Mole
-
Posts
185 -
Joined
-
Days Won
4
Everything posted by Mole
-
I indeed did accept your syllogism as part of my original formulation. However, I could make an argument that the syllogism is false. Stefan actually made this argument and it seems to be compatible with physicalism. It is that the whole is something else than the sum of its parts. So while atoms are determined, free will is something else that is not determined. This is not contradictory with physical laws because 1. physics doesn't necessitate determinism. 2. physics doesn't necessitate that everything is reduced to particles, in fact it necessitates the opposite. Physics also has laws that apply at one level of analysis but don't apply at others. For example, you can't formulate laws of electrical circuits by looking at individual electrons. Another perhaps stronger example is that you can't formulate theories of consciousness without considering the a whole neural network. Electrical circuits and consciousness exist, so we know that studying particles using Newtonian/Einsteinian/Quantum/String theory physics is inadequate to understanding the world. We have to use different levels of analysis. Hence, we could understand single neurons as being determined in a closed system but we could understand the brain as having free will. Now, this raises a question. It seems the elements of consciousness does depend on reduced parts. For example, emotions light up in one part of the brain. Senses can be reduced to photons entering my retina. Movements are firings of neurons. It seems then that even if the brain has free will, any particular function of the brain must correlate with the functions of its parts or neurons. It would not make sense that I could have a dream but there would be no trace of it in an MRI. Hence, it must be that free will actually determines the position of neurons. That is, there is a bidirectional relationship between the whole brain and its parts. We are accustomed to believing that everything is reducible. That all phenomena are determined by its parts, and those parts are determined by its parts and so on. I needn't see why this is the case. It makes more metaphysical sense to say that the world consists of entities that act according to their nature and that they have relations to other entities including the very parts of the entity itself but that the entity is the originator of its effects. This is indeed how a child would first understand the world. We may try to prove that everything is reducible but we should at least understand that any such conception must be compatible with what I just said and also that it is possible that we can have metaphysics without reduction. The only issue I have with what I have described in this reply this: As I said, the brain must correlate with its parts even if it isn't determined by those parts. A brain cannot do anything unless something has changed in its parts. However, it also seems to follow that it cannot compel free will without it being correlated with its parts. If I decide to shoot a gun, those thoughts will be reflected in my neural structure. How then could I compel free will such that it has an effect in the parts of my neural structure unless free will itself was correlated with my parts? It seems then that free will cannot effect parts of the brain because any deviation from the determinism of particular neurons would itself need to be reflected in those determined neurons meaning that the deviation is not possible. This is a strong argument, I believe, against what I have proposed in this reply, so I am not entirely convinced of what I have said. The only possible solution is that perhaps free will is not physical and that it doesn't have any correlate with particular neurons at all. This isn't as crazy as it sounds. After all, if we are going to even conceive of free will, it seems to be something that is separate from my thoughts because it seems pure free will doesn't have any content or mechanisms whatsoever. It really does seem to be something that precedes my thoughts and hence it could be non-physical. Furthermore, it may not exist in some kind of other realm but rather be some kind of property of the whole brain. In this way it still belongs to the whole and so the idea that the whole is something else than the sum of its parts still stands. This possibility is the most likely if free will does exist. Maybe in such a way it is actually physical but just doesn't correlate with its parts. Whether this is at all possible, I am not sure and it's something I have to think more about.
-
Thanks for your perspective. I'll definitely consider what you said.
-
When I percieve a cloud, the cloud is part of the causal chain that makes up my consciousness in the sense that it led to my perception. But as you seem to agree, consciousness is another part in the entire chain. Well, then what I mean by external is external to the part that is conscious.
-
Sorry, I dont think I know what this means It means that consciousness is one experience. It is not like seperate body limbs. Our experience is one thing. And that correlates with an endogenous system. The system is the neural network, and it is the entire neural network working endogenously that makes consciousness one thing.
-
Hold on. Did Stefan read a book a week?
-
I don't see why truth is not an architectonic good. I should have been more clear in my last comment. The two options in my last comment both have "truth" as the architectonic good. Either actions are truth statements or actions are automatic but either way, we strive towards the truth using our willpower. I believe the architectonic good can be nothing except the truth because all that conscious deliberation is capable of is truth-seeking. All my emotions and hence desires are automatic responses to truth. That might raise the question what is the good that our emotions seek, and I would say that is entirely subjective and based on our biological nature. However, whatever that nature is, it must be consistent with the truth, so, for example, murder could not be a good because murder is not consistent with the truth of morality. The unfortunate thing is that people generally believe that emotions are something to be fought against and we must strive towards some abstract ideal good regardless of how we feel, but that is a paradox. It would mean we would have to be unhappy to be happy. Emotions are responses to thoughts and it could not be otherwise because emotions can't be experienced without context. If you believe something, your emotions will automatically adjust to it. If you believe something contrary to your emotions, you don't really believe it deep down and rather you are rationalising and that is your false self.
