while mine is perhaps broader but also perhaps more problematic. A problem with UPeB UPeB might be problematic because any preferred behaviour that is not universally permissible could be deemed to be so. E.g., I am not murdering you because you ought to permit me killing you, in fact you are the irrational one and not me. It begs the question, what ought a person permit? Perhaps UPB solves this by saying the preferred behaviour could not be deemed to be universally permissible because the action itself conflicts with the requisites of argumentation? UPB and consequences I believe that an ethical framework people ought to follow must be able to at least theoretically explain different consequences of unethical behaviour. UPB the book lacks in this regard. He does make some consequential arguments for UPB (page 66), but he doesn't make an explicit argument of explaining how they are causally linked. According to UPeB, irrational beliefs cannot be within one's rational self-interest. UPeB and consequences An explanation about why UPeB will lead to positive personal consequences goes like this: Having irrational beliefs (including irrational preferred behaviours) means you seize conscious control over those beliefs. These beliefs must stem from some unconscious part of your psyche which seems to be particularly resistant to rationality. That which is resistant to your conscious awareness is painful and destructive to your conscious awareness. I'd like to know if I've made a correct evaluation of UPB with the syllogism I used and my understanding of preferability and what people think about UPeB and how morality can be proven to be rational. References 1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=viZYL3ceh9U 2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGYendXNjGg 3. https://board.freedomainradio.com/topic/46332-why-be-moral-answered/ 4. Universally Preferable Behaviour: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics by Stefan Molyneux Paperback 5: https://mises.org/wire/primer-hoppes-argumentation-ethics

The question that any person faces in life is, what should I be doing with my time? I think this is a sufficient proof of free will because it asks man to be rational and to have objective ideals. If emotions are arbitrary, then there are no objective ideals because the purpose of life is happiness but happiness is just positive emotions. To say that it's a false dichotomy sounds like saying that rationality and irrationality is a false dichotomy. I can understand that emotions might be inaccurate some of the time, e.g., it's just a prank bro. I'm not saying that emotions are always accurate, but I am saying that they are always rational and that just means empirical. And given that our emotions such as guilt are so complex, this must be the case. That's because in order for us to even be able to feel guilt, we must have built a conceptual chain leading to guilt that includes other concepts such as justice, and that can only be done by a robust, empirical mind. But if we are able to do that, it doesn't make sense that we make a 'cognitive error' of thinking that we ought to be guilty for things we didn't do wrong. That cannot be the case, because if we feel guilt then we very well know what justice is, but if we know justice, then we know that what we have done isn't wrong. If emotions such as guilt don't really exist or are much more primitive than we make them to be, then I don't understand how a person can find meaning in such a complex world. I think it is most likely that we evolved to have complex emotions as we concurrently came to understand the world and society. I would definitely say that the true self consists of sub-personalities which can even contradict one another. However, a conceptual net can be caste around these sub-personalities that are more or less not merely self-defense mechanisms. The sub-personalities of the false self are simply reacting to the sub-personalities of the true self. To give a very concrete example, obviously there is a part of you that knows your dog didn't eat your homework. However, there is another part of you that doesn't want other people to know that you know that. Without the first part, the second part cannot exist. This is how we differentiate the true and false self. Perhaps this is where the idea of shoulder angels originated from. Psychoanalysis or rather psycho-dynamics has been shown to be as effective as CBT in the long-term. However, many psychologists argue that there is a common variable that explains this. And they say that this common variable is the empathy of the counsellor/therapist. Given these results, I think the debate is not nearly settled. Anyway, I'm not even sure whether it is fair to compare psycho-dynamics to other psychotherapies, just like it is unfair to compare weight loss and liposuction. Also, it should be noted that almost every FDR call-in show contains a great chunk of psycho-dynamics. It is very hard to argue that self-defense mechanisms don't exist or that there aren't unconscious drives or motives which we only discover later in life. Cognitivism might claim to be able to explain these things, but it goes nowhere near into detail as psycho-dynamics has.

