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Reason Vs. Emotion Vs. Belief Vs. Consciousness Reason, emotion, belief, and consciousness, have a fundamental place in epistemology and psychology but I have not found where they sit. I especially haven't found where they sit from first principles. My hope with this discussion is that these things can find their proper place. Emotions reflect belief and beliefs are always rational I have some ideas, each with their own arguments and evidence. From what I gather, Stefan has an implicit, specific conception of the relation between these things. The two major premises I can identify are 1) Emotions reflect belief, and 2) beliefs are always rational. Now, this second premise seems obviously false, but there is a corollary to it 3) beliefs do not necessarily reflect conscious thought. I should make it clear, by beliefs I mean what we really believe deep down and might not even be conscious of. Evidence for It's from these premises that much of the psychology in this community can be explained. We can explain the true self as rationality and the collection of beliefs. We can explain the false self as the origin of conscious thought that is not wholly informed by beliefs. We can explain free will by saying that it is a choice whether conscious thought wholly informs itself with belief. It also conforms with the evidence. It explains self-defence mechanisms where a person consciously thinks something but believes something else. It explains how personalities as a collective can be fragmented throughout history from all the evils that take place. It gives foundation to how a child protects themselves with false thoughts. It explains how psychotherapy works, by uncovering beliefs using critical thinking and self-reflection. It explains procrastination, as procrastination just reflects the belief of resentment. It would suggest we should follow our emotions as long as we identify them properly. Evidence against The issue is, there is a lot of evidence against these things. Are emotional leftist protesters simply misunderstanding their emotions? Are they masking a true self with a false self? Do people fall for propaganda because of the false self, or maybe we aren't actually innately rational? Another problem is, it seems incredibly redundant to have a true self making calculations, and then a false self making entirely different calculations about the same thing. Cognitive therapies suggest something is wrong with cognition itself. For example, schema therapy suggests that we have core beliefs that are often themselves unconscious and formed in childhood that are irrational and make us feel some ways or generate negative thoughts. It would be strange to have an extra layer to this by saying that those irrational core 'beliefs' are preceded by true beliefs. It is very hard for me to believe that emotions reflect belief and beliefs are always rational. But it also explains so much and makes life a lot easier. Argument for from first principles Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Rather than doing some kind of trial-and-error, making observations, etc, an argument from first principles would take away a lot of doubt about the psychology taught in this community. I would think that arguing for these psycho-epistemological concepts from first principles would be the most important thing, as the psycho-epistemology kind of defines what this whole community is about. I tried to find these first principles, and I found these quotes from Ayn Rand. "There can be no causeless love or any sort of causeless emotion. An emotion is a response to a fact of reality, an estimate dictated by your standards." (Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual, p. 147) All knowledge is derived from reality, so emotions follow cognition. Perhaps we could further say from this that emotions reflect cognition. And, perhaps we can assume cognition and reason that goes with it have sovereignty. Indeed, doesn't seem logical that a rational faculty would allow something like 2+2=5. It is more likely that anyone who thinks such a thing is not using their rational faculty. It would also seem strange that the rational faculty would switch off, rather than keep working at the background. In fact, I think that our very feeling of having a self and having free will sort of rest upon the idea that we have some kind of sovereignty, and that we know what is best for ourselves, and we trust our faculties to give us the most accurate information possible. Perhaps this should be self-evident. Perhaps this is self-evident to any peacefully parented individual. Argument against from first principles Ayn Rand would disagree with our second premise; that beliefs are always rational. "Your subconscious is like a computer—more complex a computer than men can build—and its main function is the integration of your ideas. Who programs it? Your conscious mind. If you default, if you don’t reach any firm convictions, your subconscious is programmed by chance—and you deliver yourself into the power of ideas you do not know you have accepted. But one way or the other, your computer gives you print-outs, daily and hourly, in the form of emotions—which are lightning-like estimates of the things around you, calculated according to your values." (Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It?, p. 5) also, "An emotion as such tells you nothing about reality, beyond the fact that something makes you feel something. Without a ruthlessly honest commitment to introspection—to the conceptual identification of your inner states—you will not discover what you feel, what arouses the feeling, and whether your feeling is an appropriate response to the facts of reality, or a mistaken response, or a vicious illusion produced by years of self-deception . . . . In the field of introspection, the two guiding questions are: “What do I feel?” and “Why do I feel it?” (Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It?, p. 17) Rand is seeming to suggest emotions can reflect irrational thoughts. It seems beliefs held in the subconscious can be 'programmed by chance'. She says that using the rational faculty is not automatic but voluntary. So it has sovereignty, but it is up to a person to use it. Her view does make a lot of sense. Our working memory is incredibly limited, so thinking rationally would be incredibly limited. Perhaps there is no 'true self' beyond our ability to reason consciously. If Rand is right, I believe it challenges the psychology of this community. Rather than listening to a true self, and to emotions and their origins, her views would suggest we should rather use reason alone to find what is the right thing to do and to create habits out of it. Perhaps one problem with her view is that there is no ought from an is. It makes a lot of sense to me that only emotions can tell us something as trivial as what flavour of ice cream to have and something as serious as whether I should really marry some person. Maybe the truth is somewhere in between. Maybe the subconscious can be 'programmed by chance', but maybe it a somewhat active system which holds our true beliefs, while our conscious thoughts themselves can differ. What do people think? Can these premises be proven from first principles? Maybe you think the premises I outlined are inaccurate? How do you think is the best way to approach and deal with emotions and choices? Have any podcasts/books to share about this stuff?

