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1) Something is optional if there is a physical possibility to otherwise. 2) Something is obligatory if there is a physical possibility to do otherwise, but it is our obligation to do it. On the one hand, there is a physical possibility to violate any moral rule, and in this sense, morality is optional. On the other hand, moral obligation is not conditioned upon us wanting to be a moral, but it applies to anyone. In this sense, morality is not optional.

That was a miswording on my part. The intended meaning was the same.

Based on the context, it seems to me that Stef is writing here about morality being optional in the sense that it is possible to do evil, because unlike physical law, moral laws are not automatically enforced. No thunderbolt strikes us down if we do evil. This is very different from saying that the obligation of morality is optional.

True ethics must take into account all sentient beings. We should not have an unfounded bias towards ourselves. Ethical vegetarianism is an example of ethics that is not completely biased towards human beings. If we find evidence this is the case, let us incorporate it into our ethical theory. Yes, it should be applied universally. Some behavior is harmful and based on selfishness, which shows it to be evil. Suppose this evil act had unintended beneficial consequences for an alien civilization. It would still be an evil act, because evil is dependent on the intention. We cannot be required to take into account what we don't know. We should view each being separately, not as a whole (the rest of universe). Each individual counts. Even if the other beings in the universe are individually superior in intelligence and consciousness, there is still reason for them to have empathy towards us, in the same way that human beings can have empathy with animals. Suppose a SETI program would give us communication access to an alien civilization. I suppose we would not be indifferent towards their well-being.

I have difficulty understanding your ethical theory. - some behavior is evil: this sounds like moral realism - there is no moral obligation: this sounds like moral nihilism. How would you categorize your ethical theory? Can you point to a prominent philosopher or article that shares your view? Do you think that Stef shares this view? If so, could you point to where he specifically says this? From what I have read and heard, I got the impression that Stef affirms moral obligation. In the UPB-book, "good" is defined as: "universally preferable and enforceable through violence".(p.64), so it is not about stern looks. To justify means to show something complies with the moral standard. Translated to neutral words, this means the function of the standard is: 1) to show that deviances from the standard do not comply to the standard 2) to show that enforcement of the standard complies to the standard which is similarly circular. I think the only way to solve it, is to establish a link to a separate goal, value, or obligation.

If an organization collects money, not through voluntary contracts, but through threats or violence, then such an organization is actually telling us what to with our life to some degree, because how we spend our money is a part of our life. I considers it very important to be free not to fund such violent organizations. They might call what they do "protection service", but I would not call it a "service", because it is not what I have asked for. I would not call it "protection" either, because when they threaten people, this is the opposite of protection. Whether or not such an organization would be called a government, it behaves strikingly similar.

Besides the subject of welfare, maybe it is useful to first prepare the ground by talking a bit about stupid, arbitrary, and evil purposes that tax money is spent on, and ask if he can justify the use of violence to collect money for those kind of purposes, and if not, if you are allowed to deduct this amount from the taxes. Another approach could be to ask if he agrees that the same moral standard should apply to everyone. Then, you could try to point out the double standard that is applied: - Suppose a charity organization would collect money from people through threats and violence, and use it for welfare purposes, would this be considered acceptable? - If a stranger asks you how much money you earn, are you required to answer that question? - Suppose a company uses violence against his competition to enforce a monopoly, would such a business be entitled to receive whatever they charge for their services? - Suppose a company would provide you with a "service" you did not ask for, would it be fair if this business sends you an invoice and demands payment? I hope this helps, and wish you good luck.