A rational observation is psycho-epistemologically distinct from irrational observations because assuming free will exists, there must be some underlying personality that is empirical and that therefore knows that religion is invalid, the state is invalid, etc. If this underlying personality did not exist, free will would be impossible because there would be no objective standard to compare our actions to. If someone believed that murder was moral in their heart of hearts, then that person could never have had a choice to act differently and therefore did not have free will. Likewise, there must also be a personality that is irrational (the false self), but emotions cannot be created in this personality because you cannot perceive something that does not exist. But the false self only believes those things that do not exist. Think of it this way, a blind man can convince himself that he knows what red looks like. This would be his false self, and the 'red' that he thinks he sees is a false qualia (just like a false emotion). The reason he consciously believes that is because something had impeded his empirical true self at some point in his life; mythologies and falsehoods. But unconsciously, his true self knows that he has never seen red. It is very obvious to his true self for good reason. It is only once he actually has seen red that his belief becomes a rational observation, and it is exactly at that time that he can experience what red actually is. This is exactly how thoughts and emotions work together. How can a person know what guilt means unless they had empirically first understood justice? The very fact that animals (which aren't capable of rationality) don't have these complicated emotions further supports my argument that emotions are involuntary responses to rational observations. Your example of reductio ad absurdum is an example that I would use to support my argument?? I even said that if emotions were arbitrary (not objective rational observations) then someone could 'work' themselves into a positive state. But I precisely said that it's not possible. As I said, if a person could work themselves into a state of mind, we all ought to become meditating monks which is not too far off from the example of the serial husband that you gave.

Ahh yes. You will notice my views have only become more sophisticated but haven't fundamentally changed. Now that I look back, I don't think FDR was wrecking my development. I was just still at an immature stage of intellectual development. Other people probably get things more intuitively than I do (e.g., empathy) but they don't understand things intellectually. I think intellect is my most important tool for guiding my life and so it was not fair for me to compare myself to others who probably have more empathy than I do and didn't have the same experiences that I had.

If free will is valid, they must be. If emotions are arbitrary, then given enough time we could theoretically become monks completely at peace or train ourselves into become mass murderers without any regret and that would negate free will. There is such a thing as false self emotions. These aren't emotions per se. They are either us misinterpreting our emotions or pretending that emotions exist that aren't really there. That way of thinking comes from being subject to propaganda, like having these viruses in your head that order you around. The true self isn't the same as the virus. What I'm saying is not new. Stefan has said the same thing, and this proposition serves as the basis of psychoanalysis as far as I understand it.

This is my argument The reason why people have a passion is because they believe that they can change something and that it is important. In fact, all emotions are true in such a way. Emotions are simply involuntary responses to our rational observations. A child observes what he is good at and that is how a passion develops. It is very obvious to a child. Everyone as a child had figured it out, but not many people actually followed their passion. Since all passions are rational, then if society is rational, following one’s passion will lead to prosperity. However, this is not the case with our current society. If I want to become a philosopher in North Korea, my prospects are very low or I will not make enough money to survive. This would never happen in a free society because passions are always valuable. However, state intervention prevents the pursuit of an individual’s rational self-interests. It subdues free will. There was a man who did a major in philosophy but who after regretted it because he hadn’t been able to make money from it. It as at this point that people break with their passions. He concluded that passions are not necessarily good and he implicitly accepted nihilism rather than recognising that evil was done unto him. It makes it hard for him to recognise it since sophism is state sponsored in philosophy departments. The majority of people share a similar story. Whether it is coercion from the state, or their parents, or their peers, an adult or child is in some way rejected for following their passions and the adult or child concludes that he cannot trust his emotions. This is the very essence of evil. It is why people did not trust the invisible hand of the free market for tens of thousands of years. Essentially, their self-esteem was so destroyed that they did not trust their own rational faculty. It is the greatest contradiction that ever existed. A virtuous man would find a work-around. He knows that his life is meaningless without passion. He knows that if he were to look back at his life without following his passion, he would regret it and wonder what could have been. There is no alternative for him. Every action we make is motivated by emotion. A person cannot simply think and do. They must think until they feel that they can do. An artificial line has been created between emotions and thoughts. Emotions simply are an expression of our deepest and truest thoughts that we may not even be conscious of. It is analogous to the arbitrary distinction between qualia and meaning. We see red because we associate it with everything else that is red. A person void of passion then, is a robot without free will, following the instructions of others without even being consciously aware of it. So, the virtuous man has no rational choice other than to find alternatives to the best of his ability. This does not mean that the virtuous man will be unsatisfied. The passion arises only from what can be done. If man finds that his passion is unreachable, his passion will naturally change. So, the virtuous man is a force that cannot be stopped by anyone or anything. It is as clear as sunlight what his objective is. A rock cannot turn into a tree, nor can man change his neurological predispositions, particularly once he becomes aware of them. Even if a man is destroyed for following his passions, he will never be the same. He will always be at ease, because he knows what must be done so he will inevitably build himself back up. He is the man who works. But if a man does not immerse into his passions, he will always live a shallow life not knowing what he could have been. “Nothing is softer or more flexible than water, yet nothing can resist it” – Lao Tzu.

