square4

It is clear that we responsible for the direct results of what we do, but what about indirect effects of our actions, if they follow with certainty from our actions? Some scenarios: A. a sound maniac switches on a device on the street that generates such a loud noise that random bystanders get hearing damage The sound maniac is responsible for the physical damage he has caused indirectly. Even though he did not touch anyone, it was a violation of their body rights. B. someone molests another person Even when no physical damage was done, the molester is guilty of a crime against its victim. C. policemen deploy a radiation scanner on the street, scanning people that happen to walk by Even when the radiation does not cause physical damage, the radiation enters the clothing without permission, extracting an image; it is a violation D. someone talks to random bystanders on the street, and causes their eardrums to move The eardrum movement is caused by the one who talks, and he is responsible for that, but it is not bad, even without permission. If you agree the behavior in scenario A, B, C is impermissible, while the behavior in D is permissible, then my question is this: How can we objectively make a distinction between these scenarios. It seems to me that: - the distinction cannot be indirectness, as scenario A shows. (the sound maniac) - the distinction cannot be lack of physical damage, as scenario B shows. (molestation) - the distinction cannot be the combination of indirectness and lack of physical damage, as scenario C shows. (radiation scanner) I have difficulty finding an objective criteria for distinguishing the different scenarios. Does anyone has a good idea how to solve this? The idea for this topic originated in another thread. I copy here some remarks already made in that other thread. Dsayers remarked about the eardrum scenario: Eardrums moving are an effect. It's not at all the same as a direct action such as raising your hand. Related to moral responsibility is the idea of ownership. If we act indirectly, are we able to acquire ownership? Do we own something if we have manufactured it using air / thermal / electrical flows, without directly touching the object that is manufactured? Dsayers remarked in the other thread: If I put a brick through your window, I own that action even though I didn't touch your window directly. I was using the brick as a tool to amplify my force and/or range. Using an intermediary is still investing value into an object to meaningfully alter it from a naturally occurring state. It has no bearing on the claim of ownership.

OK, I copied this into a new thread. We are examining the attempt by Stef and others to proof self-ownership, and you have pointed out the difficulty of bridging is/ought gap. But I think a similar argument applies to the opposite position as well. In a situation without conflicts between people, each person is controlling his own body. This is the default situation. People understandably prefer to be free from aggression from other people against their body, such as murder, rape, assault, imprisonment. When someone nevertheless commits aggression he is: 1) going against the default non-conflict situation, 2) going against a probably strong preference of the other, 3) assigning himself more than his victim (control over two bodies). Because of this, I think it is up to the aggressor to show that what he wants should take precedence over the desire of the victim to be safe from aggression. It is appropriate to place the burden of proof with the proponents of violence, instead of on peaceful people that want to be left alone. It is my expectation that it will be impossible for aggressors to justify their violence. This will in practice imply self-ownership. It is a fact that taxation is enforced through violence. Although private property is arguably valid, even if it would be invalid, taxation proponents would still have to show that their property claim is valid and that violent enforcement of it would be justified. If it is difficult to proof that the man who has produced a chair with his own hands has property rights in what he has produced, how much more difficult will it be to show that other people would have a valid claim on the chair, enforceable through violence. I think they will not even come remotely close of showing this would be justified.

Almost everyone agrees that in general people may have exclusive control over their own body. The problem is the exceptions and asterisks that people use to water it down. Some say: you may exclusively control your body except when you steal, others say: except when you sell illegal drugs, etc.. For the idea of self-ownership to fulfill a role of significance in the moral debate, as Stef and others want it to have, then its exceptions have to be defined or at least constrained in some way. Dsayers, you seem to be rather quick to think about people that they might insincere, deceptive, trolling, etc. The reason I did not respond is 1) because it did not seem to matter in the current discussion anymore, because of the direction it had taken, and 2) because I was preparing to start a separate thread about indirect effects of actions in general. But to answer your question: I was talking about manufacturing things by using air / thermal / electrical flows, without directly touching the object that is manufactured.