When someone has a debt, this means he owes the other person an amount of money. The word "ought" used to be the past tense of owe: "he aught me ten pounds". So the concept of an "ought" is historically derived from the concept of a debt. I would agree that in the long run, morality gives the best outcome for humans, but I would include also non-human sentient beings in the equation. But the point I was trying to make is something different: If UPB seeks to determine what we ought to do (if that is its application), then we must judge its derivation based on whether it is suited for the goal of determining what we ought do. If UPB seeks to determine what is good for society, then we must test if its derivation is suited for determining what is good for society. If UPB seeks to determine something that is undefined or defined in a circular way, then it cannot be tested for validity. We can then only check its internal consistency, not its external consistency. For example, person X attacks person Y, is generalized to: a human being imposes his personal preference on another human being, based on the assumption that the difference between the two human beings is not ethically relevant. The man in coma is generalized into a human being, based on the assumption that ability is not ethically relevant. The preference/rule "Don't eat fish" is generalized into: Don't eat (at all), or Don't eat organisms, based on the assumption there is no ethically relevant difference between a fish and a cabbage. The way generalization is performed to a large degree determines what the outcome will be of UPB. I expect a standard to be either: a) applicable for a specific goal, for example a safety standard: if you want to be safe, then do this. b) applicable regardless of our goals, so a moral standard, such as: don't steal. But to say a standard fulfills the goal of being compliant, then this does not give us any information about the standard, because it is true for any standard. The UPB theory of Stef in the UPB-book seems to imply it. "The proposition before us is thus: can some preferences be objective, i.e. universal? ............. Thus when I talk about universal preferences, I am talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer." (p.33) From the little truths of “I should not murder” we can get to the great truths such as “the initiation of the use of force is morally wrong.” (p.96) [emphasis added] If his theory does not intend to imply a moral obligation, then I have really misunderstood him.

What the UPB theory shows is that some preferences, when generalized in a certain way, cannot be universalized. If UPB wants to be a valid ethical theory, then aspects that are ethically relevant should not be generalized away. You imply morality is optional in two senses: 1) it is possible to violate the moral imperative. I agree, it is not physical law. 2) the moral imperative applies only if you want to be good. I disagree. It are especially those that do not want to be good, that need the moral imperative. I see the same problem of circularity here (morality ~= virtue ~= goodness). If the implication of UPB is not intended to be a moral obligation (an "ought"), what would you say are its implications for our personal life or for society? [facts] --derivation--> [uPB content] --application?--> [our life] So this question is not about the derivation or content of UPB, but about its application.

For which goal is UPB objectively required? Or is it required regardless of your goals? Every preference can be universalized. The preference to commit aggression against others can be universalized, but it would have very bad effects; it could even cause human extinction. But to call such effects bad, is to invoke a value. Which principles?

Adding a conditional does not, in itself, get us closer to or further away from an "ought" in the moral sense of the word. For example, if you want to be a thief, then you ought to steal? No. If you want to be a thief, then you ought to change your mind and refrain from stealing. When we convert what we know into logical propositions, we can only describe the relations between concepts, not the concepts themselves. For example, when we put the fact "John suffers" into a logical system, then as far as logic is concerned, it is equal to "Object X exhibits property Y". Humans, on the other hand, can understand what suffering and joy actually means, and they have the ability of empathy, which is very relevant for the subject of ethics. Consider, for example, an extreme situation where someone is literally tortured by someone else. The victim says: "You are hurting me severely. You ought to stop." The statement of the victim is correct, although he deduced an "ought" from an "is". To say otherwise, would that not amount to moral nihilism? When the "ought not" implication is removed from the concept of immorality, combined with the idea of complete subjectivity of value, the result is this: - "rights" without the implication of an ought - "self-ownership" without the implication that we ought to respect it - "good" that is not objectively valuable, "evil" without negative objective value - "immoral" without the implication that we ought not do it It makes no sense to me. What do you mean by "virtue", if it is not morally required (no ought), not objectively valuable, and not universally preferable? There are many logically consistent ways to categorize human action, or the subset of human action that is the enforcement of a preference. We can categorize it based on whether or not it is the initiation of force, whether or not it raises the aggregate life expectancy of humans, whether or not it raises CO2 emission. This categorization based on the initiation of force, what sets it apart from all other categorizations? What is the relevance of it, apart from an exercise in logical consistency? That it tells us what is immoral? But what is "immoral" according to your definition? Not in the sense of how we determine it, but what it is. It would be helpful if such concepts were clearly defined.

If I understand correctly, you are saying that "you ought not commit aggression" is only applicable to those who wish to live a consistent, sustainable, virtuous life. I am surprised and a bit shocked... We then have a very different conception of ethics. It seems obvious to me that everyone, regardless of their wishes, ought to refrain from evil actions such as murder and rape. Let us consider the victims of crimes and their rights not to be attacked. Their rights imply an "ought" for all others.

I have never claimed rules are automatically legitimate. The rules I am talking about in this context are moral claims in the form of "you ought to do X", and "you ought not to do Y". These rules themselves, even if they are invalid, are not the initiation of force. If a moral rule is invalid, then its enforcement will be immoral, of course. My point was about valid moral rules. My claim is that if a moral rule is valid, this does not imply that its enforcement will always be moral. Or, stated differently, if enforcement of a rule is wrong, this does not imply the rule is necessarily invalid. Stated in logical formula, this would be: not ( Valid(Rule) ---> Moral(Enforcement(Rule)) ) not ( Immoral(Enforcement(Rule)) ---> Invalid(Rule) )I would be interested to know whether you and others agree, and if not, what would be your reasons for disagreement.