-
Technically it must if "I should do X" might be considered a truth statement. However, there is also the approach that "I should do X" is not a truth statement and rather a person will automatically act on knowing the truth. I would presume the second approach to be correct because an ought cannot be derived from an is.
-
I am not sure what you mean out of sync with reality. I am not sure where I said or implied that. I believe these people are conscious, but they cannot retain memories so they cannot remember what they did. I don't necessarily think physicalism would hold matter to be primary. I think it can hold matter to be identical to consciousness. In fact, I think it is crucial that it is identical because if consciousness was an after effect of matter, then consciousness would be determined by external elements which is the brain, but that would be determinism. But if consciousness is the elements in the brain, then it is not determined by those elements, it simply is those elements. This means no external elements are necessarily determining it or it's outputs, so it can be self-caused.
-
Maybe I should say not contingent instead of independent? (1) As with the definition of free will, I mean not determined by. (2) Also, what do you mean by a physically appropriate surrogate? (3) (1) - See my first comment in this reply above. (2) - Ok. (3) - Sure. Back then (IQ-G), now, additionally (living vs. dying) I was thinking back then about how IQ-G (biologically determined) isn't sufficient for free-will, from personal observation, empirically too. Place two smart enough individuals side by side and if one of them isn't capable to manifest free-will in a scenario where the other was capable to utilise it, it's fair to conclude, free-will required more than just sufficient bodies/brains...or 'whatnot' (Chemistry is 'reallyverytoomuch' complicated here, for me) But now, when I have re-visited it, it's also likely that since free-will can be partially blocked/erased (ie - in abuse, coercion, threat), it must have been either intrinsically present before as a capability and later developed further into a more complex sytem. Or in the case if it wasn't intrinsically there, maybe it was taught/learnt. Which made me ask: Would an individual be able to survive on a deserted island (provided enough food, no predators, endless supply of fdr podcasts... was available) by having to rely on the self only, to invent and then manifest free-will? I think yes. It's because life's core part is an endless chain and continous manifestations of choices. Failing at making decisions on a continuous basis, equals to being very good at atrophy, dying. Does what I have written make sense to you? Oh, I see what you mean by physically appropriate surrogate now. You were just trying to explain how 'will' is dependent on the physical world, particularly dependent on the kind of thing it manifests (particular brains). Yes, that may be a problem for dualism. What I understand from the rest of what you said is that you are questioning the pre-requisites of the 'will'. I would agree with Stefan here that free will is the ability to compare an ideal standard. That entails particular relationships in the brain. It is essentially a pattern of consciousness.
-
Then it seems they are like animals? I would think animals don't have free will.
-
My argument doesn't necessarily need the 'will' to be an extra function, though it may be. The 'will' is a part of conscious experience, and I think my argument would apply to our entire conscious experience, so the 'will' would be covered by that, whatever the 'will' is exactly. My argument is basically trying to defend the idea of self-causation. Consciousness is a unified experience that perfectly correlates with a multi-directional, unified causal chain. The chain causes human actions. Since the chain is unified and consciousness is unified, external causes cannot change the chain without the entire chain changing. Because the entire chain is changed, consciousness is changed so that it is aware of this external cause. However, if it is aware of this external cause, then the external cause does not determine the conscious experience, so it does not determine human action. Yes, every action is 'determined' by prior causes but we are fully experiencing all these causes, so there are no unknown factors if that makes sense. Rather than actions being determined by external causes, they are self-caused. We often think that if consciousness is contingent on some causal chain, that means it is determined by things outside of our control. But if consciousness is the causal chain, then we only have to worry about causes external to that chain.
-
Haha, thanks. I'm just experimenting with my style. Thanks for contributing to my experiment
-
Your example seems to be a case against free will rather than the will itself. I would think the will is self-evident just as consciousness is self-evident.
