square4

One of the problems is, if that's correct, then to say a behavior is UPB only makes sense when a goal is specified. And yet, in the vast majority of cases in the UPB book, no goal is specified. The equivocation (if any) is done in the UPB book, as the quote below shows. I am only trying to understand its meaning. (Edit: removed confusing quote) You are talking here about the preferableness of applying the UPB method. But what I am talking about is UPB in the sense of universally preferable behavior such as non-murder, and being on time, and why such behavior is preferable. The referenced FDR episode does not address my question, but it does raise a new one. Around t=11:30, Stef says that aesthetically preferable actions, such as being on time, are not universally preferable. But in the UPB book, APAs are universally preferable. Is this a mistake, or has UPB theory changed? Maybe I need to explain what has led to my question. As far as I understand, UPB theory implies that we have the obligation to not murder. I understand libertarian theory means no unchosen positive obligations, at least no enforceable ones, but there are negative obligations. To my surprise, in a previous thread two prominent FDR members implied there is no obligation to be moral, but only if you want to be virtuous/good, then you ought to be moral. I strongly disagree. Everyone has the obligation to do nothing that is evil. One of the goals of this topic is to seek confirmation if UPB theory (as intended by Stef) implies the obligation to do nothing that is evil, or if this is denied.

The UPB book tries to determine what is universally preferable behavior. But for what reason is UPB behavior preferable? Basically, there are two possible answers: A) It is preferable because we should prefer it (or indirectly, it is preferable because it is the only way that leads to a result that we should prefer). This implies it is our moral obligation to do it. B) It is preferable, because it is required to reach a particular goal. If this is the meaning of UPB, then there are again two options: B.1) The particular goal is shared by everyone. This does not seem to be the claim of the UPB book. People have different desires. B.2) The particular goal is not shared by everyone. This means the behavior might not be preferable for those people that do not share this particular goal. If this is the correct interpretation of UPB, then to say a behavior is universally preferable makes no sense unless a particular goal is specified. For example, if we say "being on time" is a universally preferable aesthetically positive action, the question is: Assuming which particular goal? Because the UPB book has been written by Stef, I would like to know what he intends to be the meaning of UPB: Is UPB is what should prefer (as a moral obligation, regardless of our goals), or is UPB what is preferable assuming a particular goal? I can see support for both positions in the UPB book, so I am unsure. If the answer is that UPB behavior is only required for a particular goal, then the second question would be, which goal(s)? Assuming the goal of understanding the intended meaning of the UPB book, it would be preferable to have a definite answer to these questions.

Ethical theories implicitly presuppose which aspects are ethically relevant. In order to be valid, the ethical theory must apply universally across all variations that are claimed by the ethical theory itself to be ethically irrelevant (here the ethical theory is not UPB, but the theory under test, for example democracy). If this fails, the ethical theory cannot be valid. To me, universality of ethics means that moral rules must apply regardless of differences that are ethically irrelevant. In this sense, there are no exceptions.

An exception should pass the tests of consistency, and must point to a fundamental difference that is ethically relevant. Let me analyse and test the government-exception. Do all governments count, or only democratic? Suppose, someone would say, only democratic, because they (supposedly) represent the majority of the people. If a majority of people in a certain region within this country want to secede, then consistency would demand that they are allowed to secede and form their own government. Since there can exist only one ruling government in a region at the same time, this creates a contradiction. It follows that democratic government, in the sense of majority rule in a region, cannot be applied consistently as a principle. The principle of democratic governments cannot be majority-rule, because they actively deny majority-rule in subregions, and actively deny majority-rule by the world population. This is a useful result that can be obtained using logical reasoning. There are other possible formulation of the governments-exception. I think they fail invariably. If you propose a specific formulation, we could try examine it philosophically. I wonder how you view the act of making a promise to do something. Suppose you borrow money, and promise to pay it back after one year, then after one year, you should pay it back, right? This obligation does not depend on you wanting to follow UPB or be a good person. The word "ought" seems to be derived from the past-tense of to owe, as in: he aught me ten pounds. Suppose that, instead of writing down in the contract the obligation to pay back, you would write down that paying back would be advantageous to the lender. Would the lender consider that sufficient? Would he not insist on another wording of the contract? Then the next step would be to realize that even if we have not voluntary entered into a contract, there are some things we should not do.