The importance of rational ethics We are born into the world not simply to learn facts about the world but also to make choices. These choices are conscious and deliberate, therefore when we make them we are trying to base them off something we have consciously learned. Some kind of knowledge that allows for this decision making must exist, even if this knowledge is simply that we should follow our instincts. The knowledge for choices that are within our rational self-interest is called ethics. Naturally, we must find what ethics is if we are to be rational. What is essential to ethics is that it is rational, and any alternative is irrational or non-rational. If we are arguing for ethics, we are arguing that it is within peoples' rational self-interest to follow ethics. If our ethical system cannot be proven to be rational, it is not an ethical system. Indeed, people have criticised UPB for supposedly failing to prove ethics is rational (1, 2, 3). This is why when I read Universally Preferable Behaviour (UPB; 4) it was my intention to focus on why UPB is rational. It is imperative to prove that it is rational to follow ethics, as this is the only defence against nihilism. My understanding of rational ethics after reading UPB (UPeB) After reading UPB four times, I came to a specific understanding of ethics which I think makes a slightly different argument to UPB, but nevertheless works from the similar axioms. I mistakenly took 'universally preferable' to be synonymous with 'universally permissible'. A universally permissible behaviour (UPeB) is a behaviour that I can prefer and it doesn't necessarily conflict with any other person's preferences. In that sense, they are permitting my behaviour. E.g., I prefer jazz and everyone else could permit that I prefer jazz, therefore jazz is UPeB. I prefer murder but my victim necessarily does not permit the murder, therefore murder is not UPeB. My argument is laid out here in syllogistic form: 1. Preferred behaviours are deliberate. (Conscious, voluntary, etc.) 2. Deliberation requires beliefs. (Propositions, truth statements, etc.) 3. Preferred behaviours are based on beliefs. (E.g. I should listen to jazz, I should murder) 1. Preferred behaviours are based on beliefs. 2. Beliefs must be universally permissible to be true. (Reality is objective. Therefore, beliefs cannot be true for some people and false for others. Therefore, true beliefs are permissible as being true by everyone.) 3. Preferred behaviours that are not universally permissible must be based on false beliefs. 1. Preferred behaviours that are not universally permissible are based on false beliefs. 2. Falsehood is irrational. (I cannot think or deliberate without knowledge. That would be like trying to sail without a compass.) 3. Preferred behaviours that are not universally permissible are irrational. (Murder, rape, theft, fraud, lying, etc are irrational.) Stefan's understanding of ethics (UPB) When I skimmed the book recently, I realised I made a mistake. Stefan makes clear on page 51 that 'preferable' means preferences that are required for some individual to attain an end, and 'universally preferable' means required for any individual (objectively required) to attain an end. E.g., if you want to lose weight (end) it is objectively required (universally preferable) that the output of calories is greater than the input of calories. This meaning of 'universally preferable' seems to differ to my original understanding. UPB proper seems to deal with essential means to an end. My UPeB seems to deal with the objectivity of true beliefs. Is UPB rational ethics? The big question is, can UPB be proven to be rational? I.e., is someone who doesn't follow UPB being irrational? Stefan argues for why UPB exists in syllogistic form (page 55), but doesn't seem to argue for why UPB is rational in syllogistic form. However, he does mention that moral theories must be rational to be true (page 63), thus he implies that if UPB exists, it must be rational. I suspect that the proof of the rationality of UPB is similar to my argument for the rationality of UPeB. The proof of the rationality of UPB in syllogistic form would look something like this: 1. All rational beliefs have an argumentative form. (If I believe something, I should be able to argue for it.) 2. Rational preferred behaviours are based on rational beliefs. 3. All rational preferred behaviours have an argumentative form. 1. All rational preferred behaviours have an argumentative form. 2. The act of argumentation asserts UPB. (UPB are the preference for truth over falsehood, that we exist, that the best way to solve conflicts is peacefully, etc. This is similar to Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics; 5.) 3. Any preferred behaviour that conflicts with UPB is irrational. Looking at page 211 'UPB in a Nutshell', Stefan seems to be making the argument that UPB is asserted in any argument (premise 2 of syllogism 2 above). Further on page 65, moral theories are kind of theories about UPB. People who propose moral rules are proposing they are UPB, presumably because in the act of arguing for a moral rule, they are asserting UPB. This is the same as assuming the moral rule is UPB(!?). Stefan doesn't seem to make this explicit, which is why I have to do some guesswork to come up with this syllogism. I am not quite sure if Stefan would argue that ethics can be proven to be rational, ethics cannot be proven to be rational but only that ethics exists, or something else altogether. I would not be surprised by the second outcome as he says he fully accepts Hume's is-ought distinction (as do I; page 12). The differences and similarities between UPB and UPeB Argumentation asserts universally permissible beliefs. In this way, premise 2 of the second syllogism is similar premise 2 of the third syllogism in my original argument. The conclusions of my argument might be different to Stefan's. He might only mean that preferred behaviours that are in conflict with those UPB such as 'truth is better than falsehood' and 'we exist' are irrational while mine is perhaps broader but also perhaps more problematic. A problem with UPeB UPeB might be problematic because any preferred behaviour that is not universally permissible could be deemed to be so. E.g., I am not murdering you because you ought to permit me killing you, in fact you are the irrational one and not me. It begs the question, what ought a person permit? Perhaps UPB solves this by saying the preferred behaviour could not be deemed to be universally permissible because the action itself conflicts with the requisites of argumentation? UPB and consequences I believe that an ethical framework people ought to follow must be able to at least theoretically explain different consequences of unethical behaviour. UPB the book lacks in this regard. He does make some consequential arguments for UPB (page 66), but he doesn't make an explicit argument of explaining how they are causally linked. According to UPeB, irrational beliefs cannot be within one's rational self-interest. UPeB and consequences An explanation about why UPeB will lead to positive personal consequences goes like this: Having irrational beliefs (including irrational preferred behaviours) means you seize conscious control over those beliefs. These beliefs must stem from some unconscious part of your psyche which seems to be particularly resistant to rationality. That which is resistant to your conscious awareness is painful and destructive to your conscious awareness. I'd like to know if I've made a correct evaluation of UPB with the syllogism I used and my understanding of preferability and what people think about UPeB and how morality can be proven to be rational. References 1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=viZYL3ceh9U 2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGYendXNjGg 3. https://board.freedomainradio.com/topic/46332-why-be-moral-answered/ 4. Universally Preferable Behaviour: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics by Stefan Molyneux Paperback 5: https://mises.org/wire/primer-hoppes-argumentation-ethics