-
I have now replaced Cartesian dualism with mind-body dualism. Maybe I should say not contingent instead of independent? As with the definition of free will, I mean not determined by. Also, what do you mean by a physically appropriate surrogate? There are two different meaning to levels. I am aware researchers are splicing up awareness and even free will to say that there are different degrees of free will working at the same time. Another meaning is reflected in the paper you cited, which is suggesting different stages of awareness, just like developmental stages that a child goes through. I will evaluate both meanings with the original idea I had posted. First meaning (degrees of free will): It seems to me that if my argument is sound then our awareness is fundamentally in control of external causes affecting it. For example, I may be thirsty, but my thirst doesn't over-ride my free will. Because awareness is unified (awareness is a whole package) it seems that if any external cause were to create an effect in my neural network, the neural network would act as a whole to integrate this effect with the rest of the neural network through causal links that go through the entire network. Indeed, this is exactly what we experience when we realise we are thirsty. The neurobiological changes reflect the phenomenological changes. Because of this reason, I have doubt that there are levels of free will. Second meaning (stages of free will): Of course, responsibility depends on knowledge. It would seem that as more information is integrated the person reaches higher stages of free will.
-
I shouldn't have assumed that you know what I mean, I apologise for that. By specific details, I just mean the actual things I have written down outside of the context of the idea I'm trying to convey. I was not accusing you of doing this, but just cautioning you if you are. Someone can say something factually incorrect but they say it for a purpose and sometimes people when responding ignore the purpose. But it doesn't really matter if what is said is factually incorrect if the purpose is still meaningful in the larger context. But now I know you weren't doing this, you just didn't understand the purpose of why I said that.
-
I think you know what I mean. To be more specific, the possible choices are dependent on external events, but that making the choice among the possible choice is independent of external events. I would prefer if people respond to the actual argument rather than particular things I have written unless they can show that it's relevant to my actual argument/whole idea. The purpose of writing this post is to convey an idea and that's it, I don't have time to discuss particular details of what I wrote unless is it pertinent to the idea.
-
Physicalism (Materialism) Verifies Free Will Defining free will and physicalism The 'will' is the conscious experience of deciding and initiating human actions. Stefan Molyneux defines free will as the ability to compare an action to an ideal standard, but I will take a broader definition of free will which I would assume Stefan would agree with (without allowing for compatibilism): Free will is the ability to choose between possible actions independently of events that are external to a persons 'will'. That is, a person who decided to pursue action A at time X could have chosen action B under exactly the same external circumstances if he or she had 'willed' to do so. The opposite of free will is determinism which is: the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the 'will'. Another definition of determinism is that events including the 'will' are determined by previously existing causes, however, this definition will not be used because I believe it does not necessarily touch the core of the issue which is whether our 'will' can act undetermined by external causes. If we were to assume this second definition, then determinism would be compatible with free will. Physicalism (also known as materialism) is the doctrine that the real world consists only of the physical world. The contradiction between free will and physicalism In this section, I will play devil's advocate and suggest a contradiction between free will and physicalism. Stefan argues that it is self-evident that free will exists, i.e., that our will causes human actions, as anyone arguing against this is causing their human action of 'arguing'. Not only that, but they are assuming that the other person is in a sense causing their 'listening' or 'acceptance' or 'non-acceptance' of their argument, which are also human actions. An issue with free will that probably troubles the minds of others in this community is that if free will is self-evident, it is true. If it is true, then determinism is false. If determinism is false then physicalism is false. It seems if we accept free will, we must abandon physicalism and adopt mind-body dualism, that is, that the 'will' is real but is independent of the physical world. It seems that the physical world is synonymous with objective reality because all that is objective is in some way measurable and that which is measurable is physical. However, mind-body dualism would mean that reality consists of more than objective reality, which means truth is subjective. However, the statement that 'truth is subjective' demonstrates that truth is objective, which is a contradiction. We are left in a bind. Either determinism or free will is true. Determinism must be false because free will is self-evident, and free will must be false because mind-body dualism is self-contradictory. This is a contradiction. Defending free will and physicalism I believe there is an error in the above reasoning. It does not follow that "if determinism is false then physicalism is false". In fact, I will now argue that if physicalism is true, then free will is true, and hence determinism is false. The 'will', self, or consciousness exists and this is self-evident (cogito ergo sum; I think therefore I am). Therefore, physicalism would imply that the 'will' is physical. This conclusion is in line with physicalist theories of consciousness including Integrated Information Theory (IIT) which states that a system's consciousness is determined by its causal properties and is therefore an intrinsic, fundamental property of any physical system. If physicalism is