If we collectively desire something (meaning everyone wants it), then there is no need to create incentives, because it would be done anyway. But if only a majority desires it, why would their opinion be superior to that of the minority? The game of incentives is won by the strongest party. Although there are automatic incentives that favor the free market, our opponent is using heavy artificial incentives, such as the threat of imprisonment, to promote the opposite. Stronger than incentives is morality, which can cause people to let go of temporal gain voluntarily, for the benefit of those currently victimized, and for a better future. There are large differences of opinion between people, and yet it often happens that people from both sides want to violently enforce what they want, usually through the state. Surely, both sides cannot be both right. These conflicts should be resolved in a peaceful manner, using logical and ethical argumentation. Philosophy provides tools for doing this.

Forcibly injecting people with vaccines against their will is a violation of their rights. We have the right that our body is not invaded. There is indeed a legitimate concerns about the safety (or danger) of vaccines. If people call you a conspiracy-theorist or an idiot, that's ridicule, not an argument. We should not force someone to take the risk of vaccination. Probably less known, but there are also legitimate concerns about the origin of vaccines. A large percentage of vaccines are based on abortion, in the sense that tissue was taken from an aborted child, for example from the lungs or from an eye, and based on this, a cell culture was created, which was used during the creation of the vaccine. This is a reason to oppose this type of practice, in the same way that we would oppose stolen organs. If these arguments are not convincing, I hope at least that that we, who do not forcibly inoculate each other, could then have a separate society in anarchy where we are left alone.

For this point, these two books might be helpful: What Has Government Done to Our Money?, and Wall Street, Banks, and American Foreign Policy.

In AnCap, there could be multiple competing private police agencies. People could voluntary decide to purchase a coverage with one these agencies. If an agency abuses its power, people could cancel their subscription and stop paying for it. Try that in the current system. We do not need a central leadership to work together. Lets look at how the production of even a simple product is coordinated on the free market. Usually there are many different companies involved. Through the price system, resources and people are directed to the most effective and valued activities. For example, suppose people want to buy wooden pencils, this indirectly creates a price incentive for people to supply lumber to the factory where the pencils are produced. The process is coordinated in a decentralized way, without coercion. On the other hand, leadership can be very useful, and it is not forbidden in anarchy, provided it is non-coercive.

To be consistent with his system of morality, he would have to say that the morality of states would depend on them participating and obeying world government that is elected democratically. But instead, he applies a sort of NAP between states. This seems inconsistent. That's quite a strong statement, and it is false. Suppose the majority of people are sadist, or members of the nazi party? Is not paying taxes for extermination camps unsocial behavior? Of course not. Democracy fails as a moral principle. The majority is probably stronger than the others, so democracy is similar to might = right. On which level do you apply democracy? World, federal, state, county, town, household, individual? It cannot be applied at different levels at the same time, without creating a contradiction, so there is inconsistency. How do borders between states get decided? It cannot be that based on the outcome of a violent border conflict, it gets decided whether or not it is moral to obey laws of this government instead of another government. What is called a democracy is often an oligarchy. Why indirect instead of direct democracy? The usual arguments against democracy are applicable.

It is currently not handled well at all. You might want to checkout this episode of Anarchast with a CPS whistle blower. For the UK situation, this article says that the government-provided so-called "child protection" in UK is an international scandal, because children are snatched away for nonsensical reasons. Some groups are formed spontaneously, when living in the same area. Other groups can be formed through a voluntary contract or agreement between the participating individuals. The rules of interaction are defined by these contracts and by ethics. This is sufficient; we do not need a central authority. A contract is not voted on democratically, but it is agreed on unanimously by all participating parties, otherwise it is invalid. Why do we need a compromise? Voluntary interactions are perceived to be beneficial or preferable by the parties involved. If a compromise is needed by both parties, it means they started the negotiations with too many supposed rights, that cannot be satisfied at the same time in the real world.

The mutual benefit of free exchange is to a large degree because of division of labor. One person grows beans, and has so many beans, that the last 1000 beans have little marginal value to him. Another person makes cloths, and has so many cloths, that the last 10 cloths he made have little marginal value to him. When they exchange beans for cloths, they both profit, so it is a win-win situation. At the end of the day, it could even be that everyone has the same amount of beans on the table (probably not, but it could happen). And yet in the mean time a lot of beneficial exchanges have taken place, and everyone is better of. If you are the first user of a piece of land, and you grow food, and improve the land, then you own it, according to libertarian homesteading theory. You might object, but suppose that there are no suitable unoccupied unowned pieces of lands available. You could try to save some money to buy it. But is it preferable to live outside the market exchange system? Self-sufficiency is really hard, especially if you start from zero, only using things you have made or gathered yourself. So maybe it is rather the harsh reality of life on this planet, and not capitalism, that is forcing us to cooperate in an economy, or else live near subsistence level.