Sam Harris, many know of him and respect him from many sides of politics if not likely religion. Sam is painfully aware of the race and IQ correlations, but refuses to concede that deportation and the wall is one answer to a large crime, social welfare and healthcare epidemic in our country. I watched many of Sam's talks, debates and have even touched his books. The man is too rational to not see the political corruption attached to the left and DACA. He has had many podcasts decrying President Trump for racism and stupidity, who has done wonderful things since being elected, who received the Rosa Parks Award for wouldn't you guess it, not being racist, who was hailed as an icon in the media for his pro diversity business practices for above two decades. Sam has always to my knowledge presented reasonable arguments for his assertions and considered the opposition's point of view in great care if not delicacy, but what I hear from him lately is the derangement syndrome that has infected the left, just name calling and blatantly untrue accusations on the part of Sam. Has anyone else noticed this in public intellectuals, or can give further examples? Is Sam's inability to acknowledge the threat of importing low IQ races and cultures a sign of his fragility to his mainstream nature of public life or has he really just gone full syndrome? I listened to his podcast with Charles Murray on the race and IQ differences and can say he is painfully aware of the data points. I would be happy to chat about any of Trump's policies and their potential impacts, though I cannot say I would find many on the left of center on Stefan's community discussions.

In FDR358 (Stef's wager) Stefan argued that it is better to believe in free will when lacking information to its existence. He calls this argument Stef’s wager. If you believe in free will but determinism is true then you were determined to believe in free will so you lost nothing. If you believe in determinism but free will is true then you lost your ability for personal responsibility which is worse. In this post, I will argue against the wager and utilise my argument against the wager to provide a case for, and to defend determinism. I will not cite all my paraphrases of Stefan for obvious reasons, but that is not a problem given that others may correct me if they believe I have misrepresented Stefan. Also, phrases with single quotation marks are quoting Stefan. Free will is defined as that which any person who possesses it could have chosen differently in a circumstance given that the circumstance is unchanged, hence choices being uncaused by any physical effect. Decisions may be caused by something non-material like a soul. Or they may be self-caused, as Stefan has favoured. This definition of free will is the same definition Stefan has used. No sane determinist truly believes that beliefs cannot be changed or that choice does not exist. No sane determinist truly believes people cannot be rational or cannot debate. So naturally, a determinist will probably not find Stef’s wager convincing given that the determinist had probably considered the ability to choose when they adopted their belief in determinism. A determinist will not believe that beliefs cannot be influenced. Therefore, I argue that a better wager would be to show the pragmatic consequences of a determinist morality vs. a free will morality. This is more in line with the original Descartes wager. Descartes did not argue that if you believe in God but God does not exist then you cannot have lost anything because then morality does not exist anyway and so free will doesn't exist and you could not have changed your mind. Rather, he weighed up the consequences of the belief without changing epistemological postulates. He said if you believe in God but there is no God then you have not changed much in your life. If you believe in no God but there is a God then you will go to hell. Nowhere in this argument are one’s epistemological beliefs challenged. The wager is a pragmatic rather than a philosophical argument. Speaking in pragmatic terms, the wager favours neither position particularly strongly. There are many changes that a person makes if they are committed to determinism, for which it would be costly if they didn't make if determinism is true. Firstly, you stop evaluating people based on the decisions they make and start evaluating them on their behaviour. This makes life much simpler because you stop judging your own desires about people. You don't try to convince yourself someone is worth your time because they are trying their best to be a good person. You don't feel guilty for being selfish with regards to your relationships. According to a study, 44% of trait conscientiousness is heritable. This study supports the claim that virtue is predetermined. Secondly, you become compassionate towards others. You understand anger does not