square4

As a thought experiment, imagine there are no other people, only you and land, then you are forced to either work hard (self-sufficient farming) or die. This shows this "inherent force that will kill you" does not come from the other people or from capitalism, but it is the force of nature. Then add back all the people. Now the difference is that you have the opportunity to cooperate with them, which provides tremendous benefits. It is indeed possible that they might want to cooperate only on certain very unattractive conditions. However, if we make sure there is always some land available (similar to the Lockean proviso) for those who would want to live self-sufficiently, then, regardless of the conditions other people set on cooperation with them, you are not worse off, because you can always ignore them, and go back to the land, which would be the only possibility if the other people would not be there. Counterarguments: 1) the argument ignores that capital was itself produced using labor. 2) Profit earned with capital is a reward for delayed consumption. 3) Competition on the capital, labor and consumer product market ensures that businesses cannot pay whatever they want. 4) The salaries of the workers are voluntarily agreed on.

It is always possible to do what you can, by definition, so it is not impossible. I did not mention an obligation to acquire more ability. How do these premises help to decide in which way to universalize, for example, in the example of stealing mentioned in my OP? Or consider the following example from the UPB book: If, on the other hand, eating is moral, then it cannot be moral to eat a cabbage, and immoral to eat a fish, since that is a violation of universality, insofar as the same action – eating – is judged both good and bad. (p.87) Clearly, fish and cabbage have differences, so why is it a violation of universality to distinguish between them? How does it follow from the premises? From the standpoint of a certain moral theory, other competing moral theories will always appear as making unwarranted distinctions. This works both ways, and therefore proves nothing. It could similarly be said that someone who has abundance and does not give to a beggar is simultaneously accepting and rejecting the importance of food for humans. If the universality rule should only consider consent as relevant, this means that the question whether consent is indeed the only relevant thing, must be first established without the universality rule, to avoid circular reasoning. This was the point of my OP. Anyone sees a further objection to this point?

The universality rule of ethics says that moral propositions should apply universally. After analysis, I have come to the tentative conclusion that the universality rule can only function by using (hidden) assumptions about morality, that are contentious and require separate proof. And that the universality rule, on its own, has no power to invalidate moral theories. But if someone can show it to be otherwise, please do so. Moral propositions should apply to all people all the time. If we propose the rule "Give to the poor", then this leads to a contradiction, because a man in coma cannot give anything. To solve this, we modify the rule: "Give to the poor if you can", and the contradiction is gone. All possible moral rules can similarly modified to be universal, by adding the required clauses and conditions. A stronger version of the universality rule says that we should not make arbitrary distinctions between people, or places, or whatever other criteria it deems inappropriate in ethics. However, it is clear that morality has to make some distinctions: For example, swinging your fist is moral when you only hit air, but immoral if you hit an innocent person. In order for this universality rule to work, it is needed to know which aspects are ethically relevant, and which are irrelevant and should be ignored. But this is contentious, and requires separate proof. Similarly, it is often argued that a behavior is immoral if it cannot be universalized. But there does not exist a neutral way of universalizing a behavior. For example, if someone who is poor steals from the rich, this can be universalized in two ways: 1) All poor people may steal from all rich people. 2) All people may steal from all people. Only the latter version creates an absurdity, because the stealing would cancel out each other. But to argue that the latter version is the correct way to universalize, is another way of saying that the difference between the situation of the poor and the rich is ethically irrelevant, which would probably be one of the main points of contention. Every human behavior has certain unique characteristics, and if deemed relevant, to universalize the behavior becomes meaningless, because no one will ever be in the exact same situation.

What are good/bad fields to work in, when you want to avoid interference from the state, and having the state as "customer"? What type of job minimizes the chance you will be placed by your employer on a gov. project, or required to implement unjust laws, or your company starts receiving massive subsidies, more than they loose in taxes, and they are becoming an agent of the state? Or when you already have a particular job, what is an advisable way to deal with this issue?

