Jot

Yeah, I am of the same mind.

How much make-up is a turnoff?

I meant synthetic not analytic, in my OP I defined them correctly but for whatever reason I always confuse them, meaning synthetic when I write analytic and the other way around... You claimed 2 times in a row that my argument was inductive not deductive, I offered a rebuttal, what is your response to it? Am I wrong that it is a deductive argument? Thanks, this really helps.

Crap...you are right. What is funny is that in my original post I did not make this confusion...and this is not the first time I make this confusion, for some reason based on how these words sound to me my mind finds it more natural to be the other way around.

Premises are propositions. And premises can be wrong/false. And you still need to define your terms, "best" is not an appropriate qualifier in your statement. You are confusing analytic with synthetic, it is the other way around. Ignoring that, Stefan disagrees with this, I would like to hear your counter-argument to his argument, http://www.fdrpodcasts.com/#/237/the-analyticsynthetic-dichotomy-how-confusion-serves-power(@16-20 mins)

Then why did you say "nothing is knowable" instead of nothing analytic is knowable? To return to your counter-argument: "I'm not sure how this is different than saying "if nothing is knowable, then nothing is knowable" It is different because my argument was a Modus ponens which is a valid form of argument, not a tautology as you claimed. Proof: 1. If the laws of matter are not consistent then the analytic-synthetic distinction is valid. 2. The laws of matter are not consistent. (the premise you agreed to accept as true for the sake of the argument) 3. Thus, the analytic-synthetic distinction is valid. What I tried to argue in the precedent post was that squares, circles and any geometrical shape cannot describe the shape of any physical object because "if you zoom in enough any object in nature that looks like a circle you will find that at some point that thing does not look like a circle anymore and in fact was never a circle to being with because it has imperfections alongside its circumference and even if we did find such a thing, it would still be 3D, would not it? Even atoms occupy space so I do not see how a 2D object is possible in the physical world, only as a concept in the brain." Even the closest physical object to a square in the physical world is not a square but an approximation of the concept of a square. What other quality does the concept of the square have outside of the shape? Indeed but what about a simulation? If you are a brain in a vat you can only know what is simulated, can you really have analytic knowledge of the reality that is outside your brain? Word games is not an argument. If we are a brain in a vat we could at best have theories about the simulation we live in, not about the reality itself that is outside of our senses.

The law of detachment (also known as affirming the antecedent and Modus ponens) is the first form of deductive reasoning. A single conditional statement is made, and a hypothesis (P) is stated. The conclusion (Q) is then deduced from the statement and the hypothesis. The most basic form is: If P, then Q. P. Therefore, Q. 1. If Stefan claims knowledge over at least one analytic claim then he rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction. 2. Stefan claims knowledge over at least one analytic claim. 3. Thus, Stefan rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction. Am I missing something?

Notice that never in this thread I said "nothing is knowable", otherwise this would have been a thread about nihilism. What I tried to argue is that nothing of the physical reality is knowable (analytical claims cannot be proved) given that there is such a thing as analytic/synthetic distinction (if it is a valid dichotomy). Synthetic claims are provable in any kind of solipsistic universe. "If matter and energy are so variable and random that no objects can be defined, then we have far bigger problems than debating how accurate concepts can be" This is something I tried to wrap my mind around way long before I found out FDR. And I am still not able to get too far with this. First off, I am not sure from which premises got you to no objects can be defined if matter and energy are variable. Are you exclusively talking about physical objects? If we take the example of the square circle for example, how could matter and energy ever change in a way in which this would be possible? Would not this concept be impossible no matter what properties the physical roam has? (As a sidenote, how did we arrive at the concept of the square and circle or any other geometrical form to begin with? After all, there is nothing in nature that is a square or a circle...if you zoom in enough any object in nature that looks like a circle you will find that at some point that thing does not look like a circle anymore and in fact was never a circle to being with because it has imperfections alongside its circumference and even if we did find such a thing, it would still be 3D, would not it? Even atoms occupy space so I do not see how a 2D object is possible in the physical world, only as a concept in the brain. Once a concept is defined it does not matter what happens to its physical correspondent in reality, does it? If we witness a man that is a bachelor and we create the concept of an unmarried bachelor in our heads, no matter what happens to physical reality this concept will never lose its validity, would it? I am also curious if is possible for someone who was born without senses to come up with any concepts...would such a person ever be able to come up with the laws of non-contradiction or identity? Or with any mathematical concepts? What could stop him from being able to do so?