appeal to their rationality. Given that you evaluate them on their behaviour, you can infer that they are not worthy of your time if they don't change their behaviour. You may call them stubborn without any need to grant them free will. Thirdly, you have a richer understanding of human nature. How anger could change someone even if free will is true is difficult to imagine. A much simpler approach is to understand our emotions do not necessarily have any moral content. Anger may be a fight or flight mechanism. Shame may be a way of keeping the integrity of a tribe. Hatred depends on subjective values. There is not necessarily an unconscious 'true self' that 'knows everything' and then the extra component of free will. Rather, we can understand how people think by analysing their biology and experiences. According to free will, brain damage may affect a person’s emotions or unconscious motives, but it should not be able to affect a person’s virtue or moral worth, which should be solely determined by free will, and free will not being determined by physical effect. However, a study found that brain damage can casually make changes in the way that people reason which can causally change moral beliefs. Fourthly, you become compassionate towards yourself. A meta-analysis found a large effect size for the negative relationship between self-compassion and psychopathology, r = − 0.54 (95% CI = − 0.57 to − 0.51; Z = − 34.02; p < .0001). We can come to understand that when we say ‘sorry’, we don’t really mean we are worthy of shame, but rather that we understand that we should change how we behave in the future compared to the past. We also stop comparing ourselves to others. Under the dictum that reason equals virtue equals happiness, we may feel compelled to compare our levels of happiness to others, or to compare our virtue to that of others. This is not a good approach. We can accept that we are not all dealt the same hand, and there may as well be things that determine our virtue for which are difficult to control. It is not to say that we ought not to strive for virtue, but that virtue should not necessarily be the determinant of self-esteem. What is more appropriate is to compare oneself in the present to oneself in the past. Stefan has argued that determinism is paradoxical because it presupposes that a person is capable of choice, that is, changing their beliefs, while at the same time asserting that choice is impossible. Determinism is the opposite of free will. So, determinism is defined as not being able to have chosen differently in a circumstance given that the circumstance is unchanged, hence choices being caused by physical effects. According to this definition, whether a person has actually made a choice remains untouched. So, the ability to choose and the fact that a person could not have chosen differently are compatible. Choice itself does not require free will. Choice is the ability to change behaviour in virtue of being rational. Rationality is simply conceptual ‘fidelity to reality’. This does not entail free will. Rationality distinguishes us from animals. Animals cannot think conceptually, and we can. Free will then is not required to distinguish human and animal thought. Stefan has argued that if a determinist attempts to debate because they believe others are 'inputs and outputs', then it explains why other people debate, but it would also mean the determinist is also an input-output machine. And therefore, a determinist has not chosen to debate with others and cannot attempt to debate in the first place which is a performative contradiction. To this argument I rebut. If free will does exist and we are watching two others debate, we can explain their behaviour without appealing to free will by labelling them as inputs and outputs much like philosophical zombies. A determinist simply takes that further to say that this is also a characteristic of the observer. We can still choose to debate even if it was determined. I am yet to have heard a philosophical argument from Stefan against determinism without him appealing to the argument of performative contradiction. If there is no contradiction with the belief of free will, we should look at the evidence and the simplest explanation. Stefan has acknowledged that determinism should be accepted only if it is non-contradictory given that it is simpler. The evidence overwhelmingly supports that determinism is simpler to free will for the following reasons. Firstly, everything else seems to be determined by all effects acting as also as all causes. Stefan has argued that we should not be surprised to find that the human mind possesses free will given that it is only the brain that possesses consciousness. However, I am not sure whether it's correct to assume that only the brain possesses consciousness. Consciousness cannot be objectively observed. If it were not for what we have