Consider the following statement: IF {a specific set of propositions}, THEN {a conclusion}. Suppose the statement is logically valid. The coherence theory would say that {a conclusion} is true relatively. The objective theory says that the whole statement is true, and that {a conclusion} is true if the mentioned propositions are true. The coherence theory cannot handle the whole statement, because it has a truth value that it cannot express. We would need another term to describe such truths. On the other hand, the objective theory of truth can already handle conditional statements just fine.

So basically, you are proposing the maxim: "Do not do to others, what which would cause you to feel wronged when done to you." To address the criticisms, maybe it can be improved as follows: "To be consistent, do not do to others, that which has characteristics that you would consider wrong when done to you (or otherwise change your opinion about what is wrong)" The above is similar to your maxim, but more difficult to disagree with. I agree, but I don't know how to reconcile this with your view that value and well-being is subjective. If the value of candy bars, and of any other property, and of being alive and healthy is entirely subjective, how can we decide objectively what kind of the defense force is justified?

Was it the intention of Adam to be imprisoned? Unless Adam specifically wanted to be in prison, then it is not intensional, and saying it is intensional is similar to saying it was "intentional rape", when a woman would put herself in a risky situation. (sarcasm begin) Adam, you have sold lemonade, and you knew this was against the law. Now the people will even more think that we anarchists are really nasty abrasive folks. So Adam, why can't you be a good obedient slave? Just do whatever they say, otherwise you will make things worse. (sarcasm end)

What land qualifies? all land above sea level (without distinction). The calculation and limit are stated in my previous post. About the "avoidable" issue: I was hoping one of the UPB experts would chime in to answer your UPB questions about it. Maybe an idea to start a topic about the avoidability issue in the Philosophy section? In relation to the proportionality rule: If one person claims more land than proportional for himself, this is indeed avoidable by going to another place that he hasn't claimed. But suppose that people universally claim more than proportional (except yourself), than you are locked out of the possibility of owning land, and it becomes unavoidable. So a problem with using avoidability as a criteria is that when you universalize a behavior, a lot of behaviors become practically unavoidable, but not necessarily immoral. The action "using land exclusively" means that you take active measures (fences/force) to ensure exclusivity. Now I think about it, the rule would actually make more sense, if it would also include situations where the land owner would possibly allow other people on its land. So the rule would then be: "People should not control a more than proportional share of the land area of the earth." Exclusive use is only one form of control. Consuming a resource, for example food, is an ultimate form of control, and it doesn't involve force, but land cannot be consumed. In that case, we would have to divide the amount of land by the number of people that collectively control it. For example, a married couple could together own a double amount, without contradiction if it is universalized. Controlling exclusively more than one square inch of land can be universalized without contradiction. On the other hand, controlling more than proportional cannot be universalized. Murder and rape are examples of controlling a more than proportional amount of human bodies. Only controlling one body can be universalized, hence self-ownership.

It seems that at least some wage laws were put in place, not to help the lowest class, but rather to protect a privileged group from competition from cheaper but less skilled labor. Pointer: The book: Race and Economics, by Walter E. Williams (link to a page from the book), interviewed by Rockwell. And if the wage is really too low to live or eat, there are other voluntary ways to solve that, that don't involve violence or coercion.

Indeed. It also doesn't make sense to me, but is our common sense on this subject objective? At least, the proposed rule is now feasible; most people don't violate it. When you would use force to get exclusive control over it, it wouldn't be shared. And if that area would be more than a proportional part of the earth, it would violate the rule. Does that mean that personal property rights of areas larger than about 20,000 square meters are not enforceable?

Retry: People should not use exclusively more than a proportional share of the land area of the earth. (added the word exclusive, because otherwise violating it can be universalized by sharing land). About the other objections: they seem to be about values and human customs, which are not considered objective in UPB. It is still interesting to know if something is an aesthetically preferable action (APA), because in UPB theory this means it is universally preferable (but not enforceable), and it would be placed in the same category as being on time, and honesty, etc. things that are in high regard. For which purpose are APAs preferable? In analogy with Kevin's response, the goal for which APAs are preferable (or objectively required) would be the goal of confirming to consistent and universal aesthetical propositions.