In your argumentation you stress the fact that people possess their body. But it is important to realize the fundamental difference between mere possession and rightful ownership. At some point, you seemed to conflate these two ideas. - Mere possession: actually controlling something (an “is”) - Rightful ownership: the right to control something exclusively (this implies an “ought” for all the non-owners) Responsibility for past actions is based on the actual possession of our body, not on ownership. If someone controls something illegally, he is still responsible for what he causes. Suppose someone steals a car and causes an accident, then the thief is responsible for it, not the rightful owner of the car. Controlling your fingers or your car is only an expression of ownership if the possession is rightful, but that is what needs to be proven in the first place. Also, it focuses only the positive aspect, the right the control something, and not on the negative aspect of ownership, that others should not control it. I agree that self-ownership is intuitively right, but the point is, can we prove it? I think the term "greater claim" needs clarification or elaboration. For it work, it must be possible to evaluate different ownership claims, and to decide, according to some criteria, which claim best corresponds to reality. For example, suppose a thief runs away with stolen property. Is it morally permissible for the owner to grab the thief to get back his property? Because by doing so, he would demonstrate that he thinks to have a better claim to control the body of the thief at that moment, compared to the thief himself. Or is your position that property rights (of things outside the body) should never be enforced? What would your criteria be to decide between conflicting ownership claims? Can you prove it is the right criteria to use?

I would think indirectness does not matter when causation is certain. If someone produces an object without actually physically touching the object, but only working on it indirectly, does that mean he does not get ownership? Suppose someone claims in a debate: People are free to use their body and property, but with certain restrictions, such as that they should share their abundance with those in need. Using his speaking faculty in an exclusive manner would not be in opposition to his claim, because we have only one body, so it is not in abundance.

So the argument is that people who argue against property rights are inconsistent, because they exercise self-ownership while speaking. The underlying generalized argument seems to be this: 1. You perform behavior X that fits into category A. 2. So you agree that we should approve behavior X that fits into category A. 3. So you should also approve behavior Y and Z that fit into category A. But this is not valid in general. This reasoning is only valid to the degree in which the behaviors in category A are homogeneous, without significant differences. In other words, by employing this reasoning, one assumes that category A is the overriding principle that should settle the matter, although this is probably one of the main points of dispute. If this type of reasoning would be valid in general, then, by carefully choosing categories, one could “prove” that almost any behavior is acceptable (or not acceptable), for example: Suppose a stranger on the street asks you a question without invitation. This means he is sending sound waves that move your ear drums. This fits into the category: moving a body part of someone else without permission. So this means he should also accept any behavior where someone moves a body part of someone else without permission. But of course, this claim is absurd and invalid, which illustrates the point. Humans cannot create something out of nothing. Without the chair maker, there would be wood available to make another type of furniture. Humans can only manipulate objects into a different state or configuration. People have different opinions about the value of configurations of matter, and in some cases (an example is given below), even libertarians are not willing to grant ownership to those who have caused a new configuration of matter. You are making valid points, but I think the example of the wind that moves tree leaves is problematic, because wind is not a voluntary actor. It might be more instructive to take the example of someone who walks on the beech and creates footprints in the sand. The impressions in the sand are the results of his actions, but it is generally not accepted that he will own the land because of it. Although I agree to a significant degree with the libertarian view of property rights, I think the cause is not advanced by claiming that something proofs it, when it in fact, it does not.

If the decision of the parents to have a child creates the positive obligation to care for the child, what about orphans? Maybe the parents should have purchased life-insurance, but suppose they have not done that.

If you get property from another person, for this property transfer to be valid, the ownership of the original owner must be valid. The validity of the whole chain of owners depends on the original property right claim. So the important question is, for what reason does the original owner gets to own the object that he took out of nature and modified to a more preferable state. Is it because he has earned this by his heavy labor? It is useful to examine carefully property rights rules, and apply them with scrupulous objectivity to corner cases, where societal norms reject property claims on the results of your actions (such as when you make footprints in the sand). I have come to the conclusion that these cases show that property rights are partially based on well-being. If respecting property rights is a moral rule, then indeed that moral rule is unavoidable like the laws the gravity. This argument applies equally to all valid moral rules, also to those based on well-being. I am disappointed that my efforts to address your arguments have appeared to you as deception. I am not sure which points you are referring to. If there is a point I need to address, please point it out specifically. When I joined the discussion in this topic, you were asking someone if he affirmed self-ownership, as if that was very important in the discussion (“because "well-being" violates self-ownership”). You did not respond to my positive case for well-being based on the unavoidable negativeness of pain, but responded only to my controversial claim about property rights. This is a reason why we are on this side track.