observed in the physical human body and comparing it to our subjective experience, there would have been no way to know that consciousness resides in the brain. In fact, we still don't really know whether animals are conscious. In that regard, a rock could even be conscious in some manner, a position known as panpsychism. If a computer was capable of conceptual processing, it is likely that the computer would be conscious at a level similar to our own. Consciousness may have to do more with complexity and feedback loops than it has to do with the brain. I had a dream a while ago in which I saw consciousness and life itself arising from feedback loops, weird dream. Secondly, I do not know what it means to feel free. At least from my perspective, I see my thoughts as constant dialectics. I have said sorry enough times to my girlfriend where I really feel like I don't have much control as I thought I had. Do any men concur? Split-brain patients will often have opposing preferences in separate hemispheres. For example, one hemisphere may have atheistic leanings while the other has theistic leanings. Whether the person is actually theistic may have to do with what ever preference dominates consciousness as a unitary experience, but it does go to show the power of causality in the brain. Also, in my experience the biggest changes in my behaviour have arisen from changes in my environment rather than changes in my attitude. Thirdly, morality requires rationality but it does not require free will. Nowhere in the UPB framework is there a requirement for free will. If a person is rational, they will be moral by adopting universal preferences. Whether a person is rational may be predetermined. Fourthly, it is difficult to articulate what free will actually is. If you were asked to pick a random grass leaf from a field, it is difficult to claim you could have chosen differently. Every choice must depend on knowledge. Picking a grass leaf from a field is not an informative decision. You cannot for example say to have free will about whether to steer a ship east or west while in the middle of an unknown ocean at least without some scientific acuity. Likely, you will pick based solely upon gut feelings, or some kind of patterns of thinking or heuristics. Indeed, this is why neuroscientists can predict such behaviour before the person is aware of their decision. But even if a decision were to be more informative, like for example whether to watch this movie or that movie, there is nothing in your environment which informs you about what you ought to do. It is not intrinsically more rational to watch either movie. There is no ought from an is. Now, we can still say that morality exists. We can say it’s rational to be moral, for your behaviour to be universally preferable. However, choosing to watch a movie is not a moral decision. Subjective taste would largely determine which movie to watch, which arises from unconscious processes. If you are rational, unconscious motives will drive your specific behaviours. If you are irrational, unconscious motives will still drive your specific behaviours. Then, free will might not exist in the behavioural decisions per se, but rather in the choice about whether one acts rationally or irrationally regardless of what behaviour that entails. This is certainly what Ayn Rand believed. The point here is that free will how it is typically conceptualised as existing in every choice we make is unnecessary, and creates the problem of supposing some open system where we get inspiration or information from something that is neither in our environment or biology. To conclude, whether or not a person believes in determinism has significant effects on their life regardless of whether determinism is true. Determinism is not incompatible with the ability to choose. Therefore, it does not contradict how we act. Given that determinism is the simplest explanation, determinism is true. Determinism is defined as a lack of the ability have chosen differently. Free willers would argue the corollary to determinism is that choice does not exist. Conventionally then, determinism is also defined as the lack of choice. But I would argue that this belief is the idea of fatalism and not determinism. Given that morality exists and free will is an important concept in moral reasoning, I am in favour of compatibilism which states that free will does not contradict determinism if we define free will conventionally as the ability to choose and determinism as not having been able to have chosen differently. A person who is a compatibilist is still a determinist. I also wish not to do a disservice to free willers by abandoning the term known as free will used to describe the position of believing in the ability to have chosen differently, so I think it is appropriate to call that position free will while separating it from conventional free will.