UPB also includes universally preferable behavior that is non-enforceable (called APA). I consider APA and ANA part of ethics, Stef does not. It is a bit of a side issue, because it is a matter of definition. About universality: If we say, a moral proposition must apply universally to all people, this is another way of saying that the differences between people are ethically irrelevant. If we say, a moral proposition must apply universally across all variations of aspect X, this is another way of saying that aspect X is ethically irrelevant. Clearly, moral rules must take into account some aspects (context). For example, if someone swings his fist, this is considered evil only if he hits someone else. So the moral proposition "Swinging your fist is immoral" is invalid. But this does not mean that swinging your first is always neutral. The reason is that "swinging your fist" has removed an ethically relevant aspect (whether someone is hit by it), and therefore, if it is not forbidden universally, it can still be forbidden sometimes. For this reason, I recommend to move the discussion away from the question: Is this moral proposition universal? and towards the question: Is this aspect ethically relevant? Aspects that are considered ethically relevant: a) (history of) force applied to other humans (=> NAP) b) whether or not a behavior is preferred by the involved parties (=> permission is important) c) who first significantly improved a physical object. (=> property rights) These are not the only ethically relevant aspects. An argumentation is needed to establish whether something is ethically relevant or not. I think this is incorrect. Rape is an enforced preference, but it is not enforceable (without being immoral). UPB-quote: "APAs are not enforceable through violence – you cannot shoot a man for being late". The word "cannot" here means it is wrong to do so. In which category belongs: a) self-defense that involves force, and b) forcibly preventing non-violent theft ? Validating a moral proposition implicitly categorizes behavior as moral or immoral.

Right, and the complementary category of "universal" is "not-universal", which means it still can be valid sometimes, if it is does not pass the universality test. Related to this is the biased standard about what is universal: Negative property right rules are allowed to take into account the context of the action as necessary (who has homesteaded etc.), but other rules are not allowed to do so, because that would supposedly violate universality. The universality rule only makes sense after we have established which aspects are ethically relevant. My analysis is derived from statements in the UPB book. The five UPB categories are derived from this: "To help us separate aesthetics from ethics, let us start by widening these categories to encompass any behaviour that can be subjected to an ethical analysis. These seven categories are: ... good, ... aesthetically positive, ... personally positive, ... neutral, ... personally negative, ... aesthetically negative, ... evil." For simplicity, I have combined the categories "personally positive, neutral, and personally negative" into one category: personal preference (PP). Words ending on "-able" are avoided in my analysis, because they are too ambiguous. I use the word "required" as substitute for "universally preferable". UPB-book quote: "when I talk about universal preferences, I am talking about what people should prefer" The word "should" indicates a requirement. The word "banned" is used in the UPB book: "what is universally banned is simply a mirror image of what is universally preferable" Banned means it is required to be absent. This confirms the word "required" was a good choice for the opposite category. I have interpreted "enforceable" to mean that enforcing it is never banned. What is the original content that you think is in conflict with Stef's version?

Employers should not take unfair advantage of this lack of economic literacy. They should not give the employee the false impression that the purchasing power of the wage will remain constant. In the current situation of inflation, it would make sense for people to include a clause in their contracts that stipulates a nominal wage increase of x% per year (maybe tied to a price index). But why is this rarely done? Some possible reasons: - thinking unions or government will take care of it - lack of economic literacy - short term thinking - weak bartering position (lack of other job options)

The UPB book tries to establish a rational proof of fundamental moral rules, which is a laudable effort. However, based on my current understanding of UPB, it seems that the way UPB classifies behavior is incomplete, and that for that reason, adjustments or additions are needed to make it logically sound. The UPB book places human behavior into the categories good, APA, PP, ANA, or evil, according to its definitions. But these are not the only logically possible categories. This is shown in the following table. APA,ANA = aesthetically positive/negative action PP = personal preference X = logical impossibility In UPB reasoning, a behavior is placed in a category mainly by showing it cannot be in any of the other categories. For example: If a behavior cannot be good, APA, or PP, then it must be ANA or evil. But this only works if there are no valid alternative categories. Possible alternative categories are labeled 1 to 9 in the table. For UPB reasoning to fully work the way it is intended, it must be that these alternative categories are empty. Can it be proven these are empty? Categories 1 and 8: the behavior is not morally required, but enforcing it is not morally wrong (and its opposite category) It seems obvious these categories are empty, but moral nihilists would deny it. Categories 2, 3, 6, 9: the behavior is sometimes required, or sometimes banned A single action in a specific situation cannot be sometimes required, because it is only a single instance. Once we generalize a behavior, it becomes a possibility that the behavior will be sometimes morally required, and sometimes neutral. In order to prevent this, ethically relevant aspects should not be generalized away. On the other hand, if too much aspects are kept, then the UPB reasoning would also break down, because applying the same behavior to both involved parties would then no longer create a contradiction. If an aspect is generalized away, but many people believe the aspect is ethically relevant, then a valid argumentation should be provided why this aspect is ethically irrelevant. (Category 3 cannot logically be applicable to forcible actions.) Categories 4, 5, 6, 7: enforcing or forcibly preventing sometimes not banned. To show or make sure these categories are empty, two things are required: - It must be shown that the way a preference or behavior is enforced is ethically irrelevant (I think this cannot be shown), or the definition of the UPB classification must be adapted to precisely make the distinction between right and wrong enforcement. (related thread) - Behavior must be generalized in such a way that the moral status of its enforcement is not effected by the generalization.