Did/ Do you also feel uncomfortable around women your age? Or is it that you just did not feel an interest for them?

Did you read my OP? I argued that knowledge of any world requires that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is invalid/false. If you cannot prove that this distinction is wrong then you have to admit that we cannot know whether analytical propositions are true or false. How do you solve the hard problem of solipsism? (How do you know you are not a brain in a vat?) In fact, I think you are correct, even if they could change that would not mean that you cannot make knowledge claims for the present moment, instead of "unchangeable" I should have said consistent (that is, across the whole physical reality they behave the same). Analytic propositions such as "Gases always expand when heated" can only be a certainty only if we know that the properties of matter are consistent. If the laws of matter are not consistent then the analytic-synthetic distinction is valid since we cannot make claims such as "Gases always expand when heated" for example or any other analytical claim. Thus, knowledge of analytical truths/external world is impossible.

This thread was never about utilitarianism.

Then we have to admit that the synthetic-analytic dichotomy is valid and that analytic knowledge (100% certainty) is impossible. In other words knowledge of the physical world is impossible.

Why is it necessarily implied? You could mean should as in unchosen positive obligations, that is the difference I was talking about.

It might save me some frustration over the fact that I can not disprove the usual claims of woo-peddlers. Also, truth is my most important value so sometimes I am pretty big on the foundations of knowledge itself. So answer his question...how could your life change right now if that was the case?

It is not a logical deduction. It is implied but you can not make the leap to absolute certainty unless you prove that synthetic-analytic distinction is bollocks. Schizophrenic people often have hallucinations. They can hear or see things that are not there in the external world. They only exist in their brains. So the way they perceive things is not necessarily the way things are in the exteranl world. The "reality" in their heads is not congruent with reality itself. This is a big part of my motivation too. As I said, to me truth is the most important value, so I do not believe it is hard to see why something as big as the very foundation of epistemology itself would be of importance to me. It is not like this topic is about some little insignificant detail. The hard problem of solipsism is a problem of philosophy, not physics.

This is what I said: "by deduction from his viewpoints on epistemology, in general, it seems to me that he rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction" I heard him making statements/arguments that are logically incompatible with this distinction, things like, I am paraphrasing "a tree is a tree, it does not magically turn into something else" , "objects always fall down" and more statements of this sort. I can deduct that he does not accept this dichotomy since he claims absolute certainty over things like these. Yeah, you can put it like this. As I presumed Stefan does not agree with this, he said that this dichotomy is quite non-sensical. He talks about this here. His actual argument against it between the minutes 16-20 approximately. His argument, as I understood it is that since concepts are derived from the observation of empirical reality which is made out of atoms that behave in a consistent manner you cannot say that purely abstract concepts hold more validity than observations made by the senses since the very tools of creating the concepts in the first place are the senses and in order for the concepts to be able to be created it requires that matter behaves consistently.

I think 2) is the core issue here. This is exactly my case as well. If you were to tape every second of the relationship dynamic between my parents since I was born till now it would be impossible to tell whether they were a married couple or two old siblings that lived together out of necessity and have been bored of each other for a long time. Seriously, there has been just as much sexual tension between my parents than between me and my sister, and no, nothing out of ordinary ever happened between us two. Would you not be even more embarrassed to tell your parents that you have a girlfriend than your friends? I think your parents shame about sexuality and relationships was transferred to you. If as a child you witnessed that your parents are not intimated with each other, this transmitted you a message about sexuality and intimate relationships, so if your parents were ashamed of intimacy then the messaged you got is that intimacy is shameful.

I do not think this is right, UPB works on axioms, not assertions, otherwise, we should consider it a science. Tautologies and syllogisms are not the same thing.

If you define gases:"an airlike fluid substance which expands when heated" (or something along these lines) then you are correct. However, I have never heard someone define a gas like this...the most common definition you will find I think is gas:a substance possessing perfect molecular mobility and the property of indefinite expansion, as opposed to a solid or liquid. Using the second definition the problem is now a purely analytical one, expansion when heated is an observation not part of the definition itself. So you are saying that there is no difference between the physical world and the conceptual/abstract/world created in the mind, how is something like daltonism possible under this premise? What is the reason for you becoming increasingly sarcastic? The exact same argument could be made about morality...it does not matter whether there is objective morality because people of good conscience would still act as they acted before "morally" and bad people would still act "immorally" yet I do not see you complaining about Stefan having put so much effort in coming up with UPB. The interest is personal. That is right. But if there is no guarantee that it wont change in the future then how can we know it has always been the same way in the past?