true, then consciousness is a property of the causal links between neurons in a person's neural network. Then, consciousness is identical to the neural network. They are one of the same. If consciousness is the neural network, then our 'will' is also the neural network. Determinism would suggest that human actions are caused by this neural network but that human actions are caused by events external to our 'will': Determinism would suggest that the neural network itself is determined by external events such as non-conscious 'zombie' networks or neural networks connected to but external to the brain such as the peripheral nervous system. Therefore, if our brain determines actions and our brain is determined by external events, then our actions are determined by external events. However, it is not necessarily the case that external events determine our conscious neural network. According to IIT, the neural network is causally linked in such a way that the system is more akin to a positive feedback loop than a feed-forward system. That is, rather than external events causing consciousness causing action, external events play a role in consciousness (for example, I might say the reason I drank a glass of water is that I am thirsty) but that consciousness is caused by prior consciousness. Therefore, actions would be caused by consciousness, but consciousness would not be caused by external events. And because the 'will' is synonymous with our experience of consciousness, our 'will' has self-caused the action. It is not even that non-conscious processes cause our 'will'. It is that our 'will' and indeed our 'self' is composed in that integrated neural network that plays out causes and effects with itself. This is exactly what free will is, it is the freedom of the 'will' to act without being determined by external events, and because the ‘will’ is equal to the neural networks, the neural networks don’t count as external events. The best way to describe free will would be to say that it is an endogenous system. So we must conclude that physicalism actually demonstrates that free will is true and determinism is false. Looking at it from this perspective, it is completely, both ontologically and metaphysically accurate to say that 'I' convinced myself do to action A or action B. Conclusion The conception of free will I have suggested seems to dissolve much of the worries that people have about determinism. Some may worry that if determinism is true, then how can we ever be satisfied that we act rationally or are responsible for our actions? If external events determined that I would do something irrational or evil, how are we to expect any kind of integrity from ourselves. If we cannot expect integrity from ourselves, how can we say that we are really rational animals and how can we assign responsibility to ourselves and others? It seems that if determinism is true, then we are in a way doomed to a quasi-pathological life and we are fundamentally not in control of our own happiness. I believe this is the fundamental worry among free willers. The conception of free will I suggest solves this issue by suggesting that our self-integrity lies within the physical integrity (literally the integrated information) in our neural networks that retain a self-generating, endogenous system. If we look at free will with a physicalist lense, I believe we can preserve free will without compromising physicalism.
-
My bad! I meant ought from an is! Rookie mistake. I'll correct that.
-
The reason I said that perhaps one problem with her view is that there is no ought from an is is because she seems to think that reason should be used separately from emotion, but reason alone cannot derive an ought from an is, so it will ultimately fail. You seem to be saying that Rand would say that a man is only a man if he thinks (deductively). I am not sure how your comment relates to my quote.
-
I think what you are saying is that as long as my intent is clear, then I will become what I think I will become?
-
I'm not sure what you are trying to explain, could you elaborate?
-
I'll read it in the coming weeks. No spoils!
-
Reason Vs. Emotion Vs. Belief Vs. Consciousness Reason, emotion, belief, and consciousness, have a fundamental place in epistemology and psychology but I have not found where they sit. I especially haven't found where they sit from first principles. My hope with this discussion is that these things can find their proper place. Emotions reflect belief and beliefs are always rational I have some ideas, each with their own arguments and evidence. From what I gather, Stefan has an implicit, specific conception of the relation between these things. The two major premises I can identify are 1) Emotions reflect belief, and 2) beliefs are always rational. Now, this second premise seems obviously false, but there is a corollary to it 3) beliefs do not necessarily reflect conscious thought. I should make it clear, by beliefs I mean what we really believe deep down and might not even be conscious of. Evidence for It's from these premises that much of the psychology in this community can be explained. We can explain the true self as rationality and the collection of beliefs. We can explain the false self as the origin of conscious thought that is not wholly informed by beliefs. We can explain free will by saying that it is a choice whether conscious thought wholly informs itself with belief. It also conforms with the evidence. It explains self-defence mechanisms where a person consciously thinks something but believes something else. It explains how personalities as a collective can be fragmented throughout history from all the evils that take place. It gives foundation to how a child protects themselves with false thoughts. It explains how psychotherapy works, by uncovering beliefs using critical thinking and self-reflection. It explains procrastination, as procrastination just reflects the belief of resentment. It would suggest we should follow our emotions as long as we identify them properly. Evidence against The issue is, there is a lot of evidence against these things. Are emotional leftist protesters simply misunderstanding their emotions? Are they masking a true self with a false self? Do people fall for propaganda because of the false self, or maybe we aren't actually innately rational? Another