The normal course of action is that during a debate, we exchange ideas, and honestly try to find out what is the truth, and what is the right thing to do. Then after the debate, we deliberate it (but not endlessly), and if we are convinced, then we act on it. Those actions might effect other people, even our debate opponents. When we decide to act (instead of remaining idle), then those actions can no longer be influenced by new insights or information. Does this mean we have abandoned the search for truth? No, it is the normal rational procedure, first deliberation, then action. If we have the correct opinion, then acting on it means doing justice. Suppose someone has stolen something from you non-violently (without initiating force). You talk to him, but fail to convince him to give it back peacefully. After the conversation, is it inconsistent and unjustified to grab his arm (initiate force) and recover your property? So even if you could prove it, it would imply a total ban on force applied to another human being, even non-violent force. I had not yet read it. It is better and more rigorous than the article I linked to.

What I had in mind was that the entire plot of land was modified by the owner. That is the reason he owns it. I have modified my original post for clarity.

I see the following problem with this: It assumes there is no fundamental difference between the debate situation and the debated situation. In the debate situation, we should try to find out what is justice (truth-seeking), in the debated situation, we should do what is justice. Actually, argumentation ethics, as advocated by Hoppe, is something different. An interesting analysis of it and its problems can be found here.

When people produce something, they mix their labor with resources. If we go back in time far enough, these resources were initially unowned. natural resource + labor ==> modified resource The modified resource has been produced by a laborer. If someone else takes control over it (steals it), then the laborer would have worked for nothing. We don't want that, because we want to be fair towards the laborer. On the other hand, the laborer has not created the resource. The unmodified resource would have been there also without him. Natural resources, even when still in their unmodified form and location, often have significant value to people. An unmodified natural resource, such as an unimproved plot of land, cannot be legally owned in an anarcho-capitalist society, but suppose it could, then it would have a considerable market value. For most things that are owned, the market value added by labor is much higher than the market value of the unmodified natural resource would be. For example, a car has a much higher market value than the unmodified resources from which it is built. In these cases, it is not difficult to accept that the laborer who has worked on an unowned resource, becomes the owner. Determining ownership is more challenging when one or more of the following conditions apply: 1.- the labor is mostly unmixed from the resource Example: the produced crop of a field is harvested and sold Example: someone improves a yet unowned tree, resulting in a higher quantity of fruits, with the quality staying roughly the same. Not all fruits, but only the extra fruits bear significantly the effects of his labor. 2.- the labor applied to the resource did not result in an improvement For example, after heavy production, the soil is getting depleted, even to the point where the market value has become less than that of an uncleared unmodified plot of land. 3.- the resource is abandoned temporarily Even if someone has not done enough with a resource to acquire ownership, the fact that he uses it, would give him sort of temporal ownership to the part of the resource that he uses (personal space). If the resource is abandoned, this does not apply. 4.- the value of the natural resource is very high This can happen because land is needed for essential food production, and the population increases. Suppose someone has modified a very valuable plot of land. Other people might want to access this resource too, not because of the modification done by the first laborer, but because of the value of the resource, regardless of the modification. This means they do not try to steal the fruits of the labor, but want to access the resource that the laborer has not created. They want to work on it with their own hands, just as the first laborer has done. Based on which right, from an ethical point of view, could the first laborer forbid others from using the same natural resource that he has used, when he has added only comparatively little to it? A property rights theory should be able to handle these situations accurately, in order to be valid and complete. None of the approaches I have read about so far from both left and right are satisfactory to me. My question is: Would your property rights theory be able to handle these situations in a fair and ethical way, and if so, how? Related threads: Land ownership, Is homesteading UPB? Geolibertarianism.