You used the word “earned” in your argumentation for property rights: And earning implies getting a reward for something. Because your argumentation makes logical jumps, I have to try to fill in the gaps and guess at the underlying assumptions. Property right rules imply a restriction on freedom, but they give people a chance to get a reward from their investment, so it is a trade-off. I have not said such a thing. I have done exactly that. In case you missed it, here it is again:

I totally agree. My issue was with the last part of the sentence, where you linked it to property rights. My arguments against it can be found in my previous post. I have not seen an attempt from you to directly refute that argumentation. This is simply not true. Your free-will is not stolen. Also, your reasoning does not explain why getting a reward for your previous actions is more important then the freedom of others who want to take your property. It is impossible to show that that reward for work is more important than freedom of action, when importance is all subjective. Let us consider again the man who walks on the beech. Walking might have been hard work for him. Does he earn the reward that his footprints will remain permanently under his control? Or is walking on the beech already sufficient reward in itself? Does it amount to slavery, if we destroy his work of art? It is easy to show that some values are subjective. It becomes problematic when you say that all values are purely subjective. Taken to it logical conclusion, it would mean that conformance to moral rules is not objectively valuable, and all moral rules invalid. If it is not like tilling the soil, in which objective aspect does it differ? Indeed this particular argument was not about self-ownership, but about subjectivity. The original topic was about well-being. You consider moral rules based on well-being invalid based on two reasons: 1) it is subjective, 2) it violates self-ownership. My arguments are intended to show that property rights 1) are similarly subjective, and 2) similarly violate self-ownership.

You have addressed my claim, but it was not convincing for me. I have explained why in my previous post, and will explain further in this post. I understand this is stating your position. If it is intended as an argument, then please elaborate. - What is ownership of yourself? That other people should not do something with your body against your permission. - What is owning the effects of your actions? That other people should not do something with the effects of your actions against your permission. Being able to control the effects of your actions, at the moment you do those actions, indeed follows from self-ownership. But after the act, it is like owning history, and has no relation to property rights. Property rights is being able to control something after you have acted, which is something quite different, in other words: - That other people should not manipulate an object after you have manipulated that object. But this rule, when enforced, would be inconsistent with self-ownership as defined above. This argument was addressed in my previous post, when I said: “the work of someone cannot be objectively assigned any value, if values are all subjective”. Although stealing is immoral, it is not the same as forcing another to do something against their wish, as happens during slavery. No one is forced to do something. What I said was “in your view of subjective values”. What I meant was: “according to your view that values are subjective”. Because we disagree about whether values are all subjective. Making impressions in the sand, is that not like tilling the soil? Suppose the beech is yet unowned, does he get to own the land?

To be clear, I am also against theft, and you deserve to keep what you have earned with your labor. My point is that if we reject moral rules based on well-being, because they are subjective and violates self-ownership, then when consistent, we would reject property rights as well. Suppose someone chooses to manipulate an object in nature into a more preferable state, and subsequently claims exclusive ownership. In your view of subjective values, the preferred state would not be better in any objective sense. It is only a different state. Why would the simple act of manipulating an object into a different state have the result that no one else is morally allowed to manipulate that object again without permission? Because it would destroy the hard work? But the work of someone cannot be objectively assigned any value, if values are all subjective. Owning the results of our actions could lead quickly to impossible situations when applied literally. Suppose someone walks on the beech in some seemingly random pattern, and creates footprints with his footsteps. Suppose he would claim ownership of these footprints, and forbid anyone to walk across it, because that would destroy his work of art. That would seem unreasonable, but why? The footprints are, after all, the results of his actions. Can we objectively distinguish between frivolous property right claims and valid claims? To accomplish significant things in this world, we often have to invest, before we can reap the benefits. We travel a value curve, first downwards, during investment, and then upwards, after the task is accomplished, when we enjoy the results of our work. If our work is taken away half way, we suffer a net loss. If this happens frequently, investment is no longer profitable. In order to reach higher states of well-being, it is important for human beings that their property rights are respected. In this way, property rights are based on the importance of well-being.

Assault, rape, and murder violate the self-ownership of others, because it is doing what you want, not only with your own body, but also with the body of someone else, without their permission. But theft is using your own body to take an object that is not part of any other self. If someone touches your body, you can say, you touched me, but if someone touches your property, you cannot reasonably say, you touched me. The idea that property is part of yourself, sounds like a mystical claim to me. So self-ownership is ownership of your body. This means theft is not a violation of self-ownership, but only a violation of property rights. Absolute self-ownership, when taken to the extreme, would imply no property rights in anything besides our body.