Registration on FDR requires: "You agree, through your use of this service, that you will not use this board to post any material which is [....] violative of any law." There are state laws that require people to remain silent about certain crimes of the state (a gag order). Other such restrictive rules exist, or if they don't exist, they could be enacted by them in the future. Even if current state laws allow free speech, there is no guarantee that they will continue to allow open discussion about any of the subjects on this message board. Some people live in countries with more oppressive governments than the US. In some countries, it might be against the law of the state to publish texts that encourages peaceful yet illegal behavior. Why would a libertarian require that you voluntarily submit to the rules of the state during a discussion that is, among other things, about the evils of the state? Of course, people are free to set rules on their property or website, but I think it is counterproductive to your stated goals. We could take the position that any law that is unjust is not really a law. I hope this is the correct interpretation. The only problem then is that the way it is formulated currently, is confusing. In that case, I would recommend to amend the text to avoid the confusion with state rules.

OK, you are making a number of valid objections to the proportionality rule. So here is my new attempt, and lets see if it passes the tests now: People should not use more than a proportional share of the land area of the earth. This is a resource that is almost constant in quantity, and it is feasible to estimate with a reasonable amount of accuracy. It is about 149 million km2. Divided by the earth's population, this is about 20,000 m2, which would then be each person's proportional share. The value difference between various land areas are disregarded in this rule, to avoid subjectivity, instead each square mile is treated equally. Any new person that comes into being or arrives on earth is allocated a proportional share; others have to make room in that case. Nope, that breaks universality. And we'd better include any intelligent space aliens in our calculations. Would you think it still brakes universality, when we apply a rule to all possible areas and subareas in the universe (including all rooms)? It would not. Positive obligations still need to be conditioned on ability, otherwise they fail the coma test. A man in coma does no action, so he complies with all rules that forbid something, but he violates all rules that ask a positive action unconditionally. Secondly, if unconscious actions are not excluded from morality, violating NAP can also become unavoidable. For example, it is possible that someone suddenly gets a seizure, and hits another unintentionally. So this argument is needed to prevent NAP from being rejected as a moral rule.

Can the same be said about the principle of private land ownership? Do we have to evaluate separately each rule that the land owner sets for visitors, or can something in general be said about it? To avoid the difficulty of determining what is the opposite or negation of a behavior (there was a long thread about this), it is easier start with a moral rule, such as "Do not steal", determine what is the violation of it (stealing), and then test if this violation can be universalized. Similarly, for the rule "Do not consume more than proportional", the violation is "consuming more than proportional", and this cannot be universalized. To calculate what is proportional, we have to know what are the available resources, and divide this by the number of persons. The "available" resources can be defined in a number of ways: we could take the resources of the earth, a community, or a room (for the two-guys-in-a-room test). Whatever we choose, as long as the available resources are a definite set of things, using more than a proportional part of it cannot be universalized. A man in coma uses oxygen involuntary. It is conceivable that this amount of oxygen would be disproportional. But if an action is involuntary, it is not really your action, but that of your body, and similar to a rock falling, it is outside of morality. The violation of this rule is smoking pot. It is possible for everyone to smoke pot at the same time, while not resisting that others smoke pot. Since the violation can be universalized, I think the rule would not be accepted in UPB.

Suppose someone was doing five immoral things, but then he stops one of the immoral behaviors, yet continues to commits four. An outside observer could call this a step in the right direction, because it really is an improvement, even if you see morality of actions as a digital yes or no. There are less violations of people's rights. On the other hand, if an active participant in the remaining immoral actions would call it a step in the right direction, this would be strange. It would be an implicit acknowledgment of the fact that there is more to do, while failing to do so. The idea of taking steps in a direction might draw a picture of a long road to be traveled. It might give the false impression that morality must be reached slowly, instead of at once.