Or both are in the wrong. This is not part of the assumption I was proposing. Otherwise, that would be assuming the NAP, and it is of little use to prove NAP using NAP as assumption. In the situation I was describing, I assumed it was already established using some other means that one party was violently enforcing something non-required on another. Because refraining from theft is required, my argumentation does not apply to theft. The more formalized argumentation is: Suppose person X imposes a non-required preference on person Y (e.g. that X murders Y), and Y tries to impose the negation of the preference on X (e.g. that X does not murder Y). The preference of Y cannot be banned, because that would make the negated preference, which X has, required, but we know it is not required. So the preference of Y is either neutral or required. Then use the assumption that one or both must be in the wrong when they are using violence against each other. If Y is in the wrong, this means it is wrong to violently impose a preference that is either neutral or required. But then it follows that X is also in the wrong, because what X is doing is equivalent or worse. So based on this assumption, it follows that X is in the wrong, and consequently that violently imposing a non-required preference is morally wrong. I think argumentation ethics is not a convincing argument, because it relies on other assumptions that are less certain than what it seeks to prove, but maybe I don't fully grasp the argument. It is very difficult to show what is right and wrong, starting from zero, without relying implicitly on some basic values or assumptions. What we can do is try to make the assumptions explicit and as little contentious as possible. Even a statist could agree that if two people attack each other, one of them must be in the wrong. So it could be a useful assumption to use among those that agree with it.

There are three possibilities: a behavior is always required, sometimes required, or never required. If we make sure we do not generalize away ethically relevant aspects of the behavior, the category "sometimes required" is empty. Then we can say, if something is not always required, it must be never required. If something is only a personal preference, then everyone else can have a legitimate opposite preference. So the violent action amounts to imposing unavoidably a non-required preference on another. How can we show that this is not morally neutral? If it is not wrong for me to violently impose my preference on you, then it is not wrong for you to violently impose your (possibly opposite) preference on me. Based on the reasonable assumption that if two persons attack each other, at least one must be wrong, then it follows that enforcing a non-required preference is morally wrong. Another approach could be this: The violent action could be interpreted as a message. When someone uses violence against another, this could be seen as enforcing a rule that the victim "must" move in this or that way. We could try to test if the imposed rule can be a valid moral rule or not.

It seems that the OP wanted to give a definition of everything that is a property violation, not just of what is aggression. And property right violations do not necessarily involve aggression, violence, or fraud. Previously, we had a similar discussion about indirect effects of actions, in which you said that making loud noise for too long would be a property violation. So the larger question is, what constitutes a property right violation? - Forbidding any meddling, even moving eardrums, forbids too much. - Forbidding only violence forbids too little. So it must be somewhere in between. Can we determine objectively where to draw the line, if so based on which objective criteria?

I don't know if there is a slight tendency in the universe towards life. We don't have to follow the bias of the universe. Actually, I strongly dislike the cycle of death that humans are exposed to. In which sense would you call death a prerequisite of reality? Because we need to eat other organisms to live? but plants are not conscious beings (as far as I know), so the death of a plant is very different from the death of a human being. It is difficult to compare existence to non-existence, because non-existing beings are not really beings, but fantasies. But those people that do exist, they mostly value a happy continued existence. What they experience, their suffering and joy, is real. It is rooted in our being, but that does not make it unimportant or an illusion. I don't have to prove that pain is negative, I experience it as a negative, and that is sufficient "evidence" for me. By the way, the UPB framework of Stef aims to be applicable regardless of whether people value life or death. It could be applied to people struggling for whatever they consider important.

It was not intended as a complete definition. If you have ever lent or borrowed money, promised something, or entered into a contract, you know what obligation is. Never does a contract stipulate the obligation to obey gravity, asking you to promise that you will obey gravity. Why? Because there is no possibility to do otherwise. Why might it be important to realize this? Because otherwise, it might seem as if you have fully explained obligation (and ought-statements), and it might seem there is no need to search for its true meaning. Secondly, the continued use of loaded words, that have a different meaning in daily use, might have the psychological effect of preventing you from realizing the full consequences of the position you are taking.

Suppose you lend me money for one year, then after one year, I should pay you back. But based on your reasoning, I have no obligation to pay you back, if I have the physical possibility to do otherwise, which seems to me rather absurd. It is a strange definition of obligation. Which word then can I use to express the idea of obligation that applies regardless of our possibility to do otherwise? If you lend me money for one year, then after one year, I [must/ought to/am obliged to/??] pay you back. I would say that the acknowledgement of moral obligation only occurs when people want to be good.