The idea of well-being as the foundation of morality can be consistent with self-ownership in some sense. Moral rules do not have to be enforced. And well-being is promoted by refraining from all acts of aggression. But if you would define self-ownership as meaning that people may morally do whatever they want with their own body, then there is indeed a contradiction. But then property rights are also in contradiction. Property right rules restrict the freedom of how other people may use their body, and if enforced, that would be controlling the body of another without consent. One aspect of well-being is not having pain. The pain experience is negative subjectively, but I would say, also objective in some sense. In my experience at least it is not possible to turn pain itself into something positive. To value it negatively then is not a subjective “opinion”, because there is no choice. We might be able to alleviate the suffering by focusing our attention on other things, but that does not eliminate the negativeness when it was there. Even if some people experience pain as positive, that does not diminish the reality of negative pain for all the others. The negativeness is really happening in reality.

To clarify the issue, it is useful to have a definition of objectivity. Something is objective if: Definition 1. It exists independent from a mind Definition 2. It is without bias My statement that “every difference in valuation should be grounded in some reason that is applied objectively to everyone”, was based on the second definition of objectivity: to be without bias. We can use our rational mind to prevent bias in our values to a reasonable degree. I don't think that anything in my argumentation (the revised one) depends on the assumption that values can exist independent from a mind. If the idea of unbiased values (to a reasonable degree) is controversial, I submit the following argumentation: Moral rules, in order to be valid, must be objective, that is, without bias. If a moral rule is valid, then all people should follow that rule. Because people do that which they, on the whole, prefer, this implies they should prefer conformance to the rule. Or in other words, conformance to the moral rule is universally preferable behavior (UPB). Because a preference is a valuation of one option above another, this means that our values should conform to an unbiased rule. So if there is any morality at all, then our values not only can, but should be objective in some respect (again objective in the sense of unbiased). A similar argumentation is possible in support of the idea that something can be valuable objectively in the sense of independent from a mind. Suppose everyone would disagree with some valid moral rule, this would not invalidate the rule. This means that the moral rule is independent from a human mind that affirms it, and therefore objective in the fullest sense. If a moral rule is valid, then people should follow the rule, which means they should prefer conformance to the rule. But this means that conformance to moral rules is a objectively valuable (not valued, but valuable). If something is objectively valuable, then it can be said to have value objectively.

Values are subjectively assigned by people, but I would say they have a relation to objective reality. I would be interested to know how you think then any objective moral rules can deduced. Why is objectivity a requirement for a moral rule? Or is objectivity of moral rules only our shared personal preference? And if objectivity should be applied to moral rules, why not to values? Are moral rules not based on the idea that what they require is universally preferable?

It is possible to let our valuation be grounded in some reason, and apply that reason objectively (consistently), right? I am not sure I understand this objection. If you make a reasoned argument, that implies it is according to reason, so it is in conformity with the rule. The rule does not imply that everyone has to do the same thing. There are indeed many reasons to do otherwise. It would still be relevant, because the first assumption could be modified as follows: If you want to assign value according to reason, then you should do the following to reach that goal. The other proposition could remain the same. And if someone does not want to assign value according to reason, then a reasoned debate about values is not possible anyway. Indeed, humans are not equal but similar, but unless you know more about the other person, or about yourself compared to the general population, you cannot know or guess if the needs of that other person warrants more or less importance than your own, so why assume less? A possible valid reason that might justify a lower valuation could be precaution, because you don't know the other person yet (it might be a thief or so). But the mere fact that the other person is not part of your family, would not be an objective reason, because the other person is part of some family. It is normal that some people will be more personally valuable to us than others, in the sense of personal benefit, appreciation, and attachment. However, at the same time, we might realize that there are other people, not fundamentally different, that are similarly precious to others, and take that into account in our final valuation. This might sound contradictory, but I hope you are understand the distinction I am making. Not necessarily, but that every difference in valuation should be grounded in some reason that is applied objectively to everyone.

Your remarks have helped me see several weaknesses in my argumentation, so I appreciate your feedback. Here is my next attempt: Assumption: The way we assign value should be according to reason Assumption: We value that our own basic needs (food, water) are met All humans are biologically similar. Each human being has similar basic needs (food, water) that must be fulfilled to stay alive We should value that the basic needs are met of people that value such themselves, until a good reason to do otherwise appears, because there is no known difference between us and them at this point, and therefore no reason on which to base a difference in valuation Because people act to ensure that which they consider as valuable, if we really value that the needs of others are met, we will act accordingly When we know more about other people, then every difference that we make in our valuation of their needs, should be made according to reason The conclusion depends on the assumption that the way we assign value should be according to reason. The following can be said in support of this assumption (although it is not a proof): Good reasons take account of reality, but valuing things differently without reason does not. Moral rules must be objective in order to be valid. If there are valid moral rules that say something about what we should value, they must therefore be grounded in reality. So when we assign value according to reason, we prevent the possibility of violating moral rules that might exist. Beside that, if those that do not prefer to value things according to reason, would be convinced to such a degree that they will say that the only way to reject the conclusion is to assign value not according to reason, then that would almost seem as if they agreed. In the scenario of the rich and poor man, if the assumption is accepted that we should assign value according to reason, then the rich man, if he does not give to the poor man, should have a reason for that. The scenario does not give any details about the two persons, except a difference in wealth, but that alone does not seem to be a very good reason to warrant a difference in valuation.