Found some time to respond to your response. So a question is, are actor distinctions admissible in UPB? Property rights, when formulated abstractly, are universally applicable to all moral actors. But a property right opponent might argue as follows: The owner (capitalist) of property may do whatever he wants with it, but the non-owner (a proletarian) has to ask permission. So he would argue that there are different rules for different actors in this case, in violation of universality. And then we could respond: But everyone has the right to homestead and acquire property through trade etc., so it is not a different rule. But the other side remains unconvinced. Similarly, if someone proposes the rule: Obey state laws, this might seem universal, but we might argue that it is not universal, because it incorrectly makes a distinction between the rulers and the ruled. But then the democrat replies: But everyone has the right to form a political party, and try to get elected etc. Do you see the parallel? So those who agree with a rule, see it as universal, those who disagree with it, see it as non-universal. Can this be resolved within UPB? Does UPB treats proposition differently according to their formulation? I don't think so. It would be nice if one ore more UPB experts would do this. Everyone else could then critically examine it. It could resolve many doubts and misunderstandings around UPB. For capitalism, this is already done in the UPB book. For communism, that's difficult, but if you don't mind, lets instead examine the following egalitarian principle: People should not use more than a proportional share of the available resources. Not fulfilling this rule cannot be universalized. It is impossible that everyone uses more than their proportional share. It also fails the "two guys in a room" test. Suppose there are two apples in the room, then they cannot both eat two apples. Someone might say: but it's not force, but neither is non-violent theft. I would be very interested to see and examine a step by step derivation of UPB, that shows that moral nihilism is false.

Whether a particular lion is evil is to be decided the same as for humans: Has the lion the ability to understand morality, if so, does it deviate systematically from the portions of morality it understands? If so, then it’s evil. Animals are not free to treat us like they want. NAP does not forbid that you defend yourself against aggressive animals. Letting animals be what they are: I mean things like letting the young calf stay with its mother cow, not that nature is perfect, or that we should reverse breed. I agree that animals are very different from us, I also agree that they are below us, but would you argue that animals are mere biological machines, having no consciousness whatsoever? If you could show that to me, that would convince me. Do you think there exist humans that cannot and never will be able to understand the non-aggression principle, for example, children that die very young, or adults that are severely mentally disabled? If so, how would you view aggression directed against them? If NAP can be applied to newborns, and even to adults who are bent on breaking it, why not to animals? My argument regarding pain in humans and animals was for the purpose of establishing consciousness; that there exists a person that is affected by possible acts of aggression. It was not intended to establish that they are moral agents (although I do think that many of them are to some degree). Treating animals as property.

Another vegan here. The reason I became vegetarian six years ago was the conviction that is wrong to slaughter another being for food. I think that morality also applies to the treatment of animals, and that it does not matter whether animals themselves can understand morality. We also have to treat well newborn humans, who also lack that ability. My initial reason for going from vegetarianism to veganism was that dairy products are currently linked to meat production and other animal mistreatment. But more fundamentally, it is about letting animals be what they are, not enslaving them. Veganism = Not exercising dominion over animals Anarchism = Not exercising dominion over humans I think it fits nicely together as a lifestyle. When comparing humans and animals, the important difference is the advanced reasoning skills. But advanced reasoning is not a prerequisite for experiencing something, or for having pain. Suppose for example, that you have a medical procedure, and are happy about it using long-term thinking that it will heal you, but at the same time you suffer intense pain because of the procedure. So if the pain experience can be opposite to the effect of your advanced reasoning, then advanced reasoning cannot be a prerequisite of the pain experience. In other words, I see no reason to suppose that similar beings, such as monkeys, and other mammals, are not sentient beings, like we are. Then we have a gradient of animal species up to the microbe, and the problem where to draw the line: which is impossible to answer. It is appropriate in this case to use the precautionary principle, which means: If there is a small chance a human is living in a certain house, we wouldn't blow it up, similarly if we think that maybe a particular animal is a person, we wouldn't kill or enslave it.