What is your "reason for being?" Why are you alive, as opposed to not alive? What do you strive for? Do you strive for anything beyond momentary pleasures? If so, what? How do you know it's worthwhile? Why do you want it in the first place? What value am I to society? Why do I care about my value? How do I know this is in fact my value? These are all questions I regularly ask myself, and while I have my own answers: I am alive because I like living more than not; I strive to build a family; I want to build a good family because I came from a terrible one; and I think it will be worthwhile because it works for Stef. I consider my language skills to be, essentially, my only real skill as, besides my ability to speak and write, I am a very plain person with only a layman's wisdom in any of the various fields I study--history, philosophy, self-knowledge, creative work, etc.--and therefore without my language skills I am not "special". And then there's that question; "Why do I have to be special?" My answer: I don't know, but I think I have to be special because I despise everything that is ordinary and mundane, and if I am mundane and ordinary, I must hate myself. These questions, I'm asking, for both personal and professional reasons. I want to know why people live. I want to know why you live. The reason being, I want to compare myself to others in order to gauge my own value relative to others who have signaled a desire for self-knowledge and self-reform by making themselves regulars of FDR. Also, I want to know more about superior people. Superior being defined as "willing and actively seeking self-improvement and evolution; as compared to inferior people who are wrongfully content with who they are. Wrongful content being determined based on the economic value and the depth of relationships one has." Therefore "right contentment" would be a millionaire following UPB and NAP along the same lines as Stef. He can be content because he has proven himself a man of quality, and established himself and his progeny above the masses. Asking again: What is your reason for being? You don't have to answer all the other questions, but I'd appreciate it if you did and shared how you determined your reason for being. After all, I'm not entirely sure if it is right for me to have this mindset that people should have a reason for being at all.