For those who want to engage in further debate, I will to try to further explain and elaborate my argumentation. What I meant with importance was not subjective importance, like when someone says: That person is important to me, because he does this or that for me.What I meant was this: If someone is more important than another, than his needs and preferences may rightfully take precedence over the other one. UPB and NAP also assume similar importance of people, because they forbid forcibly imposing your preferences on someone else. Suppose two people want to take an apple from a tree at the same time, and they both say: "I am more important than you, so it is mine". They cannot be both right. At least one of them must be wrong in their view of relative importance. What I meant was: Each human being has similar needs that must to be satisfied in order to stay alive. Each human being needs food with certain properties, water, and oxygen. It is my opinion that it is universally the right thing to do. If it is not important to have beliefs that correspond to reality, why bother to discuss reality? And if beliefs are not acted upon, what is the point of discussing them? It is difficult to engage in a debate without assuming these things have at least some importance. It follows from proposition 4, 5, and 6. If they would regard is as unimportant, while at the same time considering their own basic needs as very important (prop.6), they would have an opinion that is inconsistent with reality (if prop.4 is true), which is something they should not do (prop.5).Actually, there is one other way out that I overlooked: that they would downscale the importance of their own basic needs, in order to match those of others. The corrected proposition is as follows:7. Those people should either A) no longer regard their basic needs as very important, or B) regard it as important that the basic needs of others are met, and they should act accordinglyHowever, I do not advocate option A), but would rather see an upscale of the needs of others. Do you recommend specific books or authors?

Hi philosophers, I was thinking about the question if it is possible to logically deduce positive responsibilities from reality. I came up with the following reasoning: All humans are biologically similar Each human being has similar importance Each human being has similar needs in order to live It is of similar importance that the needs of each person is fulfilled, because the importance of each person is similar Human beings should have beliefs that correspond to reality, and act accordingly The vast majority of people regard it as very important that their basic needs are met Those people should regard it as important that the basic needs of others are met, and they should act accordingly Compared to UPB, the argumentation above is based on shared preferences, while UPB is based on universal preferences. The argumentation could applied to a specific case of giving to the poor: Suppose there is a poor man that has lack of food. He knocks on the door of a rich man and asks for a gift of food. Suppose the rich man does not give it. Is this morally valid, invalid, or neutral? The rich man has eaten food regularly to keep himself alive. By doing so, he has affirmed the importance for humans to have access to sufficient food. The rich and poor man are biologically similar, so they have similar needs with regard to food. When refusing to give food to the poor man, the rich man is implicitly making the statement that it is not important that the poor man has enough food to eat. This is a contradictory attitude towards the necessity of food, inconsistent with reality, and therefore morally invalid. So it is his responsibility to give something to the poor man. Do you see an error in the argumentation, or do you think it is valid? Could it be that the lack of emphasis on responsibility to help others as a moral non-enforced rule, is one of the main reasons people are reluctant to accept a free society? Looking forward to your comments.

I was also struggling with this issue. It seems that the UPB book uses two different definitions to distinguish the categories 'ANA' (aesthetically negative actions) from 'evil':Definition 1. whether the behavior is inflicted on othersDefinition 2. whether the behavior may be violently opposed Examples of the use of definition 1:p.48 "Ethics is the subset of UPB which deals with inflicted behaviour"p.70 "aesthetically negative actions (ANAs)"... "by definition they can be avoided" Examples of the use of definition 2:p.48 "ethics or morality will refer to enforceable preferences"p.87 if it is "evil, then it can be prohibited by using force, since that is one of the very definitions of evil that we worked out above"The two definitions are equal only under the following assumptions:Assumption 1. violence is allowed to defend against any inflicted behaviorAssumption 2. defending against inflicted behavior is the only case in which violence is allowed Definition 1 is in my opinion the only workable definition, because it focuses on properties of the behavior (whether or not it is inflicted), while definition 2 is actually more of a conclusion.To clear up the situation, I would recommend to drop definition 2 (enforceability), and only accept it as a conclusion when its two contestable assumptions (listed above) are proven.