problem is, it seems incredibly redundant to have a true self making calculations, and then a false self making entirely different calculations about the same thing. Cognitive therapies suggest something is wrong with cognition itself. For example, schema therapy suggests that we have core beliefs that are often themselves unconscious and formed in childhood that are irrational and make us feel some ways or generate negative thoughts. It would be strange to have an extra layer to this by saying that those irrational core 'beliefs' are preceded by true beliefs. It is very hard for me to believe that emotions reflect belief and beliefs are always rational. But it also explains so much and makes life a lot easier. Argument for from first principles Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Rather than doing some kind of trial-and-error, making observations, etc, an argument from first principles would take away a lot of doubt about the psychology taught in this community. I would think that arguing for these psycho-epistemological concepts from first principles would be the most important thing, as the psycho-epistemology kind of defines what this whole community is about. I tried to find these first principles, and I found these quotes from Ayn Rand. "There can be no causeless love or any sort of causeless emotion. An emotion is a response to a fact of reality, an estimate dictated by your standards." (Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual, p. 147) All knowledge is derived from reality, so emotions follow cognition. Perhaps we could further say from this that emotions reflect cognition. And, perhaps we can assume cognition and reason that goes with it have sovereignty. Indeed, doesn't seem logical that a rational faculty would allow something like 2+2=5. It is more likely that anyone who thinks such a thing is not using their rational faculty. It would also seem strange that the rational faculty would switch off, rather than keep working at the background. In fact, I think that our very feeling of having a self and having free will sort of rest upon the idea that we have some kind of sovereignty, and that we know what is best for ourselves, and we trust our faculties to give us the most accurate information possible. Perhaps this should be self-evident. Perhaps this is self-evident to any peacefully parented individual. Argument against from first principles Ayn Rand would disagree with our second premise; that beliefs are always rational. "Your subconscious is like a computer—more complex a computer than men can build—and its main function is the integration of your ideas. Who programs it? Your conscious mind. If you default, if you don’t reach any firm convictions, your subconscious is programmed by chance—and you deliver yourself into the power of ideas you do not know you have accepted. But one way or the other, your computer gives you print-outs, daily and hourly, in the form of emotions—which are lightning-like estimates of the things around you, calculated according to your values." (Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It?, p. 5) also, "An emotion as such tells you nothing about reality, beyond the fact that something makes you feel something. Without a ruthlessly honest commitment to introspection—to the conceptual identification of your inner states—you will not discover what you feel, what arouses the feeling, and whether your feeling is an appropriate response to the facts of reality, or a mistaken response, or a vicious illusion produced by years of self-deception . . . . In the field of introspection, the two guiding questions are: “What do I feel?” and “Why do I feel it?” (Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It?, p. 17) Rand is seeming to suggest emotions can reflect irrational thoughts. It seems beliefs held in the subconscious can be 'programmed by chance'. She says that using the rational faculty is not automatic but voluntary. So it has sovereignty, but it is up to a person to use it. Her view does make a lot of sense. Our working memory is incredibly limited, so thinking rationally would be incredibly limited. Perhaps there is no 'true self' beyond our ability to reason consciously. If Rand is right, I believe it challenges the psychology of this community. Rather than listening to a true self, and to emotions and their origins, her views would suggest we should rather use reason alone to find what is the right thing to do and to create habits out of it. Perhaps one problem with her view is that there is no ought from an is. It makes a lot of sense to me that only emotions can tell us something as trivial as what flavour of ice cream to have and something as serious as whether I should really marry some person. Maybe the truth is somewhere in between. Maybe the subconscious can be 'programmed by chance', but maybe it a somewhat active system which holds our true beliefs, while our conscious thoughts themselves can differ. What do people think? Can these premises be proven from first principles? Maybe you think the premises I outlined are inaccurate? How do you think is the best way to approach and deal with emotions and choices? Have any podcasts/books to share about this stuff?
-
Isn't it both? Sensations can be contradictory. The brain will have to integrate or block out any contradictions between sensations before it becomes conscious or perceived. For example, with binocular rivalry, I can have one stimulus through my left eye and another through my right. But I will only perceive one of these stimuli at any time. Perceptions are always integrated in such a way. For example, in the attached image, the smaller figure cannot be a cube inside a cube-shaped room and a notch of a larger cube or a smaller cube in front of a larger cube all at the same time. That would be logically contradictory. We can perceive one of these things at any time, and this demonstrates that perceptions are non-contradictory. The same with colour, I am sure there are some illusions where the perception of colours alternative. We derive logic from perception rather than sensation.
-
I'm not sure what that means. Even something fragmented has specific points at specific times in specific relations. As long as those points cannot appear as blue and green at the same time, we can find non-contradiction.