I am a psychology major undergraduate and have a couple days to apply for a job/internship at the Centre for Cognitive Work and Safety Analysis which is a part of the Department of Defence Science and Technology, Australia. Australia is an ally of the United States of America and fought beside them in all the major wars. Australia is a Commonwealth so if Britain declares war, Australia must contribute to the war effort. Australia is actively involved in the war in Afghanistan and the war against ISIS. Australia is also part of the Korean war. My duty might involve improving the displays of fighter aircraft which would directly effect bombing missions in the middle east. Other duties I could be involved in is research, transcribing, conducting interviews and analysis. This internship would last for 4 months maximum. There are many benefits to getting this internship. There are not really any other jobs in the market for students that would challenge my research and cognitive skills. I'm thinking of becoming a neuropsychologist so it's really important, especially when I go for PhD (In Australia it is required). Also, the pay is good and I have no shame for taking taxpayer money while I am young. Also, the centre is literally in the same suburb that I live in, and halfway between my house and my university. Also, it could teach me something about the psychology of those in the military which is very unique knowledge for a libertarian to have. If it were not for the initiation of force, there wouldn't be many better jobs that I could be doing at the moment. While what I'm doing might be directly working for the military, but morally speaking, it's not necessarily different to other work I could be doing because my taxes would go towards the military anyway. Violation of the NAP is wrong, but what I could be doing could help me prevent violations of the NAP more than actually violating the NAP. Also, if I were at any time uncomfortable, I could quit. Still, it bothers me that what I would be doing would be directly contributing to the murder of innocent people. How could I find a balance in this scenario? (did you forget it's valentines day?)

The way it's put here is deeply metaphysical. But I don't think it has to be. For example, we don't say that randomness is some innate quality of nature. We understand that randomness is a mental state, dependant on our level of knowledge. Fundamentally, randomness is epistemological. Likewise, free will may also be epistemological. We don't know what our decision will be, which is the very reason we have the decision. That decision being a conscious action of any sort. We have the choice because we don't know what we were going to do. So epistemologically a decision tree exists. But metaphysically its completely determined. No contradiction here. We don't say randomness doesn't exist because of physical laws. We also don't have to say free will doesn't exist because nature is determined. That is why compatibilism is probably the most appropriate position. Empirically, people are very predictable given that they have been fed so much propaganda. But the police, teachers, parents, etc are all very conscious of their actions and for them they feel that they are free even though they could not have made much of a different choice. Why not use Occam's razor to say that we are all as such, determined metaphysically. There is no contradiction with determinism and epistemological free will, so there is no contradiction with morality. Behaviour can still be universally preferable even if it is determined. Rationality which is simply fidelity to reality is not dependent on metaphysical free will. And of course, if we are going to accept metaphysical free will, then we introduce a whole slew of questions such as, what is the relationship between consciousness and nature, is dualism valid, how do we measure free will, does it have to be taken as a given or can we subject it to science, does it contradict physical laws, etc. It also seems that any attempt to define free will ends up in a loop. Free will = choice = conscious decision making = free will... etc. There is not necessarily a problem with that, it would make free will a primary axiom, much like colour cannot be defined and explained to a blind man or much like explaining the meaning of 'existence'. It is something that is supposed to be obvious to our perception and all language and abstractions build upon it, so language cannot describe it. In fact, I think this is rather valid when we are speaking epistemologically. Yes, metaphysically, consciousness exists as a primary axiom. That in itself explains choice and epistemological free will. There is our elusive primary axiom. There is no need to add an additional layer.