A moral theory is required to be true, but as a practical matter, we might argue for it because of its desirable effects.At the same time, the actual content of a moral theory might or might not argue based on effects. For example, the deontologist Kant argued that morality consists of good will, regardless of unintended effects.A problem we face when evaluating actions by its effects is this: How can we objectively determine if the effect of an action is good? The reality is unfortunately that people disagree about it. For that reason, the UPB approach focuses on effects that are inflicted on the property of others. The owner is the one who may decide to allow or forbid that something is done with his property. This means that the same action with the same effect is accepted if the owner wants it, but rejected if the owner does not want it. This shows it is not an argument from effect.Nevertheless, I think there exist valid moral arguments based on the evaluation of effect. These types of moral arguments would look at the direct result of the act, while an argument from effect would look at the larger indirect consequences.

My purpose is to create a series of logical steps, expressed in operational terms, in order to verify logically the claim of ownership. But if ownership is indeed an a priori-assumption, then there is not much to analyse. Although most people assume some type of ownership over their body (they use it after all), libertarians usually see this ownership as much more absolute than others, so I don't think we can take it for granted. Or in other words, the claim of absolute ownership requires a (absolute) proof. There is another argument in UPB book for self-ownership. It goes like this: you are debating, so you are exercising 100% ownership, so you should accept 100% ownership in general. Let's analyse this: 1. You are exercising "100% control over your body" in order to debate 2. So you accept behavior in the category "controlling your body 100%" 3. Therefore you should accept any behavior in the category "controlling your body 100%" (=absolute ownership) But the last step from claim 2 to 3 is logically not valid, so it is not a proof.

The term "should control morally well" was meant to be a neutral expression of responsibility. At that point of the argumentation, it is not yet proven what is our responsibility.

Hi people, This post is about an aspect of the the book “Universally Preferable Behaviour , A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics ” (online here) written by our host Stefan. In the UPB book, it is argued that, since we own our bodies, we own our actions, so also the effects of actions, and therefore we own whatever we produce, such as a bow or a book. A homesteading theory or a theory of just acquisition is regarded as unnecessary to establish property rights. It would be preferable if it would indeed be that simple. But after thinking about it, it seems to me that there are some problems with it, which I will explain below. On page 75 of the UPB book, the ethical problem of theft is examined. I understand the argumentation as follows: I control my body I should control my body morally well (responsibility) I am allowed to control my body (ownership) I think the argumentation needs one extra qualification in order to be logically sound: I inherently control my body I should control my body morally well (responsibility) I am allowed to control my body (ownership) The responsibility to control something cannot be inferred from only the fact that we control something. For example, the government controls the economy, but it should not do so. But if we unavoidably (inherently) control something, then it can be inferred we should do so morally well. The reasoning is now valid because: 1. is obviously true 1.->2. is valid, assuming there is morality at all 2.->3. is valid, otherwise there would be an impossible moral obligation What has been said for our bodies, can also be said for our actions, and the effects of our actions, as far as we can predict them. Let us examine further what this actually means. We have control over what we will do next, because we can decide it. We control our future actions and the effects of those actions. Once we have acted, the effects of our actions materialize, and become a fixed part of history that we cannot control anymore. We are still responsible for past actions, because we have controlled it in the past. Responsibility can refer to both past and future moral obligations. But the right to control something now, cannot be automatically deduced from past obligations to control it. Besides, even if we had the right to control the effects of our past actions, it would be impossible to exercise it. We cannot control the effects of our past actions, any more than we can change history. We can only control the effects of our future actions. In the reasoning of the UPB book, the right to control the effects of our actions is based on our ability to control it. Theft, on the other hand, implies that we have lost control over it. To argue that we are allowed to control something, after we lost control over it, therefore needs another type of reasoning. Secondly, in the theory under study, the right to control something is based on our obligation to control it well (responsibility). If someone would let any of this type of possession be stolen, it would create the impossible moral obligation upon him to control that which he cannot control, which is of course absurd. In fact, stealing of this type of possession is logically impossible, because we have control over it by definition. For the reasons stated above, it seems to me that this type of reasoning is insufficient to establish property rights and handle the subject of theft. By the way, my argumentation is not intended to justify theft, but to get to a better theory of property rights. I think we need some type of homesteading theory to effectively proof property rights, or at least make them plausible. Looking forward to your comments. Best regards.