I have a somewhat different definition of the word defensive. Based on your definition, defensive force means non-initiatory force. Enforcement of a rule can either be initiatory or non-initiatory force(a digital yes or no). How does this relate to the subject of this topic?

Enforcement sometimes is defensive, sometimes it is partially defensive, sometimes it is not defensive.

In the UPB book and also on this message board, the idea is often expressed that valid moral rules are always enforceable. Either it is assumed to be true by definition, or it is seen as a logical conclusion. In this post, I will try to show why I think this is not a good idea. A question of definition In the UPB book, ethics is defined as follows: In general, we will use the term aesthetics to refer to non-enforceable preferences – universal or personal – while ethics or morality will refer to enforceable preferences. Similarly, "good" is defined in the UPB book as: universally preferable and enforceable through violence, such as “don’t murder” with evil being defined as the opposite of this. A problem with these definitions is that they diverge from what is commonly understood to be morality and aesthetics, and this is confusing. Ethics is about what we ought to do. This is a concept separate from enforcement. Aesthetics is about subjective taste, what we consider beautiful etc. It is not morally binding at all. If "being on time" and "not lying" is classified as merely "aesthetically positive", this is a too weak expression to my taste. Another problem is that the definition tries to categorize two behaviors at the same time: 1) the behavior itself, and 2) the reactionary rule-enforcing behavior. Generally, it is not a good idea to categorize two things at the same time. Each of these two behaviors can better be categorized separately as either good, evil, or neutral. Another possible objection to the definition is that it is circular. Behavior is good if it is enforceable. Enforceable means that enforcing is not evil. Enforcing is not evil if a prohibition on this enforcement would be unenforceable. And so on. Does it follow logically? If it cannot be assumed by definition that moral rules are always enforceable, can it maybe be deduced logically? A moral rule forbids or requires certain behavior. A negative moral rule could be: People ought not do action X. This means that it is universally preferable that people don't do action X. What else can we logically deduce from this? Not much. To help the deduction a bit, let's introduce the assumption that the reason for the moral rule is that the effects of action X are really bad. In that case, if the effects of action X are bad, then it cannot be evil to prevent these effects. But enforcement never simply prevents the effects of bad actions to occur. Enforcement always has side effects. In some cases, enforcement has the side effect of physical harm. It does not follow logically, that this would be always acceptable. This is a reason why there are pacifists. The same reasoning applies to the enforcement of positive rules. In addition to this, positive rules have a few extra characteristics that make their enforcement less likely to be allowable and preferable, compared to negative rules. - Enforcement of a positive rule cannot make sure the required action is done (because of free will, and because physical harm will only impede performing the required action), while enforcement of a negative rule can possibly make sure a forbidden action is stopped. - It is not possible for a person to fulfill a negative duty as a substitute for someone else, but it might be possible to perform a positive duty as a substitute for someone else, with similar positive effects. If the external positive effects of the action were the reason for the moral rule, then it makes sense to do this. A counter-example to the idea that moral rules are always enforceable, is the requirement of proportionality. Many people believe that enforcement is only allowable if it is not disproportional. It is possible to imagine a situation where evil behavior is not preventable, except by disproportional violence, for example a thief running away with a candy bar. Such a situation could not exist, if indeed enforcement would always be allowable. For these reasons, I would say that ethics is a matter distinct from enforceability, although it is a related concept. What would your response be to this argumentation?

In a panarchy, would someone have the option of joining no government at all? If it is required to join one, then there would be no freedom of association. If it is not required, could you explain how panarchy would be any different from anarchy with a free market and competing DROs (Dispute Resolution Organizations)?