Hi all, I am posting here today in an attempt to discuss some ideas that have been on my mind for some time, firstly, I will begin with a thought/experience that occurred several days ago that I jotted down in one of my notepads: I feel the haze pass over my mind (?) - And am met again with familiar thoughts - Am I in control of my thoughts and rational processes? or as Nietzsche puts it are all my apparent 'emotional free' rationalizations [and that of all other material aspects that constitute my being] simply the work of 'seed' emotions, subconscious drivers that I have no control over. It is difficult to come to a conclusion, although I feel as if one can come to be in control through the pursuit of self knowledge and understanding, it does not allude me that the capacities responsible deducing this conclusion may, in fact be the controlling force. This also leads me to think about the underlying implications that this may have on 'human nature', determinism and human consciousness. 'To our strongest drive, the tyrant in us, not only our reason but also our conscience submits' - Friedrich Nietzsche I may make further posts late about further thoughts on the matter, however, for now I would just like have this looked over with fresh eyes to see if anyone has a different perspective to what I may have thought, thanks for taking the time to read this - Ajax

I am asking this because recently i had an apphipheny (spelling?) about my anger and reason why i have been so struggling with motivation, is because as kid and always i did good rational things for other sake. IN THE PAST, (especially childhood and teens): Why be good? Because others. Why be good? Rules. Why be rational? Because unhappiness otherwise and because its hurts OTHERS. So i find myself in almost ego-death'esque situation with my own beliefs about myself. Why should i do or be anything or anyone? Why simply not lie, be crazy, insane, and contradictionary? WHY does it really matter what i want? What’s the difference between my preferences and anyone else? Why shouldn’t i just take other peoples desire as my own? Yes, this is also about setting or not setting Rules for yourself. And also about the value of myself value if any of my preferences? Why should i prefer anything at all? And is this question itself contradiction on some level? Do i "prefer" truth over falsehood? I do or maybe i say i don’t. Maybe i say gibberish. Then what? Does it all come down to preference? And if so... why do i feel like that’s an arbitrary/subjective standard and thus meaningless or exactly the same as anyone else’s opinion or preference? I feel like my preferences do not have any value objectively. I prefer health? I prefer truth? I prefer to be moral and kind and good? Who cares about that? PS. Yeah... one could say that i sound and come off as bit of nihilistic... but that’s empty one feels when finally your shrugs off your FALSE reason to be X Y or Z. When false-self goes, when "respect" for parents complete evaporates. When values placed and forced in me by abusers vanish.

I just finished a new three-part article series on silencing the voice of reason. Here's the first part. "In this series of articles, I will talk about people’s avoidance of reality, and about personal and social outrage when encountering a voice of reason. In the first part that is this article, I will explain the origins of a person’s unreasonable reaction to describing reality and the mechanism behind this phenomenon. I will also talk about the social outcomes of openly describing the unpleasant aspects of reality, especially child mistreatment." Read more here: http://blog.selfarcheology.com/2016/02/silencing-voice-of-reason-part-1.html

Hello, We often hear Stefan comparing examples to other examples in order to clarify and spot contradictions. For example: If somebody said "Government is moral" Stefan would probably reply similarly to this - "So if I come to you and take your money at gunpoint, that is not moral. This is exactly what governments do, therefore we cannot call governments moral if we have already established that they steal, which we know is immoral" Then the contradiction becomes clear since we all know that this is precisely what governments do. My question is, does this art of spotting and pointing out contradictions with the use of metaphors and different examples have a name? Is it Aristotle's First Principles? Sorry for a silly question but I wish to learn more about this art of....brilliancy.