It does not make me more miserable. The hope was that I would have more clarity, that itself is a secondary benefit. I have more clarity in some areas but not in the areas where it is needed. That is why I still say that I am confused. Other secondary benefits are it has made me more mature and allowed me to make better decisions and I have more knowledge of the world and a stronger moral sense. This has not led me to long-term happiness though, or given me clarity about my depression or my existing relationships.

My friends, I have tried. This show appealed to me because it worked from first principles. In this way, we can know things for certain. That is what I needed in my life - certainty. I have learned a great deal. Read the books and listened to thousands of podcasts. The next step was to apply these ideas in my own life. Well, something is not going right for me. I'm just as confused and depressed as I have been since high school. I have seem some counsellors, each one peculiar to the other. I try to be assertive but find it hard to communicate. Some ideas are perfectly clear including those about politics and UPB. Other ideas are not as polished in my mind. Take the false self. Can this be derived from first principles? As the years have passed, I have been constantly reforming the meaning of this term and many others. So far I understand it to be a conscious or unconscious part of the personality that is dishonest about the person's true mental state, and that it is formed for the need of survival and conformity. Where should I find evidence of this? Perhaps it can be justified if we call it the irrational - as opposed to rational - part of the mind, and that rationality can be derived from first principles? Another idea is the idea of free will. After listening to so many podcasts about this topic, I still don't know why the ability to choose necessitates the ability to have chosen differently, which is the premise Stefan Molyneux keeps falling back on. Another idea is corrupt relationships. What is the standard for that? Through my own contemplation with first principles, I have had to come to risky conclusions. Such that when a person is confronted by the truth, they may choose to be either rational or irrational, and that if they are irrational even when they confront their own irrationality, then they are corrupt. Whether Stefan holds this view, I only can say I wish I knew what he thought. Obligation is also a sticky concept for me. Stefan has argued that we don't have obligations towards our parents. But he also adds that we will likely choose to give back to them if they were good, simply because we want to. But what if feelings are not so clear-cut? Why can't a person desire be arbitrary in some cases? That leads to the other idea of there being a set of true, real, identifiable emotions. Why real emotions are necessarily objective, I do not know. Stefan says these ideas are not original, however, I have never heard him reference any psychologist with regards to these critical concepts. It is much easier for me to believe that free will does not exist so I can treat people as ignorant rather than merely evil. Morality can still exist. We can still be rational animals without being metaphysically free. It is much easier for me to believe that parents screw up without knowing they screwed up rather than being corrupt, this way I don't have the task of sifting corrupt and non-corrupt people. I have tried being honest to the best of my ability, and I expected the depression to disappear, but the only thing that disappears is the fear that I had of confronting others. That fear may have been synthesised because I was so invested in the idea that speaking honestly with people would set me free, and also I was invested into the idea that other people are corrupt. Perhaps by investing in those ideas, it became a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is little reason for me not the think that perhaps I was unlucky. Maybe it's my genes, or the way the world works, or maybe I need some medication. I have tried analysing my dreams, but my dreams end up contradicting each other, and I suspect they are merely reflections of what I had already consciously thought about, usually during the day. If pursuing the good life includes such arbitrary experiences, then maybe it's impossible to find that clarity I'm after. This is what's scary, but it may be true. The universe may not be so benevolent.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_biology