A common objection against anarchy is: Who will take care of the poor? The response might be: The free market will provide much more wealth, and for that reason, help the poor. But even then, there will always be people that are unable to earn a living because of sickness or other disabilities. These people will depend on voluntary donations from others. But many people would like more assurance that indeed other people will help them in time of need. It is possible in a free society to provide this assurance as well. And we do not have to wait for anarchy to arrive, to show this is true. This brings me to the idea of a libertarian trust fund for the poor. It could function as follows: - People transfer money to the trust fund voluntarily. - When anarchy arrives, it is contractually required that the money is transferred to the poor, in some predefined way. - As long as the state persists, the money in the trust fund is invested, and after a predefined number of years, released back to the original owners with interest. People could voluntarily replace it with new money. - There could be multiple competing trust funds with different pay-out rules, different investment strategies, etc. Possible benefits: - It could be referred to in debates to show that anarchists are willing to give to the poor when not forced to. - It could provide some level of assurance for the case we or others would be poor in a situation of anarchy. - It could show people that there are viable ethical alternatives for state welfare programs, providing the same level of assurance, demonstrating the state is redundant. - It could be made sure the money is not directly invested in NAP-violating state projects. I would be interested in hearing your opinion about this.

How does someone acquire excessive wealth? If it was justly obtained, then it was through voluntary transactions with other people. Those other people have regarded the exchange as beneficial; they considered the product or service more valuable than the money they had to pay for it; otherwise they would not have done it. If we want to prevent that people get excessively wealthy, then there is the option of not buying their products or services. By buying Microsoft products, people were making Bill Gates richer, one small step at a time. They could have said: It is more important that Gates does not get excessively rich, than that I have access to Windows, so I will use Linux instead. Many people have decided to buy nonetheless. The people that have bought a copy of the software have jointly transferred an excessive amount of wealth from their own wallets to the wallet of Microsoft. Is it fair for consumers to complain about excessive wealth, when each of them has contributed to it? On the other hand, if someone has acquired wealth through theft, then of course, he has to give back the property to the rightful owner. And if the thief has given the stolen property to his children, this does not make the children the rightful owners, no matter how many generations. A thief does not have valid ownership of the stolen goods, so he can never possibly transfer ownership.

The article makes an argument against free trade based on a number of advantages of buying locally instead of abroad, such as: stimulation of local industries, better employment and larger wealth in the long run for that area, and environmental friendliness. The idea of buying more things locally might be a very good idea. The problem is the author of the article wants to force it using government, which is a bad idea. Besides the mentioned advantages, there are also disadvantages of buying locally, when a competing product from abroad is less expensive. It increases the cost of living for the consumer. Also, if a product is more expensive than another product, this suggests its production took more resources from society. Because there are both advantages and disadvantages for buying locally, people have to weigh these factors and then make a decision. People will choose to buy locally or abroad depending on which factors they consider more important. Politicians and economists are not the only ones that have the ability to consider long term social consequences. Ordinary people can do that too. We don't need enforced trade restrictions to promote local industry. People can do this themselves voluntary, and they will do so, if they consider it important enough. The decision of people to buy local or remote products might be wise or unwise, but it is their money they are spending. They are not committing a crime, so other people have no right interfering with it through threats and sanctions. This implies free trade is the only ethical option. It is indeed only true at the exact moment of the decision, but this is also the moment when the coercion is active (if any). So if someone is unemployed because of enforced minimum wage laws, we know he would have preferred to work at the lower rate, compared to having no work at all. Those that are not good at making decisions, might say afterwards: I wish I had made another decision. They usually don't say: I wish another person would have threatened me with sanctions. In other words, even if they make mistakes, people usually prefer to make their own decisions. And even if they prefer that someone else decides for them, this would be like voluntarily listening to advice. The question whether a person was right in his evaluation of perceived benefit is a different subject altogether. It requires an objective theory about what is beneficial.

The word "initiation" establishes a historical context that does not contain an earlier initiation. If you have been attacked by everyone, it is impossible to initiate force. Relevant parts of the context of theft are whether you are the owner of the property, and if not, whether the owner has given permission. It depends on how we define context and what we see as the action itself. We could define an action very narrowly, only seeing it as movement of atoms and energy. In that case, all moral rules are completely based on context. Is it your position that: 1. moral rules with positive obligations are difficult to determine in detail, or 2. moral rules with positive obligations cannot be valid ? I would agree with the first proposition, that it is difficult. But I don't see why a rule would be invalid, because it is difficult to determine all the details of it. Humans are subject to morality because of their ability to exercise free-will and do things. A man in coma can do nothing. This is morally very relevant. Children have less ability to understand the consequences of their actions, so moral rules apply adjusted to them. Healthy adults also do not have all the same ability. Valid moral rules take ability into account.