Or this paraphrase: "What is this [$20k] bracelet worth [in the market]?" (because the buyer obviously wants to know the market value) "$20"(=a lie) "OK, a deal." There was no real consent, because the consent was conditioned on $20 being its real worth (in the market). I think the distinction between deceit before or after the trade is arbitrary. Suppose you agree on buying a functioning car, and it turns out to be broken, this could be considered deceit before the trade, because the car was misrepresented, but also deceit after the trade, because the seller failed to supply you with a functioning car, as he promised to do. If we should verify that a car is really functioning, should we also verify that he actually owns the car and it is not stolen? Do we also have to verify that the money used for payment is real and not counterfeit? The person who has made a statement is responsible for it, and any agreements made afterwards, are implicitly conditioned on those statements being true. What else are we agreeing on? Only on the object (the car), and not on the properties of the object (functioning)? Why the distinction? A little more difficult is the situation when the deceit is not through verbal statements, but through false impressions. The point is to realize that language gets its meaning through what is commonly understood by it. The same is true for impressions. So there is really not a big difference between saying you are part of Unicef, or walking down the street with a big Unicef logo on your clothing. It can equally be deceit and fraud.

By reformulating a moral propositions, the non-universality can seem to switch from the moral agent to the objects of the sentence. For example compare: A) For those who drink alcohol, the rule applies: Don't drive. B) The following rule applies to everyone: Don't drive after drinking alcohol. UPB theory does place a (universality) requirement on the objects of moral propositions. Two examples: 1. The discussion about not eating fish (p.90) What is happening here is that it is implicitly assumed, incorrectly IMO, that what is eaten is ethically irrelevant, and therefore should be excluded from moral propositions, because of the universality rule. 2. The discussion about the sleeping man (p.74). In this case, it is argued that it is not ethically relevant if we are asleep or awake. I consider this a correct application of the universality rule. Sometimes, not only objects, but also moral agents are excluded from UPB. This is not done in the UPB book, but on this message board, it has been suggested several times that moral rules don't apply when threatened by a third-party. To me, this is a violation of the universality rule. As the situation is now, it seems to me that the universality rule is not very well-defined, used selectively, derived using a weak analogy with physical sciences, and in some cases leading to incorrect conclusions about morality. To advance the discussion further, I would recommend the following: - Define in a formal way what exactly is the universality rule, such that it can have consensus support among the main proponents of UPB, and that it is possible to determine objectively whether a moral proposition passes or fails this universality test. Whether a moral proposition passes the test should not depend on how we formulate it, but only on the meaning of the proposition. - Test various moral propositions, such as don't steal, using this universality rule - Specify the logical derivation of the universality rule in a formal way, using a sequence of logical steps, such that it can be tested whether its derivation is logically sound. Or if it needs auxiliary axioms, let these assumptions be explicitly specified. Yes, their union can be treated as a single theory. Why bother? Because theoretically, there can be multiple internally logically consistent ethical theories, that contradict each other. For example, maybe both communism and capitalism are logically consistent and universal. Logical consistency is only a minimal requirement. To use an analogy, if we know that a house can logically be built in only one way (only one logically consistent ethical theory), and we know we must build a house (nihilism is false), then we know we must build a house in this particular way. As I understand the UPB method, it categorizes behavior by showing other possibilities are impossible (e.g. murder cannot be good or neutral, so it must be evil.) If moral nihilism would be valid, then the neutral category cannot be excluded, and it would be no longer be possible to establish that any behavior is evil. I would like to understand how this refutation works. A quote from the UPB book, in which a nihilistic moral proposition is rejected: Why is this seen as a moral rule, although the word "may" is an allowance, not a rule. Because it involves force?