Spirituality or reason? Is it a false dichotomy? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QOSs2Wknsqw

Matt Dillahunty has been doing some awesome work on rebutting theist arguments for the existence of deities on his youtube channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/SansDeity/videos?view=0&sort=dd&shelf_id=0 If you're not already familiar with Matt, he is the regular host of the The Atheist Experience and the NonProphets, and recently made the decision to work as a full-time counter-apologist making videos, and traveling and debating theists. You can support his work here: http://www.patreon.com/AtheistDebates I would like discussion to center around debating techniques and tactics -- efficient use of arguments, common traps and dead ends, what to listen for from your opponent, etc. Check out his apologetics/counter-apologetics wiki at http://www.ironchariots.org

I'd like to start a new topic even though I found one with the wrong order of the three words that I think matters because of the meaning of the equal sign here. http://board.freedomainradio.com/topic/33098-reason-happiness-virtue/?hl=%2Breason+%2Bvirtue+%2Bhappiness I think I heard in one podcast Stef saying a different version "Reason + Virtue = Happiness", but I can't find it. How do you understand this? Reason leads to virtue which leads to happiness. Is this a more accurate version? Is it possible to use reason for vice? What are the definitions of reason, virtue or happiness? Is it possible to prove any part of this statement? Here are my thoughts on why reason (or truth) is at least necessary (may be not sufficient) for happiness. A person who has a valid theory describing the surrounding physical reality is happier than the person who doesn't have such theory or has an invalid theory. The reason for this is that if your theory is invalid (or you don't have one) then your expectations on how the reality behaves are inaccurate. You don't know what to expect or the reality regularly produces not what you expect. Uncertainty could be dangerous and also leads to frustration making you less happy. For example, people not knowing the theory of weather may pray and offer sacrifices and still have gods sending them bad weather. People having an invalid theory of government may often get upset about the political process and poor economic outcomes.

Principles are found in Peace.Anarchy is the ULTIMATE respect for Humanity.

Hello FDR! A few months ago I was Christian Missionary newly commissioned to go to Belgium for two years to teach people about how great my religion was. I was surfing the tubes one day and came across FDR. The very first video I ever saw was Stefs proof's against God. That video slapped me in the face and dragged my brain down one wall and up another. After I watched it once, I watched it two more times. I was faced with an obvious choice that Stefan presented in his video, either I except his logic and reason or I go back to my delusion. Well, there was no way I could actually go back. I knew for certain that the logic was too well layed out and air tight. I was very moved by Stefan's points and knew I had an obligation to reality and to my personal well being to leave the religious nonsense behind. The reasoning helped me make the leap from questioning christian to confirmed empirical driven atheist. This was a long leap due to the depth of involvment I was in inside the church. And FDR has helped every step of the way. I've lost so many friends and the community of a church it is truly tragic to feel so detested when just months ago I was cheered and respected by hundreds and hundreds. I am deeply happy to have found FDR because it raised me out of my delusion, and so elegantly fit with my already deep Anarchist convictions (though of course beleiving in a God is actually anti anarchic). I'm certain right now I'd be stuck in Belgium for two years going around trying to convince people to become a religious psychopath like me. Right now I'm trying to get out of my debt I am in for the travelling expenses as a missionary. But as I become more finacially stable I will increase my support more for this show as my life has literally been saved in all practical senses from the tragedy of living to die. Thank You Stefan and Thank You FDR and community!

i went on through the videos and podcasts and cant find something adressing specificaly logics and argumentation. i mean, some material on the actual study of logics and reasoning, you know, like what's an argument, a statement, a fallacy, what kinds of it are there and so on.. could you help me? i'm new here so i'm still kinda lost.. thanks!

http://dinnertimedebates.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-worship-of-reason.html I'm having a debate with my cousin-in-law on the merits of reason and he directed me to his blog. I have a lot of opinions about it, but I'm curious as to what you all might think. Be gentle - he's nice, but misguided, like most Mormons.