There is a difference between "should" and "IF X then you should". When you use "should" without the conditional IF then should = It is moral to X /It is immoral not to X. Example: You should be moral. I am arguing that there is no logical principle by which you can sustain that the use of this type of "should" is logical/reasonable/valid. The other type of should, "IF X then you should " This is the one you are talking about which is different from the one I was arguing against. Example: If you WANT to be moral then you should conform to a universal standard of truth => change your mind => behavior must change in order to accept a universal truth. This is the way I see this, I welcome counter arguments. Why? Aren't arguments meant to be deductive?

No. There are no "shoulds", there is no principle that says that you "should" act morally. All UPB is about is what can be universalized and what can not. Things that can be universalized are either neutral or moral and those actions that cannot are immoral. There is no link to the effects or potential effects of those actions, just the laws of identity and non-contradiction.

The thing that makes someone a Christian or not is if he believes in the divinity of Jesus and the existence of the Abrahamic god. Stefan does not believe in those. It does not matter that he shares some common beliefs with the doctrines or the Christians. Those are meaningless if he does not believe in God.

My interest is not the level of usefulness of analytic propositions, it is the level of certainty that we have regarding them compared to synthetic propositions. Kevin posted the link to one of Stefan's podcasts where he talks exactly about this subject. Stefan disagrees with this dichotomy as I expected, since you hold the opposite view I would like to hear your attempt at rebutting the argument he gave against it (the argument starts @16th min of the podcast) If you find a gas that doesn't expand when heated you either didn't heat it, or it isn't a gas - : CLAIM. Substantiate it. which would give a synthetic solution to the analytical problem : I am not seeing the reason you could be giving for why the problem is analytical...to me it looks like it is purely a synthetic problem all along. What did you mean? My take is, why is this concerning? Is anyone dying from it? : My most important value is truth. I think it is pretty easy to see why this problem could be of interest to me. Just think about the implications if it is indeed the case that there is a distinction between these two and such we cannot have in fact knowledge of the external world.

His argument, as I understood it is that since concepts are derived from the observation of empirical reality which is made out of atoms that behave in a consistent manner you cannot say that purely abstract concepts hold more validity than observations made by the senses since the very tools of creating the concepts in the first place are the senses and in order for the concepts to be able to be created it requires that matter behaves consistently. I think that this argument relies on the core premise that matter (atoms) has, is and will always have the same properties and behave the same way, in other words atmos cannot ever change their behavior, they are fixed from the very beginning of time and cannot ever be other way than they are now. My challenge is the following: How do we know that this is the case? And the second challenge that I have is: How does Stefan or any other man know that he is not a brain in a vat while making that argument? Or, how does he solve the hard problem of solipsism? (Metaphysical solipsism)

If there is one thing that I never "came to terms with" in regards to Stefan's views on the major areas of philosophy is his take on epistemology. I could not identify from the very beginning what exactly was bothering me when he would argue epistemological problems but after a while, I think I identified the source of my distress, that is the synthetic-analytic distinction. I do not actually remember him ever specifically addressing this issue but by deduction from his viewpoints on epistemology, in general, it seems to me that he rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction (I have also read that Ayn Rand rejected this distinction too and since Stefan said that his views on epistemology mostly come from her, I would not be surprised if he does indeed reject this as well). The synthetic-analytic distinction basically puts propositions in 2 categories: -analytic propositions: those propositions "which are true by virtue of their meaning" Ex. There are no married bachelors. -synthetic propositions: those propositions which "are true by how their meaning relates to the world" Ex. Gases expand when heated. What I am arguing is that there is a fundamental difference of certainty we can have in relation to those 2 categories. The difference is that we can prove (100% certainty) whether an analytic statement is true or false, in other words, we have knowledge regarding those but we cannot prove whether a synthetic proposition is true or false since we must rely on external observation and experimentation and not on the laws of logic. How could we prove for example that we are not a brain in a vat? However, my impression is that Stefan does not believe in this distinction (is my impression wrong?) for him "gases expand when heated" and "there are no square circles" are equally "provable". How come? Did he ever give any arguments for this? Ultimately, what is your take on this subject?