The reason you are not responsible for what the government does with your money is because it is the government that does it, not you. It is not because of the sanctions when not sending money. Also, sending money in itself is not causing harm or violating people's rights. The agent who receives the money has the possibility and the responsibility of using it well (or better, send it back to you). On the other hand, if someone participates in war and kills others, he is himself actually inflicting harm and violating the rights of others. Big difference. If a moral theory implies that it is sometimes impossible to avoid immorality, there is something wrong with the theory. If we should not do something, then it must be possible to avoid it, otherwise the rule is nonsense. Suppose Joe does not participate in government evil, and he is attacked because of that, then the government agent who imprisons him is the one who is responsible for the bad effects it has on Joe and his family. To place the blame on Joe in that case would be very unfair. Also, we should not promise something that is impossible to achieve morally, and if we have done so, then such a promise would be invalid to the degree that it requires immoral action. Hopefully none of us will experience it, but suppose the government would institute the draft. This is a serious issue, because participating in a war might involve committing murder. Suppose they would give the command to shoot an innocent person, would you obey...? I would definitely say: No! I hope all of you will also say: No!

The act of murder is more evil than the incitement to do it, because the act inflicts the actual damage, while threatening words, although immoral, do not inflict damage themselves. Another reason is that someone might say lots of threatening things, but then, when looking his victim in the face, he can't do it, because he realizes it's evil. Those who are in a position of power, that can be more or less sure that their words will put into action, have increased responsibility. A moral decision is always possible. In this case, the moral decision is: don't murder. If Joe kills an innocent man, he is guilty of murder, and fully responsible, also if he is threatened by Steve. And Steve is guilty of threatening people to do evil. If Joe does not kill, he is not responsible for the murders that Steve might commit. Steve is responsible for that. People are always responsible for what they do themselves. The only situation when people are not responsibly, is when they are literally insane, or have no control over their limbs, or something like that. The threats that Steve has made are a prediction that he will do evil, if another person will do good. It creates a tough situation, similar to when a famine would strike. It cannot change the morality of an action. Suppose a famine occurs which places Joe into a position where he will starve if he will not murder. Since there is no one else to blame, certainly he is fully responsible if he murders. But this situation is not very different from a person who is conscripted. Innocent people have the right not to be attacked. These rights imply that is immoral to attack them. The utterance of a government official cannot change this. Responsibility cannot change based on what a third-party is saying. Suppose two countries are at war, and both sides employ conscripted soldiers. It cannot be that two people are attacking each other, and both not guilty, or both are not responsible. It is very convenient for dictators that so many people believe they are not responsible for what they do when threatened. We are not the mindless robots of dictators. We are responsible for what we do.

I know there is a distinction between the UPB method and the ethical theories it evaluates. By the way, UPB = Universally Preferable Behavior. Wouldn't it be a good idea to reserve the term UPB for behavior, when confusion with the UPB method or UPB theory is possible? In physical science, consistency is only a minimal requirement, and to establish a theory, empirical evidence is also required. The UPB book also speaks of empirical evidence, but I have never understood how this could be applicable to moral theories. A moral theory does not predict any behavior, except that it must be possible to do it, since "ought" implies "can". So how can it be tested empirically? Some UPB quotes: Why in the world would the success or failure of communism have any effect on the validity of property rights? In order to use the dual standard of logical consistency and universality as the only tests for moral theories, without empirical verification or any other test, then the following would be needed: (in my opinion) 1) Make sure the universality-requirement has not removed any ethically relevant aspect. 2) When all non-contradictory moral theories are combined into one theory, show that the number of moral theories that pass the test is exactly one. 3) Show that moral nihilism is false. Then it logically follows that the one remaining ethical theory is indeed the correct description of morality.

If a moral theory is logically consistent and universal, is it then always accepted as valid within UPB theory? Or are there additional requirements? In other words, is this dual standard a necessary or sufficient condition?

Is the following interpretation correct? UPB = behavior that complies with all possible logically consistent universal normative rules. These normative rules apply regardless of our goals, because otherwise that would violate universality. But UPB theory does not claim we should keep these rules, it only identifies behavior with certain characteristics.