The coma test is valid, but it does not have the sweeping consequence of erasing all positive obligations. It only invalidates very simplistic positive rules such as "Thou shalt give to charity, even when in coma." The rule to give to charity when there is good opportunity for it, is not violated by the man in coma. (leaving open for debate what is a good opportunity) When properly formulated, positive moral rules can be universal. They cannot impose an actual obligation in all circumstances, but neither do property right rules. For example, the prohibition against theft does not impose any actual negative obligation on a man living alone on an island. Positive rules are based on context, but negative rules are also based on context. Also, ownership rules do not remove subjectivity. Ownership lets the owner decide what is forbidden with his property. But the decision of the owner is based on his own subjective opinion... It is civilized to let the owner decide, but still the owner might be making a mistake, because he is not infallible. The UPB framework places all non-enforceable rules in the realm of aesthetics, outside of morality. I think this is unwarranted. For example, it can be morally required to stretch out your hand to help a drowning man, while it would be wrong (and absurd) to grab the hand of another one and pull it toward the drowning man. There can be valid moral rules that are wrong to enforce. For this reason, positive obligations are not in contradiction with ownership. A moral rule requiring charity can be valid, while theft is still wrong.

An economy is based on division of labor and mutual beneficial trade transactions. If all advertisements that equate hapiness with material ownership would stop at this moment, would people stop buying food, houses, cars, computers, smart-phones, etc.? I don't think so. Arguably, a part of the economy is based on persuading people to buy useless things or to live materialistically, but not all of the economy is based on it.

Thank you for all the interesting responses. In some situations, this issue could indeed be resolved by using the authority of the land owner. But even on owned land, there would still be default rules that apply, when nothing else has been agreed upon. By default, it would be impermissible to hit someone on the head, while permissible to talk. Besides that, sound waves, or pollution in general, easily crosses property boundaries. This shows that also in a free society there would be a need for clarity on this subject. Objections against speech, by the way, are not uncommon. Not to speech itself, of course, but to the content of the speech that they involuntary get exposed to (insults, swearing, etc.). If someone is granted absolute authority over eardrum movement, he could use that authority selectively, for any purpose. At one end of the spectrum, there is the sound we make while breathing, which is unavoidable, and therefore cannot be immoral. At the other end, there is the sound that causes deafness to its victims, which is clearly immoral. In between there is uncertainty. Based on which objective criteria can we determine which behavior is immoral, or the degree of immorality? Societal norms will probably not quality as objective. A nice quote from Rothbard about this in "For a New Liberty": Noise, too, is a form of air pollution. Noise is the creation of sound waves which go through the air and then bombard and invade the property and persons of others. Only recently have physicians begun to investigate the damaging effects of noise on the human physiology. Again, a libertarian legal system would permit damage and class action suits and injunctions against excessive and damaging noise: against "noise pollution." When actions are done directly, libertarian ethics is based on the authority of the owner. No need to refer to damage. If the owner does not allow it, it is forbidden, period. But when it happens indirectly through particles, such as with loud noise or pollution, the criteria that is often used is if something is damaging. This raises several questions: - The different ethical evaluation of causation through particles seems inconsistent. Can it be shown it is not inconsistent? - Can objectively be determined what constitutes damage? If not, how can it be part of moral evaluation? If yes, does this imply that damage could possibly also be the base for other moral rules, such as the positive obligation to help someone to prevent damage? - Is damage the only determining criteria? What about annoying or disturbing sounds that do not damage you, but make it impossible to concentrate, or to sleep, etc. Is privacy also a criteria (the radiation body scanner)? Can we logically and objectively deduce, based on first principles, which criteria should determine the morality of particle effects?

I think that morality still fully applies when under duress. Moral rules such as against murder are based on the right of the victim not to be attacked. Suppose someone is threatened and told to commit a crime. Can this in any way change the rights of the victim of the crime? Of course not. So this means it is still forbidden to attack him. Does threatening suspend the free will of the actor? No, the actor still has the possibility to refrain from doing it. In practice also, many people have resisted the temptation of giving in to threats, which shows that it is possible. This could never happen if free will was indeed gone. This means the actor is still responsible for what he does to his victim, even though he himself is threatened. The one who threatens is of course responsible as well. Moral responsibility does not have to add up to 100%; they can be both responsible. Because people are often threatened (by the state, especially), if giving in to threats would be permissible, there would be little left of morality. For example, consider the masses of people that fought in wars against each other, because each of them had been threatened.